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"Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" April 19, 2001 - Companion Document

Comments and Analysis by John Rasmussen

Please read a disclaimer for the statements I make on this website accusing judges, politicians and activists of criminal actions.



BACKGROUND:

        In the late 1990's, King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng and the leadership of King County, Washington, participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. In order to cover-up their participation in the crime, Norm Maleng and his staff manufactured a legal excuse for the County's actions. This excuse is a legal argument that I've named Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Norm Maleng's "legal theory" contends that the Washington State Supreme Court threw out one hundred years of consistently held legal precedent and established a new rule to construe railroad deeds in Brown v. State of Washington (1996). Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is completely bogus. It's a dishonest legal argument which justifies its contentions by misapplying Brown, ignoring legal precedent, and manufacturing outright lies. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was first published by the King County Prosecutor's office in 1997, and is the basis of dishonest legal argument in this King County brief. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View a detailed explanation of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

      View a detailed explanation of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

INTRODUCTION:

        This is a companion document which analyzes and comments on the King County Prosecutor's summary judgment reply brief to Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein. A photocopy of the brief and the resulting judicial opinion are hyperlinked directly below. It's intended that the reader open the Prosecutor's brief in a separate window and reference that document as the comments and analysis are read here.

      Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (April 19, 2001) in a Separate Window.

      Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

        This King county brief is in reply to my lawyer's brief in opposition to summary judgment. Here is a hyperlink to my lawyer's brief.

      Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Judge Rothstein.

        My lawyer's brief opposing summary judgment, above, was in response to King County's initial brief in support of summary judgment. Here is a hyperlink to that initial King County brief.

      Read King County's "Brief in Support of King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (February 15, 2001).

        The King County briefs advocate summary judgment. It was critical for the County to have this lawsuit decided by summary judgment. Summary judgment takes the lawsuit away from a jury and gives complete control to the judge. No legitimate jury would come to the decision that the judges made in construing the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Understand the rules of summary judgment.


BRIEF PAGES 1 through 3 - "I. MOTIONS TO STRIKE AND OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR ORAL AGRUMENT"

      Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment." Go to Pages 1-3.

        Here, King County requests that evidence of its participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme be struck. If the reader believes that our judicial system should value the truth, then the reader should be offended that the County or the court would find reasons to deny the truth be established in the court. To understand this problem, one needs to go to the opinion by Federal District Court Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein to see what she did with this "prayer" for relief. Kindly read the annotated version of Rothstein's opinion to understand that this federal judge doesn't believe in my constitutional right to establish the facts in her court. The annotated version is available with the hyperlink below. One will find that Rothstein's justification for striking much of the material is questionable. For example, an informal agreement for extended briefs was made with Rothstein's clerk. Rothstein then refused to honor that agreement and struck the over length portions. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Judge Rothstein struck material facts that we were establishing with our briefing and exhibits. Once she had dishonestly eliminated facts that we presented, Rothstein substituted her own material facts, declared we agreed with her "facts", and decided the lawsuit by illegally applying summary judgment. Any American who believes in the Constitution and the law should be calling for Rothstein's impeachment. Rothstein covered up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme with her opinion. This was a very intentional criminal act by this dishonest judge.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Open King County v. Rasmussen (2001) at the position which Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein decides to strike my briefing and exhibits.


BRIEF PAGES 3 and 4 - "II. Reply - A. No Genuine Issues of Material Fact"

      Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment." Go to Pages 3 & 4.

        It is natural for King County to claim that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Since the County moved for summary judgment, it knows that there must be no issues of material fact in order for the judge to authorize that legal process. Since Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein joined in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme with her dishonest opinion, it might be better to look at the disputed material facts that she illegally allowed in her summary judgment opinion, and then determine whether the County manufactured the facts, or whether the judge manufactured them, and determine whether the facts were disputed in the briefs. So, based on Rothstein's opinion, here is a partial list of material facts that were not in agreement which should have required the judge to allow the case to go to a jury for resolution. Of course, Rothstein could not have delivered her dishonest predetermined outcome to the lawsuit if she had allowed the material facts to be resolved by a jury. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS USED TO DECIDE KING COUNTY V. RASMUSSEN:

          The ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their railroad right-of-way deed is a material fact. Further, It is a material fact who wrote the Hilchkanum deed because the words in a deed are construed against its author, or the party whose attorney prepared the deed. King County Senior Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson moved for Rothstein to strike our statement about Hilchkanum's ability to participate in the deed, and to strike our statement about the Railway's authorship. Here is what Rothstein struck.

            "Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian. At the very best he was functionally illiterate, and "made his mark" when he signed legal documents. Thus, all drafting of any ambiguous documents was completed by the railroad’s representative. In this case Bill Hilchkanum and his wife signed a document that did not comport with the necessary elements for conveyance of a fee simple interest, because of the qualifying and limiting language of the document."

        [Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion and view this statement on page 2. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.]

          I discussed the issue of Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed in a study I wrote on the easement-fee issue and submitted to the court as Exhibit 1. Of course, Judge Rothstein struck my Exhibit 1 and almost every other exhibit that I submitted. She then illegally applied summary judgment in order to award my land to the County and cover up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. It was critical for Rothstein to strike the facts we submitted and deny our right to reestablish the facts before a jury. No legitimate jury could come to the same conclusions as Rothstein's. When a judge strikes facts and substitutes her own, she can guarantee whatever outcome she wants. That's the danger of summary judgment. The following is the statement that I made in my Exhibit 1.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            "The deed signed by the Hilchkanums was prepared by the educated white men that organized the railroad. The Hilchkanums, on the other hand, were Indians unable to even sign their own names on the deed. They both signed with an "X". In his homestead application Bill Hilchkanum certified that he had given up his tribal affiliation in order to qualify. This would indicate the Hilchkanums were not educated nor likely socialized to all of the white man's customs. With this thought in mind, the Hilchkanums were at a great disadvantage in their transaction with SLS&E. Since the deed was drafted by SLS&E, and the Hilchkanums probably had little or no unbiased legal advice, the deeds must be construed most strongly against SLS&E. This would favor the deed's interpretation as an easement. This is supported in the citation from Brown below:

              "The railroad was a sophisticated, well financed, and organized party, undoubtedly represented by counsel. Landowners stood at a disadvantage to railroads in the early 1900s. For these reasons, the deeds, at least the preprinted portions of them, must be construed against the railroad. '[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it.'" Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2d 430, 457, 924 P.2d 908 (1996)"

        View my Exhibit 1, struck by Judge Rothstein. The above quote is found on page 21.

          Bill Hilchkanum and his wife "signed" their right-of-way deed with an "X". For everyone in the world, except Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, this would be proof of Hilchkanum's illiteracy and strongly suggest that he had no part in drafting the deed. Further, we provided documents that showed the Hilchkanums were Native Americans who relied on their white friends when they needed legal help. American Indians were at the mercy of the white settlers in those days. In the case of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, we provided documents that show the Hilchkanums were helped by David Denny who was one of the owners of the SLS&E Railway. This obvious conflict of interest should have been examined by a jury to determine if Hilchkanum had unbiased advice in the "signing" of his deed.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Rothstein ignored the history of the settlement of the American west, and the history of the settlement in Washington Territory. She ignored the laws that protected Natives in those days. Rothstein ignored the exhibits we provided, which showed the Hilchkanums were at a great disadvantage in legal transactions. Instead, Rothstein decided that the Hilchkanums were essentially skilled lawyers, capable of dealing with complex legal issues. Rothstein decided that the Hilchkanums actually chose the words in their right-of-way deed. This established the Hilchkanums as author of the deed. Rothstein stated that the Hilchkanums selected certain words in their right-of-way deed in order to comply with complex legal technicalities of federal law. Rothstein referenced no document to support her bizarre conclusions. She denied my constitutional right to establish the facts before a jury. She denied my Constitutional right to establish the obvious fact that the lawyers for the Railway wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Rothstein denied our many and repeated requests for oral arguments.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          It is true that we did not draw Rothstein's attention to our supporting exhibits when we made the statement about Hilchkanum's illiteracy and ability to participate, but since Rothstein published the Hilchkanum deed in her opinion, she was aware that the Hilchkanums could not even sign their own names, a sure indication of illiteracy and sufficient argument that they did not write their deed. Judge Rothstein was playing sick lawyer games instead of being a judge. Rothstein committed a crime from the bench by striking our correct description of Hilchkanum's abilities and participation, and then substituting her own unjustified "facts". It is obscene that Rothstein then stated we agreed with her "facts" and allowed herself the right to decide the lawsuit using summary judgment.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Read Rothstein's King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

        Read a study about Hilchkanum's participation and intentions with his deed. This study provides the history and laws related to Native Americans in that time. Further, it provides specific Hilchkanum documents which explain his participation and intentions with his right-of-way deed.

          Scott Johnson moved to strike our statements about Hilchkanum's ability to participate in the deed, and made no counter argument to our statements describing Hilchkanum's illiteracy and ability to participate. It is obvious from Rothstein's denial of my constitutional rights, and her misapplication of the law, that Rothstein worked with the participants in the tax fraud scheme in order to write her opinion. In her opinion, Judge Rothstein irrationally found that Hilchkanum actually wrote his right-of-way deed. She irrationally construed all the words against Hilchkanum as author of his deed. This lie and denial of my right to correct this disputed material fact was critical to Judge Rothstein's justification for illegally granting my land to the County.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          The blatant and intentional misstatement of the words in a published opinion may be a material fact. King County v. Squire absolutely destroys Scott Johnson's argument, so Johnson misstated the facts and conclusions of that decision in this brief. The Squire court identified the SLS&E form deed which is also the basis of the Hilchkanum deed. By default, the Squire court found that this form deed was written by the Railway lawyers. In King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Federal Judge Rothstein refused to acknowledge that material fact, and instead irrationally found that Hilchkanum wrote the words of his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Neither Scott Johnson nor Judge Rothstein provided any fact to support Hilchkanum's authorship of his deed. Further, in this brief, Scott Johnson misrepresented the legal conclusion in Squire which found that the Squire granting clause strongly indicated that the parties intended to convey an easement. Johnson stated that only the words in the Squire habendum were responsible for the Squire deed being found to grant an easement. This was an outright and intentional lie by Scott Johnson. It is a material fact to establish what is clearly stated in a legal decision. The argument can be made that this is a question of law and not of fact, but the blatant and intentional misrepresentation of the words in a published opinion is a fact.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Compare the Hilchkanum and Squire ROW deeds to understand that the granting words of both deeds are identical, and were found in King County v. Squire to strongly indicate the grant of an easement.

        Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (April 19, 2001) in a Separate Window. Go to Page 8 of the brief to read Scott Johnson's dishonest statement about the legal conclusions of the Squire court.

          The intentions of the parties in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact. Scott Johnson states on Page 3 of his reply brief that it was the intention of the parties to grant fee title, but provides no legitimate legal argument or fact to support that claim. Instead of providing argument to counter our statements about the Hilchkanum's inability to participate in the deed, Johnson tries to "wipe the slate clean" by moving to strike our statements. Since the Railway lawyers wrote every word in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, and the Hilchkanums simply made an "X" on the form deed which was placed in front of them, it is ridiculous to determine the Hilchkanum's intentions from the words of the deed. Only the Railway's intentions are evident from the words in the deed. But, after Judge Rothstein agreed to strike our argument about the participation of the Hilchkanums in their deed, she wrote a "fairy tale" with her opinion, describing how these illiterate Native Americans were essentially experts in Homesteading law and real estate law and signaled their intention to grant fee simple title by the words they selected to use in the deed. Ridiculous!
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          It is a material fact to determine what was conveyed in the right-of-way deed. In King County's motion for summary judgment, Scott Johnson stated repeatedly that a "strip of land" was conveyed to the SLS&E. Judge Rothstein states in her opinion that a "'strip' of land" was conveyed to the SLS&E. We pointed out that one needs to simply read the Hilchkanum deed to see that a "right-of-way" was conveyed. A critical issue in construing railroad deeds is to determine whether a "right-of-way" is conveyed or whether "land" is conveyed. The rules to construe the grant of a "right of way" and the rules to construe the grant of "land" are established by common law precedent. Here they are, with the supporting precedent.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Railroad Land Granting Rule: A deed conveying land to a railroad grants fee simple title unless there is a statement that the deed is for the purpose of a railroad right-of-way or if the deed is limited to railroad right-of-way use. A statement of right-of-way purpose or limitation will change the grant to an easement.
        [Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.]

        Railroad Right-of Way Granting Rule: A deed conveying a right-of way to a railroad grants an easement.
        [Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.]

          What is granted in the Hilchkanum deed is a material fact. Because this was a disputed material fact, Judge Rothstein was required to send it to a jury for resolution. Most people would simply read the deed to realize that a "right of way" was conveyed. But, apparently Judge Rothstein and Scott Johnson are incapable of reading the Hilchkanum deed to see what is conveyed. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Read the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed to understand what was granted in the right-of-way deed. Rothstein and Johnson state that a "strip of land" is granted. Do you believe it?

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit..."
        [Read the complete Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, and view a photocopy.]

          Of course, Rothstein and Johnson would claim that this is not an issue of fact, but rather of law. Issues of fact are resolved by a jury. Issues of law are resolved by the court (judge). I present this as an issue of fact because it has always been found that the grant of a right-of-way is the grant of an easement in Washington State common law. There is no law or precedent which allows the judge to substitute the term "'strip' of land" for the term "right of way" in a deed, but that is what Scott Johnson does in his briefs and Rothstein does in her opinion. It is a material fact to read what is conveyed in the deed. Use the following hyperlink to view fourteen citations which hold the grant of a right-of-way is the grant of an easement. With no law or citation allowing the substitution of critical terms in the Hilchkanum granting clause, what is granted in the Hilchkanum deed is a material fact.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View fourteen citations explaining the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement.

        View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

          The intention of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds is a disputed material fact. As an exhibit, Scott Johnson provided a subsequent Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson which excepted the right-of-way. He then stated that this exception of the right-of-way excepted the land under the right-of-way, and that it revealed Hilchkanum's intention to convey fee simple title in his right-of-way deed. But, Scott was just a "little" dishonest with his exhibit. The deed which Scott Johnson provided wasn't in the chain of title of the land contested in the lawsuit. But, there was another Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson that was in the chain of title involved in the lawsuit. Why, oh why, oh why, didn't Scott Johnson provide the Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson that was in the chain of title, and therefore more relevant to the lawsuit? Scott's "little" problem was that the second Chris Nelson deed did not except the right-of-way. The fact that this more relevant deed did not except the right-of-way, strongly suggests that the right-of-way was considered to be an easement. Scott was determined to misrepresent the Hilchkanum's intentions in their subsequent deeds, so he presented a less relevant deed which he could more easily use to misrepresent their intentions.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In common law, the exception of a right-of-way does not automatically except the land under the right-of-way. When a right-of-way is excepted in a subsequent deed, the court is required to go to the original right-of-way deed to determine whether the original grant was an easement or fee. The issue of easement of fee is not determined by the subsequent deed, but rather the original deed. Scott Johnson "cherry picks" the Hilchkanum subsequent deeds, selecting a deed which is not in the chain of title of the land contested in the lawsuit. He then misrepresents the law with respect to his "cherry picked" subsequent deed. He ignores a more relevant deed which would force him to come to a different conclusion about the Hilchkanum's intentions with their subsequent deeds.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Use the hyperlink below to go the discussion which explains this law. Sadly, Judge Rothstein adopted the same dishonest strategy in her opinion. Judge Rothstein used the non-relevant Chris Nelson deed in her opinion and ignored the Chris Nelson deed that was in the chain of title of the lawsuit land. Considering the use of "cherry picked" extrinsic evidence, the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent deeds is a disputed material fact that should have gone to a jury for resolution. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Open the annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) where Rothstein's dishonest manipulation of these subsequent deeds is discussed.

        At the top of this section, I suggested that the denial of my right to resolve disputed material facts appears to be a result of Scott Johnson's dishonest briefs, combined with criminal actions by Federal District Judge Rothstein. Johnson claims that there is no disagreement with the material facts. I've listed disputed material facts above that were used by Judge Rothstein, and shown that responsibility for the illegal use of summary judgment lies with both Scott Johnson and Federal Judge Barbara Rothstein. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Reference:

      Open King County's "Brief in Support of King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (February 15, 2001)

      Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion. (April 12, 2001) The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.

      Open King County's "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (April 19, 2001)


BRIEF PAGE 5 - "II. Reply - B. Defendants Do Not Raise A Genuine Issue Regarding the County's Chain of Title"

      Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment." Go to Page 5.

        Scott Johnson states that un-patented homesteaders were authorized to convey fee simple title of their land to railroads under 17 U.S. Stat. 602 (Act of March 3, 1873). This is not the truth. Un-patented homesteaders were allowed to grant rights-of-way to railroads under that federal act. So, the question for the court is: Did the Congress intend for the un-patented homesteaders to grant an easement or fee simple title with its authorization for homesteaders to grant railroad rights-of-way under 17 U.S. Stat. 602? At the time of passage of 17 U.S. Stat. 602, Congress intended these grants of rights-of-way to be easements. Scott Johnson provides no legal argument to settle this critical issue. Instead, he simple states that Congress was allowing the conveyance of fee simple title with its act. Johnson provides no argument to show 17 U.S. Stat. 602 (Act of March 3, 1873) authorized the conveyance of fee. Judge Rothstein dishonestly agreed with King County, again failing to support her opinion with any citation. I discuss this issue in detail in my annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001). I provide a United State Supreme Court decision as argument that it was the intention of Congress for the right-of-way grants to be easements. Please select the following hyperlink to understand this issue.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Understand that Congress intended homesteaders to grant easements with 17 U.S. Stat. 602.


BRIEF PAGE 6 - "II. Reply - C. Only Reasonable Inference is that the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed Intended to Convey Fee Simple Title in Subject Property"

      Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment." Go to Page 6.

        On Page 6 of Scott Johnson's April 19, 2001 "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment.", the dishonesty, corruption, and desperation of the King County Prosecutor to hide his East Lake Sammamish crime is exposed. At the bottom of that page is Footnote 5 in which Johnson describes a "sea change" in the way the Washington State Supreme Court construes railroad right-of-way deeds. It seems that crooked lawyers like to hide their most dishonest statements in the footnotes. The "sea change" that Johnson describes is a statement of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" which I describe at the top of this document. Here is Scott Johnson's footnote 5 from page 6 of his reply brief supporting summary judgment. I've emphasized the critical words in bold font.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Footnote 5 "The Brown court acknowledges that in every prior case where the Washington State Supreme had considered a deed conveying an interest in a narrow strip of land to a railroad it found only an easement was conveyed, Brown 130 Wn.2d 430 at note 4. The fact that the court goes on to find a variety of instruments - including a quitclaim deed, indentures and the Simpson deed - conveying strips of land to railroads granted fee simple title in those strips should be taken as an expression of the court's intent to effect a sea change in the way such instruments are interpreted."
      [Open Scott Johnson's reply brief and go to the bottom of Page 6 to find Footnote 5.]

        In this Footnote 5 of his brief Scott Johnson sends the reader to Footnote 4 of Brown v. State of Washington to verify his "sea change". But, when one goes to Brown and reads its footnote 4, there is no support for Scott Johnson's "sea change". Here is Footnote 4 of Brown v. State of Washington.

      "4. Since we are reviewing summary judgments, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 774, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). In this case, where both parties have agreed no material facts are in dispute, the only issue is a question of law. Department of Labor & Indus. v. Fankhauser, 121 Wn.2d 304, 308, 849 P.2d 1209 (1993)."
      [Brown v. State of Washington at Footnote 4.]

      Open the full un-emphasized Brown v. State of Washington (1996) opinion.

        So, where is this support for Scott Johnson's "sea change" statement? It would be important to verify this "sea change". It isn't often that the Washington State Supreme Court reverses one-hundred years of consistently held legal precedent. If one reads the full Brown opinion, the only footnote that has words similar to the words Scott Johnson uses in his footnote 5, is not footnote 4 in Brown, but rather footnote 14 in Brown. Here is Footnote 14 of Brown v. State of Washington. I've emphasized the critical words in bold font.

      "14. In every case where this court has considered a deed conveying an interest in a narrow strip of land to a railroad company we have found only easements. See Biles v. Tacoma O. & G.H. R.R., 5 Wash. 509, 32 P. 211 (1893); Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry., 10 Wash. 357, 360, 38 P. 1126 (1894); Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 60 Wash. 502, 111 P. 578 (1910); Neitzel v. Spokane Int'l Ry., 65 Wash. 100, 117 P. 864 (1911); Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 278 P. 686 (1929); Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wn.2d 533, 225 P.2d 199 (1950); Veach v. Culp, 92 Wn.2d. 570, 599 P.2d 526 (1979); Zobrist v. Culp, 95 Wn.2d 556, 627 P.2d 1308 (1981); Roeder Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wn.2d 567, 716 P.2d 855 (1986); Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d. 444, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986); see also King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wn. App. 888, 801 P.2d 1022 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1021, 811 P.2d 219 (1991)."
      [Brown v. State of Washington at Footnote 14.]

      Open the full un-emphasized Brown v. State of Washington (1996) opinion.

        Comparing Scott Johnson's comment in his footnote 5 (above) to Brown footnote 14 (directly above), it is obvious that Johnson is citing Brown footnote 14 and not Brown footnote 4. Why was it important for Scott Johnson to write that his "sea change" was found in footnote 4 of Brown instead of footnote 14? The answer is that footnote 14 is in the dissenting opinion. Perhaps a legal expert who reads this page can tell me how many times the Washington State Supreme Court has used a footnote in the dissenting opinion to signal a "sea change" in the way it construes deeds. Scott Johnson and the King County Prosecutor actually make that argument. In the County's "defense", it is important to understand that the Prosecutor needed to make outrageous and dishonest claims like this in order to hide his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. This is the state of our judicial system. Crooked lawyers intentionally make false statements in their briefs with the knowledge that there is no penalty or punishment for their lies. From my experience with the King County Prosecutor, I believe that there is not one honest lawyer in the civil division of that office.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        There was no "sea change" in Brown! Brown recognized the legal precedent which has been used for over one hundred years to construe railroad right-of-way deeds in Washington State. This was just a lie by Scott Johnson. When this brief went to Federal district Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, she incorporated many of Scott Johnson's lies into her opinion. Scott's "sea change" wasn't specifically mentioned in Rothstein's opinion, but Rothstein used elements of Johnson's misinterpretation of Brown to justify her dishonest decision. My discussion of Norm Maleng's "legal theory", above, describes the Prosecutor's misrepresentation of the Brown opinion.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Judge Rothstein's dishonest opinion.


BRIEF PAGES 6 and 7 - "II. Reply - C. Only Reasonable Inference is that the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed Intended to Convey Fee Simple Title in Subject Property"

      Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment." Go to Pages 6 & 7.

        At the bottom of page six and top of page 7 of his brief, Scott Johnson repeats the logic used by King County Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney in his September 17, 1997 memorandum explaining Norm Maleng's "legal theory". In this section of his brief, Scott Johnson works to blur the meaning of the term "right-of-way" into a non-meaning. Johnson groups our argument on the legal meaning of the term "right-of-way" in the granting clause with the legal meaning of the term "right-of-way" in the caption. He tries to blur these very different legal meanings together in order to diminish and misrepresent the common law understanding of the grant of a right-of-way in the granting clause. This is Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Here, again, is the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule" which provides a number of citations which clarifies what Scott Johnson is trying to confuse with his argument.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

        After Scott Johnson blurs and blends the understanding of the term "right-of-way" in the granting clause and the caption in his discussion on page 7, he blends the understanding of the term "right-of-way" in the granting clause with its understanding in the legal description of the property. This is another misrepresentation that ignores the consistently held common law rule that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad in the granting clause conveys only an easement. Scott Johnson refers to Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929) where the court found evidence of the intention to grant an easement in the legal description of the deed. Here is an abbreviated quote from Johnson's argument on page 7. (with my emphasis)
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "Defendants attempt to distinguish the Hilchkanum deed by arguing that "right of way" is used in the granting clause as well as the legal description. However, their argument fails when one considers that the legal description is considered part of the granting clause. Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 566, 278 P. 686 (1929) [.....] Furthermore, the second occurrence of "right of way" in the Hilchkanum deed is preceded with "such". The only reasonable inference to draw from that language is that the second occurrence refers back to the first occurrence. Therefore, it is unreasonable for Defendants to concede that the second occurrence of "right of way" describes a strip of land or parcel but the first occurrence is express limiting language."
      [Open Scott Johnson's reply brief and go to Page 7 to find this abbreviated quotation.]

        Johnson lies when he states that "the legal description is considered part of the granting clause". Morsbach was a unique case in which the granting clause referred to the legal description to define what was granted. This dishonesty in confusing the legal meaning of "right-of-way" is Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

        Scott Johnson's misrepresentation of the of the law can only be understood by reading the many citations in Washington State common law which explain the meaning of the term "right-of-way" in a deed. His misrepresentation of the law can be understood by reading Morsbach v. Thurston Co. to confirm that the granting clause referred to the legal description for determination of what was granted. One needs to understand that Morsbach was a justified exception to a rule that has been understood and enforced for over one hundred years. Scott Johnson tries to upset consistently held precedent by concentrating on a single opinion, and misrepresenting the conclusions of the court in that unique case. Below, I provide a link to forty-four citations which explain the meaning of the term "right-of-way" in a railroad deed. Scott Johnson works hard to blur and misrepresent the meaning of the term "right-of-way" in this portion of his brief. This is the tactic used in Norm Maleng's "legal theory", presented first by Bill Blakney in his 1997 memorandum. How and where the term "right-of-way" is used in a railroad deed determines its legal meaning. In this section of his brief, Johnson claims that this is not true by blending the meaning of "right-of-way" in the granting clause into its meaning in the caption and the legal description. Please read these forty-four citations to understand that "right-of-way" has a completely different meaning when used in the granting clause of a railroad deed. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

        Norm Maleng's "legal theory" holds that, in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), the Washington State Supreme Court overturned one hundred years of legal precedent which held that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveyed an easement. Scott Johnson and his boss, Norm Maleng, claimed that the Supreme Court overturned that precedent, and now finds that the grant of a right of way to a railroad grants fee simple title to the land unless there is a separate statement limiting the grant. Scott Johnson, and other crooked King County lawyers, support and justify that theory by ignoring portions of the Brown opinion, and misrepresenting others. Johnson repeatedly uses abbreviated citations and then misrepresents the meaning that is understood when the citation is read in the context of the Brown opinion. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is completely bogus. The Brown court recognized previous precedent and made no statements which support Maleng's twisted and dishonest analysis. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been held to be an easement in Washington common law. Scott Johnson wants the reader to believe that precedent was changed in Brown. His proof is a footnote in the Brown dissenting opinion, as I discuss in the section above. Of course, when one calls his bluff and goes to the Brown opinion to confirm his claims, one finds that Scott Johnson is lying. Here are fourteen citations which hold the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement. Johnson provides no citation to support Norm Maleng's "legal theory" that this long held precedent was changed in the Brown opinion. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View fourteen citations explaining the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement.

        Since, Scott Johnson claims everything was changed by the Brown court, and claims the use of the term right-of-way in a deed has no specific meaning, I'll provide this citation from Brown that destroys Scott's argument in this brief and contradicts Norm Maleng's "legal theory". This citation is taken from the majority opinion, and is not hid in the footnotes where Scott Johnson finds such unjustified meaning. Use the hyperlink attached to the citation to read the words in the context of the Brown opinion. The truth is my friend, and the mortal enemy of Scott Johnson, Norm Maleng, and the other participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property."
      [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

        Scott Johnson argues that the one hundred year old precedent, holding that the grant of a right-of-way conveys an easement, was changed in Brown. He ignores the above citation from the Brown majority opinion which destroys his argument, and instead misrepresents a footnote in the dissenting opinion to support his and Norm Maleng's "legal theory". In this portion of his brief, Johnson works to blur and confuse the precedential understanding of "right-of-way" by blending the meaning of "right-of-way" in the granting clause into its meaning in the caption and the legal description. He ignores the long held rule that where-and-how "right-of-way" is used in a railroad deed determines its legal meaning.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGE 8 - "II. Reply - C. Only Reasonable Inference is that the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed Intended to Convey Fee Simple Title in Subject Property"

      Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment." Go to Page 8.

        At the bottom of page 8 of his brief, Scott Johnson misrepresents King County v. Squire (1990). The Squire court's analysis destroys Scott Johnson's argument, so he misrepresents the Squire court's conclusions. On page 8, Johnson writes that, in Squire, "...the terms used are significantly different than those used in Hilchkanum." Then Johnson stated that "The fact that the parties in that deed conditioned the effect of the grant and its continuation on the construction and operation of the railroad creates more than a 'minor difference.'" That is Scott Johnson's evaluation of Squire, but it is not the opinion of the Squire court. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The court in King County v. Squire construed Watson Squire's right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Watson Squire was a lawyer, the Governor of Washington Territory, and was elected as one of the State's first U.S. Senators. In its opinion, the Squire court published the relevant portions of the Squire deed to the SLS&E. Since Watson Squire made changes to the right-of-way form deed which was prepared by the Railway lawyers, the Squire court published his changes in bold font. The words not in bold font were the words from the form deed that the Railway presented to the Squire, and the other landowners, in order to establish its track. Directly below is the portion of the Squire opinion that provides this information. Again, please note that the bold font in this citation is from the published opinion, and not my added emphasis.

          "On March 29, 1887, Watson and Ida Squire executed a deed granting a half-mile right of way to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company. The material portion of the deed reads as follows with the handwritten additions by Mr. Squire set forth in boldface type:

            In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit: [legal description]. Such right-of-way strip to be twenty-five (25) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across the said lands by the Engineer of said Railway Company, which location is described as follows, to-wit [description.] . . . .

            To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888...."
        [King County v. Squire (1990)]

        To construe a deed, the court construes the words most strongly against its author. In this case, the Squire court identified which words were changed or added by Watson Squire, and then tried to understand and enforce his intentions with those changed and added words. Here is a citation to support the rule that the words are construed against the author.

          "Initially, it should be noted that contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it. Underwood v. Sterner, supra; Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn.2d 162, 332 P.2d 454 (1958); Restatement, Contracts SS 236 (d) (1932)."
      [Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood (1966) - Citation is emphasized.]

        So, when Watson Squire modified the form deed which was written by the SLS&E lawyers, his words should have been examined to understand his intentions. Amazingly, this is exactly what the Squire court did with its analysis. The Squire court struggled to understand if Squire intended the grant to be a "fee simple determinable" with his changes to the habendum. ( Note: "Fee simple determinable" is not the same as a "fee simple".) The Squire court determined that Watson Squire was not trying to change his SLS&E grant to a "fee simple determinable" with his handwritten change to the habendum, but rather he was "reiterating" the grant of an easement that was described in the granting clause of the SLS&E form deed that he modified. The Squire court construed the form deed language in accordance with common law. Common law had always held that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement. The Squire court confirmed that precedent and found that the changes made by Watson Squire were consistent with that intent. Scott Johnson misrepresents the conclusion of the Squire court. His misrepresentation is designed to protect the Prosecutor's office from prosecution for its participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Scott Johnson is not briefing the law or citing the conclusions in Squire. Instead, Scott Johnson is intentionally lying in order to keep himself, and the other King County lawyers who participated in tax fraud scheme, out of federal prison.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The following citation explains this analysis. It explains that the words in the Squire granting clause "strongly" suggests the conveyance of an easement. Further, it explains that the additions to the Squire habendum, made by Watson Squire, indicate the intention to "reiterat[e]" the grant of an easement in the granting clause. Scott Johnson misrepresents this analysis. Please carefully read the following citation. (With my added emphasis)

      "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, "or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company," which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the "so long as" language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the "so long as" language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and "to its successors and assigns forever". The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement.

      In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed."
      [King County v. Squire (1990)]

        King County v. Squire absolutely destroys Scott Johnson's argument. In order to keep himself out of federal prison for his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, Scott Johnson simply lies, again and again, in this brief. This dishonesty and criminal action should have been exposed by Federal Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein in her King County v. Rasmussen (2001) opinion. Judge Rothstein stood at a crossroad. She could have had the character to uphold her oath to support the Constitution and the law, or she could protect the powerful folks in King County, BNSF, and Arthur Andersen who committed federal tax fraud. Barbara Rothstein chose the "dark side". Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein decided to deny my rights as an American citizen, and instead, participate in the federal tax fraud scheme in order to protect friends in King County, or perhaps in exchange for a bribe. With her opinion, Rothstein establishes anarchy as the rule of law in her federal district court. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGE 9 - "II. Reply - C. Only Reasonable Inference is that the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed Intended to Convey Fee Simple Title in Subject Property"

      Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment." Go to Page 9.

        Scott Johnson directly refers to Norm Maleng's "legal theory" with his statement in the middle of page 9. Johnson states "Defendants have failed to offer evidence that would lead to a reasonable inference that Hilchkanum clearly and expressly limited the interest granted to an easement." This is Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" in explicit terms. The grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been found to grant an easement in Washington State common law. In Scott Johnson's statement, he promotes Norm Maleng's "legal theory" that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad no longer grants an easement. Instead, Scott claims that a separate statement "clearly and expressly limiting the interest" is required in order to find the conveyance of an easement. This is a lie which is not found in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), or in common law. In this brief, Scott Johnson repeatedly misrepresents Brown in order to justify his lies.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View fourteen citations explaining the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement.


BRIEF PAGE 10 - "II. Reply - C. Only Reasonable Inference is that the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed Intended to Convey Fee Simple Title in Subject Property"

      Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment." Go to Page 10.

        About a third of the way down Scott Johnson's brief on page 10, Scott makes this statement: "It is true that the second deed to Chris Nelson for Government Lot 2 does not specify acreage to subtract, but neither does it mention an easement for the railroad. No inference can be drawn from that deed regarding the intent of the parties to the deed at issue." The question in my mind is this:   Exactly how ridiculous a statement can be made by a lawyer before honest people say "enough"? This chronic liar, Scott Johnson, is now admitting that one of the deeds most relevant to this lawsuit does not except the right-of-way. Scott has previously stated that the exception of the right-of-way, in a subsequent real estate deed, indicates the intentions of the Hilchkanums to except the land under the right-of-way. Then, Scott claimed that the exception of the right-of-way indicates that Hilchkanum understood that the land under the right-of-way had been conveyed, fee simple, to the Railway. Now, Scott claims that the lack of a exception of the right-of-way, in a deed conveying another portion of his right-of-way, has no meaning what-so-ever. So, Scott, let me ask you this question here on this webpage, since Federal Judge Rothstein refused my Constitutional right to ask you this question in "her" court.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    A question for Scott Johnson from John Rasmussen:

          Scott, since there is no exception for the SLS&E right-of-way in the deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson for Gov. Lot 2, then that deed conveys the land under the right-of-way to Chris Nelson. The land under the right-of-way on Gov. Lot 2 is the same land that you claim was already deeded to the SLS&E Railway in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Scott, how many times do you claim that a party can sell the same land to different people?

        It is a basic concept in real estate law that a person cannot sell the same land to two different people. Yet, Scott Johnson is describing the double sale of Hilchkanum's land in his brief, and then declaring that this glaring legal conflict does not relate to the issues before this court. Please use the following two hyperlinks to understand that the Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson for Government Lot 2 did not except the SLS&E right-of-way and therefore sold the land under the right-of-way. If Hilchkanum understood that he had previously granted the land under the right-of-way to the SLS&E, he should have excepted that right-of-way land in his subsequent deed of Government Lot 2 to Chris Nelson. For orientation, the first hyperlink includes a map of the Hilchkanum homestead with the railroad tracks and Government Lots 1 and 2 depicted. Additionally it provides a transcription of the deed for Gov. Lot 2 and a link to a photocopy of the original deed. In comparison, the second hyperlink shows the grant from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson which conveyed Government Lot 1. This deed, conveying Government Lot 1, excepted the right-of-way. The question for the court is whether the exception of that right-of-way, excepted the land under the right-of-way or simple recognized the existence of an easement for the right-of-way. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View the Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson conveying all of Government Lot 2. This document contains a map of the Hilchkanum homestead with the railroad tracks and Government Lots 1 and 2 depicted. Additionally it provides a transcription of the deed for Gov. Lot 2 and a link to a photocopy of the original deed.

      View the Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson conveying all of Government Lot 1, with the SLS&E right-of-way excepted.

        With respect to the fact that the deed from Hilchkanum to Nelson conveying all of Gov. Lot 2 does not except the right-of-way, Scott Johnson claims that "No inference can be drawn from that deed regarding the intent of the parties to the deed at issue." Scott Johnson ignores common law which would explain the exception of the right-of-way in some of Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds and the lack of an exception in others. He ignores this law because it destroys his argument that Hilchkanum intended to grant fee simple title of the land under his right-of-way to the Railway. Here is a discussion of the law which Johnson ignores. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    How to legally construe the exception of a right-of-way in a real estate deed:

        To understand the exception of a right-of-way in a subsequent deed, one must first understand the definition of an exception in a deed. Zobrist v. Culp (1977) provides this definition:

      "An exception is the withholding from the operation of the deed of something existent which otherwise the deed would pass to the grantee."
      [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

        So, this requires an honest lawyer, in his brief, to determine what was "existent" in order to determine what is "excepted". If Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, then the exception of that right-of-way in a subsequent deed would simply except an easement. If Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E in his right-of-way deed, then the exception of that right-of-way in a subsequent deed would except fee title to the land under the right-of-way. In fact, this exact issue is discussed in Zobrist.

      "The conveyance of a fee simple interest with a clause excepting an easement...conveys to the grantee all the grantor's rights and interests...yet compels the grantee...from acting...inconsistent with the rights of the third party...described in the exception."
      [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

        This citation explains that the excepting of an easement in a real estate deed simply identifies the easement to the grantee, and does not alter the easement. So, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, the exception of that right-of-way in a subsequent real estate identifies the easement, and nothing more. Zobrist made that exact point:

      "The grantor here excepted a right-of-way amounting to an easement from the grant. No reference was made in the conveyance to Custer of an exception of the fee to the 100 feet." "...Custer...received a fee interest in the land...restricted only...that he could not use...in a manner inconsistent with the existing rights of the railroad..."
      [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

        Now, I ask this question. Is there a requirement that an easement be identified in a subsequent real estate deed, or is it optional to identify an easement in the words of a subsequent deed? The answer is that it is optional to identify the easement. An easement goes with the property whether it is identified in the subsequent deed or not. Anyone who has purchased property, and obtained a title report, has very likely found easements identified in the title report that are not identified in the deed. This is the common way for a grantee to identify easements. It is uncommon in modern real estate deeds to find easements identified as exceptions, but it is legal to do it in that manner.

        If Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, he would need to except the land under the right-of-way grant in every subsequent deed. Otherwise, he would be selling land in that subsequent deed that he had already deeded fee simple to the Railway. He would be selling land that he didn't own in that subsequent deed. On the other hand, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, he wouldn't need to except the right-of-way in every subsequent deed because the easement goes with the property whether it is identified in the deed, or not. So, if some subsequent Hilchkanum deeds excepted the railroad right-of-way and others did not, that would be consistent with the Hilchkanum's granting an easement to the SLS&E with their right-of-way deed.

      View an expanded study of the meaning of the exception of a right-of-way in a deed.



SUMMARY:

        My statements describing wrongdoing in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.

        This is King County's reply brief in support of summary judgment. Summary judgment requires agreement with the material facts. A number of material facts were disputed. We briefed the material fact that the Hilchkanums were illiterate and limited in their ability to participate in the deed. Further, we briefed that the lawyers for the Railway wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Instead of providing evidence to counter our briefed material facts, Scott Johnson moved to strike our argument. Judge Rothstein irrationally granted the County's motion to strike. She then refused our many requests for oral argument. She illegally granted summary judgment. In her opinion, Rothstein determined that the Hilchkanums were legal experts, that they were fully capable to participate in their deed, and that they actually wrote their right-of-way deed. She provided no document to justify these factual assumptions, and ignored the documents we provided which proved her contrived material facts were wrong.

        In order to falsely claim title to my land, Scott Johnson needed to overcome the fact that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been held to convey an easement, in common law. He takes these steps:

      * Johnson repeatedly refers to the Hilchkanum grant as a "strip of land" instead of a "right-of-way". The rules used to construe the grant of "rights-of-way" are different than the rules used to construe the grant of "land".

      * Johnson claims that, in Brown, a "sea change" was made to the rules used to construe railroad deeds. This is Norm Maleng's "legal theory". These arguments are completely dishonest, and are not found in the Brown opinion.

      * Scott Johnson misrepresents, and hides, the conclusions in King County v. Squire. An honest evaluation of Squire absolutely destroys the County's argument that Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E.

      * Johnson misrepresents the Hilchkanum's intentions in their SLS&E right-of-way deed with his dishonest analysis of a subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deed. To do this, Johnson uses a subsequent Hilchkanum deed which was not in the chain of title to the land contested in the lawsuit, and ignores a more relevant deed which, when analyzed, contradicts his argument. Scott Johnson "cherry picks" the extrinsic evidence, and then misrepresents the legal implications of this "cherry picked" deed.

        This brief must be seen in the context of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. In my opinion, Scott Johnson's dishonesty throughout this brief is designed to keep his boss, King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng, and other participants in the crime, out of federal prison.

        My statements describing wrongdoing in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.