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"Appeal from the U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington - Plaintiff-Appellee King County's Brief"
September 5, 2001 - Companion Document

Comments and Analysis by John Rasmussen

Please read a disclaimer for the statements I make on this website accusing judges, politicians and activists of criminal actions.



BACKGROUND:

        In the late 1990's, King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng and the leadership of King County, Washington, participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. In order to cover-up their participation in the crime, Norm Maleng and his staff manufactured a legal excuse for the County's actions. This excuse is a legal argument that I've named Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Norm Maleng's "legal theory" contends that the Washington State Supreme Court threw out one hundred years of consistently held legal precedent and established a new rule to construe railroad deeds in Brown v. State of Washington (1996). Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is completely bogus. It's a dishonest legal argument which justifies its contentions by misapplying Brown, ignoring legal precedent, and manufacturing outright lies. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was first published by the King County Prosecutor's office in 1997, and is the basis of dishonest legal argument in this King County brief. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The most disgusting aspect of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is its adoption by the Hilchkanum judges. If these dishonest judges were ever prosecuted, I believe the charge would be racketeering or criminal collusion.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View a detailed explanation of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

      View a detailed explanation of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

      Understand the "House of Cards", the common dishonest tactics used by the Hilchkanum judges.


INTRODUCTION:

        This is a companion document which analyzes and comments on the King County Prosecutor's brief to the Ninth Circuit appeals panel reviewing King County v. Rasmussen (2001). A photocopy of the brief and the resulting judicial opinion are hyperlinked directly below. It's intended that the reader open the Prosecutor's brief in a separate window and reference that document as the comments and analysis are read here.

      Open a photocopy of this brief. ["Appeal from the U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington - Plaintiff-Appellee King County's Brief" (September 5, 2001)]

      Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

        This King county brief is in reply to my lawyer's opening appeal brief to the Ninth Circuit appeals panel consisting of Circuit Judges Betty Binns Fletcher and Ronald M. Gould, and District Judge Mary H. Murguia. Here are hyperlinks to my lawyer's opening appeal brief and his response to the King County brief discussed here.

      Open my lawyer's opening appeal brief, "Defendants-Appellants' John and Nancy Rasmussens' Opening Appeal Brief".

      Open my lawyer's reply brief, "Defendants-Appellants' John and Nancy Rasmussens' Reply Brief".


BRIEF PAGE 2 (PDF page 10) - "STATEMENT OF THE FACTS"

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Page 2. (PDF page 10)

        On page 2 of his brief, Scott Johnson repeatedly refers to a "strip of land", and states that the Hilchkanums conveyed a "strip of land" in their right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. This substitution of the words in the deed has been one of Johnson's principle lies in his "legal" argument. A person simply needs to read the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E to realize that a "right of way" was granted. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Read the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed to understand what was granted in the right-of-way deed. It is completely dishonest for Scott Johnson, and Judges Fletcher and Rothstein to state that a "strip of land" is granted.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit..."
      [Read the complete Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, and view a photocopy.]

        This claim that the Hilchkanums granted a "strip of land" is an important part of "Norm Maleng's 'legal theory'", which I describe above. Norm Maleng, the King County Prosecutor, participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and needed to do some other dishonest things to cover up his crime. His "legal theory" is one of those dishonest things. Maleng claims that the Washington State Supreme Court, in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), threw out one hundred years of consistently held property law and adopted the elements of Maleng's "legal theory" as new law. This "legal theory" is a series of lies. Scott Johnson's claim, that the grant of a "right of way" to a railroad is the same as the grant of a "strip of land", is a lie designed to keep his boss and the leadership of King County out of federal prison.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Open an expanded description of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" in a separate window.

        In Washington State common law, the opinions over the years have established different precedent to construe grants of "land" than the precedent used to construe grants of "rights-of-way". The Washington State Supreme Court, in Brown, recognized these precedental opinions.

      Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

      Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.


BRIEF PAGE 5 (PDF page 13) - "I. Court Properly Granted the County's Motions to Strike."

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Page 5. (PDF page 13)

        An incredible amount of argument and exhibits was struck by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein, on motions from King County. Considering the complete dishonesty in Rothstein's opinion, it is apparent that she abused the rules of the court as a means to eliminate our argument and make room for the material facts that she manufactured in order to justify her opinion. Rather than study Scott Johnson's summary and argument in this brief, it would be better to use the following hyperlink to go to Rothstein's annotated opinion and view the materials struck, and a discussion on the legitimacy of the judge's actions. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Go to the annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) to understand what Federal District Judge Rothstein struck.

        The civil rules, established for the efficient operation of the court, are not intended for judges to use to deny a party's Constitutional right of due process. But, it is obvious that Judge Rothstein did exactly that with her dishonest and unjustified actions to strike our argument and exhibits. It's the court's duty to see that the facts are established, not to deny that right to a party. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGE 6 (PDF page 14) - "I. Court Properly Granted the County's Motions to Strike."

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Page 6. (PDF page 14)

        Just one example of the dishonesty involved in the striking of briefs and exhibits is seen on page 6 of Johnson's brief. Johnson makes this statement: (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "The district court also struck allegations in the Rasmussen's' brief in opposition to the County's motion for summary judgment regarding Mr. Hilchkanum's literacy. See ER 589. This allegation was stricken because no evidence was cited to support it. In their Appellant Brief, the Rasmussens now cite to evidence that had been submitted to the district court. Appellant's Brief at 4-6. However, the Rasmussens failed to direct the district court's attention to this material in their brief opposing the County's motion for summary judgment. ER 57. Therefore, the allegation lacked foundation and the court properly exercised its discretion in striking the inadmissible testimony contained in the brief."

        This paragraph by Scott Johnson describes what appears to be a coordinated attack on my rights by the county and the courts. Judge Rothstein struck our statement about Hilchkanum's illiteracy and ability to participate in his right-of-way deed, and then found that Hilchkanum actually wrote his deed. We had provided a number of documents that established Hilchkanum's illiteracy and inability to participate in his deed, but did not draw the court's attention to those documents at the appropriate place in our brief. Rothstein refused to look for those documents and refused our many requests for oral arguments where the fact of Hilchkanum's illiteracy could have been established to her "satisfaction". Judge Rothstein actively worked to deny my constitutional right to establish the facts in "her" court. But, there was a document that established Hilchkanum's illiteracy, which Rothstein admitted to in her opinion. Rothstein published significant portions of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The deed was signed by each Hilchkanum with an "X". It is obscene that a judge would find that a person who cannot even sign his own name would be capable of writing the deed he "signed". The deed established Hilchkanum's illiteracy, and it was up to Scott Johnson and Judge Rothstein to provide a document or some evidence that Hilchkanum was capable of writing his deed and participating. Of course, there was no evidence.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        This paragraph of Scott Johnson's brief replies to my lawyer's appeal brief argument. Use the below link to read our brief.

      Open my lawyer's appeal brief to Senior Circuit Judge Fletcher's Ninth Circuit panel. Read pages 4-6 (PDF pages 10-12) which pertain to the discussion here.

        Hilchkanum's illiteracy destroys Judge Rothstein's statements finding Hilchkanum the author of his right-of-way deed. But more important, Hilchkanum's illiteracy is a material fact. Disputed material facts are required to be resolved by a jury, not by dishonest judges. It was critical for Scott Johnson to justify Rothstein's decision to strike our statements of illiteracy because, by law, that issue should not have been resolved by Rothstein.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The destruction of our argument and exhibits, by questionably justified reasons to strike, was a critical element of the County's and the Court's maneuvers to hide the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGE 9 (PDF page 17) - "II. Summary Judgment, B. No Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 1. Chain of Title"

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Page 9. (PDF page 17)

        On page 9 of his brief, Scott Johnson cites 17 U.S. Stat. 602 as authority for Hilchkanum to convey fee simple title of his pre-patent homestead to the SLS&E. Johnson makes a giant leap of logic with that conclusion. 17 U.S. Stat. 602 (Act of March 3, 1873) allowed pre-patent homesteaders to grant rights-of-way to railroads, but it is necessary to examine the intent of Congress as to whether it intended those grants to be easements or grants of fee. Scott Johnson, Judge Rothstein, and the Ninth Circuit panel, headed by Judge Fletcher, refused to make that examination. I did.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        In Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S. (1942) the United States Supreme Court examined the intent of Congress in its legislation in the period that includes 17 U.S. Stat. 602 (Act of March 3, 1873). The Supreme Court found that Congress intended the grant of rights-of-way to be the grant of easements. I discuss this issue and provide an extended citation to support my discussion in my annotated versions of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

      Read the discussion of this issue in the detailed version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

      Read the discussion of this issue in the detailed version of King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

        It is completely dishonest for Scott Johnson, Federal District Judge Rothstein, and Federal Circuit Judge Fletcher to cite 17 U.S. Stat. 602 and conclude that it authorized the fee simple grant of land in its authorization to grant rights-of-way. Since the issue in the King County v. Rasmussen lawsuit is whether BNSF owned an easement or fee title, it is obscene for these crooked lawyers and judges to simply conclude fee simple was passed, and not provide any legal justification. It's safe to assume that they didn't provide legal justification for their conclusions because they knew no justification existed. These two dishonest Ninth Circuit judges repeatedly show in their opinions that they are not bound by the U.S. Constitution, the laws, or the opinions of the United State Supreme Court.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGE 11 (PDF page 19) - "II. Summary Judgment, B. No Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 2. Intention of the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed was to Grant a Fee Simple Interest, b. Presumption is fee simple estate was granted"

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Page 11. (PDF page 19)

        At the bottom of page 11 and top of page 12 of his brief, Scott Johnson states both Element 1 and Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory", with this statement. (my emphasis in bold font)

      "The court in King County v. Hanson, 34 Wn.2d 430 112, 208 P.2d 113 (1949), explained that it is settled law in Washington 'that a deed which by its terms conveys the land to a grantee operates as a grant of the fee although it may also contain a recital designating, or ever restricting, the use to which the land may be put.' Id. at 119 (emphasis supplied by the court). The Hanson court also cited to the general rule that 'to make an estate conditional, the words used in the deed must clearly indicate such an intent, either by express terms or my necessary implications from the term used.'"
      [Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief. Go to the bottom of Page 11. (PDF page 19)]

        With reference to Johnson's above statement of Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory", here is the citation from King County v. Hanson (1949). I've added a link to read the citation in the context of the full opinion, for better reference.

      "It is also the settled rule in this state, as elsewhere, that a deed which by its terms conveys the land to a grantee operates as a grant of the fee, although it may also contain a recital designating, or even restricting, the use to which the land may be put."
      [King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. (1949)]

        On these two pages of his brief, Johnson identifies the finding in King County v. Hanson (1949) in order to misapply it to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. He makes the same dishonest argument that Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney made in his 1997 memorandum, where Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was first made public. The Hanson citation relates to the grant of "land" and would not apply to the Hilchkanum deed, which grants a "right of way". Use the following hyperlink to read my annotated version of Bill Blakney's 1997 memorandum, exposing the dishonesty of his use of Hanson.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read the 1997 Blakney Memorandum at the position it misrepresents King County v. Hanson.

        Scott Johnson claims that there is a presumption that a fee simple estate is conveyed in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. He bases this presumption on his misstatement of the discussion in King County v. Hanson (1949). This dishonest "presumption" is Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". There is no "presumption" a fee simple estate is conveyed in Hilchkanum. There is no "sea change" in Brown v. State of Washington, as Scott Johnson claimed in his brief to the District Court. In that brief, Scott Johnson cited a footnote in the dissenting opinion as proof that the Washington State Supreme Court had dramatically altered the rules to construe railroad deeds. The same sort of dishonesty is found throughout this brief by Johnson. The Brown court did not find that the grant of a "right-of-way" is the grant of a "strip of land", as Scott Johnson claims. So, there is no presumption that Hilchkanum grants a fee simple estate.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGES 12-15 (PDF pages 20-23) - "II. Summary Judgment, B. No Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 2. Intention of the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed was to Grant a Fee Simple Interest, c. Interest Granted not Clearly or Expressly Limited or Qualified"

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Pages 12-15. (PDF pages 20-23)

        The discussion, starting at the bottom of page 12 and continuing through page 15 of Scott Johnson's brief, centers on the lies established in Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Here is a quotation from page 14 of his brief.

      "The [Brown] court acknowledged that "...the use of the term 'right of way' as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant generally creates only an easement." Id. (emphasis added). However, the court took great pains throughout the decision to explain that the parties must have clearly or expressly intended to have the words limit the interest granted. Id. at 440. Merely using the phrase "right of way" is insufficient by itself."
      [Open Scott Johnson's reply brief and go to Page 14 (PDF page 22) to find this statement.]

        Norm Maleng's "legal theory"claims the Washington State Supreme Court decided in Brown v. State of Washington (1996) that the grant of a right-of-way is the same as the grant of land, and that a deed granting a right-of-way will be found to convey an easement only when "the deed contains a separate statement expressly and clearly limiting the estate conveyed". Of course this is a complete lie. The Washington State Supreme Court made no such decision.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The Supreme Court, in Brown, considered only deeds which granted strips of land to the Milwaukee Railroad. None of the deeds in Brown granted rights-of-way. As I have stated repeatedly on this website, Washington State common law establishes different rules to construe deeds which grant land to a railroad than the rules to grant rights-of-way to railroads.

      Understand the Basic Rules to Construe a Deed, with supporting precedent.

      Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

      Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

        In this portion of his brief, Scott Johnson claims that a separate statement expressly and clearly limiting the estate conveyed is required to find the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to be an easement. This is an intentional lie by this dishonest King County prosecutor. It is a statement of Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is construed using the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", which does not require a additional statement expressly and clearly limiting the estate conveyed. The grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been held to be an easement in Washington State common law.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        As I stated above, the Brown court considered only deeds which granted strips of land to the Milwaukee Railroad. Here is a citation to support that fact. (with my emphasis)

      "In general, when construing a deed, the intent of the parties is of paramount importance and the court's duty to ascertain and enforce. /4 Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wn.2d 533, 535, 225 P.2d 199 (1950); Zobrist v. Culp, 95 Wn.2d 556, 560, 627 P.2d 1308 (1981). In this case, where the original parties utilized the statutory warranty form deed and the granting clauses convey definite strips of land, we must find that the grantors intended to convey fee simple title unless additional language in the deeds clearly and expressly limits or qualifies the interest conveyed."
      [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

        So, we establish that Brown considered only deeds which granted strips of land. To try to make the Hilchkanum deed fit the Brown deeds, Scott Johnson tries to blur the meaning of "right-of-way" in a railroad deed. He repeatedly, and cleverly, uses the term in a way that would make the uneducated reader assume that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is considered the grant of a strip of land. This is a complete lie. There is one citation in Brown that explains that where-and-how the term "right-of-way" is used in a railroad deed determines the meaning of the term. Here is that citation which Scott Johnson carefully avoids. (with my emphasis)
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris, 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property. The Eidal deed, for example, states:

        Said Railway Company . . . will permit a telephone wire and an electric light wire to cross its said right-of-way. . . . Before grading is begun Right of way fences shall be built. . . . Said Railway Company is to furnish such facilities for conducting water for irrigation and other purposes under its track and across its Right-of-Way as are reasonable and practicable. . . .

      Clerk's Papers (Brown) at 27. Used in this manner, "right of way" merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines; it does not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses. To point out that the Eidal deed and others describe the property as right of way simply begs the question of what interest Milwaukee acquired, because a railroad can own rights of way in fee simple if that is what the deed conveys."
      [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

        As seen in the above citation, Brown held that the term "right-of-way", used in the granting or habendum clauses, limits and qualifies the deed to be an easement. Scott Johnson repeatedly claims in this brief that there is no qualifying or limiting language in the Hilchkanum deed. Then, on page 15 of his brief, he reluctantly reverses himself and admits that the Hilchkanum deed does use "right of way" in its granting clause, and compares the Hilchkanum deed to the deed construed in Veach v. Culp (1979). But, Johnson quickly adds that the intentions in Veach do not compare to the Hilchkanum's because of the extrinsic evidence he has provided to define the Hilchkanum's intentions. His extrinsic evidence consists of "cherry picked" subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds. Johnson cites a deed, not in the chain of title of the property contested in this lawsuit, and then misrepresents the legal implication of exception language in that deed. Scott Johnson ignores more relevant subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds which disprove his legal argument. This misrepresentation of the legal understanding of exception language, in subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds, is discussed below.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Scott Johnson tries to minimize the importance of the language in the Hilchkanum deed which grants a right-of-way to the SLS&E, by referring to only Veach v. Culp as precedent. He ignores and misrepresents King County v. Squire (1990). A comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds destroys Johnson's argument.     Further, Scott Johnson ignores the citations which define the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule". The grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been held to be the grant of an easement in Washington State/Territory, without exception. Scott Johnson attempts to reverse that rule in this brief and his other briefs. His argument is completely dishonest, and he knows it.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGE 16 (PDF page 24) - "II. Summary Judgment, B. No Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 2. Intention of the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed was to Grant a Fee Simple Interest, c. Interest Granted not Clearly or Expressly Limited or Qualified"

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Page 16. (PDF page 24)

        Scott Johnson uses both Element 1 and Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" as the basis of his summary on page 16 of his brief. Here is a quote from that page.

      "The Hilchkanum deed describes a strip of land of specific width and location. In addition, the language of the Hilchkanum deed does not expressly limit the estate conveyed. It does not contain language specifying that the strip of land is granted for "the purpose of a right of way for a railroad" of limits use to "so long as said land is used as a right of way by said railway company" or similar language. To the contrary, the deed conveys the premises and appurtenances to the grantee's successor and assigns forever without limitation."
      ["Appeal from the U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington - Plaintiff-Appellee King County's Brief", Page 16]

        In his statement on page 16, Scott Johnson states that "The Hilchkanum deed describes a strip of land of specific width and location." this is completely misleading, and implies that the Hilchkanum deed grants a "strip of land". The issue is what the Hilchkanum deed grants, not what it "describes". The fact that the Hilchkanum "describes" a "strip of land" does not mean that the Hilchkanum deed grants a "strip of land". This is typical of the misleading statements that Johnson makes throughout his brief. Here is the Hilchkanum deed, again, for the reader to understand that the Hilchkanum deed grants a "right of way", not a "strip of land" as Johnson dishonestly implies.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit..."

        The Hilchkanum deed grants a "right of way", not a strip of land. This slime-ball lawyer, Scott Johnson, ignores what is granted, which is the issue, and dishonestly implies that what is described is the issue. It is frustrating to explain the complete dishonesty of that statement because of the collaboration of the federal judges in the cover-up of the ELS tax fraud scheme.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        After identifying that is described rather than what is granted, Scott Johnson then dishonestly states that the Hilchkanum deed "....does not contain language specifying that the strip of land is granted for "the purpose of a right of way for a railroad" of limits use to "so long as said land is used as a right of way by said railway company" or similar language.". This is a statement of both Element 1 and Element 2 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". This is a ridiculous lie, and ignores the fact that the grant of a "right-of-way" has always been held to be the grant of an easement in Washington State common law, and needs no additional limiting language.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read fourteen right-of-way citations which hold the grant of a right-of-way conveys an easement.

        Scott Johnson works very hard to misrepresent Brown v. State of Washington (1996). But, Brown betrays Johnson's dishonesty in this brief. Scott claims that the Hilchkanum deed "....does not contain language specifying that the strip of land is granted for "the purpose of a right of way for a railroad" of limits use to "so long as said land is used as a right of way by said railway company" or similar language." But when one goes to Brown, he finds this citation:
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property."
      [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

        The Hilchkanum deed grants a right-of-way in its granting clause. This has always been held to grant an easement in Washington State common law. This is supported by the fourteen citations that I provide in the above link. Further, this is supported in Brown by the citation I provide directly above. Scott Johnson isn't interested in the law or the Constitution. Instead, Johnson is intent on misrepresenting the law in order to keep his boss, Norm Maleng, out of federal prison for his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The issue here is character. More specifically, the issue is the lack of character by Scott Johnson, and the Federal judges who decided this lawsuit. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGES 17-18 (PDF pages 25-26) - "II. Summary Judgment, B. No Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 2. Intention of the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed was to Grant a Fee Simple Interest, d. Comparison with Simpson and Roeder III Deeds"

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Pages 17-18. (PDF pages 25-26)

        Scott Johnson dishonestly claims that the grants in the Simpson and Roeder III deeds are the same as the grant in the Hilchkanum deed. This is an intentional lie, and echoes the dishonest claim in Norm Maleng's "legal theory" that the grant of a "right-of-way" is the same as the grant of a "strip of land". In the paragraphs, above, I've shown that this "legal theory" is a compilation of lies and misquoted citations designed to keep Norm Maleng and the leadership of King County out of federal prison for their participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The Simpson and Roeder III deeds grant "land". The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "right of way". Above, I've stated that the rules to construe deeds which grant "land" are different than the rules used to construe deeds which grant "rights-of-way". Below, I provide links to the citations which support these different rules. Further, I provide a link to the Simpson and Roeder III deeds, so that the reader can confirm that these deeds grant "land", not rights-of-way. Last, I provide a link to the Hilchkanum deed, so that the reader can confirm that Hilchkanum grants a "right of way"

      Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

      Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.

      Read the Simpson deed to confirm that a "strip of land" is granted, not a "right-of-way".

      Read the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E to confirm that a "right-of-way" is granted, not a "strip of land".

      Read Roeder v. K&E Storage (2000) [Roeder III] to confirm that the deed construed granted a "strip of land", not a "right-of-way".

        Scott Johnson has the habit of hiding his most dishonest statements in his footnotes. At the bottom of page 17 of his brief, Johnson inserts a very dishonest misanalysis of common law with his footnote 3. Here is that footnote.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "3 Appellants attempt to distinguish the Hilchkanum deed by arguing that "right of way" is used in the granting clause as well as the legal description. Appellants' Brief at 21-22. However, their argument fails when one considers that the legal description is considered part of the granting clause. Morsbach y. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 566,278 P. 686 (1929) and Veach v. Culp, 92 Wn.2d at 573-4. Therefore, technically, the use of the term "right of way" is also found in the granting clause of the Simpson Deed."
      ["Appeal from the U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington - Plaintiff-Appellee King County's Brief", Page 17.]

        In this analysis of Morsbach, Johnson lies when he states that "the legal description is considered part of the granting clause". Morsbach is a unique case in which the granting clause referred to the legal description to define what was granted. This intentional confusing of the legal meaning of "right-of-way" is Element 1 of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Scott Johnson works hard in this footnote 3 to misrepresent the common law which is used to construe railroad deeds. He essentially states that the term "right-of-way" has no particular meaning when used in the granting clause. As I have repeatedly stated, where-and-how the term "right-of-way" is used in a railroad deed determines its meaning when construing the deed. The rules to use are primarily held in over one hundred years of Washington State legal precedent. I present, again, forty-four citations that establish these rules.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

        One rule used to construe railroad deeds stands out, and is most important to the settlement of this lawsuit. The grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement. To admit this rule would expose the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. So, Scott Johnson presents this dishonest legal argument that echoes the dishonest argument King County Deputy Prosecutor Blakney's 1997 memorandum which first proposed Norm Maleng's "legal theory".
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


BRIEF PAGE 18 (PDF page 26) - "II. Summary Judgment, B. No Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 2. Intention of the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed was to Grant a Fee Simple Interest, e. Comparison with Squire Deed"

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Page 18. (PDF page 26)

        On Page 18 of his brief, Scott Johnson misrepresents King County v. Squire (1990). The Squire court's analysis destroys Scott Johnson's argument, so he intentionally misrepresents the Squire court's conclusions. On page 18, Johnson writes that, in Squire, "...the terms used in the Squire deed are significantly different than those used in the Hilchkanum deed." Then Johnson stated that "The fact that the parties in that deed conditioned the effect of the grant and its continuation on the construction and operation of the railroad creates more than a 'minor difference.'" That is Scott Johnson's evaluation of Squire, but it is not the opinion of the Squire court.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The court in King County v. Squire construed Watson Squire's right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Watson Squire was a lawyer, the Governor of Washington Territory, and was elected as one of the State's first U.S. Senators. In its opinion, the Squire court published the relevant portions of the Squire deed to the SLS&E. Since Watson Squire made changes to the right-of-way form deed which was prepared by the Railway lawyers, the Squire court published his changes in bold font. The words not in bold font were the words from the form deed that the Railway presented to the Squire, and the other landowners, in order to establish its track. Directly below is the portion of the Squire opinion that provides this information. Again, please note that the bold font in this citation is from the published opinion, and not my added emphasis.

          "On March 29, 1887, Watson and Ida Squire executed a deed granting a half-mile right of way to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company. The material portion of the deed reads as follows with the handwritten additions by Mr. Squire set forth in boldface type:

            In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit: [legal description]. Such right-of-way strip to be twenty-five (25) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across the said lands by the Engineer of said Railway Company, which location is described as follows, to-wit [description.] . . . .

            To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888...."
        [King County v. Squire (1990)]

        To construe a deed, the court construes the words most strongly against its author. In this case, the Squire court identified which words were changed or added by Watson Squire, and then tried to understand and enforce his intentions with those changed and added words. Here is a citation to support the rule that the words are construed against the author.

          "Initially, it should be noted that contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it. Underwood v. Sterner, supra; Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn.2d 162, 332 P.2d 454 (1958); Restatement, Contracts SS 236 (d) (1932)."
      [Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood (1966) - Citation is emphasized.]

        So, when Watson Squire modified the form deed which was written by the SLS&E lawyers, his words should have been examined to understand his intentions. Amazingly, this is exactly what the Squire court did with its analysis. The Squire court struggled to understand if Squire intended the grant to be a "fee simple determinable" with his changes to the habendum. ( Note: "Fee simple determinable" is not the same as a "fee simple".) The Squire court determined that Watson Squire was not trying to change his SLS&E grant to a "fee simple determinable" with his handwritten change to the habendum, but rather he was "reiterating" the grant of an easement that was described in the granting clause of the SLS&E form deed that he modified. The Squire court construed the form deed language in accordance with common law. Common law had always held that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement. The Squire court confirmed that precedent and found that the changes made by Watson Squire were consistent with that intent. Scott Johnson misrepresents the conclusion of the Squire court. His misrepresentation is designed to protect the Prosecutor's office from prosecution for its participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Scott Johnson is not briefing the law or citing the conclusions in Squire. Instead, Scott Johnson is intentionally lying in order to keep himself, and the other King County lawyers who participated in tax fraud scheme, out of federal prison.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The following citation explains this analysis. It explains that the words in the Squire granting clause "strongly" suggests the conveyance of an easement. Further, it explains that the additions to the Squire habendum, made by Watson Squire, indicate the intention to "reiterat[e]" the grant of an easement in the granting clause. Scott Johnson misrepresents this analysis. Please carefully read the following citation. (With my added emphasis)

      "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, "or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company," which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the "so long as" language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the "so long as" language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and "to its successors and assigns forever". The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement.

      In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed."
      [King County v. Squire (1990)]

        King County v. Squire absolutely destroys Scott Johnson's argument. In order to keep himself out of federal prison for his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, Scott Johnson simply lies, again and again, in this brief. This dishonesty and criminal action should have been exposed by Federal Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein in her King County v. Rasmussen (2001) opinion. Judge Rothstein stood at a crossroad. She could have had the character to uphold her oath to support the Constitution and the law, or she could protect the powerful folks in King County, BNSF, and Arthur Andersen who committed federal tax fraud. Barbara Rothstein chose the "dark side". Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein decided to deny my rights as an American citizen, and instead, participate in the federal tax fraud scheme in order to protect friends in King County, or perhaps in exchange for a bribe. With her opinion, Rothstein establishes anarchy as the rule of law in her federal district court. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read an expanded discussion comparing the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

        Here in this appeal brief, Scott Johnson makes the same dishonest analysis of King County v. Squire that he made to Judge Rothstein in Federal District Court. In fact, he uses almost identical wording in this brief. It is critical for Johnson to encourage the appeals judges to ignore Squire, because an honest examination of the conclusions of the Squire court destroys King County's argument. The dishonesty of the Ninth Circuit panel which considered this brief is reflected in its willingness to hide the conclusions of the Squire court. In Senior Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher's opinion, she refused to even name the Squire opinion when she dishonestly described its lack of importance in her brief.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read the section of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) where Judge Fletcher refuses to name King County v. Squire.


BRIEF PAGES 19-20 (PDF pages 27-28) - "II. Summary Judgment, B. No Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 2. Intention of the Parties to the Hilchkanum Deed was to Grant a Fee Simple Interest, f. Subsequent Conduct of the Parties"

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Pages 19-20. (PDF pages 27-28)

        Once again Scott Johnson hides his most dishonest statements in his footnotes. Footnote 5 on page 19 of his brief has this statement: "It is true that the second deed to Chris Nelson for Government Lot 2 does not specify acreage to subtract, but neither does it mention an easement for the railroad. ER 516 No inference can be drawn from that deed regarding the intent of the parties to the deed at issue." The question in my mind is this:   Exactly how ridiculous a statement can be made by a lawyer before honest people say "enough"? This chronic liar, Scott Johnson, is now admitting that one of the deeds most relevant to this lawsuit does not except the right-of-way. Scott has previously stated that the exception of the right-of-way, in a subsequent real estate deed, indicates the intentions of the Hilchkanums to except the land under the right-of-way. Then, Scott claimed that the exception of the right-of-way indicates that Hilchkanum understood that the land under the right-of-way had been conveyed, fee simple, to the Railway. Now, Scott claims that the lack of a exception of the right-of-way, in a deed conveying another portion of his right-of-way, has no meaning what-so-ever. So, Scott, let me ask you this question here on this webpage, since Federal Judge Rothstein refused my Constitutional right to ask you this question in "her" court.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    A question for Scott Johnson from John Rasmussen:

          Scott, since there is no exception for the SLS&E right-of-way in the deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson for Gov. Lot 2, then that deed conveys the land under the right-of-way to Chris Nelson. The land under the right-of-way on Gov. Lot 2 is the same land that you claim was already deeded to the SLS&E Railway in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Scott, how many times do you claim that a party can sell the same land to different people?

        It is a basic concept in real estate law that a person cannot sell the same land to two different people. This double sale of land is what Scott Johnson is describing in his brief, and then declaring that this glaring legal conflict does not relate to the issues before this court. Please use the following two hyperlinks to understand that the Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson for Government Lot 2 did not except the SLS&E right-of-way and therefore sold the land under the right-of-way. If Hilchkanum understood that he had previously granted the land under the right-of-way to the SLS&E, he should have excepted that right-of-way land in his subsequent deed of Government Lot 2 to Chris Nelson. For orientation, the first hyperlink includes a map of the Hilchkanum homestead with the railroad tracks and Government Lots 1 and 2 depicted. Additionally it provides a transcription of the deed for Gov. Lot 2 and a link to a photocopy of the original deed. In comparison, the second hyperlink shows the grant from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson which conveyed Government Lot 1. This deed, conveying Government Lot 1, excepted the right-of-way. The question for the court is whether the exception of that right-of-way, excepted the land under the right-of-way or simple recognized the existence of an easement for the right-of-way.

      View the Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson conveying all of Government Lot 2. This document contains a map of the Hilchkanum homestead with the railroad tracks and Government Lots 1 and 2 depicted. Additionally it provides a transcription of the deed for Gov. Lot 2 and a link to a photocopy of the original deed.

      View the Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson conveying all of Government Lot 1, with the SLS&E right-of-way excepted.

        With respect to the fact that the deed from Hilchkanum to Nelson conveying all of Gov. Lot 2 does not except the right-of-way, Scott Johnson claims that "No inference can be drawn from that deed regarding the intent of the parties to the deed at issue." Scott Johnson ignores common law which would explain the exception of the right-of-way in some of Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds and the lack of an exception in others. He ignores this law because it destroys his argument that Hilchkanum intended to grant fee simple title of the land under his right-of-way to the Railway. Here is a discussion of the law which Johnson ignores. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    How to legally construe the exception of a right-of-way in a real estate deed:

        To understand the exception of a right-of-way in a subsequent deed, one must first understand the definition of an exception in a deed. Zobrist v. Culp (1977) provides this definition:

      "An exception is the withholding from the operation of the deed of something existent which otherwise the deed would pass to the grantee."
      [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

        So, this requires an honest lawyer, in his brief, to determine what was "existent" in order to determine what is "excepted". If Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, then the exception of that right-of-way in a subsequent deed would simply except an easement. If Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E in his right-of-way deed, then the exception of that right-of-way in a subsequent deed would except fee title to the land under the right-of-way. In fact, this exact issue is discussed in Zobrist.

      "The conveyance of a fee simple interest with a clause excepting an easement...conveys to the grantee all the grantor's rights and interests...yet compels the grantee...from acting...inconsistent with the rights of the third party...described in the exception."
      [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

        This citation explains that the excepting of an easement in a real estate deed simply identifies the easement to the grantee, and does not alter the easement. So, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, the exception of that right-of-way in a subsequent real estate identifies the easement, and nothing more. Zobrist made that exact point:

      "The grantor here excepted a right-of-way amounting to an easement from the grant. No reference was made in the conveyance to Custer of an exception of the fee to the 100 feet." "...Custer...received a fee interest in the land...restricted only...that he could not use...in a manner inconsistent with the existing rights of the railroad..."
      [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

        Now, I ask this question. Is there a requirement that an easement be identified in a subsequent real estate deed, or is it optional to identify an easement in the words of a subsequent deed? The answer is that it is optional to identify the easement. An easement goes with the property whether it is identified in the subsequent deed or not. Anyone who has purchased property, and obtained a title report, has very likely found easements identified in the title report that are not identified in the deed. This is the common way for a grantee to identify easements. It is uncommon in modern real estate deeds to find easements identified as exceptions, but it is legal to do it in that manner.

        If Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, he would need to except the land under the right-of-way grant in every subsequent deed. Otherwise, he would be selling land in that subsequent deed that he had already deeded fee simple to the Railway. He would be selling land that he didn't own in that subsequent deed. On the other hand, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, he wouldn't need to except the right-of-way in every subsequent deed because the easement goes with the property whether it is identified in the deed, or not. So, if some subsequent Hilchkanum deeds excepted the railroad right-of-way and others did not, that would be consistent with the Hilchkanum's granting an easement to the SLS&E with their right-of-way deed.

      View an expanded study of the meaning of the exception of a right-of-way in a deed.

        On page 20 of his brief, Scott Johnson intentionally misrepresents the law by citing Scott v. Wallitner (1956) and implying that the exception of a right-of-way "...is evidence that the grantor intended for the right of way to be conveyed in fee simple". As is common with Scott, he fails to provide a full citation which represents the finding of the court. In this case, he "forgot" to admit that there was no grant of a right-of-way in the chain of deeds construed in Scott v. Wallitner. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "right of way" to the SLS&E. Therefore there is no comparison between the deeds in Scott v. Wallitner and the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds. Here is a more significant citation which exposes Scott Johnson's dishonesty, with a link to the full opinion. (Citation with my emphasis)
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "It will be noticed that in none of these transactions was there a grant of a right of way for the purpose of building a railroad thereon. Here the Ebey Logging Company purchased several tracts of land. As a part of its operations, it built and operated a logging railroad thereon. It carved the right of way out of its own lands. When it completed its operations, it deeded the railroad and the right of way thereof to the Canyon Lumber Company. It subsequently deeded all other lands to the Eyre Shingle Company. In doing so, it was particular to except any lands theretofore conveyed to anyone else. From that point on, one set of conveyances conveyed the right of way and the other set conveyed land except the right of way. There can be no doubt that the intent of the grantors of the right of way was to convey the land and not to convey an easement or right therein."
      [Scott v. Wallitner (1956)]

        When the Hilchkanum's inconsistency with the exception of the right-of-way was briefed to Senior Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher, and the proper legal interpretation of the exception of a right-of-way in a subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deed was briefed, Judge Fletcher ignored our brief and the law. To hide the importance of the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds which did not except the right-of-way, Fletcher simply stated that these deeds did not provide a "scintilla of evidence". Fletcher's finding means that the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds, which did not except the right-of-way, sold the land under the right-of-way a second time. Apparently, selling the same land to two different parties is legal in Senior Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher's mind. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read the portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) where Judge Fletcher makes her "scintilla of evidence" comment.


BRIEF PAGES 21-23 (PDF pages 29-31) - "II. Summary Judgment, B. No Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 3. Appellants Arguments do not Reveal Genuine Issues of Material Fact or Alternative Inferences"

      Open a photocopy of this King County Prosecutor's brief in a separate window. Go to Brief Pages 21-23. (PDF pages 29-31)

        King County moved for summary judgment and knows that there must be no issues of material fact in order for the judge to authorize that legal process. Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein joined in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by refusing my Constitutional right to establish the material facts in "her" court. So, it might be better to look at the disputed material facts that Rothstein illegally allowed in her summary judgment opinion, and then determine whether the County manufactured the facts, or whether the judge manufactured them, and determine whether the facts were disputed in the briefs. Based on Rothstein's opinion, here is a partial list of material facts that were not in agreement which should have required the judge to allow the case to go to a jury for resolution. Of course, Rothstein could not have delivered her dishonest predetermined outcome to the lawsuit if she had allowed the material facts to be resolved by a jury. In this appeal, Senior Circuit Judge Fletcher supported Rothstein's illegal use of summary judgment.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS USED TO DECIDE KING COUNTY V. RASMUSSEN:

          The ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their railroad right-of-way deed is a material fact. Further, It is a material fact who wrote the Hilchkanum deed because the words in a deed are construed against its author, or the party whose attorney prepared the deed. In Federal District Court, King County Senior Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson moved for Judge Rothstein to strike our statement about Hilchkanum's ability to participate in the deed, and to strike our statement about the Railway's authorship. Rothstein dishonestly complied. Here is what she struck.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            "Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian. At the very best he was functionally illiterate, and "made his mark" when he signed legal documents. Thus, all drafting of any ambiguous documents was completed by the railroad’s representative. In this case Bill Hilchkanum and his wife signed a document that did not comport with the necessary elements for conveyance of a fee simple interest, because of the qualifying and limiting language of the document."

        [Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion and view this statement on page 2. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.]

          I discussed the issue of Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed in a study I wrote on the easement-fee issue and submitted to the District Court as Exhibit 1. Of course, Judge Rothstein struck my Exhibit 1 and almost every other exhibit that I submitted. She then illegally applied summary judgment in order to award my land to the County and cover up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. It was critical for Rothstein to strike the facts we submitted and deny our right to reestablish the facts before a jury. No legitimate jury could come to the same conclusions as Rothstein's. When a judge strikes facts and substitutes her own, she can guarantee whatever outcome she wants. That's the danger of summary judgment. The following is the statement that I made in my Exhibit 1.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            "The deed signed by the Hilchkanums was prepared by the educated white men that organized the railroad. The Hilchkanums, on the other hand, were Indians unable to even sign their own names on the deed. They both signed with an "X". In his homestead application Bill Hilchkanum certified that he had given up his tribal affiliation in order to qualify. This would indicate the Hilchkanums were not educated nor likely socialized to all of the white man's customs. With this thought in mind, the Hilchkanums were at a great disadvantage in their transaction with SLS&E. Since the deed was drafted by SLS&E, and the Hilchkanums probably had little or no unbiased legal advice, the deeds must be construed most strongly against SLS&E. This would favor the deed's interpretation as an easement. This is supported in the citation from Brown below:

              "The railroad was a sophisticated, well financed, and organized party, undoubtedly represented by counsel. Landowners stood at a disadvantage to railroads in the early 1900s. For these reasons, the deeds, at least the preprinted portions of them, must be construed against the railroad. '[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it.'" Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2d 430, 457, 924 P.2d 908 (1996)"

        View my Exhibit 1, struck by Judge Rothstein. The above quote is found on page 21.

          Bill Hilchkanum and his wife "signed" their right-of-way deed with an "X". For everyone in the world, except for the federal judges of the Ninth Circuit, this would be proof of Hilchkanum's illiteracy, and strongly suggest that he had no part in drafting the deed. Further, we provided documents that showed the Hilchkanums were Native Americans who relied on their white friends when they needed legal help. American Indians were at the mercy of the white settlers in those days. In the case of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, we provided documents that show the Hilchkanums were helped by David Denny who was one of the owners of the SLS&E Railway. This obvious conflict of interest should have been examined by a jury to determine if Hilchkanum had unbiased advice in the "signing" of his deed.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In this appeal Judge Fletcher supported Distinct Judge Rothstein's manipulation of the facts. Rothstein ignored the history of the settlement of the American west, and the history of the settlement in Washington Territory. She ignored the laws that protected Natives in those days. Rothstein ignored the exhibits we provided, which showed the Hilchkanums were at a great disadvantage in legal transactions. Instead, Rothstein decided that the Hilchkanums were essentially skilled lawyers, capable of dealing with complex legal issues. Rothstein decided that the Hilchkanums actually chose the words in their right-of-way deed. This established the Hilchkanums as author of the deed. Rothstein stated that the Hilchkanums selected certain words in their right-of-way deed in order to comply with complex legal technicalities of federal law. Rothstein referenced no document to support her bizarre conclusions. She denied my constitutional right to establish the facts before a jury. She denied my Constitutional right to establish the obvious fact that the lawyers for the Railway wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Rothstein denied our many and repeated requests for oral arguments.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          It is true that we did not draw Rothstein's attention to our supporting exhibits when we made the statement about Hilchkanum's illiteracy and ability to participate, but since Rothstein published the Hilchkanum deed in her opinion, she was aware that the Hilchkanums could not even sign their own names, a sure indication of illiteracy and sufficient argument that they did not write their deed. Judge Rothstein was playing sick lawyer games instead of being a judge. Rothstein committed a crime from the bench by striking our correct description of Hilchkanum's abilities and participation, and then substituting her own unjustified "facts". It is obscene that Rothstein then stated we agreed with her "facts" and allowed herself the right to decide the lawsuit using summary judgment.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Read a study about Hilchkanum's participation and intentions with his deed. This study provides the history and laws related to Native Americans in that time. Further, it provides specific Hilchkanum documents which explain his participation and intentions with his right-of-way deed.

          Scott Johnson moved to strike our statements about Hilchkanum's ability to participate in the deed, and made no counter argument to our statements describing Hilchkanum's illiteracy and ability to participate. In her district court opinion, Judge Rothstein irrationally found that Hilchkanum actually wrote his right-of-way deed. She irrationally construed all the words against Hilchkanum as author of his deed. This lie and denial of my right to correct this disputed material fact was critical to Judge Rothstein's justification for illegally granting my land to the County. In this appeal, Senior Circuit Judge Fletcher supported Rothstein's dishonest actions.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      The statement of facts and published legal conclusions made in King County v. Squire are material facts. King County v. Squire absolutely destroys Scott Johnson's argument, so Johnson misrepresented the facts and conclusions of that decision in this brief. The Squire court identified the SLS&E form deed which is also the basis of the Hilchkanum deed. By default, the Squire court found that this form deed was written by the Railway lawyers. In King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Federal Judge Rothstein refused to acknowledge that material fact, and instead irrationally found that Hilchkanum wrote the words of his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Neither Scott Johnson nor Judge Rothstein provided any fact to support Hilchkanum's authorship of his deed. Further, in this brief, Scott Johnson misrepresented the legal conclusion in Squire which found that the Squire granting clause strongly indicated that the parties intended to convey an easement. Johnson stated that only the words in the Squire habendum were responsible for the Squire deed being found to grant an easement. This was an outright and intentional lie by Scott Johnson. It is a material fact to establish what is clearly stated in a legal decision. The argument can be made that this is a question of law and not of fact, but the blatant and intentional misrepresentation of the words in a published opinion is a fact.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Compare the Hilchkanum and Squire ROW deeds to understand that the granting words of both deeds are identical, and were found in King County v. Squire to strongly indicate the grant of an easement.

        Open "Brief in Reply to Defendants' Opposition to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (April 19, 2001) in a Separate Window. Go to Page 8 of the brief to read Scott Johnson's dishonest statement about the legal conclusions of the Squire court.

          The intentions of the parties in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact. Scott Johnson states in his brief that it was the intention of the parties to grant fee title, but provides no legitimate legal argument or fact to support that claim. Instead of providing argument to counter our statements about the Hilchkanum's inability to participate in the deed, Johnson tries to "wipe the slate clean" by moving to strike our statements. Since the Railway lawyers wrote every word in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, and the Hilchkanums simply made an "X" on the form deed which was placed in front of them, it is ridiculous to determine the Hilchkanum's intentions from the words of the deed. Only the Railway's intentions are evident from the words in the deed. But, after Judge Rothstein agreed to strike our argument about the participation of the Hilchkanums in their deed, she wrote a "fairy tale" with her opinion, describing how these illiterate Native Americans were essentially experts in Homesteading law and real estate law and signaled their intention to grant fee simple title by the words they selected to use in the deed. It is obscene that Senior Circuit Judge Fletcher allowed this dishonesty to continue with her opinion.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          It is a material fact to determine what was conveyed in the right-of-way deed. In King County's motion for summary judgment to the District Court, Scott Johnson stated repeatedly that a "strip of land" was conveyed to the SLS&E. He pulls the same dishonest stunt in this brief to the Appeals Panel. Judge Rothstein stated in her opinion that a "'strip' of land" was conveyed to the SLS&E. Judge Fletcher made the same dishonest statement in the appeals opinion that followed this brief. We pointed out that one needs to simply read the Hilchkanum deed to see that a "right-of-way" was conveyed. A critical issue in construing railroad deeds is to determine whether a "right-of-way" is conveyed or whether "land" is conveyed. The rules to construe the grant of a "right of way" and the rules to construe the grant of "land" are established by common law precedent. Here they are, with the supporting precedent.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Railroad Land Granting Rule: A deed conveying land to a railroad grants fee simple title unless there is a statement that the deed is for the purpose of a railroad right-of-way or if the deed is limited to railroad right-of-way use. A statement of right-of-way purpose or limitation will change the grant to an easement.
        [Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.]

        Railroad Right-of Way Granting Rule: A deed conveying a right-of way to a railroad grants an easement.
        [Understand the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule", with supporting precedent.]

          What is granted in the Hilchkanum deed is a material fact. Because this was a disputed material fact, Judge Rothstein was required to send it to a jury for resolution. Most people would simply read the deed to realize that a "right of way" was conveyed. But, apparently Judge Fletcher, Judge Rothstein, and Scott Johnson are incapable of reading the Hilchkanum deed to see what is conveyed.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Read the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed to understand what was granted in the right-of-way deed. Rothstein and Johnson state that a "strip of land" is granted. Do you believe it?

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit..."
        [Read the complete Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, and view a photocopy.]

          Of course, Fletcher, Rothstein, and Johnson would claim that this is not an issue of fact, but rather of law. Issues of fact are resolved by a jury. Issues of law are resolved by the court (judge). I present this as an issue of fact because it has always been found that the grant of a right-of-way is the grant of an easement in Washington State common law. There is no law or precedent which allows the judge to substitute the term "'strip' of land" for the term "right of way" in a deed, but that is what Scott Johnson does in his briefs, and Judges Fletcher and Rothstein do in their opinions. It is a material fact to read what is conveyed in the deed. Use the following hyperlink to view fourteen citations which hold the grant of a right-of-way is the grant of an easement. With no law or citation allowing the substitution of critical terms in the Hilchkanum granting clause, what is granted in the Hilchkanum deed is a material fact.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View fourteen precedential citations which show that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is the grant of an easement.

        View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

          The intention of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds is a disputed material fact. As an exhibit to the District Court, Scott Johnson provided a subsequent Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson which excepted the right-of-way. He then stated, in briefs to District Court and this brief, that this exception of the right-of-way excepted the land under the right-of-way, and that it revealed Hilchkanum's intention to convey fee simple title in his right-of-way deed. But, Scott was just a "little" dishonest with his exhibit. The deed which Scott Johnson provided wasn't in the chain of title of the land contested in the lawsuit. But, there was another Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson that was in the chain of title involved in the lawsuit. Why, oh why, oh why, didn't Scott Johnson provide the Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson that was in the chain of title, and therefore more relevant to the lawsuit? Scott's "little" problem was that the second Chris Nelson deed did not except the right-of-way. The fact that this more relevant deed did not except the right-of-way, strongly suggests that the right-of-way was considered to be an easement. Scott was determined to misrepresent the Hilchkanum's intentions in their subsequent deeds, so he presented a less relevant deed which he could more easily use to misrepresent their intentions.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In common law, the exception of a right-of-way does not automatically except the land under the right-of-way. When a right-of-way is excepted in a subsequent deed, the court is required to go to the original right-of-way deed to determine whether the original grant was an easement or fee. The issue of easement of fee is not determined by the subsequent deed, but rather the original deed. Scott Johnson "cherry picks" the Hilchkanum subsequent deeds, selecting a deed which is not in the chain of title of the land contested in the lawsuit. He then intentionally misrepresents the law with respect to his "cherry picked" subsequent deed. He failed to consider a more relevant deed which would force him to come to a different conclusion about the Hilchkanum's intentions with their subsequent deeds.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Use the hyperlink below to go the discussion which explains this law. Sadly, Judges Fletcher and Rothstein adopted the same dishonest strategy in their opinions. They used the non-relevant Chris Nelson deed in her opinion and ignored the Chris Nelson deed that was in the chain of title of the lawsuit land. Considering the use of "cherry picked" extrinsic evidence, the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent deeds is a disputed material fact that should have gone to a jury for resolution. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Open the annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) where Rothstein's dishonest manipulation of these subsequent deeds is discussed.

        At the top of this section, I suggested that the denial of my right to resolve disputed material facts appears to be a result of Scott Johnson's dishonest briefs, combined with criminal actions by the federal judges. Johnson claims that there is no disagreement with the material facts. I've listed disputed material facts above that were used by Judges Rothstein and Fletcher, and shown that responsibility for the illegal use of summary judgment lies with both Scott Johnson and the federal judges.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)



SUMMARY:

    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Summary" are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        This brief must be seen in the context of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Scott Johnson's dishonesty throughout this brief is designed to keep his boss, King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng, and other participants in the crime, out of federal prison. Maleng accepted a fraudulent donation of land from BNSF as a condition of the railroad railbanking the ELS right-of-way. In order to protect himself, and the leadership of the County, from federal prosecution for their part in the tax fraud scheme, Maleng needed to claim the donation of land was legitimate. The principal element of this brief is the false claim of ownership of my land. To make this claim, Scott Johnson needed to overcome the fact that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad has always been held to convey an easement, in common law. He takes these steps:

      * Johnson repeatedly refers to the Hilchkanum grant as a "strip of land" instead of a "right-of-way". The rules used to construe the grant of "rights-of-way" are different than the rules used to construe the grant of "land".

      * Johnson claims that, in Brown, a "sea change" was made to the rules used to construe railroad deeds. This is Norm Maleng's "legal theory". These arguments are completely dishonest, and are not found in the Brown opinion.

      * Scott Johnson misrepresents, and hides, the conclusions in King County v. Squire. An honest evaluation of Squire absolutely destroys the County's argument that Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E.

      * Johnson misrepresents the Hilchkanum's intentions in their SLS&E right-of-way deed with his dishonest analysis of a subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deed. To do this, Johnson uses a subsequent Hilchkanum deed which was not in the chain of title to the land contested in the lawsuit, and ignores a more relevant deed which, when analyzed, contradicts his argument. Scott Johnson "cherry picks" the extrinsic evidence, and then misrepresents the legal implications of this "cherry picked" deed.

        Scott Johnson uses a combination of disputed material facts and misrepresentation of the law in order to make false claim of my land. It was critical for Federal District Judge Rothstein and the Ninth Circuit panel which considered this appeal to illegally apply summary judgment in the face of the disputed material facts. A legitimate jury would never come to the same conclusions of fact and law that were made by these dishonest judges.

    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Summary" are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)