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"Brief in Support of King County's
Motion for Summary Judgment"
February 15, 2001 - Companion Document

Comments and Analysis by John Rasmussen

Please read a disclaimer for the statements I make on this website accusing judges, politicians and activists of criminal actions.



INTRODUCTION:

        This is a companion document which analyzes and comments on the King County's initial brief in support of summary judgment to Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein. A photocopy of the brief and the resulting judicial opinion are hyperlinked directly below. It's intended that the reader open the Prosecutor's brief in a separate window and reference that document as the comments and analysis are read here.

      Read King County's "Brief in Support of King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (February 15, 2001).

      Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

        Here is a hyperlink to my lawyer's brief in reply to King County's motion for summary judgment.

      Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Judge Rothstein.

        Following my lawyer's brief opposing summary judgment, above, King County replied with this brief.

      Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (April 19, 2001) in a Separate Window.

        The King County briefs advocate summary judgment. It was critical for the County to have this lawsuit decided by summary judgment. Summary judgment takes the lawsuit away from a jury and gives complete control to the judge. No legitimate jury would come to the decisions that the Hilchkanum judges made in construing the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Understand the rules of summary judgment.

BACKGROUND:

        In the late 1990's, King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng and the leadership of King County, Washington, participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. In order to cover-up their participation in the crime, Norm Maleng and his staff manufactured a legal excuse for the County's actions. This excuse is a legal argument that I've named Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Norm Maleng's "legal theory" contends that the Washington State Supreme Court threw out one hundred years of consistently held legal precedent and established a new rule to construe railroad deeds in Brown v. State of Washington (1996). Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is completely bogus. It's a dishonest legal argument which justifies its contentions by misapplying Brown, ignoring legal precedent, and manufacturing outright lies. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was first published by the King County Prosecutor's office in 1997, and is the basis of dishonest legal argument in this King County brief. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View a detailed explanation of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

      View a detailed explanation of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

      Understand the "House of Cards", the common dishonest tactics used by the Hilchkanum judges.


BRIEF PAGE 2 - "II. Facts": King County repeatedly describes the Hilchkanum grant as a "strip of land":

      Open a photocopy of this brief, and go to page 2.

        On Page 2 (two) of this brief, Senior King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson repeatedly refers to the grant in the Hilchkanum deed as a "strip of land". In fact, Johnson uses the term "strip of land" six times. Johnson never refers to the grant as a "right of way". This is a significant misstatement of fact by Scott Johnson because what was actually conveyed in the Hilchkanum deed was a "right of way". For over one hundred years a critical factor in construing railroad deeds is to determine whether a "right-of-way" or land is conveyed. There are different rules to construe the grant of a "right of way" from the rules to construe the grant of "land". So, what was actually granted by Hilchkanum? Here is the Hilchkanum granting clause which shows that a "right of way" was granted, not a "strip of land".
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

      "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit"
      [1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

        It is a critical distinction whether a "right of way" or "land" is granted in the Hilchkanum deed. Scott Johnson knows this and intentionally misrepresents the grant. In construing railroad deeds to determine easement or fee, "right of way" and "land" are contradictory terms. This substituting of contradictory terms is an essential element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument concocted by the King County Prosecutor to hide the County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

      Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.


BRIEF PAGE 8 - "b. Hilchkanum Deed conveyed fee simple estate": Scott Johnson sets up Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory":

      Open a photocopy of this brief, and go to page 8.

        King County Prosecutor, Norm Maleng, understood that his criminal act in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme exposed himself and his staff to federal prison terms. In order to cover up his crime, Maleng devised his "legal theory". This was first stated in the "white paper", a memorandum by King County Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney, explaining how the Washington State Supreme Court had magically reversed one hundred years of legal precedent, conveniently exonerating Maleng and his staff. Of course, this is a complete fabrication by Maleng and his staff.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

      Read Senior Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney's 1997 Memorandum, the first statement of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

        On Page 8 of his brief, Scott Johnson begins to set up Maleng's "legal theory" with his discussion on the grant of a "strip of land". Since this dishonest lawyer is later going to claim the grant of a "right of way" is really a fee simple grant of a "strip of land" in his argument, he first correctly discusses the law in reference to the grant of a "strip of land". He did it with these words: (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "In Washington state, if a deed conveys a definite strip of land and contains no language limiting the purpose of the conveyance, the deed conveys a fee simple interest in the strip of land - not an easement."
      [This Brief, Page 8.]

        Scott Johnson's statement is correct for deeds which convey "strips of land". But, of course, the Hilchkanum deed does not convey a "strip of land". Rather, the Hilchkanum deed conveys a "right of way". As I show above, the rules are different for construing deeds which convey "land" than the rules for construing deeds which convey "rights-of way". This explains Johnson's odd statement of "Facts" on Page 2, where he repeatedly and dishonestly states that the Hilchkanum deed grants a "strip of land", when one needs to merely read the deed to understand that Hilchkanum grants a "right of way". As this brief is read, one will realize that the King County Prosecutor tries to cover up his crime by claiming that a "strip of land" is granted in the Hilchkanum deed, and by misrepresenting the conclusions in Brown v. State of Washington (1996). Read on!
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGE 8 - "b. Hilchkanum Deed conveyed fee simple estate": Scott Johnson sets up Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory":

      Open a photocopy of this brief, and go to the bottom of page 8.

        Here I expand on the quote presented in the section above. At the bottom of page 8 of his summary judgment brief, Scott Johnson presents Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". After dishonestly inferring that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "strip of land" to the Railway (Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory"), Johnson claims that additional limiting language is needed in order for the deed to be construed an easement. He cites Brown for authority. Since, that Brown citation takes the reader to King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. (1949), Scott Johnson cites Hanson also. Here is a portion of Johnson's page 8 and 9 briefing.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "In Washington state, if a deed conveys a definite strip of land and contains no language limiting the purpose of the conveyance, the deed conveys a fee simple interest in the strip of land - not an easement. [...] In order for the deed to convey something less that a fee simple estate, words in a deed must clearly and expressly indicate an intent to make the estate conditional. Brown at 438 (citing King County v. Hanson Inv. Co., 34 Wn.2d 112, 208 P.2d 113 (1949))"
      [King County Summary Judgment Brief, Page 8 and 9.]

        Since the Hilchkanum deed is the subject of this brief, Scott Johnson's analysis of the grant as a "strip of land" is a statement that the Hilchkanum grants land. This is Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". His statement would be correct if the Hilchkanum deed granted a "strip of land". But, of course, the Hilchkanum deed does not convey a "strip of land". Rather, the Hilchkanum deed conveys a "right of way". After stating/implying that Hilchkanum grants a "strip of land", Johnson claims that the Hilchkanum deed needed additional limiting language in order to be construed an easement. He cites Brown and Hanson for authority. This misapplication of Brown and Hanson is Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". This dishonest legal argument was first concocted by the King County Prosecutor in 1997. Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is repeated in all of Scott Johnson's legal briefs relating to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Sadly, Element 2 is adopted by the dishonest judges who illegally decided the King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County lawsuits.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGE 9 - "b. Hilchkanum Deed conveyed fee simple estate": Scott Johnson dishonestly compares the Hilchkanum deed to the Simpson deed in Brown:

      Open a photocopy of this brief, and go to page 9.

        In this initial brief, Johnson tries to compare the Hilchkanum deed to the Simpson deed in Brown. This comparison was dropped by Johnson in his later briefs because there is very little to compare. The Simpson deed conveys "a strip of land" in its granting clause. The Hilchkanum deed grants a "right of way" in its granting clause. As I've stated above, the grant of a "right of way" has a completely different meaning than the grant of a "strip of land" in common law. The grant of a "right of way" to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement, without exception until this lawsuit. The abandonment of that consistently held precedent in this lawsuit has nothing to do with the law, but rather it was abandoned by federal and State judges in order to hide King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read the Simpson deed to understand that a "strip of land" is granted.

      Read the Hilchkanum deed to understand that a "right of way" is granted.

      Understand the rules to construe the grant of a "strip of land", with supporting precedent.

      Understand the rules to construe the grant of a "right of way", with supporting precedent.


BRIEF PAGE 9 - "b. Hilchkanum Deed conveyed fee simple estate": Scott Johnson finds unjustified significance in the "caption" of the deed:

      Open a photocopy of this brief, and go to page 9.

        On page 9, Scott Johnson explains how a couple of deeds, construed by the court, had been found to grant fee simple title despite the fact they were captioned "Right-of-Way Deed". His implication is, since the Hilchkanum deed is captioned "Right-of-Way Deed", that the Hilchkanum deed grants fee simple title, too. Of course, Scott Johnson is counting on folks not reading the opinions he references for authority. The fact is that these opinions found that the words in the deed, not the caption, determine the intentions of the authors of the deed, and determine whether fee simple title or an easement is granted. This dishonest lawyer intentionally misrepresents the law in this respect. I've hyperlinked the two opinions that this crooked lawyer cites in his argument. Please read these opinions to understand that the words in the deed, not the caption, control the issue of fee simple or easement. Please read the full opinion to understand the importance of this issue. Again, the words in the deed, not the caption, control the issue of fee simple or easement.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read Brown v. State of Washington (1996) to determine that the words in the deed, not the caption, determined the issue of easement of fee.

      Read Roeder v. K&E Storage (2000) to determine that the words in the deed, not the caption, determined the issue of easement of fee.


BRIEF PAGE 10 - "b. Hilchkanum Deed conveyed fee simple estate": Scott Johnson draws a dishonest conclusion by citing only a portion of a paragraph from Brown, and ignoring the conclusion stated in Brown:

      Open a photocopy of this brief, and go to page 10.

        At the top of page 10, Scott Johnson makes this dishonest statement: (The paragraph containing this dishonest conclusion starts at the bottom of page 9.)
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "Therefore, the mere use of the term "right of way" in the Hilchkanum deed is not dispositive of the issue of what is the nature of the ownership interest conveyed in that deed."
      [This Brief, Page 10.]

        This sentence is profound dishonesty. The truth is that the "nature of the ownership interest conveyed in that deed" is understood by where and how the term "right of way" is used in the deed. If Scott Johnson had any integrity, he would have acknowledged that the grant of a "right of way" to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement in Washington State common law. Johnson has a "little problem" with honesty, but he has a good reason. Scott Johnson needs to lie about the common law in order to keep his boss, Norm Maleng, and his fellow crooked deputy prosecutors out of federal prison. Here is the full citation from Brown that Johnson cuts short and intentionally misrepresents:
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property. The Eidal deed, for example, states:

        Said Railway Company . . . will permit a telephone wire and an electric light wire to cross its said right-of-way. . . . Before grading is begun Right of way fences shall be built. . . . Said Railway Company is to furnish such facilities for conducting water for irrigation and other purposes under its track and across its Right-of-Way as are reasonable and practicable. . . .

      Clerk's Papers (Brown) at 27. Used in this manner, "right of way" merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines; it does not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses. To point out that the Eidal deed and others describe the property as right of way simply begs the question of what interest Milwaukee acquired, because a railroad can own rights of way in fee simple if that is what the deed conveys."
      [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

        Brown concludes that the term "right-of-way" as used in "Swan, Veach, and Roeder" restricts the deed to an easement by the use of "right-of-way" in the granting or habendum clause. Scott Johnson did not reference this portion of his cited paragraph from Brown because he isn't briefing common law, he's briefing his "prayer" to the judge to keep himself, the Prosecutor, and other lawyers in the Prosecutor's civil division out of federal prison for their part in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. To better understand the legal understanding of the term "right of way", I provide abbreviated citations (with my emphasis) from Swan, Veach, and Roeder, the three opinions which Brown references for precedent in the citation above. Use the hyperlink attached to each citation to read the full citation in the context of its opinion. These citations will show that where and how the term "right-of-way" is used in a deed determines its effect. They show that the term "right-of-way" used in the granting clause or habendum does restrict or limit the deed to an easement.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "...when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only..."
      [Swan v. O'Leary (1950)]

      "The parties...describe what was being conveyed: a right-of-way...Language like this has been found to create an easement..."
      [Veach v. Culp (1979)]

      "...language of the deed...describing the conveyance of a right-of-way...we conclude the deed conveyed an easement..."
      [Veach v. Culp (1979)]

      "...land being conveyed as "a right-of-way"...has been found to create an easement..."
      [Roeder v. BNSF (1986)]

        Scott Johnson, King County Deputy Prosecutor, cites an abbreviated portion from Brown and concludes "Therefore, the mere use of the term "right of way" in the Hilchkanum deed is not dispositive of the issue of what is the nature of the ownership interest conveyed in that deed." When one goes to the full citation from Brown, he finds that the term "right of way" is defined by where and how the term is used in a deed. Scott Johnson would like the reader to believe his statement and not go to Brown to verify. The legal precedent referenced in Brown destroys this crooked prosecutor's argument. The grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement in Washington State common law. Instead of citing the many times this rule has been stated, Johnson cites only a portion of a paragraph from Brown, leaving out the critical portion, and then misrepresents the conclusion made by the Brown court. I've given the full citation and a link to the opinion so that the citation can be read in context. The truth is my friend, and the mortal enemy of the King County Prosecutor. To further emphasize the rule that the grant of a right-of-way is the grant of an easement, I provide fourteen citations, hyperlinked to their respective opinions. If the reader has any doubt about this issue, please do your homework. Read these citations in the context of their full opinions.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Citations Explaining the Grant of a Right-of-Way to a Railroad is an Easement.

        (in chronological order with my emphasis)

        Abercrombie v. Simmons et al (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1905)

          "In Railway Co. v. Geisel, 119 Ind. 77, 21 N. E. 470, there was a deed releasing and quitclaiming to a railroad company a right of way 80 feet wide through a certain tract of land, and it was held that the company did not acquire the fee of the land."
          [Abercrombie v. Simmons et al (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1905)]

        Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)

          "It is followed by a case note in 6 Ann. Cas., p. 239, supra, among others, citing many cases to the effect that, where a railroad has taken a conveyance expressly granting a right of way, it will be held to have taken an easement merely, and that a grant of a strip of land to a railroad company 'for right of way and for operating its railroad only,' conveyed merely an easement."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "...The granting clause of this instrument conveys only a right of way, which is a mere easement, the owner of the soil retaining his exclusive right in all mines, timber and earth for every purpose not incompatible with the use for which it is granted;..."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "The agreement in this case does not grant land in its granting clause, but only right of way . . . Where the granting clause declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement only, though it be in the usual form of warranty deed."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "In Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Wachter, 70 Ohio 113, 70 N. E. 974, the grant involved was of a right of way, one hundred feet in width, across a tract of land containing twenty acres or more, together with a waiver of all further damages that might arise by reason of the location or construction of the railroad or repairing thereof when finally established or completed. There was no reservation of any kind in the instrument. The right of way was adopted, the road completed in 1854, and used continuously for the operation of railroad passenger and freight trains. The court there said:

                 'The right of way of the company is an easement. Washb. on E. & S. 4. It is, using exact language, a servitude imposed as a burden on the land. The conveyance from Crane in terms specifies that it is a 'release of a right of way,' and no question is made, and we presume none can be, that the right thus granted is not different from, nor greater than, that which would result from an appropriation proceeding under the statute.'
          It was held in that case that an easement, and not a fee simple estate, was granted."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "A noted text writer states the law as follows:

                 'A grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely, and the fee remains in the grantor. The mere fact that the railroad company's charter empowered it to acquire a greater estate than that which it contracted for has been held not to affect its rights in the land purchased. But statutes authorizing railroad companies to acquire the fee in land have been generally given effect. It is held that a deed conveying land to a railroad for a right of way gives the railroad no more rights than it would have acquired by condemnation. 'The easement is not that spoken of in the old law books, but is peculiar to the use of a railroad which is usually a permanent improvement, a perpetual highway of travel and commerce, and will rarely be abandoned by nonuser. The exclusive use of the surface is acquired, and damages are assessed, on the theory that the easement will be perpetual; so that, ordinarily, the fee is of little or no value unless the land is underlaid by quarry or mine.' Where the intention to convey a fee does not appear, as in case of the conveyance of a 'right of way' for the railroad through certain lands, the company takes an easement only. The fact that the right conveyed is designated as a fee, or that the deed contains covenants of warranty, does not necessarily pass the fee.
            1 Thompson on Real Property, SS 4:20.'"
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

        Veach v. Culp (1979)

          "The parties in fact describe what was being conveyed: a right-of-way 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the railroad. Language like this has been found to create an easement, not a fee simple estate."
          [Veach v. Culp (1979)]

          "Given the language of the deed explicitly describing the conveyance of a right-of-way and given the rule of Swan v. O'Leary, supra, and Morsbach v. Thurston County, supra, we conclude the deed conveyed an easement, not a fee title."
          [Veach v. Culp (1979)]

        King County v. Squire (1990)

          "Although the language of a particular deed defines the interest conveyed, rights of way granted to a railroad are frequently held to create easements."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

          "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

          "Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement,"....."The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

          "The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

        Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)

          "When the granting clause of a deed conveys a right of way to a railroad, this court has usually concluded that the deed passes an easement and not a fee with a restricted use:

            [I]t is clear that we adopted the rule that when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only, and not a fee with a restricted use, even though the deed is in the usual form to convey a fee title. "
          [Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)]

        Brown v. State of Washington (1996)

          "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property. ..."
          [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

        King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson cites an abbreviated portion of Brown and misrepresents the Brown court's finding. For more that one hundred years, the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has been found to grant an easement. Scott Johnson ignores this consistently held precedent and instead makes a new precedent based only on his need to hide the criminal activity of the County.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGE 10 - "b. Hilchkanum Deed conveyed fee simple estate": Scott Johnson writes a paragraph that is completely dishonest:

      Open a photocopy of this brief, and go to page 10.

        On page 10, Scott Johnson makes this statement:

      "Here, the intent of the parties is made clear by the deed. The Hilchkanum deed describes a specific strip of land by defining its centerline and boundaries with specificity. See Exhibit 1 to DeGoojer Decl. In addition, the language of the Hilchkanum deed does not expressly limit the estate conveyed. To the contrary, the deed conveys the premises and appurtenances to the grantee's successor and assigns forever without limitation. Id. Moreover, the deed contains no reversionary clause of any kind."
      [This Brief, Page 10.]

        This paragraph by Scott Johnson is simply a statement of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". The critical element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is to equate the grant of a "right-of-way" to the grant of the underlying "land". This dishonest King County lawyer does exactly this in his statement above. I'll take these dishonest statements one at a time and explain the law which applies. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "The Hilchkanum deed describes a specific strip of land by defining its centerline and boundaries with specificity."

        A critical factor in construing a railroad deed is to observe whether a "right-of-way" is granted or if "land" is granted. Different rules apply based on which is granted. I repeat the rules here.

      Railroad Land Granting Rule: A deed conveying land to a railroad grants fee simple title unless there is a statement that the deed is for the purpose of a railroad right-of-way or if the deed is limited to railroad right-of-way use. A statement of right-of-way purpose or limitation will change the grant to an easement.
      [Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.]

      Railroad Right-of Way Granting Rule: A deed conveying a right-of way to a railroad grants an easement.
      [Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.]

        Scott Johnson refers to the Hilchkanum grant as a "strip of land" throughout his brief. This is an intentional lie. There is no grant of a "strip of land" in the Hilchkanum deed. The deed grants a "right of way". The term "strip of land" is not found in the Hilchkanum deed. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E in order to understand it grants a "right of way".

        The Hilchkanum deed grants a "right of way" and defines the right-of-way in metes and bounds. Apparently, Johnson would like the "right of way" to somehow become a "strip of land" by the fact that its boundaries are described. This is not the law. Describing an easement by specifying its borders in metes and bounds does not change the easement to a fee simple grant. If that were the case, it would be impossible to properly describe an easement. So, there is just as strong a need for an easement to be described in metes and bounds as there is a need for a fee simple grant of land to be described in that manner. Here is a citation which explains:

      "The fact that the exact boundaries of the right-of-way were set out does not outweigh the express intent of the grantor to convey only a right to use the land, not the land itself."
      [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

        Next, we get this statement from Johnson.

      "In addition, the language of the Hilchkanum deed does not expressly limit the estate conveyed."

        This is an absolute and intentional lie by Scott Johnson. How and where the term "right of way" is used in a deed determines whether it limits the deed to an easement or not. The Hilchkanum deed grants a "right of way" to the SLS&E. This language has always been found to grant an easement in Washington State common law, without exception. This is shown in the fourteen citations I provided in the above discussion.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View fourteen citations which establish the rule that the grant of a "right-of-way" is the grant of an easement.

        Even more dishonest, Johnson refuses to discuss the opinion most damaging to his argument, King County v. Squire (1990). The Squire court construed Watson Squire's right of way deed to the SLS&E. The Squire granting words are identical to Hilchkanum's granting words. The Squire court found those words strongly suggested an easement. Further, the Squire court identified which words were written by the Railway lawyers and which words were added or altered by Watson Squire. By identifying the words written by the Railway lawyers, the Squire court identified the form deed which was used for the other SLS&E deeds, including Hilchkanum's. The Squire opinion absolutely destroys Scott Johnson's claim that Hilchkanum granted fee simple title. So, Johnson ignores the conclusions in Squire and refuses to honestly discuss it.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View a study comparing the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.


CONCLUSION:

    My statements describing wrongdoing in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.

        This brief by Scott Johnson is completely dishonest in its representation of the common law used to construe the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The dishonesty is explained by the fact that he is trying to hide the Prosecutor's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

        Since the Hilchkanum deed grants a "right of way", and this has always been held to grant an easement, Scott Johnson simply changes the words in the deed and declares that it grants a "strip of land". After misstating what is granted in the Hilchkanum deed, Johnson uses the rules and discussion in Brown v. State of Washington (1996) to construe the Hilchkanum deed. The rules (precedent) used to construe the grant of a "right of way" are different than the rules used to grant a "strip of land", and are shown in the reference section below.

        Johnson's dishonesty is discovered when one reads Brown v. State of Washington (1996) and realizes that this prosecutor has the habit of citing portions of opinions and then misstating the findings of the court. The Prosecutor's office felt compelled to rely on, and misrepresent, Brown because in its settlement of Lawson v. State it admitted that about twelve SLS&E deeds, based on the same form deed as the Hilchkanum deed, granted easements. Further, the County had lost King County v. Squire in 1990. Squire evaluated a SLS&E deed which used exactly the same granting words and found those words strongly indicated the intention to convey an easement. So, the County needed to find a decision that was later than Lawson and Squire, and misrepresent its conclusions, in order to dodge the precedent set in the earlier cases. The County settled on Brown and claimed it reversed long held precedent. This misrepresentation of Brown is the basis of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

        In this analysis, I've discussed the most significant lies that were used by Scott Johnson in this brief to falsely claim ownership of my right-of-way land and to cover up King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    My statements describing wrongdoing in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.


REFERENCE:

    Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

    Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

    Overview of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    View the evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

    View the annotated version of the Blakney Memorandum, which first states Norm Maleng's "Legal Theory".

    View an unedited photocopy of the 9-17-1997 Blakney Memorandum

    View Attorney Daryl Deutsch's 10-24-1997 reply to Blakney's 9-17-1997 Memorandum.

    Read Brown v. State of Washington (1996)

    View an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

    View an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

    View an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004).

    Understand the "House of Cards", the common dishonest tactics used by the Hilchkanum judges.

    View my complaint of Judicial Misconduct to the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, February 10, 2004.

    Understand how judges protect their fellow judges at the expense of the public.