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Ray v. King County, March 15, 2004

Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Gerald and Kathryn Ray, Appellants
v.
King County, Respondent

Docket Number: 50105-4-I



    Note from John Rasmussen:

          This web page contains an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004) issued by Chief Judge Ronald E. Cox, Court of Appeals Division I, State of Washington. Appeals Judge Ann Schindler concurs. This opinion covers-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and is a criminal act from the bench by these two corrupt judges.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    There are three versions of this opinion.

      First, the published version:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      Second, a version containing only brief comments. This version is built to maintain the continuity of Judge Cox' opinion, but make the reader aware of the violation of Constitutional rights, the massive dishonesty, and the intentional misapplication of the law by Cox. This is the best version to obtain an overview of Judge Cox' dishonesty.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)

      Third, the version, which you are viewing here, contains detailed comments analysis of this very dishonest opinion. This version provides links to supporting argument, historical documents, and precedential opinions. But, this version breaks up the continuity of Judge Cox' opinion because the lengthy explanations of his dishonest tactics and misapplication of the law.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Dissenting Opinion:

            The dissenting opinion (Ray v. King County (2004)-Dissenting), by Judge William W. Baker, identified most of the errors in applying the law, but failed to identify Judge Cox and Schindler's violation of the Ray's Constitutional rights. Cox and Schindler intentionally violated the Ray's right of due process by allowing summary judgment in the face of disputed material facts. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    I Question Judge Cox' Character and Honesty.

            Judge Cox is a member of class of 1966 at West Point. Apparently he left his "Duty, Honor, Country" there, if he ever had any. After I read this dishonest opinion, I sent an email to him through a USMA affiliated website. Of course, he didnít reply. Why would a dishonest judge reply to a person who challenges his honesty? Judges are rarely held responsible for criminal acts committed from the bench.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Email sent to Judge Cox April 13, 2004.

          "To: Ronald Cox, USMA "66

          I'd like to know why a USMA Class of '66 member is involved in the federal tax fraud scheme along East Lake Sammamish, Washington. With your Ray decision, you desecrate the graves of your USMA class members that gave their lives to support the Constitution and the law. If you are an honest man, we need to talk. As a first step, kindly send me your email address. I'd like to send a document to you.

          John Rasmussen USNA '67"

    Color Scheme:

            Judge Cox' opinion is displayed in bold blue font color. I have added my comments in black font color, bracketed by horizontal reference lines, with hyperlinks to documents that support my points. My comments will be preceded with the words "Note from John Rasmussen:".

    Reference:

      View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View Ray v. King County (2004), with brief comments. (More readable!)

      View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
NO. 50105-4-I
PUBLISHED

GERALD L. RAY and KATHRYN B. RAY, husband and wife, Appellants,
vs
KING COUNTY, a political subdivision, Respondent.

---------------------------

Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number: 50105-4-I

Title of Case: Gerald and Kathryn Ray, Appellants V King County, Respondent

File Date: 03/15/2004

SOURCE OF APPEAL
---------------------------
Appeal from Superior Court of King County
Docket No: 00-2-14946-8
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 08/24/2001
Judge signing: Hon. Carol Schapira

JUDGES
------
Authored by Ronald E. Cox
Concurring: Ann Schindler
Dissenting: William W. Baker

COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s)
John Maurice Groen
Groen Stephens & Klinge LLP
2101 112th Ave NE
Bellevue, WA 98004-2944

Counsel for Respondent(s)
Scott David Johnson
King Co Admin Bldg
500 4th Ave Ste 900
Seattle, WA 98104-2316

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Building Industry Assn Of Washington
Kristopher Ian Tefft
Association of Washington Business
PO Box 658
Olympia, WA 98507-0658

FILED

      COX, A.C.J. -This quiet title action presents two questions. First, did an 1887 deed to a railroad convey fee title or an easement? Second, did events subsequent to that conveyance divest the railroad of the interest conveyed by that deed?

      We hold that Bill Hilchkanum and Mary Hilchkanum, grantors, conveyed fee title by deed dated May 9, 1887 to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway ('the Railway'). We also hold that the location of the railroad tracks, as constructed, controls as a monument. Although the legal description of the location of that monument varies from the legal description of the right of way in the May 9, 1887 deed, there was no abandonment that divested the Railway of its fee title interest in the disputed strip. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment quieting title in King County, a successor in interest to the Railway.

      The facts are largely undisputed.1 Gerald and Kathryn Ray own lakefront property near the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish in King County, Washington. The Rays are successors in interest to property formerly owned by Bill Hilchkanum and Mary Hilchkanum, husband and wife. The Rays acquired their interest by virtue of conveyances following the Hilchkanums' May 9, 1887 deed that is the focus of our inquiry in this case.2 Likewise, King County is a successor in interest to the estate the Hilchkanums conveyed to the Railway by that deed.3

      The basic dispute between the parties centers on their conflicting claims of ownership of the 100-foot-wide strip of land that the Hilchkanums conveyed in their May 9, 1887 deed to the Railway. The strip is adjacent to the property on which the Rays reside. This strip of land is one segment of the East Lake Sammamish ('ELS') Corridor,4 which runs near the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish. For most of the last century, the ELS Corridor was known as 'Northern Pacific Railroad Right of Way' because Northern Pacific acquired ownership from the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway.5 Burlington Northern and The Land Conservancy of Seattle were successors in interest to Northern Pacific to the strip and predecessors in interest to King County for that property.6 In 1998, the County purchased roughly 11 miles of the ELS Corridor from The Land Conservancy. The purchase included the property the Hilchkanums conveyed in their May 1887 deed.7 The Rays argue that the May 9, 1887 deed conveyed an easement only to the Railway, not fee title. They also claim that the subsequent construction of the railway line in early 1888 in a location that varied from the legal description of the right of way set forth in the May 1887 deed constituted an abandonment of the estate conveyed in the deed. For these reasons, they claim title to the strip of land vests in them. King County disputes the Rays' claim to ownership of the strip. The County maintains that the May 9, 1887 deed, properly construed, conveyed to the Railway an estate in fee title to the strip of land. The County further maintains that subsequent construction of the railway line between January and April 1888 established a monument as the centerline of the 100-foot strip described in the deed. Finally, the County argues that it acquired fee title to that 100-foot wide strip of land as a successor in interest to the Railway, the grantee under the May 1887 deed.

      The Rays commenced this quiet title action to enforce their ownership claim, and King County counterclaimed to enforce its position. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court quieted title in the County, confirming that the May 1887 deed conveyed fee title, not an easement. The trial court further decided that the railroad line, as built, established the monument defining the property the original grantors intended to convey by virtue of the May 1887 deed.

      The Rays appeal.

CONVEYANCE: FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR EASEMENT?

      Our review of the grant of summary judgment below is governed by the usual standards: whether there are genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9 A party seeking to quiet title 'must succeed on the strength of his or her own title, not on the weakness of the other party's title.'10



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Here, Judge Cox violates the rules of Summary Judgment.

          Judge Cox violates the rules of summary judgment by deciding disputed issues of material fact himself rather than complying with the law and sending the case back to superior court for a jury trial. By his actions, Judge Cox violates the Washington State Constitution and the Revised Code of Washington (RCW). When a judge illegally rules on issues of fact, as Cox does in this opinion, the judge can guarantee whatever outcome he wishes. Abuse of summary judgment by judges appears to be an epidemic in our courts. The illegal use of summary judgment gives judges great power that is not allowed by our State or Federal Constitutions. This abuse of summary judgment by Judge Cox is an intentional violation of the Ray's right of due process. It denies their constitutional right to establish the facts of their lawsuit. This is a denial of one of the most basic and natural rights in any legitimate court of law.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Understand the concept and rules of summary judgment.

          There are numerous instances of Judge Cox illegally deciding issues of material fact in this opinion. Here, I identify five disputed material facts that Judges Cox and Schindler illegally resolved, and briefly discuss their significance. Each of these material facts is discussed in detail at the appropriate places in this annotated opinion.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      The intentions of the Hilchkanums in their 1887 right-of-way deed is a material fact. Judge Cox admits that he is aware of this rule with his statement directly below: "It is a factual question to determine the intent of the parties." Yet, throughout this opinion, Cox makes factual assumptions about the Hilchkanum's intentions without any document or legitimate argument in support. The intentions of the parties in a deed are determined by an analysis of the words in the deed, the circumstances at the time of the deed's execution, and the subsequent conduct of the parties. Judge Cox manipulated all three of these factors, in violation of the law, in order to falsely establish the material fact of the Hilchkanum's intentions. In doing this, Cox ignored factors such as the history of Native Americans in Washington Territory, the laws that protected Natives at that time, and many Hilchkanum specific documents that contradicted Judge Cox' irrational and illegal conclusions about the Hilchkanum's intentions. With this information, a legitimate jury would not have come to the same conclusion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Understand the Hilchkanum's intentions with their right-of-way deed.

        (The explanation linked above relates to my portion of the Hilchkanum homestead. But, the Rays and I used the same deed researcher and it can be assumed that similar documentation was provided to Judge Cox. I don't have the Ray's briefs available.)

      The intention of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds is a disputed material fact. When Judge Cox illegally determined the Hilchkanum's intentions in their subsequent real estate deeds, he "cherry-picked" the deeds, ignoring an analysis of deeds which contradicted his argument. Using only his "cherry-picked" the deeds, he then misapplied the common law precedent in his analysis.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the portion of this opinion where Judge Cox made his illegally determination of the Hilchkanum's intentions in their subsequent real estate deeds. This discussion spans several notes.

      The authorship of the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact. Authorship is important because the words in a deed are construed against its author. The Hilchkanum deed was based on a form deed written by the Railway lawyers. Judge Cox irrationally and illegally determined the material fact that the Hilchkanum's were responsible for those words. This abuse of summary judgment is later discussed in detail.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the portion of this opinion where I discuss Judge Cox' illegally determination of who authored the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

      The ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their deeds is a material fact. Judge Cox determines that the Hilchkanums were able to participate in their deeds. He comes to this determination by claiming that the Rays provide no evidence to the contrary. This analysis of the Ray's evidence is the duty of a jury, not the privilege of this dishonest judge. Since the Rays and I used the same deed researcher, and that deed researcher provided document after document that showed the Hilchkanums were limited in their ability to deal with legal matters, I'm positive that Judge Cox chose to ignore the contributing facts in order to come to his conclusion of fact concerning the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their deeds.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the portion of this opinion where I discuss Judge Cox' illegally determination of the Hilchkanum's ability to participate in their deed.

      What was granted in the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact. Judge Cox dishonestly changed the Hilchkanum granting words from a "right of way" to a "strip of land". In construing a railroad deed to determine easement of fee, it is a critical issue to identify whether a "right of way" or "land" is conveyed. This is critical because these are contradictory terms. There is no law or precedent that allows a judge to change the words in a deed and then construe the deeds using those substituted words. What is granted is a fact. Whether a "right of way" or a "strip of land" was granted is a critical material fact.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the portion of this opinion where I discuss Judge Cox' substitution of the granting words of the deed.

          Above, I've listed five disputed issues of material fact that are required to be resolved by a jury. Any one of these disputed facts should have forced Judge Cox to send the lawsuit back for jury trial. As one reads this opinion, other disputed issues of material fact will be evident.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          The rules of summary judgment are well understood and are constantly being considered in our courts. It is essentially impossible for Judge Cox to have mistakenly allowed summary judgment. Cox needed to illegally allow summary judgment in order to justify his predetermined outcome to the lawsuit. The effect of his illegal actions was to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and to protect the powerful folks in King County who actively participated in the crime.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

      View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

Where a deed conveys a right of way to a railroad, the conveyance may be in fee simple or may be an easement only.11 The interpretation of such a deed is a mixed question of fact and law.12 It is a factual question to determine the intent of the parties.13 Courts must then apply the rules of law to determine the legal consequences of that intent.14 Whether a conveyance is one of fee title or an easement is a conclusion of law as to the effect of a deed.15



    Note from John Rasmussen:

          Above, Judge Cox writes "Where a deed conveys a right of way to a railroad, the conveyance may be in fee simple or may be an easement only. 11" Cox' footnote 11 takes one to Brown v. State (1996).

      Read the citation in Brown, which is not consistent with Judge Cox' statement above.

          This implication that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad "may" be a grant of the underlying land is an adoption of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Maleng's "legal theory" is a dishonest legal argument, designed to keep Maleng and the leadership of King County out of federal prison. Brown doesnít state that the conveyance of a "right-of-way" to a railroad may be fee simple or and easement. Instead, the Brown decision recognizes that railroads can hold rights-of-way in fee simple or as easements. There is a big difference between the granting of a "right-of-way" and the holding of a "right-of-way". The grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been construed to be the grant of an easement in Washington State/Territory, without exception, until King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002) and this very dishonest opinion. All three of these decisions misconstrue the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E, and cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. All three of these decisions adopt Norm Maleng's "legal theory".
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Above, I stated that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been held to be the grant of an easement in Washington State. On the other hand, railroads have always been able to purchase land and then establish rights-of-way on their own land. In that situation, railroads may hold rights-of-way in fee simple. Judge Coxí above statement is misleading. There are two understandings of the term "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. The words can either refer to the right that is granted for a railroad to cross someoneís property (an easement), or the words "right-of-way" can be used to merely describe the area that the railroad uses to establish its tracks and run its trains. How and where the term "right-of-way" is used in a deed determines which meaning of the term is legally applied. In the history of Washington State, the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been held to grant a right rather than the grant of the land. This grant of a right has always been held to be an easement. Judge Cox' is very wrong with his statement: "Where a deed conveys a right of way to a railroad, the conveyance may be in fee simple or may be an easement only." Cox would have been correct if he had stated "Where a deed conveys land to a railroad, the conveyance may be in fee simple or may be an easement only." But, Judge Cox was not interested in applying and upholding Washington State common law. Instead, he was interested in confusing and destroying over one hundred years of consistently held precedent.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Below, are forty-four citations which explain the meaning of the term "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. The citations are from opinions spanning more than one hundred years, and are consistent in their interpretation of the grant of a "right-of-way" in a railroad deed. Each abbreviated citation is a hyperlink which will take the reader to its location in its respective opinion. Read the hyperlinked quotes in the context of the full decision. Equally important, read the full decision. These decisions establish the common law precedent that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad grants only an easement. This precedent was intentionally destroyed in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and in this decision by Judge Cox. Judges Cox, Rothstein, and Fletcher are confident that folks will not make the effort to read these opinions and understand the intentional dishonesty and the misapplication of common law in their opinions.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Citations Explaining the Meaning of the Words "Right-of-way" in Railroad Deeds:

    (Citations are in reverse chronological order, with my emphasis on the terms "right-of-way" and "easement".)

      2000: Roeder v. K&E Storage (2000)
        "Because the words "right of way" appeared only in each deed's legal description or in the description of the railroad's obligations, instead of in the granting or habendum clauses, the court concluded that '[u]sed in this manner, 'right of way' merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines; it does not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses.'"

      1996: Brown v. State of Washington (1996)
        "We have given special significance to the words "right of way" in railroad deeds."

        "...we held the deed granted an easement based on the specifically declared purpose that the grant was a right of way for railroad purposes..."

        "...the term "right of way" as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant generally creates only an easement."

        "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway." ... "Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations..." "Used in this manner, "right of way" merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines; it does not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses."

        Dissenting Opinion: "...where the granting clause...declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement only..."

        Dissenting Opinion: "...an easement is not created unless the magic words "right of way" are contained in the 'granting clause.'"

        Dissenting Opinion: "...Morsbach does not narrowly define "granting clause" nor does it require the right of way purpose be expressed in any particular words."

        Dissenting Opinion: "Where the purpose is right of way...it was the intent of the parties to grant...an easement."

        Dissenting Opinion: "...majority...giving "special significance to the words 'right of way' in railroad deeds,"...finding the absence...overpowering in significance."

        Dissenting Opinion: "A grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely..."

      1993: Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)
        "...when the granting clause...declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only..."

      1990: King County v. Squire (1990)
        "...rights of way granted to a railroad are frequently held to create easements."

        "[W]hen the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose...to be a right of way...the deed passes an easement only..."

        "...construing the deed as a whole, held...instrument conveyed a right of way easement..."

        "...The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way...This suggests an easement was conveyed."

        "...right-of-way...language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement..."

        "...language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed."

      1986: Lawson v. State (1986)
        "...where a deed is construed to convey a right of way for railroad purposes only, upon abandonment...the land...reverts...free of the easement...."

      1986: Roeder v. BNSF (1986)
        "Since the granting clause...declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement..."

        "...land being conveyed as "a right-of-way"...has been found to create an easement..."

      1979: Veach v. Culp (1979)
        "The parties...describe what was being conveyed: a right-of-way...Language like this has been found to create an easement..."

        "...language of the deed...describing the conveyance of a right-of-way...we conclude the deed conveyed an easement..."

      1977: Zobrist v. Culp (1977)
        "...when the granting clause...declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only..."

      1956: Scott v. Wallitner (1956)
        "...in none of these transactions was there a grant of a right of way for the purpose of building a railroad..."

      1950: Swan v. O'Leary (1950)
        "...when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only..."

      1929: Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)
        "...we held that the reservation was of a right of way creating nothing more than an easement..."

        "...an instrument reserving and excepting a strip of land...conveyed...for a right of way...only an easement was granted..."

        "...construed as a whole...in the light of the purpose...it was made, was a grant of a right of way or easement..."

        "...grant of the right of way...was intended to convey simply the right of way and easement..."

        "...a conveyance...granting a right of way...will be held to have taken an easement merely..."

        "...granting clause...conveys only a right of way, which is a mere easement..."

        "...Where the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement only, and not a fee..."

        "...Where the granting clause declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement..."

        "...the granting clause"..."described as follows, to wit: The right of way for a railroad"..."conveyed an easement only, and not a fee."

        "...grant involved was of a right of way...across a tract of land"..."held...that...an easement...was granted."

        "In the Uhl case...what meaning...given 'right of way' used in the granting clause of the deed...its effect...to vest...an easement..."

        "...grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely..."

      1910: Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)
        "The grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement..."

      1905: Abercrombie v. Simmons et al (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1905)
        "...in regard to the right of way...the grant...vests...an easement..."

        "...a deed releasing and quitclaiming to a railroad company a right of way...did not acquire the fee of the land."

        "...the words "right of way" in a grant to a railroad company means an easement..."

      1894: Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co.(1894)
        "The conveyance is one of a mere right of way habendum to the grantee...and show the grant of an easement only..."

      1893: Biles v. Tacoma, Olympia & Gray's Harbor R.R. Co.(1893)
        The term "right-of-way" means "easement".

          The grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement in Washington State/Territory until this dishonest decision and its sister decisions in federal court; King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002)]. The term "right-of-way" can have two different meanings when used in a railroad right-of-way deed. To understand which meaning is intended, a person must examine how and where the words "right-of-way" are used. The decisions, above, establish the rules that are used to understand which meaning is intended. One rule stands out and controls this opinion. When a "right-of-way" is conveyed in the granting clause of a railroad deed, the deed has always been found to be an easement, without exception.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In the mid 1990's, a federal tax fraud scheme was concocted by the leadership of King County and BNSF which netted King County a free bike path along East Lake Sammamish, and netted BNSF a $40 million illegal tax write-off. A number of powerful people in King County participated in the crime, including judges. I describe the crime as "Theft-by-Community". There was a problem that needed fixing in order for the tax fraud scheme to succeed. The land under the right-of-way was mostly easements and therefore not owned by BNSF. In order to hide the tax fraud scheme, it was necessary to establish that BNSF actually owned the land under its ELS right-of-way. BNSF couldn't take a tax write-off for donating land it didn't own. So, there was the need to get a judge to find that BNSF owned fee simple title to the land under the right-of-way. That would require the judge to misconstrue original right-of-way deeds by ignoring one hundred years of consistently held legal precedent. It would require the judge to steal the land from its rightful owners and award ownership to BNSF. It would require a judge to deny the Constitutional rights of the people she/he was defrauding. The first significant criminal act by the courts was committed by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein in King County v. Rasmussen (2001). Rothstein's criminal act from the bench was covered up by Senior Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher in King County v. Rasmussen (2002). This decision construes the same 1887 right-of-way deed that was criminally construed in federal court. Judge Cox joins the ELS federal tax fraud scheme as an active participant with this opinion.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In this opinion you will be treated to a view of "justice", King County style!

    Reference:

      Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

      View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

      View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

The Hilchkanum deed is entirely handwritten, and states in relevant part:

      Bill Hilchkanum and wife )
                        to                        )       Right of Way Deed
      S.L.S. and E.R.Y. Co.     )

          In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King, in Washington territory, we do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to-wit
    Lots one (1) two (2) and three (3) in section six (6) township 24 North of range six (6) East.

    Such right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across our said lands by the Engineer of said railway company which location is described as follows to-wit.

          Commencing at a point 410 feet West from North East corner of Section six (6) township 24 N R 6 East and running thence on a one (1) degree curve to the left for 753 3/10 feet thence South 16 degrees and 34 minutes West 774 2/10 feet thence with a 3 degree curve to the right for 700 feet thence with an 8 degree curve to the right for 260 4/10 feet thence South 58 degrees and 24 minutes West 259 6/10 feet thence with an 8 curve to the left for 564 4/10 feet thence South 13 15' W 341 4/10 feet thence with a 6 curve to the right for 383 3/10 feet thence S 36 15 W 150 feet to South boundary of lot 3 of said Sec 6 which point is 1320 feet North and 2170 feet west from SE corner of said Sec 6

          And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road.

          To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever.

          In witness whereof the parties of the first part have hereunto put their hands and seals this 9th day of May AD 1887

      Signed Sealed and delivered

      in presence of                                    Bill (his X mark) Hilchkanum =seal=
      BJ Tallman
      DJ Denny                                          Mary (her X mark) Hilchkanum =seal= {16}



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    This is a classic railroad right-of-way deed granting an easement under the common law rules established in the forty-four citations listed above.

    Itís an easement for these reasons:

      1. The deed grants a "right-of-way" to a railroad in the granting clause of the deed. This has always been held to grant an easement in Washington State common law, without exception. This precedent is explained in the forty-four citations presented above. From those forty-four, view these most relevant fourteen:

        View fourteen citations explaining that the conveyance of a "right-of-way" to a railroad grants only an easement.

      2. The statutory warranty form and statutory bargain and sale form were codified by the Territorial legislature in 1886, and by their use imply the grant of fee simple title of real estate. This deed was written in 1887 and is not in a statutory form which would suggest that it is a fee simple grant. This fact becomes more relevant when one realizes that the lawyer responsible for the words in the deed was Judge Thomas Burke. Judge Burke was cofounder of the SLS&E and became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Washington Territory the year after he wrote and obtained the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Judge Burke was one of our most respected territorial judges and was considered an expert in property law.

      3. Essentially, this deed has already been construed in King County v. Squire (1990). In the Squire decision, the court correctly determined which words were written by Governor Squire and which words were composed by Judge Burke and his SLS&E co-council, George Haller. This Hilchkanum deed is built on the same Railway prepared form deed, and uses exactly the same granting language that was used in the Squire right-of-way deed. Since the granting words in the Squire deed were found to "strongly suggest" an easement, the identical words in the Hilchkanum deed should be construed to be an easement, too.

        Compare the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

      4. The Hilchkanums were illiterate Native American Indians. Natives in those days were on the bottom rung of society and at tremendous disadvantage in legal transactions. Therefore, the words of the deed and the extrinsic evidence must be viewed in that light.

        Understand the Hilchkanums participation and intentions with their right-of-way deed.

      5. The Homestead Act of 1862 was the major act that encouraged the settlement of the American West. The Hilchkanums were Native Americans and were not eligible to homestead until the Act of March 3, 1875. That Act allowed Natives to homestead if they renounced their tribal relations. But, the Act also required that "Indians" not sell their land for five years after obtaining patent. Therefore, the Hilchkanums could only grant an easement to the Railway in 1887 because federal law restricted them from selling their land until 1893, five years after their 1888 patent.

        View the Hilchkanum Homestead Application showing it was authorized under the Act of March 3, 1875.

        Read the portion of the Act of March 3, 1875 pertaining to Native homesteading.

          Of course, the above reasons were not honestly considered in this opinion because Judge Cox decided to participate in the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the BNSF ELS right-of-way. In order to participate in the crime, Judge Cox decided to ignore the rights of the Rays and to ignore his oath to uphold the law.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Reference:

      View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

      View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

      In Brown v. State, our supreme court most recently articulated the principles governing resolution of the mixed questions of fact and law before us. There, the court resolved a dispute between property owners abutting the railroad right of way, who claimed reversionary interests in it, and the State, which purchased the right of way from a successor in interest to the original grantees of the strip under some 37 deeds. The deeds, which were dated between 1906 and 1910,17 were on preprinted forms with blank lines containing handwritten descriptions of the specific properties conveyed.18 The court ultimately held that the deeds conveyed fee simple title because they were 'in statutory warranty form, expressly convey fee simple title, and contain no express or clear limitation or qualification otherwise.'19

      The court began its analysis by noting that the decisions dealing with conveyancing of rights of way to railroads in various jurisdictions 'are in considerable disarray' and 'turn on a case-by-case examination of each deed.' 20 In Washington, the general rule is that when construing a deed, 'the intent of the parties is of paramount importance and the court's duty to ascertain and enforce.'21 The court then identified the following factors for determining intent:

    (1) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land, and did not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose to which the land was to be put, or in other ways limiting the estate conveyed; (2) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and limited its use to a specific purpose; (3) whether the deed conveyed a right of way over a tract of land, rather than a strip thereof; (4) whether the deed granted only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land; (5) whether the deed contained a clause providing that if the railroad ceased to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor; (6) whether the consideration expressed was substantial or nominal; and (7) whether the conveyance did or did not contain a habendum clause, and many other considerations suggested by the language of the particular deed. In addition to the language of the deed, we will also look at the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties.{22}

The court also noted the special significance that has been accorded the term 'right of way' in Washington deeds:

    In Roeder, for example, one of the deeds provided, in part, the grantor: "conveys and warrants unto Bellingham and Northern Railway Company . . . for all railroad and other right of way purposes, certain tracts and parcels of land. . . ." Roeder,105 Wn.2d at 569. Recognizing a railroad can hold rights of way in fee simple or as easements, we held the deed granted an easement based on the specifically declared purpose that the grant was a right of way for railroad purposes, and there was no persuasive evidence of intent to the contrary. /6 Roeder,105 Wn.2d at 574. We reached the same result in Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 564, 278 P. 686 (1929) (deed granted "the right-of-way for the construction of said company's railroad in and over . . ."); Swan, 37 Wn.2d at 534 (granted property "for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way . . ."); Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 572 (granted "[a] right-of-way one hundred feet wide . . ."). See also Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co., 10 Wash. 357, 358, 38 P. 1126 (1894) ("so long as the same shall be used for the operation of a railroad" construed as granting easement); Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 60 Wash. 502, 505, 111 P. 578 (1910) (deed providing "to have and to hold the said premises . . . for railway purposes, but if it should cease to be used for a railway the said premises shall revert to said grantors" grants easement not determinable fee); King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wn. App. 888, 890, 801 P.2d 1022 (1990) ("grant and convey . . . a right-of-way. . . . To Have and to Hold . . . so long as said land is used as a right-of-way . . ." grants easement), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1021 (1991). {23}



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            I took the liberty to hyperlink all of the citations in Judge Cox' paragraph above. These citations spell out some of the rules used to construe the words "right-of-way" in a railroad deed and are critical to understanding the common law precedent. Each hyperlink will take you to that citation in the context of its decision. Read the whole decision to fully understand this common law precedent.

            More important, read the forty-four citations which fully define the common law understanding of the words "right-of-way" in a railroad deed. Also, review the fourteen citations which explicitly hold that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement. These citations are available in the links directly below. These citations are a richer and more complete documentation of the legal precedent discussed in Brown. This is important because the Brown court was dealing with railroad deeds which were written in statutory warranty form and conveyed only land. This opinion deals with a deed written in a different form and conveying a "right-of-way". In fact, in his next two paragraphs Judge Cox admits that the Hilchkanum deed is not in a statutory form which implies the conveyance of fee title. But then, later in the opinion he uses the Brown criteria to analyze the Hilchkanum deed. It's dishonest for Judge Cox to apply the citations and discussion in Brown to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed without considering the full legal precedent established in Washington common law over the last one hundred years.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

        View fourteen citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" conveys an easement.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          We begin our analysis of the Hilchkanum deed by determining its form. In Brown, the court emphasized the grantors' use of the statutory warranty form of deed.24 Where such a statutory deed is used and the granting clause conveyed a definite strip of land, the court will conclude that the grantor intended to convey fee simple title unless additional language in the deed clearly and expressly showed otherwise.25

          At the time of the May 9, 1887 conveyance, there were three statutory forms of deed: warranty, bargain and sale, and quit claim deed.26 Comparison of the language of the deed, which states in relevant part that the Hilchkanums 'hereby donate, grant and convey' their property, with the statute then in effect shows that their deed is not substantially in the form of either a statutory warranty deed or a bargain and sale deed.27 Consequently, no presumption arises that the deed conveyed fee simple title.28 But, as the Brown court also indicated, determining the form of the deed does not end the analysis of intent.

          We next focus on the actual language of the deed. The Rays argue that the Hilchkanum deed did not convey 'land,' but rather only a 'right of way.'29 According to the Rays, the use of the latter term 'invariably' means the grantors conveyed a mere easement.30 We disagree.

          The granting provisions of the Hilchkanums' deed characterize the conveyed property first as a 'right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through' {the Hilchkanums'} lands,' and the property conveyed as a 'right of way strip.'31 The substance of this language is that the subject of the conveyance is a strip of land, not just the grant of some interest 'over' the land, as the Rays state. Language conveying a strip of land suggests a fee, not a mere easement.32



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            In his discussion above, Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald Cox dishonestly changes the words of the deed and then construes his substituted language instead of the actual language in the deed. This substitution of granting words is a basic element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". This dishonest "legal theory" was developed after the King County Prosecutor participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. It was designed to keep Norm Maleng, his staff, and the leadership of King County out of federal prison. Judge Cox becomes a participant in the tax fraud scheme with his adoption of Maleng's "legal theory" in this portion of his opinion.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            Earlier in this opinion, Judge Cox states "In Washington, the general rule is that when construing a deed, 'the intent of the parties is of paramount importance and the court's duty to ascertain and enforce.'" Cox provides no document showing the parties to the Hilchkanum deed intended the words "right of way" to be understood to mean a "strip of land". This changing of the critical words in the granting clause is something Cox decided to do with out any document, fact, or legal precedent in support. This changing of the words in the granting clause was necessary for Cox to construe the deed to grant fee simple title. Construing the deed to convey fee simple title was necessary to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            In the paragraph directly above, Cox starts by acknowledging a "right of way" was conveyed. But in the same sentence, he states/implies that it is really a "right of way strip". This is an outright lie by Cox. A "right of way" was conveyed, not a "strip" or "right of way strip". I copy the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed here for the reader to understand that a "right of way" was granted, not a "right of way strip". (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King, in Washington territory, we do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to-wit"
        [Hilchkanum Granting Clause]

          Read the complete Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to identify this granting clause in context.

            In his next sentence, Cox changes his "right of way strip" into a "strip of land". In two sentences, this slimy liar has changed the grant in the Hilchkanum deed from a "right of way" to the grant of a "strip of land". In construing a railroad deed to determine easement or fee, the principle consideration is whether the deed grants a "right-of-way" or if it grants land. If the railroad deed grants a "right-of-way", it has always been found to grant an easement in Washington State/Territory. If the railroad deed conveys land, without a restriction, limitation, or a stated purpose, it has always been found to grant fee simple title. It is beyond obscene for Judge Cox to equate a "right of way" with a "strip of land", when his duty is to identify which of the two is conveyed.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            The last step, in Cox' sequence of lies, is to conclude that, since a "strip of land" was conveyed, it must have been "fee" simple title to the land. What a completely dishonest person. This is essentially the same tactic used by federal judges Rothstein and Fletcher in King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002).
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Federal Judge Barbara Rothstein changed the words of the Hilchkanum deed in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

          Federal Judge Betty Fletcher changed the words of the Hilchkanum deed in King County v. Rasmussen (2002)

            I copy Cox' dishonest analysis again here with emphasis on how he restates what is granted, substituting different and contradictory terms for the term "right-of-way". Cox is implying/stating that all these different terms have the same legal meaning. They do not! (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The granting provisions of the Hilchkanums' deed characterize the conveyed property first as a 'right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through' {the Hilchkanums'} lands,' and the property conveyed as a 'right of way strip.'31 The substance of this language is that the subject of the conveyance is a strip of land, not just the grant of some interest 'over' the land, as the Rays state. Language conveying a strip of land suggests a fee, not a mere easement.32"

            The Rays correctly state that a "right-of-way" is conveyed in the deed. Judge Cox declares that a "strip of land" is conveyed in the deed. Judge Cox cites no law or legitimate legal precedent in his determination that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad can by somehow be twisted around to be the grant of a "strip of land". We have juries to keep dishonest judges, like Ronald Cox, from manufacturing material facts as he has done here. If Judge Cox and his panel were honest, they would abide by the rules of summary judgment and send the lawsuit back to King County Superior Court for a jury trial. If it were the intention of the parties in the Hilchkanum deed to convey a "right of way" in the words of the deed, but really mean to convey fee title to a "strip of land", that bizarre material fact must be established before a jury. The intentions of the parties in a deed is a fact. Facts belong to a jury, the law belongs to the judge. There is no law that allows a judge to change the words in a deed and then construe the deed based on his substituted words. But, if Judge Cox allowed the disputed material facts to be resolved by a jury, he could not hide the ELS federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants in the crime. So, the right to resolve disputed material facts before a jury was denied the Rays.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            For over one hundred years the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has been consistently held to grant an easement, until this dishonest opinion, and the decisions in King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002). Read more on this subject at the hyperlink below.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View a study of the meaning of "right-of-way" in a railroad deed.

            Above in this web page, I provided links to forty-four citations which provide the precedent that is used to construe the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. I provide a link here which will open those citations in a new window. "Click" on each hyperlinked citation to open the citation in the context of its full opinion.

        View forty-four citations defining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

            As one reads these forty-four citations in the context of their full opinions, one will understand the critical issue, in deciding whether a railroad deed is a grant of easement or fee simple, is whether a right-of way is conveyed or whether land is conveyed. Instead of determining whether land or a "right-of-way" was conveyed, Judge Cox determined that the grant of a "right-of-way" is the same as a grant of land. This throws out one hundred years of legal precedent and leaves the decision of easement or fee up to the whim of the judge. Judge Cox made this finding without any legitimate common law citation to support his substitution of words in the Hilchkanum granting clause. The Federal Hilchkanum decisions are not legal precedent, but rather are criminal acts from the bench. Judge Cox joins in those criminal acts with his above substitution of "strip of land" for "right of way" in the Hilchkanum deed.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            From the above forty-four citations, I've selected fourteen which show that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement in Washington State common law. They are listed below.

      Citations Explaining the Grant of a "Right-of-Way" to a Railroad is an Easement.

      (The citations are in chronological order, with my emphasis.)

        Abercrombie v. Simmons et al (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1905)

          "In Railway Co. v. Geisel, 119 Ind. 77, 21 N. E. 470, there was a deed releasing and quitclaiming to a railroad company a right of way 80 feet wide through a certain tract of land, and it was held that the company did not acquire the fee of the land."
          [Abercrombie v. Simmons et al (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1905)]

        Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)

          "It is followed by a case note in 6 Ann. Cas., p. 239, supra, among others, citing many cases to the effect that, where a railroad has taken a conveyance expressly granting a right of way, it will be held to have taken an easement merely, and that a grant of a strip of land to a railroad company 'for right of way and for operating its railroad only,' conveyed merely an easement."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "...The granting clause of this instrument conveys only a right of way, which is a mere easement, the owner of the soil retaining his exclusive right in all mines, timber and earth for every purpose not incompatible with the use for which it is granted;..."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "The agreement in this case does not grant land in its granting clause, but only right of way . . . Where the granting clause declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement only, though it be in the usual form of warranty deed."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "In Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Wachter, 70 Ohio 113, 70 N. E. 974, the grant involved was of a right of way, one hundred feet in width, across a tract of land containing twenty acres or more, together with a waiver of all further damages that might arise by reason of the location or construction of the railroad or repairing thereof when finally established or completed. There was no reservation of any kind in the instrument. The right of way was adopted, the road completed in 1854, and used continuously for the operation of railroad passenger and freight trains. The court there said:

            †††††'The right of way of the company is an easement. Washb. on E. & S. 4. It is, using exact language, a servitude imposed as a burden on the land. The conveyance from Crane in terms specifies that it is a 'release of a right of way,' and no question is made, and we presume none can be, that the right thus granted is not different from, nor greater than, that which would result from an appropriation proceeding under the statute.'

          †††††It was held in that case that an easement, and not a fee simple estate, was granted."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

          "A noted text writer states the law as follows:

            †††††'A grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely, and the fee remains in the grantor. The mere fact that the railroad company's charter empowered it to acquire a greater estate than that which it contracted for has been held not to affect its rights in the land purchased. But statutes authorizing railroad companies to acquire the fee in land have been generally given effect. It is held that a deed conveying land to a railroad for a right of way gives the railroad no more rights than it would have acquired by condemnation. 'The easement is not that spoken of in the old law books, but is peculiar to the use of a railroad which is usually a permanent improvement, a perpetual highway of travel and commerce, and will rarely be abandoned by nonuser. The exclusive use of the surface is acquired, and damages are assessed, on the theory that the easement will be perpetual; so that, ordinarily, the fee is of little or no value unless the land is underlaid by quarry or mine.' Where the intention to convey a fee does not appear, as in case of the conveyance of a 'right of way' for the railroad through certain lands, the company takes an easement only. The fact that the right conveyed is designated as a fee, or that the deed contains covenants of warranty, does not necessarily pass the fee.
            1 Thompson on Real Property, SS 4:20.'"
          [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

        Veach v. Culp (1979)

          "The parties in fact describe what was being conveyed: a right-of-way 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the railroad. Language like this has been found to create an easement, not a fee simple estate."
          [Veach v. Culp (1979)]

          "Given the language of the deed explicitly describing the conveyance of a right-of-way and given the rule of Swan v. O'Leary, supra, and Morsbach v. Thurston County, supra, we conclude the deed conveyed an easement, not a fee title."
          [Veach v. Culp (1979)]

        King County v. Squire (1990)

          "Although the language of a particular deed defines the interest conveyed, rights of way granted to a railroad are frequently held to create easements."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

          "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

          "Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement,"....."The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

          "The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

        Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)

          "When the granting clause of a deed conveys a right of way to a railroad, this court has usually concluded that the deed passes an easement and not a fee with a restricted use:

            [I]t is clear that we adopted the rule that when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only, and not a fee with a restricted use, even though the deed is in the usual form to convey a fee title. "
          [Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)]

        Brown v. State of Washington (1996)

          "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property."
          [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

            Below, I provide all the significant railroad right-of-way decisions in the history of Washington State/Territory which construe the meaning of the words "right-of-way", and were available at the time of this opinion. In each decision, the portion that discusses this issue has been emphasized.

      Railroad Right-of-way Decisions which Construe the Words "Right-of-Way":
      (In Chronological Order)

        1893: Biles v. Tacoma, Olympia & Gray's Harbor R.R. Co. (1893)

        1894: Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co. (1894)

        1905: Abercrombie v. Simmons et al (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1905)

        1910: Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)

        1929: Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)

        1950: Swan v. O'Leary (1950)

        1956: Scott v. Wallitner (1956)

        1977: Zobrist v. Culp (1977)

        1979: Veach v. Culp (1979)

        1986: Roeder v. BNSF (1986)

        1986: Lawson v. State (1986)

        1990: King County v. Squire (1990)

        1993: Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)

        1996: Brown v. State of Washington (1996)

        2000: Roeder v. K&E Storage (2000)

        2002: Hanson Industries v. County of Spokane (2002)

            Of all the above decisions, King County v. Squire is most damaging to this opinion. If Cox were an honest judge, he would explain why the precedent established in Squire did not control this opinion. Instead, later in this opinion, Cox misstates the facts and conclusions in Squire and dishonestly declares the decision as "instructive" and not precedential. Read a comparison of the Hilchkanum deed to the Squire deed, in the context of the Squire decision. Squire identifies the author of the words in the deed, and finds that the words in the granting clause "strongly suggests conveyance of an easement". The Squire court effectively finds that the words of the Hilchkanum deed were written by the Railway lawyers and convey an easement. An honest analysis of Squire destroys the legitimacy of this opinion. The discussion in Squire is consistent with one hundred years of consistently applied legal precedent. Honest analysis is not a goal of Judge Cox in this opinion.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Compare the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.

        Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          The Rays' argument that the use of the term 'right of way' invariably means that only an easement is conveyed is overly simplistic. In Washington, as the Brown court observed, the use of that term as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant generally creates only an easement.33 Conversely, where there is no language relating to the purpose of the grant or limiting the estate conveyed, and the deed conveys a strip of land, courts will construe the deed to convey fee simple title.34 In Brown, it was undisputed that the railroad had acquired its interest in the property under the deeds for railroad purposes. But significantly, the court went on to state:

      Identifying the purpose of the conveyance, however, does not resolve the issue at hand because a railroad can own rights of way in fee simple or as easements. Rather than identifying the purpose of the conveyances, we must conduct a deed-by-deed analysis to ascertain whether the parties clearly and expressly limited or qualified the interest granted, considering the express language, the form of the instrument, and the surrounding circumstances.{35}



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            Above, Judge Cox states: "The Rays' argument that the use of the term 'right of way' invariably means that only an easement is conveyed is overly simplistic." John Groen, the Ray's attorney, is an expert in property law and did not oversimplify his brief. I don't have Groen's brief to Judge Cox, but I do have his briefs to King County Superior Court. Read his Superior Court briefs to understand that Groen does not generalize how the term "right-of-way" is used in railroad deeds. Instead, Groen explains in detail how the term "right-of-way" is understood in railroad deeds. There are very specific rules how this term is construed in different situations. Groen supports his brief with citations and sound legal argument. Contrast Groen's quality work with the undocumented and dishonest conclusions made in this opinion by Cox.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        2001 Superior Court - Ray v. King County - Motion for Summary Judgment.

        2001 Superior Court - Ray v. King County - Brief Opposing King County Motion for Summary Judgment.

        2001 Superior Court - Ray v. King County - Reply on Motion for Summary Judgment.

            Where-and-how the term "right-of-way" is used in a railroad deed determines its meaning. This is spelled out in one hundred years of legal opinions which establish this precedent. Since, Judge Cox, Federal Judges Rothstein and Fletcher, and the King County Prosecutor repeatedly misrepresent Brown v. State of Washington (1996) to justify their arguments, I provide a citation from Brown which explains this rule. (Citation with my emphasis.)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property."
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

          This citation from Brown is ignored or misrepresented by King County and the judges in all of their briefs and opinions. The citation explains that where-and-how the term "right-of-way" is used in a deed determines which meaning of the term "right-of-way" is intended. When a "right-of-way" is conveyed to a railroad in the granting clause of a deed, the term "right-of-way" has always been held to be an easement in Washington State common law. The Brown citation , above, specifically references Veach to support this rule. The deed construed in Veach v. Culp (1979) compares well to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, and was found to convey an easement. Faced with similar circumstances, Judge Cox determines that the Hilchkanum deed grants fee simple title. His dishonest excuse to ignore Veach is discussed later in this annotated opinion.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            After Cox refuses to admit that the meaning of the term "right-of-way" is understood by where-and-how it is used in a railroad deed, he dishonestly explains that "the deed conveys a strip of land". Cox refuses to admit that the Hilchkanum deed grants a "right of way", not a "strip of land". This refusal to adopt the precedential meaning of the term "right of way", and substitution of contradictory terms to describe the Hilchkanum grant, is a basic element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". There in no truth or honesty in Norm Maleng's "legal theory" or in this opinion by Ronald Cox, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals Division I, State of Washington.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            Above, I cited Brown for an explanation of the meaning of the term "right of way" in a railroad deed. Please use the below hyperlink to view forty-three more citations which explain the meaning of the words "right-of-way" and establish the precedential rules to understand their meaning. For the sake of clarity in this webpage, I've described and named two of these precedential rules the "Railroad "right-of-way" Granting Rule" and the "Railroad Land Granting Rule". These rules are based on the forty-four citations which are a richer and more complete documentation of the legal precedent than is discussed in Brown. This is important because the Brown court was dealing with railroad deeds which conveyed strips of land, and were therefore assumed to convey fee title. Above, Judge Cox states that the Brown discussion applies when "the deed conveys a strip of land". Yet, Cox refuses to admit that the Hilchkanum deed grants a "right of way", not a "strip of land". Cox tries to fit the Brown court's discussion (of deeds granting land) to a deed granting a "right-of-way". This blending, blurring, confusing, and substitution of these contradictory terms is a basic element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Applying the "Railroad Land Granting Rule" to construe a deed which grants a right of way is like trying to fit the proverbial square peg in the round hole. It's completely dishonest for Cox to use this tactic.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View forty-four citations which explain the common law meaning of the term "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

      Reference:

        Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

        View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

        View fourteen citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" conveys an easement.

        Understand the "Railroad 'Right-of-Way' Granting Rule".

        Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule".



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          A careful comparison of the express language in the Hilchkanum deed with the language in deeds the courts have examined in other reported cases arising in this jurisdiction reveals few similarities. Only King County v. Squire36 and King County v. Rasmussen37 contain language involving a right of way that is substantially similar to that in the deed before us. For the reasons we discuss later in this opinion, Squire is not controlling, merely instructive. And Rasmussen, which construed the same deed now before this court, is consistent with Brown and the analysis and conclusions of this opinion.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            Here, Judge Cox begins the process of eliminating one hundred years of legal precedent which has consistently held the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement. In the paragraph, above, Cox eliminates Squire as precedent. King County v. Squire (1990) is a Division One Opinion which destroys this majority's legal argument. Since Squire is a prior Division One decision, it is binding precedent on these Division One judges. In Squire, the court published the material portions of the Squire deed which were used to determine the issue of easement-or-fee. Further, the Squire court identified which words were altered and added by Territorial Governor Watson Squire. If one removes Governor Squire's changes, the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E is materially identical to the Hilchkanum deed. Most important, the Squire court found that the words in the granting clause, which had been provided by the SLS&E Railway lawyers and are identical to Hilchkanum's, granted an easement. The most important binding precedent to consider in the resolution of this lawsuit is ignored by these dishonest judges. Instead, Cox dismisses King County v. Squire (1990) as "merely instructive" and then misrepresents Squire later in this opinion. Judges Cox and Schindler protect a bunch of powerful and dishonest people with their refusal to honestly apply the precedent in Squire.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Open the portion of this opinion where Judge Cox misrepresents Squire.

        Understand how a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E destroys Judge Cox' analysis.

            Cox fails to mention Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910) which construed Judge Burke's right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The Burke deed was based on the SLS&E Railway prepared form deed and was found to grant an easement. (Citation with my emphasis.) (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "...when the instrument is construed as a whole and in the light of the purpose for which the grant was made, it is a grant of a right of way or easement and nothing more.

          'The grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely and the fee of the soil remains in the grantor. Although the language used in the granting part of the deed and in the habendum is appropriate, and that commonly used to convey the fee, yet the clause descriptive of the use to be made of the land may so limit or qualify the grant as to change it from a fee to an easement.' Cyc. 1162; Robinson v. Missisquoi R. Co., 59 Vt. 426, 10 Atl. 522."
        [Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)]

            Judge Cox should have investigated the SLS&E deeds considered in Lawson v. State (1986). My understanding is that there were about twelve SLS&E deeds involved in that lawsuit, and that King County admitted all twelve of these deeds granted easements in its subsequent settlement of the lawsuit. The Lawson Court did not construe the deeds, but it did make this statement:

        "There is a strong argument to be made that Burlington Northern had no interest to convey to the County: upon abandonment of the right of way the land automatically reverted to the reversionary interest holders."
        [Lawson v. State (1986)]

            Of course, Judge Cox has no intention to consider the forty-four citations that establish the precedent used in construing the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. He can't come to his predetermined outcome if he considers well established precedent. The language in those decisions compare well with the language in the Hilchkanum deed in that they construe the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. This is the "express language" that Judge Cox is considering here.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            Cox wants to ignore these forty-four citations and eliminate one hundred years of legal precedent. Instead he wants to consider only King County v. Rasmussen. Well, I am that "Rasmussen" and I state unequivocally that federal judges committed criminal acts against me with my lawsuit in federal court. Simply read King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002) to understand. Federal Judges Rothstein and Fletcher participated in the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the BNSF East Lake Sammamish right-of-way and protect the participants in the crime from prosecution. These dishonest federal judges intentionally destroyed my rights as an American citizen in the process. Judge Cox is a participant in the crime, too, based on his irrational conclusions in this opinion and his violation of the Ray's right of due process.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          In Veach v. Culp,38 the court construed language in the relevant portion of the deed, but did not consider the full range of factors that the supreme court in Brown later articulated for characterizing the nature of the interest conveyed. Thus, we do not read Veach as broadly as do the Rays. In short, as the Brown court states, a narrow focus on the term 'right of way simply begs the question of what interest {the railroad} acquired, because a railroad can own rights of way in fee simple if that is what the deed conveyed.'39 Recognizing that the use of the term does not end the analysis, we therefore examine further the factors guiding determination of intent so that we may properly characterize the nature of the interest conveyed.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            Once again, Judge Cox has lied or is very wrong.

            Veach is a precedential decision that supports construing the Hilchkanum deed as an easement. So, Judge Cox looks for a reason to remove Veach from consideration. His tactic is to dismisses Veach by stating that Veach "did not consider the full range of factors that the supreme court in Brown later articulated for characterizing the nature of the interest conveyed." Is that true? Let's check it out.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            Veach v. Culp (1979) relies on Swan v. O'Leary (1950) and cites Swan several times. Swan lists all the "full range of factors that the supreme court in Brown later articulated for characterizing the nature of the interest conveyed." Here are the factors listed in Swan.

        "In attempting to arrive at the intention of the parties to similar conveyances, the courts have considered such factors as whether the consideration expressed was substantial or nominal; whether the deed conveyed a strip, piece, parcel or tract of land, and did not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose to which the land was to be put, or in other ways limiting the estate conveyed; whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and limited its use to a specific purpose; whether the deed conveyed a right of way over a tract of land, rather than a strip, piece or parcel thereof; whether the deed granted only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land; whether the deed contained a clause providing that if the railroad ceased to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor; whether the conveyance did or did not contain a habendum clause, and many other considerations suggested by the language of the particular deed." [Swan v. O'Leary (1950)]

            Cox claims/implies these factors are found only in Brown (a later decision). But in fact, Brown simply cites the factors established in Swan. Read the "full range of factors" listed in Brown, below, and notice that Brown simply cites Swan for those "full range of factors".

        "In determining whether the property owners have met their burden of showing that the original parties intended to adapt the statutory form to grant easements instead of fees simple, we have relied on the following factors: (1) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land, and did not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose to which the land was to be put, or in other ways limiting the estate conveyed; (2) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and limited its use to a specific purpose; (3) whether the deed conveyed a right of way over a tract of land, rather than a strip thereof; (4) whether the deed granted only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land; (5) whether the deed contained a clause providing that if the railroad ceased to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor; (6) whether the consideration expressed was substantial or nominal; and (7) whether the conveyance did or did not contain a habendum clause, and many other considerations suggested by the language of the particular deed. Swan, 37 Wn.2d at 535-36." [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

            Veach cites Swan as authority. Swan lists all the factors listed in Brown. So, Judge Cox lied by making the statement "In Veach v. Culp,38 the court construed language in the relevant portion of the deed, but did not consider the full range of factors that the supreme court in Brown later articulated for characterizing the nature of the interest conveyed."
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            So, Judge Cox, now what is your excuse for not considering Veach? I'm sick and tired of lies and dishonesty from judges who have harmed my family and me.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          The first few factors stated in Brown require consideration of whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and whether additional language limited the use of the land or the estate conveyed.40 As we have already observed, the Hilchkanum deed conveyed a strip of land. Whether language in the deed limited the use of the land is the question. The language of the deed grants a right of way to the Railway without expressly restricting how that right of way was to be used.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

      So, let's review Cox' dishonest tactics to this point.

        First, several paragraphs above, Cox looks at the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. He acknowledges that the deed conveys a "right of way" to the Railway, but then immediately morphs those words to mean that a "right of way strip" was conveyed. Then, Cox morphs those words again to mean that a "strip of land" was conveyed. So, Cox "establishes" that the Hilchkanum deed grants a "strip of land" to the SLS&E Railway. This is an intentional lie, and not supported by legal precedent. The term "right-of-way" used in the granting language has a different legal meaning than the term "right-of-way" used in the description of the property. Instead of honestly describing this important difference, Judge Cox intentionally blends, blurs, and confuses these different meanings. This tactic was first used by the King County Prosecutor, and is explained in my discussion of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Here is Judge Cox' earlier paragraph where he substitutes the words in the Hilchkanum grant.

          The granting provisions of the Hilchkanums' deed characterize the conveyed property first as a 'right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through' {the Hilchkanums'} lands,' and the property conveyed as a 'right of way strip.'31 The substance of this language is that the subject of the conveyance is a strip of land, not just the grant of some interest 'over' the land, as the Rays state. Language conveying a strip of land suggests a fee, not a mere easement.32"

        Second, Cox ignores one hundred years of legal precedent which holds the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement. Instead, he focuses only on King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002), which are criminal 9th Circuit opinions.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View one hundred years of legal precedent which holds the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement.

        Third, in his paragraph directly above, Cox again states that a "strip of land" was conveyed. He then uses the terms "right of way" and "strip of land" as if they are interchangeable. It is the duty of the court to determine whether a "right-of-way" or strip of land is conveyed in a railroad deed since different rules are used to construe the grant of these different property interests. Instead, Judge Cox blurs and confuses the issue of "right-of-way or strip of land" into a distinction that only he can define. His tactic here is to change the words in the Hilchkanum deed to conform to the deeds construed in Brown v. State of Washington (1996). In Brown, the court found that the deeds granted strips of land to the Milwaukee Railroad without any restriction for use as a right-of-way. Based on that finding, the Brown court found the deeds to grant fee title. By changing the granting words in the Hilchkanum deed to conform to the granting words used in the Brown deeds, Judge Cox tries to apply the discussion, law, and conclusions used in the Brown opinion. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule".

          Understand the "Railroad 'Right-of-Way' Granting Rule".

              Having dishonestly established that a "strip of land" was conveyed by Hilchkanum, Cox then states that the deed can be found to be an easement only if language in the deed limits its use to a "right of way" for a railroad. Of course this is ridiculous. The deed is restricted to use as a "right of way" because that is what is granted in the deed. But we are not allowed to see the words "right of way" in the Hilchkanum granting language because Cox has changed the words of the words of the grant to be a "strip of land".
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              This substitution of the words in the deed and requirement for a separate statement containing limiting language, are the basic elements in Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Maleng's "legal theory" is the dishonest legal argument developed by the King County Prosecutor to "justify" his acceptance of a phony tax donation and to cover-up his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              Judge Cox effectively asks the reader this question: "When you read the Hilchkanum deed, do you believe me that a 'strip of land' was conveyed, or do you believe your 'lying eyes'?" (to paraphrase Groucho Marx' line)
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Let your eyes help you decide.

          Read the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to see that a "right of way" was granted to the SLS&E, not a "strip of land".

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.

        Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          Turning to the fourth factor, we note that nothing in the language of the Hilchkanum deed limits the grant to the 'privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land.'41 Rather, the granting clause expressly conveys 'a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands,' without any limitations of the type expressed in the fourth factor. This language is most consistent with the grant of fee title, not an easement.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            Judge Cox has now built his "house of cards" to the point that he makes legal conclusions based on his misstatement of the law and the undocumented facts which he has manufactured. In his above paragraph, Cox claims there is no limiting language in the Hilchkanum deed.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      There is Limiting Language in the Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

            The Hilchkanum deed grants only a "right of way" to the SLS&E, yet Judge Cox can find no language in the deed that limits its use to a "right of way". He does this by ignoring one hundred years of Washington State common law, which establishes the legal precedent that the use of the term "right-of-way" in the granting clause limits the conveyance to an easement. In Norm Maleng's "legal theory", King County claims that the Washington State Supreme Court threw out this one hundred year old precedent in Brown v. State of Washington (1996). Judge Cox makes the same dishonest claim in this opinion. So, I'll provide a citation from Brown that shows that the use of the term "right-of-way" in the granting clause still limits the conveyance to an easement. (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property."
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

          Where and how the term "right-of-way" is used in a deed determines which meaning is intended. When a "right-of-way" is conveyed to a railroad in the granting clause of a deed, the term "right-of-way" has always been held to limit the conveyance to an easement. The above citation from Brown is just one of the many citations which establish this common law rule. But, I use this citation from Brown because the dishonest lawyers and judges, who construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, claim this precedent was overturned in Brown.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      The "Consideration" Expressed in the Hilchkanum Deed is a Limitation.

            Cox states above, "...we note that nothing in the language of the Hilchkanum deed limits the grant to the 'privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land.'" Apparently, Judge Cox did not read what is plainly stated in the Hilchkanum deed. The Hilchkanum deed conditions the grant of the right-of-way on the "...benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway...". Doesn't such a condition place a limitation on the grant? It's obvious to me that Judge Cox cannot find that limitation because he doesn't want to find that limitation. Here is the portion of the Hilchkanum deed which Cox ignores in his above statement. (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King, in Washington territory, we do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to-wit"
        [Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

            As with most of the lies and misapplication of the law in this opinion, there is legal precedent which Judge Cox ignores. King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. (1949) construes strikingly similar language in a deed and finds that language constitutes "consideration", or payment. So, the same language in the Hilchkanum deed should be seen as "consideration" for the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway..." This "consideration" must be seen as a limitation on the deed. Read Hanson. (with my emphasis):
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The deed of January 5, 1932, expresses, as the primary consideration for the conveyance of the land therein described, the benefit accruing to the grantor, Hanson, through the construction and maintenance of a road by the county. It would appear that, in return for such contemplated benefit, more land than would reasonably be required for road purposes was included in the terms of the grant. It is not disputed that this consideration for the grant has been executed by the county by its construction and maintenance of the county road.
        [King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. (1949)]

            Compare the language from Hanson to the almost identical language in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, both cited above. The benefit accruing to the grantor from the establishment of a road was considered "consideration", or payment, in Hanson and was therefore a condition or limitation on the grant. The same holds true for the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. If the SLS&E had not established and operated the railroad, it would have failed to uphold this required compensation, and the grant of a right-of-way by Hilchkanum would have been voided. This "consideration" is a limitation on the grant. Judge Cox "finds" there is no limitation in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed by simply saying there is no limitation. He cites no rule for his finding, and ignores legal precedent which contradicts his "royal pronouncement".
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Summary:

            In this note, I've cited legal precedent in Brown which holds the use of the term "right-of-way" in the granting clause is a limitation on the grant. I've also cited legal precedent in Hanson which supports the consideration expressed in the Hilchkanum deed to be a limitation on the conveyance. Judge Cox simply ignored Washington State common law precedent in his paragraph above. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          Factor five examines whether or not a reverter clause is contained in the deed. 42 Presumably, the existence of such a clause suggests an easement was intended.43 Here, there is no reverter clause. Rather, other language in the deed indicates that the conveyance is without any reservation of any estate in the Hilchkanums.44



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            The Hilchkanum deed grants a "right-of-way" to a railroad. In common law, this has always been held to be an easement. Therefore, no reverter clause is needed because an easement reverts on abandonment.

            Judge Cox writes above, Presumably, the existence of such a clause suggests an easement was intended.43 " Footnote 43 takes one to King County v. Squire (1990), but King County v. Squire states nothing of the sort. The Squire court considered whether Governor Squire's added "handwritten" reverter clause indicated his intention to convey a fee simple determinable rather than an easement. The Squire court's conclusion was this: (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The Squire deed granted a 'right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands'. This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, 'or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company,' which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the 'so long as' language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the "so long as" language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and "to its successors and assigns forever". The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement."

            Unless Judge Cox is an idiot or a crook, it's impossible for him to reference Squire and come to the conclusion that the reverter language "suggests an easement was intended". The Squire court determined the reverter clause suggested a fee simple determinable was intended, but found the deed conveyed an easement because of the language in the granting clause. An honest examination of the discussion in King County v. Squire (1990) destroys Judge Cox' statement above, and this opinion, in general. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

            Further, Judge Cox states, above, "...other language in the deed indicates that the conveyance is without any reservation of any estate in the Hilchkanums. 44" Cox refers to the Hilchkanum habendum with his footnote 44. The Hilchkanum habendum is generic and compares well to the habendum in the deed construed in Veach v. Culp (1979) which was found to be an easement. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The Veach habendum:

          "To have and to hold, all and singular, said premises, together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part, and to its assigns forever."

        The Hilchkanum habendum:

          "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever."

            One can see that the Veach habendum and the Hilchkanum habendum are almost identical. Yet, Judge Cox refers to the Hilchkanum habendum and states, in the paragraph above, that "...other language in the deed indicates that the conveyance is without any reservation of any estate in the Hilchkanums." He is using this statement to support the idea that the Hilchkanum deed granted fee simple title without any reservations. But, the Veach deed had the same habendum and was found to be an easement. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            Of course, I forgot, we aren't allowed to consider the Veach opinion because Judge Cox proclaimed, above, that Veach "did not consider the full range of factors that the supreme court in Brown later articulated for characterizing the nature of the interest conveyed." God forbid that we read and consider any precedential decision except for the only precedent allowed by Judge Cox: King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002) . These two federal opinions are not legal decisions, but rather they are criminal acts by the judges from their benches.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          Factor six requires consideration of whether the expressed consideration for the conveyance is substantial or nominal. Here, the Hilchkanums described the consideration as 'the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King, in Washington territory.' This statement provides no information on whether the consideration is substantial or nominal. Thus, this factor is neutral.

          Factor seven requires consideration of the existence and content of a habendum clause.45 Here, there is such a clause, which states 'To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto {the Railway} and to its successors and assigns forever.' Such clarifying language does not limit the extent of the interest conveyed in the granting clause. Rather, it suggests no limitation the grant of fee title, not merely an easement. King County v. Squire Investment Co. illustrates the significance of the language in the habendum clause in determining whether a fee or an easement is granted in a deed conveying a right of way to a railroad. In Squire, the granting clause of the deed granted a 'right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands,' while the habendum clause contained a handwritten addition, 'or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company.' While noting that the language of the granting clause could be understood to convey either a fee or an easement, this court concluded that the granting clause and habendum clause, read together, suggested that 'the 'so long as' language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and 'to its successors and assigns forever'.'46 In contrast, the habendum clause of the Hilchkanum deed contains no limiting language. This distinction supports the conclusion that the granting clause conveyed fee title, not, as in Squire, an easement.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

      Wow, that is an impressive set of lies, half truths, and misapplication of the law!

              An honest examination of Squire absolutely destroys this opinion. So, I'll present the relevant portions of King County v. Squire (1990) first and analyze its significance. Then, I'll tear apart the dishonest statements and analysis in Cox' paragraph immediately above.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      First: An analysis of the Squire deed:

              Looking at the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, it is very important to realize that the Squire court identified which words were altered or added by Governor Squire. (Historical note: Watson Squire was a governor of Washington Territory, and one of its first U.S. Senators after statehood.) It is important to understand that I have added no emphasis to this citation. The words in bold font are the changes made by Governor Squire, and are shown in that format in the published opinion.

          "On March 29, 1887, Watson and Ida Squire executed a deed granting a half-mile right of way to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company. The material portion of the deed reads as follows with the handwritten additions by Mr. Squire set forth in boldface type:

            In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit: [legal description]. Such right-of-way strip to be twenty-five (25) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across the said lands by the Engineer of said Railway Company, which location is described as follows, to-wit [description.] . . . .

            To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888...."
            [King County v. Squire (1990)]

              If the words in bold font were written by Governor Squire, then who wrote the other words in the deed? By default, those words were written by the Railway lawyers, representing the other party in the deed. In fact, those exact words are found in most, if not all, of the SLS&E right-of-way deeds. They establish the SLS&E "form deed" which was used to obtain the rights-of-way from the settlers. This fact was certainly briefed by the Ray's attorney, and is intentionally ignored by Judge Cox because it destroys his predetermined outcome to this lawsuit.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              The words in the Squire deed's granting clause were construed in the Squire opinion. Here is that edited section:

          "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, "or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company," which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the "so long as" language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the "so long as" language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and "to its successors and assigns forever". The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement.

          In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

              The Squire court construes the grant of a "right-of-way" in the granting clause with these words: "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed." and "Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". By re-reading the Squire right-of-way deed, printed above, and differentiating the authors by observing which words are in bold font, one can determine that these two statements construe words written by the Railway lawyers, not written by Governor Squire. Most important to this discussion, the granting words of the Squire right-of-way deed are identical to the granting words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

              So, the Squire decision finds that the granting words, which are identical to those used in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, were written by the Railway lawyers and were construed to grant an easement. This fact was poison to Judge Cox, who was committed to find that that Hilchkanum deed granted fee simple title to the Railway. This was no problem for this dishonest judge. Cox simple misstates the Squire conclusions and then dismisses the opinion as "instructive". Designating the Squire opinion as "instructive" allows Cox to ignore the precedent established in the Squire decision. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

      Second: We look at the complete dishonesty of Cox in his citing of King County v. Squire in the paragraph above:

              In Cox' analysis of Factor Seven, above, he quotes the standard terms used in the Hilchkanum habendum and states: "... it suggests no limitation the grant of fee title, not merely an easement." Of course, he provided no citation to support that contention. Too bad this dishonest judge didn't point to the discussion on this subject in Squire. Squire provides this analysis (with my emphasis):
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

              So, Washington State Division One Appeals Court Chief Judge Cox got it wrong again. The Veach deed was found to convey an easement because a "right-of-way" was granted in the premises of the deed. The Veach deed used the "standard habendum". The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed has the same features. The reason that the "standard habendum" does not suggest fee simple conveyance in the Veach and Hilchkanum deeds is that a "right of way" was conveyed in the granting clause. This has always been held to grant an easement in Washington common law. (View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.) By definition, the habendum cannot contradict or be repugnant to the estate granted in the premises. (See Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition.) Therefore, because an easement was conveyed in the granting clause of the premises, the habendum cannot be assumed to contradict that grant. Cox was completely wrong in stating that a fee simple estate is suggested by the Hilchkanum habendum. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Perhaps Cox' biggest lie!

              Next, Judge Cox refers to the Squire opinion and states the Squire court found: "...that the language of the granting clause could be understood to convey either a fee or an easement...". This is an absolute lie by Judge Cox! The Squire court found that "...the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement..." How could Cox get this any more wrong? But, this dishonest judge needed to misrepresent the conclusions in Squire because an honest look at Squire destroys Cox' predetermined outcome of this lawsuit, exposes the ELS federal tax fraud scheme, and threatens the powerful people in King County, who participated in the crime, with terms in federal prison. Since the language in the granting clause of the Squire right-of-way deed is identical to the language in the granting clause of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, Judge Cox had to lie about the finding in King County v. Squire. This issue is discussed in more detail on the following web page:
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Read a comparison and analysis of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

              Further, in the paragraph above, Judge Cox states that the Squire court considered whether a "fee" estate had been passed to the Railway by Governor Squire. This is another lie by Judge Cox! The Squire court considered whether a "fee simple determinable" had been conveyed. There is a world of difference between a "fee", as Cox states above, and a "fee simple determinable". A grant in "fee" or "fee simple" conveys the land, unrestricted, forever. A "fee simple determinable" grant conveys fee title until the specified event, at which time the title goes back to the grantor. Supposing the Squire deed had been held to be a "fee simple determinable", two events would cause the land to revert. (Please remember that the Squire deed was not found to be a "fee simple determinable".) Those two events are spelled out in the Squire habendum:
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "...so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company...."

          And

          "...upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888...."

                [Read the Squire habendum to confirm these determinable events.]

              In this case, a "fee simple determinable" would act much like an easement, because the land would revert to the grantor on railroad abandonment. The major difference being that the railroad would hold full rights of title rather than a mere right of use during the time the deed was in effect. In several Washington railroad right-of-way opinions, the courts have considered whether a "fee simple determinable" or an "easement" was granted. Every case in which this issue was considered, the court found that the grant was an "easement". It was completely dishonest for Judge Cox to state that the Squire court was deciding whether the deed passed a "fee" title or an easement.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              Last, it was an intentional lie for Cox to state/imply that the only limiting language in the Squire deed was the language in the habendum. One needs to simply read the Squire opinion to understand the limiting language in the Squire habendum reiterates the limiting language in the premises (granting clause) which grants a "right-of-way" to the Railway. Here, again, is the portion of the Squire opinion that makes that point (with my emphasis):
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed. "
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

              To reiterate means to "repeat" or "do again". In the above citation from Squire, it means that there is limiting language in two places in the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The Squire court found that the grant of a "right-of-way" to the Railway limits the grant to an easement. This limitation to use as an easement is then reiterated in the words of the habendum. Because it is so important to the understanding this issue, I provide, again, a link to forty-four citations that support the precedent that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is the grant of an easement. Cox provides no citation that holds the grant of a right of way can be construed to be an unrestricted fee simple grant of land. Instead, Judge Cox changes the words in the Hilchkanum deed to read that a "strip of land" is granted to the Railway instead of a "right of way". That is completely dishonest.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View forty-four citations explaining the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad grants only an easement.

      To summarize this section:

        An honest analysis of King County v. Squire combined with a comparison of the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds absolutely destroys Judge Cox' analysis in this decision. So, Cox misrepresents the Squire opinion.

        Judge Cox lied when he stated the standard habendum in the Hilchkanum deed implies a fee simple grant.

        Judge Cox lied when he stated the Squire court was considering whether the Squire grant was "fee" or "easement".

        Judge Cox lied when he stated the only restrictive language in the Squire deed was in the habendum.

        It can be assumed Judge Cox lied in order to hide the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the East Lake Sammamish BNSF right-of-way, and to protect the participants in crime from federal prosecution.

            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this summary are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.

        View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

        View a study comparing the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

    Brown recognizes that other considerations suggested by the language of a deed may be helpful in determining whether a conveyance is in fee or merely an easement. The Hilchkanum deed contains such language in the provision following conveyance of the right of way to the Railway:

      And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road.

    While the parties dispute the legal effect of this language, neither side appears to disagree that the 'right' to go on property adjacent to the right of way to cut trees is an easement, not a fee interest in that adjacent property.47 We agree that this 'dangerous trees' provision conveys an easement - the right to cut trees that endanger the operation of the railway.

          Moreover, an easement to cut trees on property adjacent to the right of way is a more limited right than the interest conveyed in the right of way itself -the strip of land. The grant of the interest in the strip was to the land itself, not an interest over the land. The lack of any limitation in the use of the strip starkly contrasts with the more limited right to cut trees only on the property adjacent to the strip. The clear distinction in the extent of rights conveyed supports the conclusion that the grant of the strip of land was in fee, not an easement similar to the more limited right to cut trees on land adjacent to the strip.

          We reject as unreasonable the Rays' claim that the apparent overlap in coverage of the two provisions (both are measured from the centerline of the right of way) means that the right of way is merely an easement. This argument is based on the theory that the grant of the right to cut trees is inconsistent with the grant of a fee because the holder of a fee would not need such a grant. But the argument ignores other language in the 'dangerous trees' provision that focuses on that right being granted for property adjacent to the right of way.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

      There are two significant lies in the above analysis by Judge Cox.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        1. It's a lie that the tree cutting secondary grant by Hilchkanum somehow reveals Hilchkanum's intentions in the primary grant.

        2. It's a lie that a "strip of land" was conveyed by Hilchkanum and that there is a "lack of any limitation in the use of the strip".

            I discuss each of these lies, separately:

      1. It's a lie that the tree cutting secondary grant by Hilchkanum somehow reveals Hilchkanum's intentions in the primary grant.

              As stated above, the Hilchkanum deed contains a secondary grant allowing for the removal of trees that could fall across the track and inhibit the operation of the Railway. The secondary grant is in these words:

            "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road."
            (Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed)

              These secondary grants are common in railroad deeds and deal with issues specific to the individual right-of-way deed. Secondary grants are necessary for the construction or operation of the railroad. The Hilchkanum secondary grant resolved a minor problem with the operation of the railroad. That problem was that the right-of-way was only 100 feet wide, 50 feet on each side of the centerline, but there were tall trees outside of the easement that could fall on the tracks and affect the operation of the railroad. So, this secondary grant allowed the Railway the right to cut down those trees. These secondary grants have nothing to do with the intentions of the parties to convey an easement or fee simple interest in the land underlying the right-of-way. There is no legitimate precedent in Washington common law for these secondary grants to be considered in the analysis of easement or fee.

              Here are two other examples of secondary grants to railroads. One secondary grant is from a deed which was found to be an easement because a "right-of-way" was granted in its premises. The other secondary grant is from a deed which was found to be a fee simple grant because a "strip of land" was granted to the railroad. Neither of these opinions found any significance in the secondary grant in analyzing the fee-easement issue. Of course, in this opinion Judge Cox has decided that a "right-of-way" and "strip of land" are the same thing, and that it is simply up to the judge to decide if it is an easement or fee conveyance. Cox needed to ignore one hundred years of well understood precedent in order to blur these two terms into the same meaning. Please follow the hyperlinks to the actual opinions to understand that these secondary grants had no effect to signal whether their deed granted an easement of a fee. This illogical construing of a secondary grant by Federal District Judge Rothstein, Federal Circuit Judge Fletcher, and here by Judge Cox, is a new precedent established by these dishonest judges and published first in King County v. Rasmussen (2001). This new precedent makes no sense when seen in the context of one hundred years of common law precedent construing railroad right-of-way deeds . (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                The Edward Kratz right-of-way deed to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company in 1872: After granting a "right-of-way" to the Railroad, the Kratz deed included a secondary grant that allowed the Railroad to deal with the interference of a nearby river on its rail operation. The secondary grant allowed for:

            "...the construction of certain canals, whereby the channel of Skookumchuck is changed and prevented from infringing upon said railroad including the land necessary for said roads and canals..."
            [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)].

          This deed was construed in Morsbach v. Thurston County (1929), which is hyperlinked in the preceding quote. The Kratz deed was found to grant the Railroad an easement because a "right-of-way" was granted in its premises. Further, there is no mention in Morsbach of the significance of the secondary grant with respect to the determination of easement or fee.

                The Brown right-of-way deed to the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company of Washington: After granting a strip of land to the Railroad, the Brown deed included a secondary grant that allowed the Railroad to resolve problems with the railroad's construction. The secondary grant allowed for:

            "Also conveying the following extra widths for excavations, embankments, depositing waste earth, and borrowing pits, as follows: Two strip[s] of land each fifty (50) feet in width and bordering one on either side of the strip of land first above described..."
            [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

          This deed was construed in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), which is hyperlinked in the preceding quote. The Brown deed was found to grant the Railroad fee simple title because a "strip of land" was granted to the railroad.. There is no mention in Brown of the significance of the secondary grant with respect to the determination of easement or fee.

              Judge Cox simply copied Federal Judge Rothstein's analysis of this issue in her opinion, King County v. Rasmussen (2001). Judge Rothstein found great, unjustified, meaning in the Hilchkanum secondary grant. She supplied no citation to justify her ruling that the words in the secondary grant indicated the intentions of the Hilchkanums to grant fee simple title in the main granting clause of their deed. Judge Rothstein simply made up a new precedent, a precedent that is illogical but supports her predetermined opinion that the Hilchkanum deed granted fee simple title. Rothstein used her twisted logic to "prove" Hilchkanum's intention to grant fee simple title to the SLS&E. But, the intentions of a party in a deed is a material fact. If there were some precedent to establish Rothstein's meaning of the Hilchkanum secondary grant, she might have been justified in her interpretation. There was no precedent. It was my right, under the Constitution, to present facts to a jury that would resolve the intentions of the Hilchkanum's with their secondary grant. Rothstein denied my Constitutional rights in order to force her unsubstantiated set of facts and her predetermined decision. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              As stated above, Chief Judge Ronald E. Cox copies Rothstein's irrational analysis. Judge Cox used Rothstein's analysis of the Hilchkanum secondary grant as precedent. In fact, Cox ignored over one hundred years of precedential railroad right-of-way opinions and used the dishonest federal decisions [King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002)] as the only significant precedent throughout this opinion.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              Since Rothstein, Fletcher and Cox could cite no law or legal precedent in their interpretation of Hilchkanum's intention with his secondary grant, this disputed material fact should have been decided by a jury. All three of these judges allowed summary judgment in the face of many unresolved material facts. This is a violation of the rules of summary judgment and a violation of the party's Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment right of due process. This was not a problem for Judge Cox because he obviously does not believe in the U.S. Constitution.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      2. It's a lie that a "strip of land" was conveyed by Hilchkanum and that there is a "lack of any limitation in the use of the strip".

              In the paragraphs above, I discuss Judge Cox' analysis that the secondary grant reveals Hilchkanum's intentions in his primary grant. This section discusses his continued assumption that the Hilchkanum deed granted a "strip of land" to the SLS&E Railway instead of a "right of way", and that there is no language in the deed limiting the conveyance to an easement. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              Earlier in this opinion I explain that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement, until the dishonest federal decisions King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002). In this opinion, Judge Cox ignores one hundred years of consistently held precedent and "hitches his wagon" to Rothstein and Fletcher. Perhaps he hopes to get a recommendation for appointment to the federal bench in exchange for his support of their dishonesty.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              I admit it is repetitive, but I need to continue to emphasize the dishonesty Cox used to state that a "strip of land" was conveyed in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. If the reader does not understand the importance of this issue, open this link to the section of this decision where this issue is discussed in detail:
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Understand how Judge Cox blends the words "right of way" into a "right of way strip" and then into a "strip of land".

              Judge Cox blurs these different and contradictory terms into the same meaning. The grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always restricted the grant to an easement until Rothstein's, Fletcher's, and this dishonest decision. If the reader does not understand the significance of this precedent, then open this link to the section of this decision where this issue is first discussed:
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Read forty-four citations supporting the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad to be and easement.

              Perhaps the most damaging citation, which contradicts Cox' analysis that the Hilchkanum deed does not contain limiting language, is this citation from Squire (with my emphasis):

          "In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed."
          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

              In the citation, above, the Squire court finds that the Squire habendum reiterated the "limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way". Since the limitation was reiterated, this means that the limitation was also expressed in another section of the deed. If one reads King County v. Squire (1990), he will understand the limiting language is also expressed by the grant of a "right of way" in the granting clause of the premises. This analysis by the Squire court is supported by over one hundred years of precedent found in the forty-four citations shown above. Judge Cox refused to acknowledge this finding in the Squire decision, and refused to acknowledge the long held precedent construing the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad to be the grant of an easement. Instead, Cox mischaracterized the analysis in Squire and declared the decision merely "instructive".
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Understand that the Squire decision, combined with a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds, destroys Cox' legal argument.

              Judge Cox' dishonest claim that Hilchkanum granted a "strip of land", and that there is a "lack of any limitation in the use of the strip", shows his adoption of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Maleng's "legal theory" was concocted by the King County Prosecutor to cover-up his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. The "legal theory" is found in all of King County's legal briefs related to the Hilchkanum right-of-way grant. Further, it was adopted by two very dishonest federal judges in King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002). (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.

        Understand that the Squire decision, combined with a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds, destroys Cox' legal argument.

        Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          We turn next to the subsequent conduct of the parties, another factor the Brown court identified as indicative of intent. To the extent any uncertainty remains after consideration of the form and language of the May 1887 Hilchkanum deed, Bill Hilchkanum's exclusion of the right of way from subsequent deeds removes any doubt that the 1887 deed conveyed fee title to the Railway. 48

          According to the record, the legal description of the Rays' property is: That portion of Government Lot 3, Section 6, Township 24 North, Range 6 East, W.M., in King County, Washington, described as follows: (metes and bounds description) {49}

          In 1898, Bill Hilchkanum conveyed to his then wife Annie Hilchkanum 'Lot one (1) less three (3) acres right of way of railroad and lot three (3) less three and 25/100 acres right of way of railroad, and all of lot five (5). . ..'50 Thus, the plain language of the 1898 deed excludes the previously conveyed right of way from the conveyance and explains why ('right of way of railroad'). The 1898 deed therefore clearly indicates that Hilchkanum's intent in 1887 was to convey the right of way to the Railway in fee, not as an easement. And there is no question that this exclusion of the right of way from the 1898 deed applied to Lot 3 - the property the Rays now own.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            In his dishonest analysis of extrinsic evidence, Judge Cox "cherry-picks" the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds and then misrepresents legal precedent in describing their effect. In two "Notes" below, I discuss how Cox disregards deeds which contradict his dishonest analysis. In this "Note", I show that Cox misrepresents the legal understanding of the exception of a "right-of-way" in a subsequent real estate deed. To understand how very wrong Cox is with his analysis, we need to look at these two issues: (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          1. What is the meaning of the exception of a "right-of-way" in a subsequent real estate deed?

          2. What is excepted in the deed which is discussed by Cox in the above paragraph?

            We will examine each of these issues separately.

      What is the meaning of the exception of a "right-of-way" in a subsequent real estate deed?

              I've found six Washington State decisions that deal with the exception of railroad rights-of-way. One of those decisions, Zobrist v. Culp (1977), deals with the exact situation discussed in this opinion. Below, I provided a link to a more complete study of the exception of rights-of-way in subsequent deeds.

              To understand the exception of a "right-of-way" in a subsequent deed, one must first understand the definition of an exception in a deed. Zobrist v. Culp (1977) provides this definition:

          "An exception is the withholding from the operation of the deed of something existent which otherwise the deed would pass to the grantee."
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              So, this requires an honest judge, or jury, to determine what was "existent" in order to determine what is "excepted". If Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, then the exception of that "right-of-way" in a subsequent deed would simply except an easement. If Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E in his right-of-way deed, then the exception of that "right-of-way" in a subsequent deed would except fee title to the land under the right-of-way. In fact, this exact issue is discussed in Zobrist.

          "The conveyance of a fee simple interest with a clause excepting an easement...conveys to the grantee all the grantor's rights and interests...yet compels the grantee...from acting...inconsistent with the rights of the third party...described in the exception."
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              The above citation explains that the excepting of an easement in a real estate deed simply identifies the easement to the grantee, and does not alter the easement. So, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, the exception of that "right-of-way" in a subsequent real estate identifies the easement, and nothing more. Zobrist made that exact point:

          "The grantor here excepted a right-of-way amounting to an easement from the grant. No reference was made in the conveyance to Custer of an exception of the fee to the 100 feet." "...Custer...received a fee interest in the land...restricted only...that he could not use...in a manner inconsistent with the existing rights of the railroad..."
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

          View a more complete study of the meaning of the exception of a "right-of-way" in a deed.

              Judge Cox finds the exception of the "right-of-way" in a subsequent Hilchkanum deed to be confirmation that Hilchkanum intended to convey fee simple title with the original right-of-way deed to the Railway. But, that conclusion is not supported by the law. You will notice that Judge Cox provides no legal precedent in support of his analysis of Hilchkanum's intentions in these subsequent real estate deeds. The intention of the parties in a deed is a material fact. Disputed material facts are resolved by a jury. Cox had no choice but to send the lawsuit back to Superior Court for a jury to resolve this material fact and the many other unresolved material facts in this lawsuit. Obviously, Judge Ronald Cox does not believe in our jury system, or a party's right to a jury.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      What is excepted in the deed which is discussed by Cox in the above paragraph?

              Judge Cox doesn't have many original thoughts in this opinion. Instead, he simply copies the logic of dishonest Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein and dishonest Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher in King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002). Cox copies the dishonest analysis of the Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds from these two dishonest opinions. Rothstein, Fletcher and now, Cox, print the words from subsequent Hilchkanum deeds excepting of the "right-of-way" and then treat that as an exception of "land", when "land" is not mentioned in any of the Hilchkanum exceptions. The exception of a "right-of-way" is completely different than the exception of "land". The exception of "land" implies conveyance of fee simple title is withheld for that excepted parcel of "land". The exception of a "right-of-way" requires one to go to the deed which established the right-of-way and determining if that original grant was easement or fee simple. This is explained in my discussion above. If the original grant was an easement, the exception of that easement in a subsequent real estate deed simply identifies the easement. So, let's look at the words used in the exception which Cox considers above.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              In the paragraph above, Judge Cox prints the words of the exception he misconstrues. Cox writes that the exception in Hilchkanum's 1898 subsequent deed is "...less three (3) acres right of way of railroad...". So, a "right of way" is excepted. The exception does not state that the "land" under the right-of-way is excepted. The exception only withholds conveyance the "right of way". As stated in the discussion above, the exception of a "right of way" requires one to go to the deed originally granting of the right-of-way to determine if the original grant was an easement.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              Perhaps Judge Cox is implying that use of the word "acres" somehow implies that "land" is excepted. Of course, that would be a very wrong conclusion by the judge. It is common for lawyers to argue that the description of an easement, in the terms used to describe "land", somehow implies that "land" is conveyed. That is not the case because such a rule would deny the ability of a party to accurately describe an easement. Here is a citation that explains this issue:
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "The fact that the exact boundaries of the right-of-way were set out does not outweigh the express intent of the grantor to convey only a right to use the land, not the land itself."
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              In Zobrist, the court rejected the argument that an easement, described in metes and bounds, somehow implies fee simple transfer. In the same way, an honest judge must dismiss the argument that using the term "...acres right of way of railroad..." somehow means "acres of land". Zobrist provides another citation useful to understanding how Judge Cox was required to analyze this issue:
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "The subject matter of both the deed to the railroad and the exception in the conveyance to Custer is described as a "right-of-way one hundred (100) feet wide." It has been stated:

            To except certain property from a lease or deed of conveyance, which otherwise would carry all the land, words of exception must be as definite as those required to convey title and if not so the whole property passes.

          6 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property SS 3092, at 796 (repl. ed. 1962).

          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              The subsequent Hilchkanum deeds construed in this decision meet the same criteria used in the Zobrist citation above. The subject of the exception in all of these subsequent deeds is "right-of-way", not "land". According to the rule stated in the citation above, if Hilchkanum intended to except the "land" under the right-of-way in his subsequent deeds, he needed to use "words of exception...as definite as those required to convey title". Hilchkanum did not except "land" in his subsequent deeds. He excepted "right of way", which simply takes one back to Hilchkanum's original SLS&E right-of-way deed in order to determine what was granted to the Railway in 1887. Whatever was granted in the 1887 right-of-way deed is what was excepted in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds.

      Summary:

              In his paragraph above, Judge Cox finds that the exception of the SLS&E "right-of-way" in Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds indicates that Hilchkanum excepted the land under the right-of-way in that subsequent deed. Cox cites no authority for that dishonest conclusion, and ignores established legal precedent which holds the exception of a "right-of-way" withholds whatever property right was granted in the original right-of-way deed.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          Bill Hilchkanum's 1905 conveyance of another portion of Lot 3 to John Hirder provides further support for these conclusions. The deed describes the boundary of the property, in part, as running 'thence in a Northeasterly direction along the right of way of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway.'51 Hilchkanum's exclusion of the previously conveyed right of way is consistent both with his exclusion of the same right of way in the 1898 conveyance and the prior conveyance in fee of that same right of way in the May 9, 1887 deed to the Railway. There is no other reasonable explanation for him to have excluded the right of way from subsequent conveyances. Again, there is no doubt that we again deal with Lot 3 - the property the Rays now own.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

      We continue our examination of the profound dishonesty of Judge Ronald Cox.

            In his paragraph above, Judge Cox writes:

        "The deed describes the boundary of the property, in part, as running 'thence in a Northeasterly direction along the right of way of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway.'51 Hilchkanum's exclusion of the previously conveyed right of way is consistent both with his exclusion of the same right of way in the 1898 conveyance and the prior conveyance in fee of that same right of way in the May 9, 1887 deed to the Railway."

            Cox is stating that, in a subsequent Hilchkanum deed, the right-of-way was excluded because the boundary of that subsequent deed used the side of the original Hilchkanum right-of-way to the SLS&E. That statement is completely wrong. The boundary of that subsequent Hilchkanum deed is the centerline of the SLS&E right-of-way, not the outer edge, or side, of that right-of-way. It is incomprehensible that Cox would not understand this issue which is well understood and was carefully explained in Roeder v. BNSF (1986). Anyone who has any understanding of Washington railroad right-of-way law knows this decision. I will simply provide the citation that explains Judge Cox' error, or intentional misapplication of the law, to let the reader understand. (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "...the conveyance of land which is bounded by a railroad right of way will give the grantee title to the center line of the right of way if the grantor owns so far, unless the grantor has expressly reserved the fee to the right of way, or the grantor's intention to not convey the fee is clear./22

              A major concern in examining conveyances of abutting land is, of course, to determine the intent of the parties to the deed./23 When the deed refers to the grantor's right of way as a boundary without clearly indicating that the side of the right of way is the boundary, it is presumed that the grantor intended to convey title to the center of the right of way."
        [Roeder v. BNSF (1986)]

            Considering the many lies in this opinion, I have to conclude that Cox' above statement is not an error, but simply another intentional lie. His lies protect the participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme from serving time in prison. Federal Judges Rothstein and Fletcher became participants in the tax fraud with their opinions, King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002). In this opinion, Cox joins their ranks.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          A third conveyance by Hilchkanum is also consistent with the view that he intended to convey fee title to the right of way to the Railway. In 1904, Bill Hilchkanum conveyed to Chris Nelson lot number one, 'less three (3) acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle and International (sic) Railway for right of way purposes.'52 Again, there is no indication in this deed that the conveyance was 'subject to' the right of way, an indication that the strip of land previously conveyed was an easement. Rather, the right of way is excluded from the conveyance entirely, an indication that the strip of land was previously conveyed in fee.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

      Judge Cox "cherry-picks" the extrinsic evidence!

              In his dishonest analysis of extrinsic evidence, Judge Cox "cherry-picks" the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds and then misrepresents legal precedent in their analysis. Above, Cox "cherry picks" the Hilchkanum deeds to Chris Nelson. In the next "Note", below, Cox continues to "cherry-pick" by refusing to honestly address the effect of the Hilchkanum deed to Julia Curley. Judge Cox is using this "cherry-picked" evidence to falsely establish the intention of the Hilchkanums in their 1887 right-of-way deed. The intentions of a party in a deed is a material fact. Disputed material facts are resolved by a jury, not by a dishonest judge who "cherry-picks" contributing material facts to justify the predetermined outcome of his decision. So, in this "Note" we will examine how Judge Cox "cherry-picks" the extrinsic evidence, and how the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds he eliminates contradicts his analysis.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Hilchkanum conveyed two very different deeds to Chris Nelson in 1904.

              Judge Cox writes, above, that the 1904 subsequent real estate deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson excepts "...three (3) acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle and International (sic) Railway for right of way purposes." That deed conveyed all of Government Lot 1 (ONE). As I explained above, one must determine what those words excepted. Do those words indicate the intention of Hilchkanum to except "land" or "easement"? I believe it is easiest to answer that question by examining another deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson in 1904. First, here is a photocopy of the February 27, 1904 Warranty Deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson.

          View the February 27, 1904 Warranty Deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson which excepted "acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle & International Railway for right of way purposes" not "acres of land". This deed conveyed about one third of the original 1887 right-of-way.

              In a second deed, on March 15, 1904 Bill Hilchkanum conveyed all of Government Lot 2 (TWO) to Chris Nelson. Government Lot 2 contained about one-third of the original Hilchkanum right-of-way granted to the SLS&E. Government Lot 1, described by Judge Cox in the above paragraph, also contained about one-third of the original Hilchkanum right-of-way granted to the SLS&E. So, if Hilchkanum excepted the SLS&E right-of-way in his sale of Government Lot 1 to Chris Nelson, he should have also excepted the SLS&E right-of-way in his sale of Government Lot 2. Right? Well, he didn't except the SLS&E right-of-way in his sale of Government Lot 2 to Chris Nelson. How can that be explained?

              Before we explain the implication of the fact that Hilchkanum excepted his "right-of-way" in only some of his subsequent real estate deeds, let's look at the deed conveying Government Lot 2 to Chris Nelson on March 15, 1904, and confirm that it does not except the SLS&E "right-of-way". I described the Government Lot 2 deed in my analysis of the King County v Rasmussen federal decisions. The Ray's property and my property on Lake Sammamish are about one hundred yards apart, both within the original Hilchkanum homestead, and both burdened by the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

          View the March 15, 1904 Warranty Deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson which contained no exception of the right-of-way. This deed conveyed about one third of the original 1887 right-of-way.

          View a series of maps which explain the location of the March 15, 1904 conveyance of Government Lot 2 to Chris Nelson.

              So, what is the logical explanation that one 1904 deed to Chris Nelson excepts the SLS&E right-of-way, and another 1904 deed to Chris Nelson does not except the same right-of-way? The answer to that question destroys Judge Cox' use of Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds to support the idea that Hilchkanum intended to grant fee simple title to the Railway with his 1887 right-of-way grant. Read on!
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              The answer to that question takes us to the common law understanding of words used to except an easement in a deed. It also takes us to the common law understanding that words to except an easement in a deed are optional. A couple of "Notes" above, I discussed the common law understanding of the exception of a "right-of-way" in a subsequent real estate deed. I repeat the citations here, with an abbreviated discussion:

              First, the definition of an exception in a deed. Zobrist v. Culp (1977) provides this definition:

          "An exception is the withholding from the operation of the deed of something existent which otherwise the deed would pass to the grantee."
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              If Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, then the exception of that "right-of-way" in a subsequent deed would simply except an easement.

          "The conveyance of a fee simple interest with a clause excepting an easement...conveys to the grantee all the grantor's rights and interests...yet compels the grantee...from acting...inconsistent with the rights of the third party...described in the exception."
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              So, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, the exception of that "right-of-way" in a subsequent real estate identifies the easement, and nothing more.

          "The grantor here excepted a right-of-way amounting to an easement from the grant. No reference was made in the conveyance to Custer of an exception of the fee to the 100 feet." "...Custer...received a fee interest in the land...restricted only...that he could not use...in a manner inconsistent with the existing rights of the railroad..."
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              Now that we have established that the exception of an easement in a deed merely recognizes the easement, the next step is to determine if it is necessary to identify an easement in a subsequent real estate deed.

      Is it necessary for an easement to be identified in a subsequent deed?

              Is there a requirement that an easement be identified in a subsequent real estate deed, or is it optional to identify an easement in the words of a subsequent deed? The answer is that it is optional to identify the easement. An easement goes with the property whether it is identified in the subsequent deed or not. Anyone who has purchased property, and obtained a title report, has very likely found easements identified in the title report that are not identified in the deed. This is the common way for a grantee to identify easements. It is uncommon, in modern real estate deeds, to find easements identified as exceptions, but it is legal to do it in that manner, as Zobrist v. Culp explains.

      Hilchkanum's failure to except the "right-of-way" in some of his subsequent real estate deeds indicates that Hilchkanum understood the 1887 right-of-way grant to the SLS&E was an easement.

              If Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, he would need to except the land under the right-of-way grant in every subsequent deed. Otherwise, he would be selling land in that subsequent deed that he had already deeded fee simple to the Railway. He would be selling land that he didn't own in that subsequent deed. On the other hand, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, he wouldn't need to except the "right-of-way" in every subsequent deed because the easement goes with the property whether it is identified in the deed, or not. Therefore, if some subsequent Hilchkanum deeds excepted the railroad "right-of-way" and others did not, that would be consistent with the Hilchkanums granting an easement to the SLS&E in their right-of-way deed.

              So, understanding the SLS&E right-of-way to be an easement is the only explanation that would allow Hilchkanum to legally grant Government Lot 1 with an exception for the SLS&E "right-of-way", and grant Government Lot 2 without an exception. This is even more revealing because both Government Lots 1 and 2 were deeded by Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson in the same year.

      Conclusion:

              In his discussion above, Judge Cox misconstrues the meaning of the exception of a "right-of-way", and ignores the legal implication of the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds which do not except the "right-of-way". Hilchkanum's failure to except the "right-of-way" in his subsequent real estate deeds indicates that Hilchkanum understood the 1887 right-of-way grant to the SLS&E was an easement.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          We are aware that in 1890, Bill Hilchkanum conveyed all of Lot 2 to Julia Curley without any exceptions.53 But because the 1890 deed contains no reference whatsoever to the right of way, it is not probative of the grantors' intent in the 1887 deed.54 In any event, Lot 3 is at issue in this appeal, not Lot 2, and the record before us establishes that Hilchkanum was entirely consistent in excluding the right of way and stating that no other encumbrances affected Lot 3.

          In short, the deeds subsequent to the May 1887 deed consistently demonstrate that Hilchkanum conveyed the right of way to the Railway in fee, not as an easement.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

      Above, Judge Cox dishonestly eliminates a deed which, when construed, contradicts his analysis.

              In his paragraph above, Judge Cox admits that the 1890 deed to Julia Curley did not except the SLS&E "right-of-way", but then finds that "...it is not probative of the grantors' intent in the 1887 deed." In my note above I provide the argument that if the "right-of-way" is not excepted in Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds, then the original right-of-way grant to the SLS&E must be seen as an easement. The logic is simple. If Hilchkanum granted fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way with his 1887 deed to the SLS&E, then Hilchkanum could not sell that land a second time to Julia Curley with his deed to her in 1890. In that case, by not excepting the "right-of-way" land in his deed to Julia Curley, Hilchkanum would be illegally selling that land for a second time. On the other hand, if Hilchkanum granted only an easement with his right-of-way deed in 1887, then excepting the "right-of-way" in subsequent deeds would not sell the land for a second time, but rather simply recognize that a railroad easement existed on the land. That sale would be legal. In light of this analysis, it is obscenely dishonest for Judge Cox to declare that the deed to Julia Curley is "not probative". (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Judge Cox copies the analysis in dishonest federal opinions which construed the Hilchkanum deeds.

              Of Course, Judge Cox' "not probative" analysis is not his own. Very little in this opinion is his original thought. Most of his analysis comes from the dishonest federal opinions, King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002). His "not probative" analysis is lifted from Senior Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher's appeals panel opinion. Here is the portion of Fletcher's opinion that Cox copies above:
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "...the total failure to except the land subject to the right of way in the lot 2 deed is not significantly probative of whether or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that a scintilla of evidence or evidence that is not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact)."
          [King County v. Rasmussen (2002)]

              As I wrote above, little in this opinion represents original thought by Judge Cox. Here are links to the position in the annotated federal opinions where I expose the same dishonest analysis and "cherry-picking" of the subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Understand how Federal Judge Barbara Rothstein "cherry-picked" and misrepresented the extrinsic evidence in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

          Understand how Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher "cherry-picked" and misrepresented the extrinsic evidence in King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

      Summary:

              In his paragraph above, Judge Cox eliminates the Curley deed which, when properly analyzed, destroys his argument. He does this by dishonestly declaring that the deed is "not probative". If he were honest, Judge Cox would admit that his analysis of Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds would have Hilchkanum selling his land twice; once to the SLS&E in the right-of-way deed, and a second time in the subsequent deed to Curley.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          The circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed may also affect determination of original intent. The Rays make several arguments based on this factor, none of which is persuasive.

          They first argue that Hilchkanum must have intended to convey an easement in the 1887 deed because conveying fee title to a portion of his unpatented homestead claim would have violated federal homestead law. We disagree.

          On March 3, 1873, Congress passed a law, codified at Rev. Stat. sec. 2288, 'providing that any bona fide settler might convey by warranty against his own act 'any part of his claim for church, school, and cemetery purposes and for a right of way for railroads.''55 This statute governs where, as here, the grant of a right of way relates to homestead property.

          The Rays argue that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Great Northern Railway Company v. United States56 is dispositive here. But that decision interpreted a different law, the Act of March 3, 1875, which governed the grant of rights of way across public lands to railroads.57 Private, not public, lands are at issue here. Thus, the United States Supreme Court's holding in the Great Northern is inapplicable here. The Rays also cite two Department of the Interior decisions, which they argue support their contention. Again, we disagree.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            There is no disagreement that Congress, with its Act of March 3, 1873, allowed homesteaders without patent to grant rights-of-way to railroads. But, that does not resolve the issue of whether Hilchkanum granted fee simple title to the SLS&E with his 1887 right-of-way deed. The important issues here are:

          1. Did Congress intend easements to be granted with their authority for homesteaders to convey railroad rights-of-way prior to receiving patent?

          2. Was Hilchkanum restricted from granting fee simple title with his 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E?

              We will look at each of these questions, in detail.

      1. Did Congress intend easements to be granted with their authority for homesteaders to convey railroad rights-of-way prior to receiving patent?

              First, let's look at the Act of March 3, 1873 to confirm that Congress allowed homesteaders to grant rights-of-way to railroads prior to receiving patent.

              The Act of March 3, 1873 was encoded as 17 U.S. Stat. 602. Judge Cox refers to Rev. Stat. sec. 2288, in his paragraph above, which is the same law. The Act allowed for a homesteader to grant a "right-of-way" to a railroad across his homestead prior to the grant of his patent. This overcame a requirement of the Homestead Act that forbad any alienation of the homestead prior to patent.

          17 U.S. Stat. 602 (my emphasis)

          "March 3, 1873. CHAP. CCLXVI. - An Act to authorize Pre-emptions or Settlers upon Homesteads on the public Land to alienate Portions of their Pre-emptions or Homesteads for certain public Purposes.

                  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any person who has already settled or hereafter my settle on the public lands of the United States, either by pre-emption, or by virtue of the homestead law or any amendments thereto, shall have the right to transfer by warranty, against his or her own acts, any portion of his or her said pre-emption or homestead for church, cemetery, or school purposes, or for the right of way of railroads across such pre-emption or homestead, and the transfer for such public purposes shall in no way vitiate the right to complete and perfect the title to their pre-emptions or homesteads. Approved, March 3, 1873."
            [17 U.S. Stat. 602]

              Judge Cox recognizes that homesteaders were allowed to grant rights-of-way to railroads prior to patent, but he fails to admit that the United States Supreme Court determined that Congress intended these grants to be easements. Instead, Cox interpreters 17 U.S. Stat. 602 to allow homesteaders to grant fee simple title of their land to railroads for the use of rights-of-way. Apparently, Judge Cox does not feel bound by the opinions of the United States Supreme Court.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              In his paragraph above, Judge Cox dismisses the importance of Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S., 315 U.S. 262 (1942) with this dishonest statement:

          "The Rays argue that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Great Northern Railway Company v. United States56 is dispositive here. But that decision interpreted a different law, the Act of March 3, 1875, which governed the grant of rights of way across public lands to railroads.57 Private, not public, lands are at issue here. Thus, the United States Supreme Court's holding in the Great Northern is inapplicable here."

              But, Judge Cox apparently did not read Great Northern v. U.S. before he dismissed its importance. Or, perhaps this is just another of the many lies by Judge Cox in this opinion. In Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S., 315 U.S. 262 (1942), the United States Supreme Court analyzed the meaning intended by the Congress in its use of the term "right-of-way" in the Act of March 3, 1875 and other legislation during that period, including the Act of March 3, 1873. This Supreme Court decision looked at the history of laws governing the establishment of railroads in the 1800's. It found that the meaning of "right-of-way", as used in the Right-of-Way Act of March 3, 1875, was an easement, and not a grant of fee simple title. While Great Northern dealt with the Act of March 3, 1875, the discussion of Congressional intent in the use of the term "right-of-way" after 1871, would apply equally to the Act of March 3, 1873 (17 U.S. Stat. 602). Judge Cox conclusion that "...the United States Supreme Court's holding in the Great Northern is inapplicable..." is not consistent with the conclusions of the United States Supreme Court in Great Northern.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Here is a portion of Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S. (1942): (with my emphasis)

          "The Act of March 3, 1875, from which petitioner's rights stem, clearly grants only an easement, and not a fee. Section 1 indicates that the right is one of passage since it grants 'the', not a, 'right of way through the public lands of the United States'. Section 2 adds to the conclusion that the right granted is one of use and occupancy only, rather than the land itself, for it declares that any railroad whose right of way passes through a canyon, pass or defile 'shall not prevent any other railroad company from the use and occupancy of said canyon, pass, or defile, for the purposes of its road, in common with the road first located'.1

          Section 4 is especially persuasive. It requires the location of each right of way to be noted on the plats in the local land office, and 'thereafter all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way'.2 This reserved right to dispose of the lands subject to the right of way is wholly inconsistent with the grant of a fee. As the court below pointed out, 'Apter words to indicate the intent to convey an easement would be difficult to find' (119 F.2d 825). That this was the precise intent of Section 4 is clear from its legislative history. 3 While Section 4 pro- [315 U.S. 262, 272] † vides a method for securing the benefits of the Act in advance of construction,4 no adequate reason is advanced for believing that it does not illumine the nature of the right granted. The Act is to be interpreted as a harmonious whole.

          The Act is to be liberally construed to carry out its purposes. United States v. Denver, etc., Railway Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 , 14 S.Ct. 11, 15; Nadeau v. Union Pacific R. Co., 253 U.S. 442 , 40 S.Ct. 570; Great Northern R. Co. v. Steinke, 261 U.S. 119 , 43 S. Ct. 316. But the Act is also subject to the general rule of construction that any ambiguity in a grant is to be resolved favorably to a sovereign grantor-' nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit language'-Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20 , 21 S., 39 S.Ct. 397, 398, and cases cited. Cf. Great Northern R. Co. v. Steinke, supra. Plainly there is nothing in the Act which may be characterized as a 'clear and explicit' conveyance of the underlying oil and minerals. The Act was designed to permit the construction of railroads through the public lands and thus enhance their value and hasten their settlement. The achievement of that purpose does not compel a construction of the right of way grant as conveying a fee title to the land and the underlying minerals; a railroad may be operated though its right of way be but an easement. 5 † [315 U.S. 262, 273] † But we are not limited to the lifeless words of the statute and formalistic canons of construction in our search for the intent of Congress. The Act was the product of a period, and, 'courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed'. United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 91 U.S. 72 , 79. And see Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 , 5 S.Ct. 606, 609; Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490, 494 , 13 S. Ct. 634, 635; United States v. Denver, etc., Railway Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 , 14 S.Ct. 11, 15.

          Beginning in 1850 Congress embarked on a policy of subsidizing railroad construction by lavish grants from the public domain. 6 This policy incurred great public disfavor7 which was crystallized in the following resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on March 11, 1872:

            'Resolved, that in the judgment of this House the policy of granting subsidies in public lands to railroads and [315 U.S. 262, 274] † other corporations ought to be discontinued, and that every consideration of public policy and equal justice to the whole people requires that the public lands should be held for the purpose of securing homesteads to actual settlers, and for educational purposes, as may be provided by law.' Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1585 (1872).

          After 1871 outright grants of public lands to private railroad companies seem to have been discontinued. 8 But, to encourage development of the Western vastnesses, Congress had to grant rights to lay track across the public domain, rights which could not be secured against the sovereign by eminent domain proceedings or adverse user. For a time special acts were passed granting to designated railroads simply 'the right of way' through the public lands of the United States. 9 That those acts were not intended to convey and land is inferable from remarks in Congress by those sponsoring the measures. For example, in reporting a bill granting a right of way to the Dakota Grand Trunk Railway (17 Stat. 202), the committee chairman said: 'This is merely a grant of the right of way'.10 Likewise, in reporting a right of way bill for the New Mexico and Gulf Railway Company (17 Stat. 343), Mr. Townsend of Pennsylvania, the same Congressman who sponsored the Act of 1875, observed: 'It is nothing but a grant of the right of way.' 11 † [315 U.S. 262, 275] † The burden of this special legislation moved Congress to adopt the general right of way statute now before this Court. Since it was a product of the sharp change in Congressional policy with respect to railroad grants after 1871, it is improbable that Congress intended by it to grant more than a right of passage, let alone mineral riches. The presence in the Act of Section 4, which, as has been pointed out above, is so inconsistent with the grant of a fee, strongly indicates that Congress was carrying into effect its changed policy regarding railroad grants. 12 †

          Also pertinent to the construction of the Act is the contemporaneous administrative interpretation placed on it by those charged with its execution. Cf. United States v. Johnston, 124 U.S. 236, 253 , 8 S.Ct. 446, 454; United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760 , 763; Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 , 53 S. Ct. 350, 358. The first such interpretation, the general right of way circular of January 13, 1888, was that the Act granted an easement, not a fee. 13 The same position was taken in the regulations of March 21, 1892, 14 L.D. 338, and those of November 4, 1898, 27 L.D. 663. While the first of these circulars followed the Act by 13 years, the weight to be accorded them is not dependent on strict contemporaneity. Cf. Swendig v. Washington Water Power Co., 265 U.S. 322 , 44 S.Ct. 496. This early administrative gloss received indirect Congressional approval when Congress repeated the language of the Act in granting canal and reservoir companies rights of way by the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, 26 Stat. [315 U.S. 262, 276] † 1101, 43 U.S.C.A. 946, and when Congress made the Act of 1875 partially applicable to the Colville Indian Reservation by Act of March 6, 1896, c. 42, 29 Stat. 44. Cf. National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 , 40 S.Ct. 237, 239.

          The circular of February 11, 1904, 32 L.D. 481, described the right as a 'base or qualified fee'. This shift in interpretation was probably due to the description in Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267 , 23 S.Ct. 671, 672, of a right of way conveyed in a land-grant act (13 Stat. 365) as a 'limited fee, made on an implied condition of reverter'.14 But the earlier view was reasserted in the departmental regulations of May 21, 1909, 37 L.D. 787.15 After 1915 administrative construction bowed to the case of Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44 , 36 S.Ct. 5, which applied the language of the Townsend case to a right of way acquired under the Act of 1875. We do not regard this subsequent interpretation as binding on the Department of the Interior since it was impelled by what we regard as inaccurate statements in the Stringham case. Cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 , 60 S.Ct. 444, 452, 125 A.L.R. 1368

          Congress itself in later legislation has interpreted the Act of 1875 as conveying but an easement. The Act of June 26, 1906, c. 3550, 34 Stat. 482, 43 U.S.C.A. 940 declaring a forfeiture of unused rights of way, provides in part that: 'the United States hereby resumes the full title to the lands covered thereby (by the right of way) freed and discharged from such easement'. This language is repeated in the forfeiture act of February 25, 1909, c. 191, 35 Stat. 647, 43 U.S.C.A. 940. Also on June 26, 1906, an act16 was passed confirming the rights of way which certain railroads had acquired under [315 U.S. 262, 277] † the 1875 Act in the Territories of Oklahoma and Arizona. The House committee report on this bill said: 'The right as originally conferred and as proposed to be protected by this bill simply grants an easement or use for railroad purposes. Under the present law whenever the railroad passes through a tract of public land the entire tract is patented to the settler or entryman, subject only to this easement'.17 It is settled that 'subsequent legislation may be considered to assist in the interpretation of prior legislation upon the same subject.' Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 309 , 31 S.Ct. 578, 583, 584. See also Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682 , 11 S.Ct. 222; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556. These statutes were approximately contemporaneous with petitioner's acquisition of the rights of way of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway.

          That petitioner has only an easement in its rights of way acquired under the Act of 1875 is therefore clear from the language of the Act, its legislative history, its early administrative interpretation and the construction placed upon it by Congress in subsequent enactments."
          [Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S., 315 U.S. 262 (1942)]

              As I wrote above, Great Northern dealt with The Act of March 3, 1875. But, as one can see from the portion of the opinion cited above, the Supreme Court looked at the intent of Congress, in its use of the term "right-of-way", from 1850 onward. The Court found that, after 1871, Congress recognized and responded to the public disfavor with the grant of land to the railroads. The resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on March 11, 1872 and subsequent legislation reveals the intent of congress with its use of the words "right-of-way" in The Act of March 3, 1873. The U.S. Supreme Court found the intent of Congress in "17 Stat. 202" and "17 Stat. 343", above, was to use the term "right-of-way" as an easement. Both of those Statutes were passed in 1872, prior to The Act of March 3, 1873.

              Judge Cox had no right to legally assume that the grant of a "right-of-way" under 17 U S Statute 602 as the grant of fee simple title, when the United Supreme Court had found the intent of Congress, with those words, was to grant an easement. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      2. Was Hilchkanum restricted from granting fee simple title with his 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E?

              In the portion of this note, directly above, I explain that Congress intended only an easement to be granted by un-patented homesteaders conveying railroad rights-of-way. But, there is other legislation that supports the fact that Hilchkanum granted only an easement with his 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

              Judge Cox refused to admit that Hilchkanum, an "Indian", could not sell his land until five years after receiving patent. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              Hilchkanum did not file for homestead entry under Section 2289, Revised Statutes of the United States, which is the codified version of the Homestead Act of 1862. Hilchkanum was not qualified for homestead entry under Section 2289 because he was a Native American "Indian". The right of Native Americans to homestead was not authorized until Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1875. This can be seen in Hilchkanum's homestead application where the words "Section 2289, Revised Statutes of the United States" are crossed out and replaced by "the provisions of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1875".

          Read Hilchkanum's Homestead Application to verify that he filed under the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1875.

          Read Hilchkanum's affidavit which states his qualification to homestead as an "Indian" under the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1875.

              The "Act of March 3, 1875" allowed Native Americans to homestead, but restricted "Indians" from selling their homestead land for five years from the date of patent. This federal law prohibited Hilchkanum from transferring fee simple title to the SLS&E until 1893. So, he was not allowed to convey fee simple title of his right-of-way land to the SLS&E in 1887, as Judge Cox claims. (My emphasis in the citation below):

          "Mar. 3, 1875. | 18 Stat., 402

          Chapter 131
          SEC. 15

            That any Indian born in the United States, who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and who has abandoned, or may hereafter abandon, his tribal relations, shall, on making satisfactory proof of such abandonment, under rules to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, be entitled to the benefits of the act entitled "An act to secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain," approved May twentieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and the acts amendatory thereof, except that the provisions of the eighth section of the said act shall not be held to apply to entries made under this act:

            Provided, however, That the title to lands acquired by any Indian by virtue hereof shall not be subject to alienation or incumbrance, either by voluntary conveyance or the judgment, decree, or order of any court, and shall be and remain inalienable for a period of five years from the date of the patent issued therefor:"

              Read a study that explains Hilchkanum's situation as a homesteading "Indian" in the late 1800's, including the history of the times, laws that protected "Indians", and specific Hilchkanum documents.

      Summary:

        When Congress allowed a homesteader to grant a railroad "right-of-way" after entry and before patent, Congress intended the grant to be an easement, not fee title. This intent of Congress was explained by the United States Supreme Court in its decision Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S. (1942).

        Hilchkanum was restricted by law from conveying any part of his homestead land until 1893, five years after receiving his 1888 patent, because he qualified to homestead as an "Indian" under the Act of March 3, 1875.

        Judge Cox provides no legal argument and no citation to refute the above discussion.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          In the first, South Perry Townsite v. Reed,58 the Department considered whether the term 'for the right of way of railroads,' as used in section 2288 of the Revised Statutes, limited the size of the right of way that could be granted to the width of the track and cars, or could include 'such space as is necessary for side tracks, stock yards, or other purpose incident to the proper business of a railroad as a common carrier.'59 This issue has no relevance here.

          The second Department of the Interior case, Lawson v. Reynolds,60 dealt with an agreement by a homestead applicant to allow construction of an electric plant on the land she was claiming as a homestead, before perfection of her entry. The Department concluded that the agreement was 'not an alienation of any part of the land, but a mere lease of a portion of the premises and the grant of an easement' and therefore did not bar consummation of her entry.61 This decision is completely inapposite, and the Rays do not explain how it bolsters their arguments.

          We conclude that neither of these decisions by a federal agency, neither of which involved the interpretation of Washington real property law, is helpful in addressing the questions before us.

          The Rays also look to a dictionary definition of the term 'right of way' to support their claim that the 1887 deed conveyed only an easement, not fee title. As Brown states, a right of way may either be in fee or an easement.62 Thus, a dictionary definition is neither dispositive nor particularly helpful here. Moreover, that court expressly rejected the argument that use of the term 'right of way' in the caption of a deed meant that the conveyance was an easement rather than fee simple.63 Thus, parsing the language either in the body of a deed or its caption and looking to a dictionary for the meaning of such language adds little, if anything, that is useful to the analysis.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

      In the paragraph above, we find more of Judge Cox' dishonesty.

              There are two issues that need to be discussed here:

          1. It is dishonest for Judge Cox to refuse to parse the language in the Hilchkanum deed.

          2. It is dishonest for Judge Cox to ignore the 1887 definition and understanding of the term "right-of-way".

              We will discuss each of these issues individually.

      1. It is dishonest for Judge Cox to refuse to parse the language in the Hilchkanum deed.

              In his paragraph above, Judge Cox writes that it is not proper to parse the language in the construing of a deed. He provides no citation for this dishonest statement. The fact is, parsing the language in order to construe a deed is common law precedent in Washington State. Read the citation below to understand this fact (with my emphasis):
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                [1, 2] The instruments of conveyance should reflect the intention of the parties. Gold Bar v. Gold Bar Lumber Co., 109 Wash. 391, 393-94, 186 P. 896 (1920), held:

            [T]he intent of the parties must primarily be gathered from a fair consideration of the deed, and the language employed therein should be consistent with the terms of the deed, including its scope and subject-matter; that the object, in construing the deed, is to ascertain the intention of the parties, especially that of the grantor; that some meaning should be given to every word, clause and expression, if it can reasonably be done and if it is not inconsistent with the general intent of the whole instrument, so that the deed may operate according to the intention of the parties; . . .
                [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              Considering the massive dishonesty in Judge Cox' analysis to this point, one must assume that this is just another intentional lie by Cox in order to support his predetermined outcome to the lawsuit and to protect the participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Judge Cox becomes a participant in that crime with this opinion.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              Since we have established the fact that the individual words and phrases of a deed must be construed in order to determine the intentions of the parties in the deed, then understanding the definition of the term "right-of-way" in the Hilchkanum deed would be a critical factor in construing the deed. So, now we look at the definition of "right-of-way".

      2. It is dishonest for Judge Cox to ignore the 1887 definition and understanding of the term "right-of-way".

              Understanding what the parties intended to convey in the deed resolves the issue of whether the Hilchkanum conveyance was fee simple or an easement. The intent of the parties is the principle determination of this opinion. In order to understand the meaning of Hilchkanum's grant of a "right-of-way", it is critical to understand what the term "right-of-way" meant to the parties in those days. The legal meaning of "right-of-way" is established in the precedential Washington State/Territory railroad right-of-way decisions that span over one hundred years. But, the meaning of the term "right-of-way" has changed over time. In order to understand the intentions of the parties in 1887, one needs to understand how the term was understood in 1887. It was completely dishonest for Judge Cox to refuse to consider the definition of "right-of-way" in the 1891 edition of Black's Law Dictionary. The definition of "right-of-way" in Black's 1891 edition reveals what the term meant to folks in those days. So, let's now look at how the definition of "right-of-way" has changed over time, and how the term was understood by the parties in 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The Legal Definition of Right-of-Way:

              To understand the meaning of the words "right-of-way", one needs to go back in time to the origin of the term. The grant of a "right-of-way" was originally the grant of a "right" of passage. A right of passage over land is an easement. Later, the strip of land that railroads used for their operation also became to be called the "right-of-way". So, over time, the term took on two different meanings. This can be seen by comparing the definition of "right-of-way" in Black's Law Dictionary in 1891 to the definition in 1979.

          The First Edition of Blackís Law Dictionary was published in 1891. It provided this definition of "right of way" (with my emphasis):

            "RIGHT OF WAY. The right of passage or of a way is a servitude imposed by law or by convention, and by virtue of which one has a right to pass on foot, or horseback, or in a vehicle, to drive beasts of burden or carts, through the estate of another."

            " 'Right of way,' in its strict meaning, is the right of passage over another manís ground; and in its legal and generally accepted meaning, in reference to a railway, it is a mere easement in the lands of others, obtained by lawful condemnation to public use or by purchase. It would be using the term in an unusual sense, by applying it to an absolute purchase of the fee simple of lands to be used for a railway or any other kind of way." (Blackís Law Dictionary, p.1046, 1891).

          In the 1979 Fifth Edition of Black's Law Dictionary, the definition of "right-of-way" had changed to accommodate the change of meaning over time. This is the 1979 definition (with my emphasis):

            "Right of Way. Term 'right of way' sometimes is used to describe a right belonging to a party to pass over land of another, but it is also used to describe that strip of land upon which railroad companies construct their road bed, and, when so used, the term refers to the land itself, not the right of passage over it. Bouche v. Wagner, 206 Or. 621, 293 P.2d 203, 209.

            As used with reference to right to pass over another's land, it is only an easement: and grantee acquires only right to a reasonable and usual enjoyment thereof with owner of soil retaining rights and benefits of ownership consistent with the easement. Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 287 Minn. 254, 177 N.W.2d 786, 789." (Blackís Law Dictionary, p.1191, 1979)

              Comparing the 1891 and 1979 Black's definitions, one can see the dramatic change in meaning. In King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Judge Rothstein applied the 1979 definition of "right-of-way" to a deed that was written 1887. This same dishonest tactic was used by Senior Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher in King County v. Rasmussen (2002). Unable to come up with an original thought, Judge Cox uses the same dishonest tactic in this opinion.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              In 1891, a railroad "right-of-way" had only one common understanding: an easement. Yet Judges Cox, Rothstein and Fletcher found that the words "right-of-way" in the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way granting clause meant fee simple ownership of the land. How could these judges decide that Judge Thomas Burke, the lawyer responsible for the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, intended the words "right-of-way" to have a meaning that did not evolve until many years later? How could these judges decide that Hilchkanum, who merely made an "X" on the Railway prepared deed, intended the words "right-of-way" to have a meaning that did not evolve until many years later? Are the judges claiming that time travel is involved in the construction of the Hilchkanum deed? Are the judges citing the movie "Back to the Future" as legal precedent here? The judges used a definition that did not exist at the time of the Hilchkanum deed because they needed to assign false understanding and intentions to Hilchkanum in order to protect the folks that committed the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              Because "right-of-way" has more than one definition and the meaning has evolved over time, the meaning that a specific party intend "right-of-way" to imply in a specific deed becomes an issue of fact rather than an issue of law. Disputed material facts are resolved before a jury. Once the appropriate meaning is established, it is a matter of law to apply that meaning in the construing of the deed. It is not the right of the judges to apply controversial or disputed meaning for words in order to obtain a predetermined outcome to a lawsuit. Yet, Cox, Rothstein, and Fletcher did exactly that in construing the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View a study of the meaning of "right-of-way" in a railroad deed.

      Summary:

        Judge Cox refuses to parse the language of the Hilchkanum deed in violation of Washington common law precedent.

        Judge Cox refuses to consider what the words "right-of-way" meant to the parties who participated in the 1887 Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E. This is a disputed material fact which should have been resolved by a jury.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          The Rays also speculate that the Railway prepared the May 1887 deed.64 Thus, they argue that we should construe ambiguities in that deed language against the Railway. We decline to do so because nothing in the record supports this argument.

          First, the face of the deed shows that the Hilchkanums executed the deed by making their marks, not by signing the instrument. Of course, neither party disputes that the Hilchkanums could neither read nor write.65 While we are mindful of the undisputed evidence that the Hilchkanums could neither read nor write, we are unaware of any rule that says that one who cannot do so lacks the capacity to understand the nature and extent of his or her property or the nature of a conveyance of such property. Nothing in the record before us indicates that the Hilchkanums failed to understand what they were doing in this particular transaction, a point counsel for the Rays appeared to concede at oral argument of this case. Second, and more importantly, examination of the deed shows that it is entirely handwritten, apparently by the same person. Both the language of the main part of the deed, as well as the acknowledgment, is in the handwriting of the notary who acknowledged the signatures of the Hilchkanums, B.J. Tallman.66 Nothing in the record before us indicates that he was the agent of the Railway. Absent such proof, we fail to see why we should construe ambiguities in the May 1887 deed against the Railway. Rather, to the extent we were to engage in applying a rule of construction to any perceived ambiguities in the language of the Hilchkanum deed, we would construe the deed against the Hilchkanums, the grantors.67 Third, the Rays also rely on the opinions of expert witnesses to support their position. Because courts decide the legal questions before us, not experts, we decline to give credence to these opinions.68



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            It is profoundly dishonest for Judge Cox to construe the deed against Hilchkanum. Further, Cox' above statements contain outrageous lies and the intentional misapplication of the law.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              In his discussion above, Judge Cox ignores the obvious disadvantage the Hilchkanums had in the execution of their right-of-way deed. Citing nothing in support, Cox illegally decided the material fact that the Hilchkanums understood "the nature and extent of [their] property [and] the nature of a conveyance of such property." It is obscene that Judge Cox would illegally resolve that disputed material fact in the light that the Hilchkanums were illiterate Native Americans in a time that Natives were on the "bottom rung" of white society. Cox' justification for establishing these material facts is that nothing proves otherwise. One could use the same ridiculous thought process to find that the Hilchkanums were aliens from outer space. Using Cox' twisted logic that any fact is true if it is not proven otherwise, the Hilchkanum's status as outer space aliens must be true because nothing in the record proves it's false. Ridiculous! Judge Cox has the responsibility to base his legal conclusions on uncontested material facts, not on the lack of evidence to the contrary. The Hilchkanum's ability to participate in their right-of-way deed is a disputed material fact. Cox admits that this is a disputed material fact, but dishonestly resolves the disputed fact himself, in violation of the rules of summary judgment.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              In order to understand Judge Cox' dishonesty in his analysis above, I'll discuss the following topics: (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          1. It is a violation of the rules of summary judgment for Judge Cox to determine the material fact of who wrote the words of the Hilchkanum deed.

            * The authorship of the Hilchkanum deed is a fact, and disputed facts belong to a jury.

            * The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is based on a form deed written by the SLS&E lawyers.

            * Why is it important to identify the author of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed?

            * Judge Cox lies when he states that "nothing in the record" supports the Railway's authorship of the deed. His lie is exposed by his fellow judge on the panel, Judge William W. Baker.

          2. Judge Cox was made aware of the correct legal precedent, and instead intentionally misapplied the law.

          3. It is a violation of the rules of summary judgment for Judge Cox to determine the material fact of the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their right-of-way deed.

          4. Judge Cox lies when he states that the notary public composed the words in the Hilchkanum deed. An examination of other SLS&E deeds exposes this lie.

              I'll discuss each of these issues, separately.

      1. It is a violation of the rules of summary judgment for Judge Cox to determine the material fact of who wrote the words of the Hilchkanum deed.

        * The authorship of the Hilchkanum deed is a material fact, and disputed facts belong to a jury.

              In his discussion above, Judge Cox admits that authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a disputed material fact. It was the Ray's sacred constitutional right to resolve that disputed fact before a jury. Cox could not allow the Rays that constitutional right because a legitimate jury would conclude that the SLS&E Railway lawyers wrote every word of the Hilchkanum deed. That single fact would have forced the jury to determine that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was an easement. That is not the outcome that Cox wanted, so a jury was not allowed.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              The only justification for Cox to determine authorship would be if the authorship had already been determined in a prior legal decision which could be used as precedent. As I've stated earlier in this opinion, there was such a legal opinion. Authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was effectively determined in King County v. Squire (1990). In Squire, the court found that identical words in the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E were written by the Railway. Cox refused to acknowledge the findings in Squire because it didn't support his predetermined outcome to the lawsuit. The findings in Squire are discussed in the next section of this note, below.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        * The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is based on a form deed written by the lawyers for the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company.

              In his discussion in the paragraphs above, Judge Cox writes this statement:

          "The Rays also speculate that the Railway prepared the May 1887 deed.64 Thus, they argue that we should construe ambiguities in that deed language against the Railway. We decline to do so because nothing in the record supports this argument.

              The Hilchkanum deed is based on a "form deed" which was used for many the other deeds from homesteaders to the SLS&E. If Hilchkanum wrote his deed, as Judge Cox states above, and the other SLS&E deeds use the same language, then one must conclude that Hilchkanum wrote the other deeds for the Railway, too. Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American. Judge Cox does not explain how Hilchkanum can be found responsible for the words in his right-of-way deed when the Hilchkanum deed is based on a form deed which was obviously prepared by the Railway lawyers. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              There is plenty of proof that the Hilchkanum deed is based on a SLS&E prepared "form deed". I had seen several SLS&E right-of-way deeds and realized they used common language which was obviously prepared by the Railway lawyers. While I understood that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed", I didn't have the proof that I needed for this webpage. So, I asked my son to go down to the King County Records Office and obtain copies of SLS&E right-of-way deeds which were recorded near the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed in May 1887. Since the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is recorded in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42, Page 250, my son copied all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds he could find in the first 500 pages of Volume 42. There were nineteen SLS&E right-of-way deeds in those 500 pages which were executed between February 4, 1887 and May 27, 1887. So, the following discussion is based on twenty SLS&E right-of-way deeds which consist of the nineteen deeds my son found in the Book of Deeds and the Squire deed which is displayed in King County v. Squire (1990). While this is not an examination of all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds, I believe the reader will understand that this is an adequate number to establish the SLS&E "form deed" which was used at the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             A study of these twenty SLS&E deeds establishes the form deed which was composed by the Railway lawyers. Here are the three basic elements of the SLS&E "form deed" which was used at the time of the Hilchkanum deed.

          Note: To aid in identifying the SLS&E "form deed" elements, I present the SLS&E "form deed" in dark red font.

            SLS&E "Form Deed" Granting Clause:

            "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to ("me" or "us") from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory ("I" or "we") do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way ("one hundred (100)" or "fifty (50)") feet in width through ("my", "our" or "said") lands in said County described as follows to wit."

            SLS&E "Form Deed" Secondary Grant:

            "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road"

            SLS&E "Form Deed" Habendum:

            "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever"

             Some of the twenty SLS&E deeds were based entirely on the "form deed". Others contained changes or additions made by the settlers who granted the deeds. The Hilchkanum deed was based on an unaltered SLS&E "form deed". Of the twenty SLS&E deeds that I examined, there were seven other right-of-way deeds which use the unaltered "form deed". Here are links to these eight deeds for the reader to confirm this fact.

          View the Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed".

          View the Sbedzuse Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed".

          View the Davis Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed".

          View the Lurber Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed".

          View the Lewellyn Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed".

          View the Burnett Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed".

          View the Davis Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed".

          View the Anderson Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed".

             I've prepared a study of SLS&E right-of-way deeds which establishes the "form deed" written by the Railway lawyers and discusses the variations caused by the changes made by the settlers. This study expands on the points that I have made in this section.

          Understand that a comparison of Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway deeds establishes the "Form Deed" used to establish the Railway and identifies the author of that "Form Deed".

             Similar proof of the SLS&E "form deed" was provided to Judge Cox and his accomplice in this crime, Judge Schindler. I don't have the Ray's briefs and exhibits to Judge Cox, but I do have a description of that evidence from the dissenting opinion. The significance of the dissenting opinion on this issue of the SLS&E "form deed" is discussed several paragraphs below. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              The form deed written by the Railway lawyers is also identified in King County v. Squire (1990). Federal District Court Judge Barbara Rothstein struck my discussion of the importance of Squire, and refused to consider it in her opinion. Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher was so afraid of drawing attention to Squire that she refused to refer to it by name, and instead referred to Squire as "a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way". In this opinion, Judge Cox refuses to consider the findings of the Squire court because it destroys his dishonest analysis. Cox dishonestly dismisses Squire as merely "instructive", and not precedential. Further he misrepresents the findings in Squire. Why are these dishonest judges so afraid of Squire?
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The discussion in King County v. Squire destroys Judge Cox' analysis.

              The granting words in the Squire deed to the SLS&E are identical to the granting words in the Hilchkanum and Pearson deeds to the SLS&E, and the other deeds to the Railway. By default, the Squire court found that the lawyers for the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) wrote those identical granting words. The Squire decision (King County v. Squire (1990) destroys the dishonest conclusions by federal judges Rothstein and Fletcher, in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), and King County v. Rasmussen (2002), that Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Duwamish Indian ("Native American" if you wish), wrote the words of the Hilchkanum deed. In this opinion, the Squire opinion destroys Judge Cox' manipulation of the law to construe the deed against only Hilchkanum. Let's compare the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds to understand that the significant words are identical, and that they were written by the Railway lawyers. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        The Hilchkanum and Squire Right-of-Way Deeds Compared:

              The significant portions of the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E were published in King County v. Squire (1990). Significant portions of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E were published in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and this opinion. Additionally, this website provides a more complete photocopy and transcription of the full Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

          The Squire Right-of-Way Deed to the SLS&E:

                The words in BOLD Red Font where handwritten changes made by Squire. By default, the remainder of the words, in black font, were written by the Railway lawyers. If one removes the changes made to his deed by Watson Squire, the Squire and Hilchkanum granting and habendum language is identical. This common wording is the SLS&E form deed written by the lawyers for the Railway. (Historical Note: Watson Squire was Governor of Washington Territory at the time of the formation of the Railway. He served as one of Washington State's first United States Senators. He was a lawyer.)

              "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:

              [legal description].

              Such right-of-way strip to be twenty-five (25) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across the said lands by the Engineer of said Railway Company, which location is described as follows, to-wit [description.] ....

              To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888."

          The Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed to the SLS&E:

              "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit

              Lots one (1) two (2) and three (3) in section six (6) township 24 North of Range six (6) East.

              Such right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across our said lands by the Engineer of said railway Company which location is described as follows to wit (legal description)

              And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road.

              To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever."

          The Granting Clauses are Essentially Identical:

                The granting clause of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds are identical, with the exception of the width of the right-of-way. The words used to grant the right-of-way are perfectly identical. Here, again, are the Squire and Hilchkanum granting clauses with the granting words emphasized:

            Squire Granting Clause:

                In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:

            Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

                In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit

                The Squire court found that the words in the Squire granting language "strongly suggests conveyance of an easement". In this opinion, Judge Cox finds that the exact same words conveyed fee simple title, not an easement. Cox refuses to explain the inconsistency with Squire. Since the granting words in the Hilchkanum and Squire deeds are identical, and by default the Squire court identified the Railway as author of those granting words, Judges Cox, Rothstein, and Fletcher should have found that the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed was written by the Railway lawyers, and that Hilchkanum should not be held responsible for the words. So now let's look at the actual authors of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Who wrote the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) form deed?

                The lawyers for the SLS&E wrote the form deed that was used to obtain right-of-way deeds from the settlers. Judge Thomas Burke was lead attorney and co-founder of the Railway. Judge Burke became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Washington Territory the year after obtaining these right-of-way deeds from Hilchkanum, Squire, Pearson, and the other settlers. The co-council for the Railway was George Haller, another powerful Seattle lawyer. The statutory deed forms were established by the Territorial legislature in 1886, the year before the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds. Two of the statutory forms, the Statutory Warranty Deed Form and the Statutory Bargain and Sale Deed Form were designed to convey land, and their use implies a fee simple grant. Burke and Haller's SLS&E right-of-way form deed did not conform to the requirements of the statutory warranty deed law or the statutory bargain and sale deed law. Since Judge Burke was considered a highly competent lawyer and judge, and an expert in property law, his decision to not use the statutory deed forms strongly suggest his intention for the SLS&E deeds to convey only easements. With this understanding, the words in the SLS&E form deed must be construed in a different light than as if an illiterate Native American wrote the deed. Considering Judge Burke's competence as a lawyer, his refusal to use the statutory deed forms, and the long held precedent that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad grants an easement, Judge Cox was required to find that the Railway prepared form deed, "signed" by Hilchkanum, conveyed only an easement. This is the precedent that was set in King County v. Squire (1990) when the court found that the words in the Squire granting language "strongly suggests conveyance of an easement". The Squire decision is so contrary to the dishonest manipulation of the facts and the law in this opinion, that Judge Cox did everything he could to hide its precedent in his analysis of the Hilchkanum deed.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                In my discussion above, I describe evidence that should have been presented to a jury to resolve the disputed material fact of who authored the Hilchkanum deed. The Rays were denied their constitutional right to establish this critical material fact because Judge Cox agreed with the use of summary judgment at the King County Superior Court level. Considering the fact that this opinion covers up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protects its participants, this opinion must be seen as a criminal act by Judge Cox.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        * Why is it important to identify the author of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed?

              Why is the authorship so important? This citation from Brown-Dissenting explains this issue. While I cite from a dissenting opinion, this argument by Washington State Supreme Court Judge Sanders is not refuted in the majority opinion, and the Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood citation is legal precedent.

          "The railroad was a sophisticated, well financed, and organized party, undoubtedly represented by counsel. Landowners stood at a disadvantage to railroads in the early 1900s. It approached the landowners to purchase their land after it had already laid out or even built its rail line over the land...The railroad and the landowners knew that the railroad possessed the power of eminent domain and would end up in possession of the right of way, if it were not already. These were not arm's-length transactions between parties of equal bargaining power. For these reasons, the deeds, at least the preprinted portions of them, must be construed against the railroad. '[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it.' Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood, 67 Wn.2d 824, 827, 410 P.2d 7 (1966)"
          [Washington State Supreme Court Judge Richard B. Sanders dissenting in Brown (1996)]

              Here, Washington State Supreme Court Justice Richard Sanders states that early landowners were at a disadvantage in their dealings with the railroads. This becomes even more relevant when one realizes that Bill Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American. In his statements, above, Judge Cox dishonestly attributes responsibility for the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the Hilchkanums. Cox then construes the words against only Hilchkanum. Is Judge Cox justified to do this under the law? Here is a more complete citation from Guy Stickney (with my emphasis):
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "Initially, it should be noted that contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it. Underwood v. Sterner, supra; Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn.2d 162, 332 P.2d 454 (1958); Restatement, Contracts SS 236 (d) (1932)."
          [Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood, 67 Wn.2d 824, 827, 410 P.2d 7 (1966)]

        * Judge Cox lies when he states that "nothing in the record" supports the Railway's authorship of the deed. His lie is exposed by his fellow judge on the panel, Judge William W. Baker.

                Judge Baker, the dissenting judge in this opinion, refutes Judge Cox' dishonest claim that "nothing in the record" supports the Railway's authorship of the deed. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Baker explains that "Hilchkanum was illiterate and the handwritten deed contained identical language to that found in a contemporaneous pre-printed deed bearing the railroad's name." Judge Baker also stated that "It is undisputed that the deed's language was taken from the railroad's standard deed." It is obscene for Cox to not acknowledge this fact which was explained to him by his fellow judge on the panel. Instead, Cox lies by stating that there is "nothing in the record" to support the Railway's authorship. Here is a portion of Judge Baker's dissenting opinion that contains his statements. (with my emphasis)
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                 "Language in the deed must be construed against the railroad.

                 It is a well established principle that ambiguity must be construed against the grantor.2 But as we explained in Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc.,3 when the grantee drafts the deed, this rule does not apply.4 Hilchkanum was illiterate and the handwritten deed contained identical language to that found in a contemporaneous pre-printed deed bearing the railroad's name. The Rays also submitted an affidavit from an expert who opined that 'given the use of pre-printed deeds, and given Hilchkanum's illiteracy, there appears no doubt that Hilchkanum did not draft the deed; but rather, it was the product of the railroad company.'"

                 [......] "It is undisputed that the deed's language was taken from the railroad's standard deed. And the affidavit by the Rays' expert creates a material question of fact concerning who actually drafted the document. Taking this affidavit in a light most favorable to the Rays as the nonmoving party, any ambiguities in the deed must be construed against the railroad.5"
            [Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting)]

                In the above citation from the dissenting opinion, one can see that the judges argued over issues of material fact. These dishonest judges know that disputed material facts are resolved by a jury. Yet, these judges persisted and took on the duty of the jury themselves. This illegal application of summary judgment is how judges force their predetermined outcome to the cases before them. This violates the Ray's constitutional right of due process, and is a direct violation of Washington State law.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            Revised Code of Washington (RCW), RCW 4.44.090 Questions of fact for jury. (Civil Procedure)

            All questions of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080, shall be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed to them.

      2. Judge Cox was made aware of the correct legal precedent, and instead intentionally misapplied the law.

              In his discussion above, Judge Cox ignores authorship and construes the words of the Hilchkanum deed against Hilchkanum as grantor. Judge Cox does this by illegally eliminating all evidence that the Railway lawyers wrote the deed, and ignoring the fact that the Hilchkanums were illiterate Native Americans and at great disadvantage in their dealings with the SLS&E. The concept that the grantor is responsible for the words in the deed would not apply to the circumstances of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The authorship of the deed and the intentions of the parties in the deed are disputed material facts that must be resolved by a jury. Instead of sending these issues to a jury for resolution, Judge Cox illegally and irrationally decides these disputed material facts for himself. He then adds this footnote:
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "[Footnote]67 'When the court remains in doubt as to the parties' intent or as to the quantum of interests conveyed, a deed will be construed against the grantor.' 17 William B. Search Term Begin Stoebuck, Washington PracticeSearch Term End : Real Estate: Property Law sec. 7.9 at 463 (1995) (citing Wright v. Olsen, 42 Wn.2d 702, 257 P.2d 782 (1953); Cook v. Hensler, 57 Wash. 392, 107 P. 178 (1910))."
          [View Footnote 67 of this opinion.]

              I don't have access to this reference from "William B. Search Term Begin Stoebuck" (a unique name, indeed!), but I'm confident that this short citation does not fully address the conditions in this lawsuit. Dishonest judges use short citations and then misrepresent their meaning in order to misapply the law. Further, the above reference cites Wright v. Olsen, 42 Wn.2d 702, 257 P.2d 782 (1953). I provide Wright v. Olsen here for the reader to find some support for Cox' analysis. Further, I provide legitimate analysis below.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Try to find Cox' justification in Wright v. Olsen (1953).

              While I don't have the Ray's briefs to Judges Cox, Schindler, and Baker, the dissenting opinion by Judge Baker provides proof that correct legal precedent was discussed by the three judge panel and dismissed in the majority opinion. As I show in the section above, Judge Baker states his disagreement with the majority's decision to construe the words against Hilchkanum. Here, Judge Baker cites common law precedent that Cox and Schindler were required to adopt. Judge Baker makes this statement in his dissent.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "It is a well established principle that ambiguity must be construed against the grantor.2 But as we explained in Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc.,3 when the grantee drafts the deed, this rule does not apply.4"
          [Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting)]

              Judge Baker provides citations which support his above statement in his Footnote 4, shown here.

          Footnote 4 "Harris, 62 Wn. App. at 376 (holding that rule that ambiguities in deed are to be interpreted most favorably to grantee and most strictly against grantor did not apply where alleged ambiguity arose in language incorporated in deed from purchase and sale agreement drafted by grantee); see also Hanson Indus., Inc. v. County of Spokane, 114 Wn. App. 523, 531, 58 P.3d 910 (2002) rev. denied, 149 Wn.2d 1028 (2003) (recognizing that ambiguities must be construed against railroad because it drafted deed)."
          [Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting)]

              The most revealing citation from Baker's Footnote 4 is from Hanson Industries v. County of Spokane (2002). In that opinion, the court looked at "form deeds" which were written by the railroad. It found that the words of those deeds should be construed against the railroad, and not the grantor. Here is a more complete citation from Hanson (2002). (with my emphasis)

          "Ambiguity Resolved Against Railroad. First, the three deeds at issue here are virtually indistinguishable and were clearly prepared by the railroad, not by the grantors. The wording is identical, except for the details of monetary consideration and property descriptions. The three deeds all contain, for instance, the malapropism 'revision and revisions' instead of 'reversion and reversions.' CP at 16, 22, 28.

          Ambiguity in a deed is resolved against the grantor. Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc., 120 Wn.2d 727, 745, 844 P.2d 1006 (1993). But, the grantor also generally drafts the deed. Here, that did not happen. And an ambiguous agreement is construed against the drafter. Rouse v. Glascam Builders, Inc., 101 Wn.2d 127, 135, 677 P.2d 125 (1984); Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood, 67 Wn.2d 824, 827, 410 P.2d 7 (1966). The landowner no doubt relied on the expertise of the railroad."
          [Hanson Industries v. County of Spokane (2002)]

              Judge Baker's published dissenting opinion shows that Judges Cox and Schindler were made aware of the proper legal precedent that was required to be applied here. But, Judges Cox and Schindler had something more important that legal precedent to "find" here. They needed to find the Hilchkanum deed conveyed fee simple interest in order to cover up the East Lake Sammamish tax fraud scheme and protect the participants from federal prosecution. In order to justify his finding, Judge Cox intentionally disregarded legal precedent and instead determined that Hilchkanum was the author of his right-of-way deed based only on the fact that he made an "X" at the appropriate place on the deed. Ridiculous!
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      3. It is a violation of the rules of summary judgment for Judge Cox to determine the material fact of the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their right-of-way deed.

              In the section above we discussed the material fact of who authored the SLS&E form deed, which also establishes the author of the Hilchkanum deed. Judge Cox ignored the issue of authorship and held Bill Hilchkanum responsible for all the words in his right-of-way deed as its grantor. I provided this citation to show the disadvantage settlers were in with their right-of-way deeds:
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "The railroad was a sophisticated, well financed, and organized party, undoubtedly represented by counsel. Landowners stood at a disadvantage to railroads in the early 1900s. It approached the landowners to purchase their land after it had already laid out or even built its rail line over the land...The railroad and the landowners knew that the railroad possessed the power of eminent domain and would end up in possession of the right of way, if it were not already. These were not arm's-length transactions between parties of equal bargaining power. For these reasons, the deeds, at least the preprinted portions of them, must be construed against the railroad. '[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it.' Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood, 67 Wn.2d 824, 827, 410 P.2d 7 (1966)"
          [Washington State Supreme Court Judge Richard B. Sanders dissenting in Brown (1996)]

              I stated that this citation becomes even more relevant when one realizes that Bill Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American. In this section we will look at information that explains Hilchkanum's ability to participate, in any manner, in his right-of-way deed. This is information that Judge Cox was required to consider. Instead, he ignored and hid this information in his opinion.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Did the Hilchkanum's have the ability to participate in their right-of-way deed?

              There are three factors that affected the analysis of the Hilchkanum's participation and intentions in their right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) deed, and in their subsequent real estate deeds. They are:

            A: The history of Native Americans (Indians) in the late 1800's:

            B: The federal and Washington State laws enacted to protect Native Americans at that time:

            C: Specific Hilchkanum documents, presented to the court, which explain their behavior and intentions with their deeds:

          Each of these factors will be discussed here in some detail.

          A. The history of Native Americans (Indians) in the late 1800's:

                  Judge Cox refused to recognize that, as the white settlers moved west in the 1800's, the Native Americans were displaced, defeated, and forced to give up their lands and their traditional way of life. When the Natives resisted they were killed or forced onto reservations. When Cox considered the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed, he chose to ignore that history. The Hilchkanums were Native American Indians. Instead, Judge Cox found that the Hilchkanums had the legal skills to participate in their right-of-way deed with the SLS&E. He agreed to this fact even though no document was presented to show this very unusual skill in a Native American of that day. He agreed to this fact even when he was made aware that the Hilchkanums were illiterate and could not even sign their own names. More important, Judge Cox agreed that the King County Superior Court judge had the right to manufacture these material facts in defiance of the constitutional right of the Rays to establish the material facts before a jury. His dishonest behavior covers up East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. We have dishonest judges because it is almost impossible to hold them responsible for their dishonest behavior in our present political system. Impeachment is the duty of our legislators, and impeaching crooked judges is about their last priority.
                (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                  It is not the responsibility of the parties in a lawsuit to teach basic American history to Judge Cox. Here are a few historical highlights that pertain to the lives and times of the Hilchkanums.
                (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              1805 Lewis and Clark Expedition enters the present state of Washington on October 10, 1805. (Source: http://www.historylink.org)

              1843 Bill Hilchkanum was born in a native environment, in 1843 or 1844, about eleven years before his tribe was forced to a reservation as a result of its treaty with Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              1850 Donation Land Claims Act takes effect on September 27, 1850, spurring American settlement of Oregon Territory. This act was similar to the later Homesteading Act of 1862. (Source: http://www.historylink.org)

              1851 Denny Party scouts arrive at mouth of Duwamish River in future King County on September 25, 1851. The Denny party was met that day by Chief Seattle, the leader of the Duwamish and Suquamish tribes. These tribes were friendly and helpful to the white settlers. Donation Land Claims during the next few days establish the first white settlement of the area now known as Seattle, Washington. (Source: http://www.historylink.org)

              1851 Bill Hilchkanum was of the Duwamish tribe. He would have been a boy of about eight years when the Denny party first contacted his tribe in the fall of 1851. The Duwamish helped the Denny party survive that first winter. In later years David Denny was the white man that helped Hilchkanum with his legal dealings. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              1854 In 1854 and 1855, most Indian tribes in the Territory signed treaties with Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens, ceding the right to their lands and agreeing to live on reservations. (Source: http://www.historylink.org)

              1855 Indian wars followed in 1855 and 1856 as the tribes recognized the unfairness of the Stevens treaties. These conflicts between Indians and whites continued for a number of years throughout the Territory. In every case the Indians were defeated. Retribution was common by angry U.S. troops and white settlers. (Source: http://www.historylink.org)

              1858 Nisqually Chief Leschi is hanged on February 19, 1858. His execution was based on trumped-up charges. The real reason for his hanging was his opposition to his tribe's treaty with Governor Stevens, which he signed under protest, or perhaps never signed at all. There is little doubt Leschi's hanging was meant to be a lesson to other rebellious Natives. (Source: http://www.historylink.org)

              1862 Smallpox kills 14,000 Northwest Coast Indians from April to December 1862. The Smallpox was intentionally spread to the Northwest Coast tribes by the forced evacuation of infected natives by white settlers on Vancouver Island. Twenty-six canoes, containing infected Indians, were towed north to infect and destroy about half of the Native population. "The gunboat Forward (Captain Lascelles), took a 15-day trip to Fort Rupert towing 26 canoes full of natives. Included were 20 canoes of Hydahs [Haida], five canoes of other Indians from the Queen Charlotte Islands, and one canoe of Stickeen [Tlingit] Indians." (Quoted from http://www.historylink.org)

              1862 The Homestead Act of 1862 was the primary act responsible for the settlement of the west. (Source: Commonly understood U.S. history.)

              1875 The Act of March 3, 1875 extended homesteading rights to American Indians. In order to participate, Indians were required to give up their "tribal relations" and were not allowed to sell their homesteaded land for five years. (Source: The Act of March 3, 1875, Sec 15 and 16 - See below.)

              1876 Bill Hilchkanum files to homestead on the east side of Lake Squak (now known as Lake Sammamish) as an American Indian under the authority of the Act of March 3, 1875, and the Homestead Act of 1862. Date of Homestead Entry is June 28, 1876. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              1884 Bill Hilchkanum makes final proof of his homestead on January 9, 1884. There was a problem. By law, Hilchkanum was required to make final proof within seven years. Since he entered his homestead on June, 28 1976, his final proof should have been made by June 28, 1883. This error generated explanations that showed Hilchkanum to be illiterate and completely dependent on his white friends to aid him in legal matters. The documents that explain this situation are displayed, in historical order, in the third section of this note, below. The document describing Hilchkanum's homesteading error (March 24, 1884 Declaration by Bill Hilchkanum regarding Late Homestead Proof), and the other related historical documents, cast serious doubt on the honesty of the federal and state judges who found that Hilchkanum was an expert in homesteading law and real estate deeds. The judges came to their conclusions without any document to support their opinion. The mischaracterization of the Hilchkanums as legal experts was critical to the judge's dishonest finding that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E Railway was written by Hilchkanum. The judges were required by the Constitution and the law to allow disputed facts to be determined by a jury. The federal and state judges, who construed the Hilchkanum deeds, intentionally violated the rights of the Rasmussens and the Rays in order to hide the federal tax fraud scheme involved in the railbanking of the ELS right-of-way. (See the supporting Hilchkanum documents in the section below titled "Documents were presented to the court that describe the Hilchkanums and explain their participation and intentions in their real estate deeds.)
                  (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              1887 Bill and Mary Hilchkanum grant a right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E). The grant is witnessed by David Denny, the white man who has helped the Hilchkanums with their homesteading legal issues. It is likely that Denny's friendship with Hilchkanum began when the Duwamish tribe assisted the Denny Party in 1851. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              1888 The Hilchkanum homestead patent is granted by President Grover Cleveland on July 24, 1888. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

                  The history of Native American Indians, during the years that the Hilchkanums lived, covers a very turbulent time for the Natives. Hilchkanum witnessed the destruction of his tribe's traditional way of life. He witnessed the defeat of the tribes in Oregon/Washington Territory and the treaties that allowed white settlers to take their lands. Hilchkanum witnessed the lack of respect for the rights and the culture of Natives. Those Indians who "limped-off" the reservations to homestead among the whites, did so with the knowledge that they needed to be on their best behavior in order to coexist with white society. Indians were on the bottom rung of white society's ladder. Bill Hilchkanum lived in a time that it was not uncommon to find signs, posted in white stores, that read "No Dogs or Indians". This equated Native American Indians to dogs, and excluded them from white establishments. This was the times in which Hilchkanum lived.

                  It is obscene that Judge Cox desecrates this history of natives in Washington Territory by assigning unusual and undocumented legal abilities to the Hilchkanums. If this were the situation with the Hilchkanums, where is any document to justify this bizarre conclusion? There is none. In this case the Judge Cox manipulated the history of the times in order to force his predetermined outcome to this opinion. Cox willing altered the history of Washington Territory/State in order to protect his fellow judges and friends from being prosecuted for their participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Altering and redefining the history of Native Americans in Washington Territory/State is a form of racism. In the last few years, the Duwamish have been denied federal recognition as a tribe. With Judge Cox and the federal judges involved in King County v. Rasmussen willing to make up and alter the Duwamish history, one has to question the fairness of that federal decision.
                (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          B. The laws established to protect Native Americans at that time:

                  There were several laws that protected Native American Indians from being taken advantage of by white settlers, at the time of the Hilchkanum's deeds. Here is a federal act:

              The Act of March 3, 1875 extended homesteading rights to American Indians, but they were not allowed to sell their homesteaded land for five years after receiving patent. This wasn't done to punish the Natives. It was done to protect them from white folks who would take their land through legal trickery. Requiring the Indian homestead land be not conveyed for five years after patent built a time buffer for the Natives to adjust to white society and the white legal system. Later, other public laws extended the period that Indian were required to hold their homesteaded lands prior to sale. Here is the portion of the federal law, The Act of March 3, 1875, that relates to these issues (with my emphasis):

                Chapter 131 † Mar. 3, 1875. | 18 Stat., 402

                SEC. 15

                "That any Indian born in the United States, who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and who has abandoned, or may hereafter abandon, his tribal relations, shall, on making satisfactory proof of such abandonment, under rules to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, be entitled to the benefits of the act entitled "An act to secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain," approved May twentieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and the acts amendatory thereof, except that the provisions of the eighth section of the said act shall not be held to apply to entries made under this act:"

                "Provided, however, That the title to lands acquired by any Indian by virtue hereof shall not be subject to alienation or incumbrance, either by voluntary conveyance or the judgment, decree, or order of any court, and shall be and remain inalienable for a period of five years from the date of the patent issued therefor:"

                "Provided, That any such Indian shall be entitled to his distributive share of all annuities, tribal funds, lands, and other property, the same as though he had maintained his tribal relations; and any transfer, alienation, or incumbrance of any interest he may hold or claim by reason of his former tribal relations shall be void."

                SEC. 16

                "That in all cases in which Indians have heretofore entered public lands under the homestead-law, and have proceeded in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, or in which they may hereafter be allowed to so enter under said regulations prior to the promulgation of regulations to be established by the Secretary of the Interior under the fifteenth section of this act, and in which the conditions prescribed by law have been or may be complied with, the entries so allowed are hereby confirmed, and patents shall be issued thereon; subject, however, to the restrictions and limitations contained in the fifteenth section of this act in regard to alienation and incumbrance. [March 3, 1875.]"

                  Also, there were Washington Territory/State laws that protected Native American Indians from being taken advantage of by white settlers. Here is a State law that was designed to protect Natives, such as the Hilchkanums (with my emphasis):

              R.C.W. 64.20.020, Enacted Laws 1890, p. 500, ß2.

                "Manner of conveyance. All deeds, conveyances, encumbrances or transfers of any nature and kind executed by any Indian, or in any manner disposing of any land, or interest therein, shall be by deed executed in the same manner as prescribed for the execution of deeds conveying real estate, or any interest therein, except that the same shall in all cases be acknowledged before a judge of a court of record. In taking said acknowledgment, the said judge shall explain to the grantor the contents of said deed or instrument, and the effect of the signing or execution thereof, and so certify the same in the acknowledgment, and before the same shall be admitted to record shall duly examine and approve the said deed or other instrument."

                  The laws displayed above show that Indians, such as the Hilchkanums, were at a great disadvantage with legal dealings in those days. There would need to be some document or evidence to assume otherwise in the case of an individual Native American. Judge Cox refused to consider the laws of the times that were designed to protect Natives, and instead found that the Hilchkanums were essentially lawyers. He did this without any declaration, document, fact, or history to support his bizarre conclusion. More important, Judge Cox knew that he was denying the Ray's right to challenge these disputed facts, and establish the truth before a jury. When judges make up the facts, as they have in Ray v. King County (2004), King County v. Rasmussen (2001), and King County v. Rasmussen (2002), they can force their predetermined outcome on any case. That is how the Ray's and Rasmussen's land was stolen. That is how the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme got covered-up.
                (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          C. Documents were presented to the court which describe the Hilchkanums and explain their participation and intentions in their real estate deeds.

                  The following documents were presented to the court in King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002) which explain the participation and intentions of the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, and their subsequent real estate transactions. The following is a partial list of these documents. The hyperlinks will take you to a photocopy of the actual document, and include a partial or full transcription. Of course, the judges in the Rasmussen and Ray lawsuits ignored these documents and refused Rasmussen's and Ray's constitutional right to present these documents to a jury in the determination of the Hilchkanum's participation and intentions in their real estate deeds. I do not have the documents that were presented by the Rays, but since we used the same deed researcher, I'm confident that the same documents, appropriate for the Ray's property, were presented in their lawsuit.
                (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              1: June 28, 1876: Hilchkanum provides an affidavit of his eligibility to homestead as an "Indian" under the Act of March 3, 1875. He swears that he has given up his affiliation with the Duwamish tribe. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              2: June 28, 1876: Hilchkanum's 1876 homestead application form. There is a handwritten correction, at a 45 degree angle, made on January 12, 1883. Hilchkanum had settled on lot 1, but lot 1 was not included in his 1876 homestead application. This is inconsistent with Federal District Judge Barbara J. Rothstein's description of Hilchkanum as an expert in homestead law, and an expert in the construction of real estate deeds. If he were an expert on real estate deeds, as Rothstein decided, he would have understood how to properly apply for his homestead. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)
                  (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              3: December 4, 1879: Hilchkanum provides an affidavit to correct his homestead application. He explains that his original application was in error because of a mistake by the white man who assisted him. In the declaration on March 6, 1884, shown below, we learn that David Denny was the white man who assisted Hilchkanum. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              4: October 24, 1882: Petition to correct Hilchkanum's homestead application is filed. Item 2: June 28, 1876, above, shows that this requested change to Hilchkanum's homestead application was entered on January 12, 1883. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              5: November 10, 1883: Hilchkanum files notice to give final proof of his homestead on January 9, 1884. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

                There was a problem with Hilchkanum making Homestead Proof on January 9, 1884. By law, Hilchkanum was required to make final proof within seven years of entry. Since he entered his homestead on June, 28 1976, his final proof should have been made by June 28, 1883. This error generated explanations and declarations that showed Hilchkanum to be illiterate and completely dependent on his white friends to aid him in legal matters. The following documents on this page explain this situation. These documents, describing Hilchkanum's homesteading error, cast serious doubt on the honesty of the federal and state judges who found that Hilchkanum was an expert in homesteading law and real estate deeds. The judges came to their conclusions without any document or fact to support their opinion. The mischaracterization of the Hilchkanums, as legal experts, was critical to the judge's dishonest finding that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E Railway was written by Hilchkanum. The judges were required by the Constitution and the law to allow disputed facts to be resolved by a jury. The federal and state judges, who construed the Hilchkanum deeds, intentionally violated the rights of the Rasmussens (King County v. Rasmussen (2001)) and the Rays (Ray v. King County (2004)) in order to hide the federal tax fraud scheme involved in the railbanking of the ELS right-of-way.
                   (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              6: January 9, 1884: Hilchkanum final affidavit for homestead proof. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              7: January 9, 1884: Hilchkanum testimony for homestead proof. This document establishes Hilchkanum's age and approximate year of birth. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              8: January 9, 1884: Testimony of Martin Monohon for Hilchkanum's homestead proof. Monohon was a neighbor of the Hilchkanums. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              9: March 6, 1884: Declaration of David Denny, taking responsibility for the late filing of Hilchkanum's final homestead proof. This document shows Denny's participation in Hilchkanum's legal affairs, and explains Hilchkanum's dependence on Denny for legal assistance. This, and the other documents, paint a very different picture of Hilchkanum than was found by the judges who construed the Hilchkanum deed. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)
                  (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              10: March 24, 1884: Hilchkanum's declaration relating to late homestead proof. This document describes Hilchkanum's illiteracy and establishes his dependence on David Denny to assist him with business matters. This is inconsistent with the court's depiction of Hilchkanum's legal abilities. This document begs the question: Why was this a disputed material fact which not resolved by a jury? (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)
                  (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              11: March 25, 1884: Declaration of George Tibbets explaining Hilchkanum's late homestead proof. Tibbets was one of Hilchkanum's neighbors. This, again, confirms Hilchkanum's illiteracy and his dependence on white friends to aid him with his legal matters. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              12: March 29, 1884: Final Homestead Certificate declaring Hilchkanum eligible for his homestead patent. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              13: May 9, 1887: Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the Seattle Lake shore and Eastern Railway. The granting clause of the deed is essentially identical to the Squire right-of-way deed, yet the judges characterized the deed as being written by Hilchkanum. The truth is that not one word in the deed was written by Hilchkanum. The lawyers for the Railway wrote the right-of-way deeds. Hilchkanum could not read or write the English language, as shown in the documents above. It was the Rasmussen's and the Ray's constitutional right to establish these facts before a jury. This right was denied in Ray v. King County and King County v. Rasmussen. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)
                  (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              14: July 24, 1888: Hilchkanum homestead patent granted by the President of the United States. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

              15: December 16, 1898: Hilchkanum grants a warranty deed to his wife, Annie, for government lots one, three and five. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

                It is significant that Hilchkanum excepts the railroad right-of-way in Government Lots one and three. But, there is no consistency in the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds with this exception language. The federal judges in King County v. Rasmussen decided that the exception of the right-of-way in this deed indicated that the Hilchkanums intended their SLS&E right-of-way deed to grant fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way to the Railway. But, common law holds that an exception in a deed excepts whatever was originally granted. The exception of a "right-of-way" granted to a railroad would except an easement, under common law, and would not except fee simple title to the land. The exception of an easement in a deed merely notifies the grantee of the easement. It does not exempt, or withhold, fee simple transfer of land. The federal judges in King County v. Rasmussen came to their dishonest conclusion about the Hilchkanum's intentions in order to hide the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the East Lake Sammamish BNSF right-of-way. That's criminal of the federal judges, but what can we-the-people do about crooked judges? The answer: Very little or nothing.
                   (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                R.C.W. 64.20.020, which was enacted in 1890, required that Hilchkanum be briefed by a judge as to the effect of this deed, and a notation be made on the deed that this briefing has occurred. This required notation is not present. The federal and state judges that reviewed these subsequent Hilchkanum deeds ignored this important consideration in their predetermined opinions.
                   (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                In Hilchkanum's May 9, 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, he and his wife, Mary, granted the Railway a "right-of-way" on his government lots one, two and three. Subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deeds refer to two other wives. We were not able to document the reason that he had three different wives, Mary, Annie and Louise, as shown in his real estate deeds on this website. This deed to his wife, Annie, probably was for the purpose of sharing his homestead land with this new wife.

              16: August 25, 1899: Annie Hilchkanum quit claims back to her husband, Bill Hilchkanum, the property that he granted to her in the December 16, 1898 warranty deed. Government lots one and three were granted with the exception of the railroad rights-of-way. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

                R.C.W. 64.20.020, which was enacted in 1890, required that Hilchkanum be briefed by a judge as to the effect of this deed, and a notation be made on the deed that this briefing has occurred. This required notation is not present. The federal and state judges that reviewed these subsequent Hilchkanum deeds ignored this important consideration in their predetermined opinions.
                   (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              17: March 15, 1904: Hilchkanum sells all of his government lot 2 to Chris Nelson. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

                In King County v. Rasmussen, Federal District Judge Rothstein ignored the meaning of the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, and instead "found" the Hilchkanum's intentions in their right-of-way deed by looking at their subsequent real estate deeds. That is a very unusual, if not bizarre, method to examine a party's intentions in a deed. Assuming that Rothstein was justified with her unconventional approach, this deed should have been the most important subsequent real estate deed for Judge Rothstein to consider, because it transferred 96% of the right-of-way land contested in the King County v. Rasmussen lawsuit. But, Rothstein ignored the implications of this deed, and instead concentrated on a deed that was not in the chain of title to the property involved in the lawsuit. What complete dishonesty by Judge Rothstein! She did that because this deed to Chris Nelson did not except the "right-of-way". This lack of the exception language in the deed suggests that the Hilchkanums granted only an easement to the Railway. So, Rothstein pretended that this deed did not exist. Instead, she "cherry picked" the Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds in order to find one she could misconstrue to support her predetermined outcome to King County v. Rasmussen. In the Hilchkanum's right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, they granted the Railway a "right-of-way" on their government lots one, two and three. In his deed to his wife, Annie, on December 16, 1898 (shown above) Hilchkanum excepted the right of way with his grant of government lots one and three. So, why didn't he except the "right-of-way" on this deed, which granted his ownership of government lot 2? It was the Constitutional right of the Rasmussens to resolve this fact before a jury. Federal Judge Rothstein does not believe in the Constitution. She intentionally denied the Rasmussen's right to establish the fact that Hilchkanum did not except the "right-of-way", or the land under the "right-of-way", in this most relevant deed.
                   (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                  View maps and discussion that depict this issue with the Chris Nelson deed.

                R.C.W. 64.20.020, which was enacted in 1890, required that Hilchkanum be briefed by a judge as to the effect of this deed, and a notation be made on the deed that this briefing has occurred. This required notation is not present. The federal and state judges that reviewed these subsequent Hilchkanum deeds ignored this important consideration in their predetermined opinions.

                In King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002) the federal judges found that the Hilchkanums were legal experts in deed construction and homesteading law. The documents, history, and laws of the times, suggest just the opposite. Read this deed to Chris Nelson and compare it to the other deeds by Hilchkanum. Then, decide if Hilchkanum wrote these very differently worded deeds, or if Hilchkanum allowed his friends and advisors to write his deeds. Decide if Hilchkanum was a legal expert, as the federal judges describe, or if Hilchkanum got his friends to write his deeds for him, with little understanding of the effect of those deeds. It was the cherished Constitutional right of the Rasmussens to have these facts resolved before a jury. Instead, the readers of this website become a "jury without power" in a judgment of our very corrupt judicial system.
                   (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              18: June 30, 1905: Hilchkanum sells portions of his government lots three and five to John Herder. (Source: See the supporting Hilchkanum document.)

                R.C.W. 64.20.020, which was enacted in 1890, required that Hilchkanum be briefed by a judge as to the effect of this deed, and a notation be made on the deed that this briefing has occurred. This required notation is not present. The federal and state judges that reviewed these subsequent Hilchkanum deeds ignored this important consideration in their predetermined opinions.
                   (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                It is very significant that Hilchkanum, again, does not except the railroad right-of-way in this deed. Since Hilchkanum excepted the railroad "right-of-way" on government lot three in his December 16, 1898 deed to his wife, Annie, why, oh why, oh why, did he not except the same "right-of-way" in this deed? Since the federal judges, who denied the Rasmussen's Constitutional right to establish this critical material fact before a jury, found so much meaning in the exception language, why did they not find significance in the lack of that exception language in this deed. Even more significant, why did the judges not explain the this inconsistency. The answer is this: The federal judges, that construed the Hilchkanum deeds in King County v. Rasmussen, had a dishonest agenda to hide the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. That is the only logical explanation for their actions. That question might have been answered in court if the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit did not lie and dismiss John Rasmussen's Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, February 10, 2004.
                   (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                  View maps and discussion that depict this issue with the John Herder deed.

                The lack of an exception for the right-of-way land, in this deed to Herder, is an indication that Hilchkanum believed he owned the land under the right-of-way, and his right-of-way grant to the SLS&E Railway was merely an easement. In King County v. Rasmussen this fact was briefed to the federal judges who construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. They ignored this implication, and instead concentrated on another, less relevant, deed that they then misconstrued to indicate that the Hilchkanums granted fee simple title of their land to the Railway. The federal judges "cherry picked" the extrinsic evidence in order to use less relevant and conflicted facts to support their dishonest opinions.
                   (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                The disagreements with material facts that I describe, here, are required to be resolved before a jury. A jury trial was not allowed by the very dishonest federal Ninth Circuit judiciary. There is no Constitution or law in the Ninth Circuit courts, just the power of an unchecked and arrogant judiciary to do whatever it pleases. It's the wild, wild west in these courts.
                   (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                  These Hilchkanum documents, which were presented to the court, do not support the dishonest conclusion of the federal and state judges who found that the Hilchkanums were the author of their deeds and were knowledgeable in real estate and homesteading law. These documents paint a completely different picture. They show that the Hilchkanums were illiterate and dependent on white friends to help them with their legal needs. The variations and inconsistencies in their deeds indicate the Hilchkanums were not the authors of their real estate deeds, but rather various unidentified authors constructed their deeds for them. The history of the times, the laws enacted to protect Natives, and the specific Hilchkanum documents suggest that the Hilchkanums had very little participation in their deeds. It is particularly significant that the railroad right-of-way was excepted on some subsequent real estate deeds, but not excepted on others. Not only did the federal and state judges misconstrue the Hilchkanum's intentions based on this exception language, but they also refused the constitutional right of the parties to establish this critical material fact, the Hilchkanum's intentions, before a jury.
                (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                  In this section, I have discussed the three factors that indicate the Hilchkanum's participation and intentions in their right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, and in their subsequent real estate deeds. They are:

              A: The history of Native Americans (Indians) in the late 1800's;

              B: The federal and Washington State laws enacted to protect Native Americans at that time; and

              C: Specific Hilchkanum documents, presented to the court, which explain their behavior and intentions with their deeds.

                The Hilchkanum's intentions in their deeds is a material fact, and not a legal determination that is the right or responsibility of the judge in summary judgment. The intentions of the parties in a deed is the critical material fact that is considered in construing a deed. Disputed material facts must be resolved before a jury. This is required by the law and by the Constitution.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

                The Hilchkanums were illiterate Native American Indians that lived through the times of radical change for Natives in the 1800's and early 1900's. Indians were on the bottom rung of white society, and at great disadvantage in legal dealings, in the years that the Hilchkanums granted the deeds that were construed in this opinion. It was completely dishonest, and likely criminal, for Judge Cox and the federal judges to find that the Hilchkanums were experts in homesteading law and the construction of real estate deeds. These judges intentionally refused to allow the Rays and Rasmussens their Constitutional right to establish the facts before a jury. This action by the judges covered up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. These judges became active participants in that crime with their dishonest opinions.
              (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      4. Judge Cox lies when he states that the notary public composed the words in the Hilchkanum deed. An examination of other SLS&E deeds exposes this lie.

             In his statement above, Cox decides (or strongly implies) that the Hilchkanum deed was written by B.J. Tallman. Here, again, is a portion of that statement:

                Both the language of the main part of the deed, as well as the acknowledgment, is in the handwriting of the notary who acknowledged the signatures of the Hilchkanums, B.J. Tallman.66 Nothing in the record before us indicates that he was the agent of the Railway. Absent such proof, we fail to see why we should construe ambiguities in the May 1887 deed against the Railway. Rather, to the extent we were to engage in applying a rule of construction to any perceived ambiguities in the language of the Hilchkanum deed, we would construe the deed against the Hilchkanums, the grantors.67

             B.J. Tallman was the notary who merely transcribed the Hilchkanum deed into the King County record. It was very wrong for Cox and Schindler to name him as author of the deed. In modern terms, this is equivalent to determining a copy machine is the author of the papers it copies. Ridiculous! It is obscene that Cox and Schindler resolved that question of authorship, because they were resolving that disputed material fact in violation of the rules of summary judgment. This disputed question of fact would go to a jury for resolution in real courts of law. Sadly, there are no longer legitimate courts of law in Washington State. I don't have the briefs and exhibits to the Washington State Court of Appeals in Ray v. King County, but Cox' ridiculous claim that B.J. Tallman authored the Hilchkanum deed would have been destroyed by a jury. As shown in the limited number of SLS&E deeds which I've obtained, the identical words found in the Hilchkanum deed are found in the Luber, Lewellyn, Burnett, Perry, and Palmberg right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E. All of these deeds are constructed from an unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed", using different notaries public. The Luber, Lewellyn, and Burnett deeds use Edwin Briscoe as notary. The Perry deed used Jo. J Beard, a Justice of the Peace and notary public. The Palmberg deed used G. Morris Haller as notary. G. Morris Haller was co-council for the SLS&E with Thomas Burk (Burke). On its face, it's ridiculous that Cox and Schindler would find that B.J. Tallman wrote the Hilchkanum deed. This becomes even more ridiculous when one realized the identical words were filed by at least three other notaries public. Confirm this fact in the transcriptions and photocopies of the deeds, below. I include the Hilchkanum deed, below, for the reader to confirm B.J. Tallmas as notary public. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View the Lurber Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that Edwin Briscoe acted as notary public.

          View the Lewellyn Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that Edwin Briscoe acted as notary public.

          View the Burnett Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that Edwin Briscoe acted as notary public.

          View the Perry Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that Jo. J Beard acted as notary public.

          View the Palmberg Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that G. Morris Haller acted as notary public.

          View the Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that B.J. Tallman acted as notary public.

             A legitimate jury would never find B.J. Tallman author of the Hilchkanum deed, considering the fact that identical wording is found in other SLS&E deeds which used other notaries public. The only common party to these SLS&E deeds is the SLS&E Railway. Further, following the notary's signature in each filed deed is the statement: "filed for record at the request of Burk and Haller..." Thomas Burk (Burke) and G. Morris Haller were the SLS&E lawyers. This statement identifies the notary as acting as an agent for the Railway. A legitimate jury would be required to find the Railway as author of these deeds. The Ray and Rasmussen opinions were settled by judges in violation of the rules of summary judgment.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              In his dissenting opinion, Judge Baker provides proof that Judges Cox and Schindler were made aware that there was legitimate argument over this question of authorship, question of fact. Disputed material facts are required to be resolved by a jury, not bargained away by dishonest judges. Here is a portion of Judge Baker's dissenting opinion that explains this disputed material fact. (with my emphasis)
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

               The majority states that because Hilchkanum must have understood the nature and extent of his conveyance, the fact that the deed was handwritten by someone else is of no consequence. And the majority holds that because there is nothing in the record indicating that the drafter was an agent of the railway, Hilchkanum must have been the drafter. This conclusion wrongly focuses on the identity of the grantor instead of the identity of the drafter of the deed. It is undisputed that the deed's language was taken from the railroad's standard deed. And the affidavit by the Rays' expert creates a material question of fact concerning who actually drafted the document. Taking this affidavit in a light most favorable to the Rays as the nonmoving party, any ambiguities in the deed must be construed against the railroad.5"
          [Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting)]

              The above citation from the dissenting opinion shows that the judges were aware that they were illegally resolving a question of material fact. Disputed material facts are resolved by a jury. Yet, these judges persisted and took on the duty of the jury themselves. This illegal application of summary judgment is how judges force their predetermined outcome to the cases before them. This violates the Ray's constitutional right of due process, and is a direct violation of Washington State law. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Revised Code of Washington (RCW), RCW 4.44.090 Questions of fact for jury. (Civil Procedure)

          All questions of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080, shall be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon addressed to them.

        Reference:

          View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

          View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

          View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion with brief comments added.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          Moreover, none of the designated experts to whom the Rays point has addressed the effect of the language in the very deed by which the Rays acquired title to their property:

      That portion of Government Lot 3, Section 6, Township 24 North, Range 6 East, W.M., in King County, Washington, described as follows: Beginning on the shore of Lake Sammamish at the northwest corner of a tract of land conveyed to W.C. Dahl by Henry M. Johnson by deed dated October 6, 1931, and recorded in Volume 1588 of Deeds, page 137, under King County Recording No. 2808278, records of King County, Washington; thence running southerly along the shore line of Lake Sammamish, a distance of 300 feet to the true point of beginning; thence southerly along said shoreline of Lake Sammamish, a distance of 125 feet; thence east to the westerly right of way of East Lake Sammamish Place S.E. (formerly Redmond Issaquah Road); thence northerly along said right of way to a point due east of the true point of beginning; thence due west to the true point of beginning; EXCEPT the Northern Pacific Railway Company's right of way. {69}

          The term 'except' is generally meant to exclude the described property.70 Here, the deed excludes the right of way at issue in this case, another indication that a successor in interest to the Hilchkanums believed that the right of way previously conveyed to the Railway was not part of the fee conveyed to the Rays. For these reasons, we do not rely on expert opinion to decide the questions before us.71



      Note from John Rasmussen:

      It is a dishonest manipulation of common law for Judge Cox to conclude that the later exception of a "right-of-way" implies the original right-of-way deed granted fee simple title.

              In his paragraph above, Judge Cox states that the "...term 'except' is generally meant to exclude the described property.70", but then he finds that the only interpretation for "except" is to exclude land. Judge Cox' footnote 70 provides this citation: (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          Footnote "70 'An 'exception' is properly the withdrawing of some part of a parcel of land from the conveyance, such as a deed that conveys Lot 4, block 2, except for the east 20 feet thereof.' 17 William B. Search Term Begin Stoebuck, Washington PracticeSearch Term End : Real Estate: Property Law sec. 7.9 at 463 (1995) (emphasis in original)."
          [View Footnote 70 of this opinion.]

              Judge Cox dishonestly limits the possibility of an exception in a deed to be only the exception of "land". But, what happens when an easement is excepted in a deed? Earlier in this opinion I cited this more encompassing definition of an exception in a deed, a definition which does not narrowly limit it to "land". (with my emphasis):
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          "In 6 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property SS 3090, at 773 (repl. ed. 1962), it is stated:

            An exception is the withholding from the operation of the deed of something existent which otherwise the deed would pass to the grantee."
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              In Zobrist, the court explained the common law understanding of the exception of an easement. So, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, the exception of that "right-of-way" in a subsequent deed would simply except an easement. (Citation with my emphasis)

          "The conveyance of a fee simple interest with a clause excepting an easement...conveys to the grantee all the grantor's rights and interests...yet compels the grantee...from acting...inconsistent with the rights of the third party...described in the exception."
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              Therefore, if Hilchkanum granted an easement to the SLS&E with his right-of-way deed, the exception of that "right-of-way" in a subsequent real estate deed identifies the easement, and nothing more. (Citation with my emphasis)

          "The grantor here excepted a right-of-way amounting to an easement from the grant. No reference was made in the conveyance to Custer of an exception of the fee to the 100 feet." "...Custer...received a fee interest in the land...restricted only...that he could not use...in a manner inconsistent with the existing rights of the railroad..."
          [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

              In his paragraph above, Judge Cox presents a narrow and dishonest analysis of the exception of a "right-of-way" in a subsequent real estate deed. He states/implies that the exception of a "right-of-way" always means that land is excepted. That is not the common law understanding of an exception as I show with my three citations above.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              When a "right-of-way" is excepted in a subsequent real estate deed, the determination of what is excepted is made by going to the original right-of-way deed to determine whether an easement or fee was conveyed. Judge Cox dishonestly tries to work the logic backwards. Instead of going to the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to determine whether an easement of fee was conveyed, Cox uses a narrow and incomplete understanding of exception language in deeds in order to contrive Hilchkanum's intentions in his original right-of-way deed.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              In Washington State/Territory the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement. Hilchkanum granted a "right-of-way" to the SLS&E, which is an easement under common law. The later exception of that "right-of-way", excepted an easement and did not except land.

              If Ronald Cox wants to be a judge, he needs to quit using the slimy lying lawyer tactics he used in his above analysis of exception language. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          The Rays also rely on a recent Division III case of this court, Hanson Industries, Inc. v. Spokane County.72 In Hanson, the court held that a series of 1903 and 1904 deeds conveying a right of way to a railroad and granted an easement rather than a fee simple estate. But Hanson is of little utility here beyond its reiteration of the principles stated in Brown.

          First, as our supreme court explained in Brown, the language of the deed under scrutiny is of primary importance in determining the intent of the parties, and the cases turn on a case-by-case examination of such language. The Hanson court quoted little of the language of the deeds it examined. Thus, we cannot meaningfully compare the language of those deeds with the Hilchkanum deed.

          Second, it is apparent from the court's analysis that the deeds in Hanson contained language conditioning the conveyances on the construction and operation of a railroad within two years, imposing obligations on the railroad to construct and maintain farm crossings, and releasing the railroad from liability for damages caused by railroad construction.73 In addition, unlike the Hilchkanum deed, the Hanson deeds did not describe the right of way in metes and bounds.74 The Hanson court found the foregoing factors to be significant in its determination that the deeds conveyed an easement. The Hilchkanum deed contains no comparable language.

          Finally, as we explained above, we find the contrast between the language in the Hilchkanum deed conveying the right of way and the language conveying the right to cut dangerous trees on land adjacent to the right of way to be compelling evidence that the first conveyed a fee interest and the second an easement. The court in Hanson did not discuss any similar provisions in the deeds it examined, and we presume none existed. In addition, we concluded that Bill Hilchkanum's subsequent conduct, in expressly excluding the right of way in subsequent deeds, demonstrated his intent and understanding of the May 1887 deed as a grant of a fee interest in the right of way, not an easement. The subsequent conduct of the parties in Hanson did not include any analogous acts.75 In sum, Hanson provides no support for the Rays' claim that the Hilchkanums' 1887 deed conveyed an easement rather than a fee simple estate.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

      Here, Judge Cox summarizes his previous lies.

            Since I don't have the Ray briefs to Judge Cox, I cannot respond to Cox' above discussion on Hanson Industries, Inc. v. Spokane County. But, I can respond to his above references to his prior dishonest conclusions:
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              Judge Cox is completely dishonest with his analysis that the secondary Hilchkanum grant indicated the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their primary grant of the "right-of-way". This is a disputed material fact that Judge Cox had no right to determine. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View my previous discussion of the Hilchkanum secondary grant.

              Judge Cox' is completely dishonest with his analysis of the exception of the "right-of-way" in Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds. Judge Cox contrived the idea that the subsequent exception of the Hilchkanum right-of-way somehow indicated the intentions of the Hilchkanums in their 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. This is the sort of slimy tricks that crooked lawyers use in their arguments, and should not be found in an opinion by a judge.
            (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

          View my previous discussion of Cox' dishonest analysis of the exception language in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds.

            The above discussion by Judge Cox uses his prior dishonest analysis to justify his conclusions. As I stated at the top of this section, I don't have the briefing by John Groen to Judge Cox, but based on the quality of Groen's prior briefs, I suspect that his argument was strong enough that Cox needed to dishonestly respond. It was up to the Washington State Supreme Court to restore the rule of law and refuse the dishonesty of Judge Cox' opinion. Sadly, with its dishonest refusal of appeal of this lawsuit, the Washington State Supreme Court is no longer a legitimate judicial body.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          In King County v. Rasmussen,76 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the very deed that is presently before us. There, King County sued to quiet title to a 100-foot-wide strip of land that bisected John and Nancy Rasmussen's property and to obtain a declaration of its rights to use the right of way for a public trail. After applying the Brown factors, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the May 1887 deed conveyed fee title, not an easement, to the Railway. Our conclusion that the conveyance of the right of way in 1887 was in fee is consistent with the reasoning and conclusions in Rasmussen.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            There is little original thought in this opinion by Judge Cox. He ignores over one hundred years of consistently held legal precedent which holds the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement. His only justification is found in the federal opinions that construed the Hilchkanum in King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002). These federal decisions are not legal opinions, but rather are criminal acts from the bench by federal judges who were influenced to cover up the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the East Lake Sammamish BNSF right-of-way. I am the "Rasmussen" in those opinions and I emphatically state that my rights as a citizen of the United States were intentionally withheld by federal judges in the resolution of my lawsuit.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Reference:

        King County v. Rasmussen (2001)

        King County v. Rasmussen (2002)

        Read forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

    ABANDONMENT

          Finally, the Rays argue that the deed cannot be understood to grant a right of way 100 feet wide in the location where the railroad was actually constructed because the actual location of the railroad is not the location described by the course and distance calls in the deed. Again, we disagree.

          Here, the parties stipulated that the location of the railroad tracks, as constructed, 'is not within the area described by the distance call stated in the Hilchkanum deed.'77 Mike Foley, a Senior Engineer for the King County Department of Transportation, attempted to determine the location of the centerline of the right of way as described in the deed. Because the deed was difficult to read, Foley surveyed the route using three different positions. In each of these surveys, the centerline did not match the actual centerline of the tracks, as constructed.78 The distances between the test centerlines and the actual centerline were 119, 25, and 5 feet. The majority of the first of these three centerlines, at 119 feet from the actual centerline, would be located in Lake Sammamish.79 The County argues that the railroad tracks, as constructed, constitute a 'monument' that determines the location of the property, which supercedes the course and distance calls outlined in the deed. 'The term 'monument' means a permanent natural or artificial object on the ground which helps establish the location of the boundary line called for.'80 If the description in a deed of the land is fixed by 'ascertainable monuments and by courses and distances, the well-settled general rule is that the monuments will control the courses and distances if they be inconsistent with the monument calls.'81

          This court considered this question in DD & L, Inc. v. Burgess. In that case, a dispute arose regarding the location of the northern boundary of a railroad right of way. The deed in that case described the location of the right of way as follows:

      A strip of land 100 feet in width, having 50 feet of such width on each side of the center line of the main track of the Chicago, Milwaukee and Puget Sound Railway Company, as the same is now surveyed, staked out and established ...; said center line being more particularly described as follows, to-wit: Beginning at a point in the east line of said section 1, 1731.7 feet south 0 51' east of the northeast corner thereof ...{82}

          Based on testimony by surveyors, the trial court found that the centerline of the railroad tracks, as constructed, was 17 feet from the distance call recited in the 1912 deed.83 We held that the law and evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the track, as built, was the monument intended for locating the boundary established by the 1912 deed, and that, because the track location conflicted with the distance calls in the 1912 deed, and because monuments control over distance calls, a survey based exclusively on the calls and distances was erroneous.84

          In this case, the railroad tracks, as constructed, constitute a monument that the deed refers to as the location of the centerline of the right of way conveyed in the deed.85 The description of the location of the right of way in this case is similar to that considered in DD&L:

      Such right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across our said lands . . . which location is described as follows to wit {legal description}{86}

          Because the location of this monument conflicts with the distance calls in the deed, and because the monument controls over the distance calls, we hold that the strip of land conveyed in this deed is centered on the railroad tracks, as constructed.

          The Rays argue that this case is distinguishable because the tracks in this case were built after the deed was signed. It appears from the language of the deed in DD&L that the tracks in that case were at least staked out when the deed was written. But this distinction is immaterial. As we noted in that case, '{t}hough the monument referred to in a deed does not actually exist at the time the deed was drafted, but is afterward erected by the parties with the intention that it shall conform to the deed, it will control.'87 The Rays cite no authority to the contrary. Nor do they claim any evidence of intent by the parties to place the tracks in Lake Sammamish, an unreasonable result.



      Note from John Rasmussen:

            Again, I don't have the Ray's briefs which I would need in order to fully understand the argument above. DD & L, Inc. v. Burgess is a decision which holds that the actual finished location of the tracks establishes a monument that is the legal centerline of the railroad right-of-way. Judge Cox' opinion, above, holds that "the strip of land conveyed in this deed is centered on the railroad tracks, as constructed". But, there is an important unanswered question.

            Is the location of the tracks in 1996 the original location of the tracks? Judge Cox may be correct that the right-of-way is defined by the actual original location of the tracks. But, is the original location of the tracks the same as the location of the tracks in 1996? We know that there was a problem with the location of the original rail bed.

            The most authoritative reference that I have found is the book "Orphan Road : The Railroad Comes to Seattle, 1853-1911" by Kurt E. Armbruster (Washington State University Press, 1999). On page 135, Armbruster observes that "Much early construction work had to be redone, and extensive cribbing and shoring up of water-saturated right of way was required on the marshy lakeside sections." If the Railway reestablished the tracks along Lake Sammamish, as Armbruster implies, it would make sense that the Railway moved the tracks away from the lake and added ballast to raise the tracks. The only way to do this without disruption of service would to be to keep the original tracks in place and re-build the tracks higher and dryer away from the original wet and marshy locations.

            Assuming that the Railway relocated the tracks, the centerline that establishes the right-of-way would be the original centerline, not the relocated centerline or the centerline that existed in 1996. This is what is held in DD & L, Inc. v. Burgess. If that original centerline could not be found, the only legal monument that should be used to establish the right-of-way is the original survey. Judge Cox is wrong again.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

            I don't know how John Groen briefed this subject for the Rays, but I do know that the original location of the tracks is a material fact, not a question of law that is the responsibility or right of the judge to decide.

            It appears that this is another case of Judge Cox assigning himself to be the jury, and illegally deciding a question of material fact. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

          The Rays argue that a Kansas case, Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown Properties, Inc.,88 and other cases that have relied on Aladdin Petroleum, support their position.89 But these cases are entirely inapposite. Each of these cases considered the scope of the use of a right of way easement, not the location of property transferred in fee simple by a deed. The rule quoted by the Rays, read in the contexts of these cases, is of no use to us here.

          To summarize, application of the factors stated and applied by our supreme court in Brown supports the conclusion that the intent of the Hilchkanums and the Railway in May 1887 was to convey a fee simple interest in the strip of land right of way, not an easement. Moreover, the actual placement of the railroad tracks controls as a monument to determine the location of the right of way. Thus, the Railway did not abandon the right of way described in the deed. The trial court properly concluded that fee title vests in King County.

          We affirm the summary judgment quieting title in King County.

          WE CONCUR:



      My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Conclusion by John Rasmussen:

            It's difficult to imagine how Judge Cox could be any more dishonest in this opinion. Cox denies the Rays their constitutional right to establish the facts. His method is the same as used by the federal judges in King County v. Rasmussen. Judge Cox illegally used summary judgment when he knew that there was no agreement with the material facts. Further, Cox repeatedly misapplies the law, as shown in the above annotation.

            Why would Judge Cox issue such a dishonest opinion? Why was it so important for Cox to find that King County owned the land under the Ray's right-of-way? We know it wasn't because it enabled the County to establish a bicycle trail. The Rails-to-Trails Act does not require the County to own the land in order to build a trail. The only reason that it was important to illegally award the right-of-way land to King County was to justify the illegal donation of that land by BNSF.

            The unstated, but everywhere present, factor in this opinion is the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the East Lake Sammamish BNSF right-of-way. This opinion protects the active participants in the tax fraud scheme from federal prosecution. It protects Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein and the Ninth Circuit appeals panel, headed by Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher, from being impeached and sent to prison for their participation in the crime from the federal bench.

            Judge Ronald Cox had something more important that the Constitution and the law to deal with here. He needed to keep his fellow judges from being held responsible for their criminal actions. He needed to keep powerful folks in King County from going to prison. It's obvious from the analysis of this opinion, above, that the Constitution and the law were Judge Cox' last consideration in deciding this case. Further, Judge Cox issued this dishonest opinion without any fear of being held responsible for his crime. He knew his fellow judges would keep him from being held responsible for his dishonesty.

            With this opinion, Judge Cox establishes anarchy as the rule of law in his court. Cox denied constitutional rights and intentionally misapplied the law. He misused the power he has as a judge in order to enforce his predetermined outcome and to protect powerful folks who had committed crimes. That's anarchy, not law. With this opinion, Judge Cox becomes an active participant in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

            This opinion was upheld on appeal to the Washington State Supreme Court. I consider the denial of appeal of this opinion to be a criminal act by the Washington State Supreme Court.

        View my March 31, 2009 public letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court.

      Reference:

        View Ray v. King County (2004) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

        View Ray v. King County (2004), with very brief comments and no documentation.

        View Judge Bakerís dissenting opinion in this case.

      My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.



    The following is a portion of Ray v. King County (2004) by Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald E. Cox.

    Footnotes:

    1 Certain facts are set forth in a written stipulation of the parties ('Stipulation'). Clerk's Papers at 12-13.

    2 Stipulation. Clerk's Papers at 12-13.

    3 Stipulation. Clerk's Papers at 12.

    4 Clerk's Papers at 89.

    5 Clerk's Papers at 89.

    6 Clerk's Papers at 89-90.

    7 Clerk's Papers at 89-90. The United States Surface Transportation Board (STB) approved interim trail use (railbanking) of the ELS corridor under the National Trails System Act (16 U.S.C. sec. 1247(d)) and the STB's implementing regulations (49 CFR sec. 1552.29). The STB ruling authorized removal of the rails, ties, and spikes, and conversion of the ELS corridor for a recreational trial as a means of preserving the corridor for future use. Clerk's Papers at 17.

    8 Clerk's Papers at 13.

    9 CR 56(c); Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2d 430, 437, 924 P.2d 908 (1996).

    10 Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wn. App. 491, 499 , 857 P.2d 283 (1993).

    11 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 439-40; Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 568, 278 P. 686 (1929).

    12 Veach v. Culp, 92 Wn.2d 570, 573, 599 P.2d 526 (1979).

    13 Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 573.

    14 Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 573 (citing Vavrek v. Parks, 6 Wn. App. 684, 690, 495 P.2d 1051 (1972); Warren v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 19 Cal. App. 3d 24, 35, 96 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1971)).

    15 Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 573.

    16 Clerk's Papers at 92-94. See also King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2220, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1106 (2003).

    17 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 433.

    18 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 434.

    19 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 433.

    20 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 436-437.

    21 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 437 (citing Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wn.2d 533, 535, 225 P.2d 199 (1950); Zobrist v. Culp, 95 Wn.2d 556, 560, 627 P.2d 1308 (1981)).

    22 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 438 (citations omitted).

    23 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 438-39 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

    24 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 437.

    25 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 437. Washington case authority generally classifies the choices in railroad rights of way cases as between either fee simple title or easement. See Reichenbach v. Washington Short-Line Ry. Co., 10 Wash. 357, 358-360, 38 P. 1126 (1894) (construing a conveyance in the form of a bargain and sale deed as conveying an easement, not fee title). No case holds that a defeasible fee was intended.

    26 Laws of 1885-6, p. 177-79. The statute governing conveyances of real estate and providing for the form of deeds stated, in relevant part: SEC. 3. That warranty deeds for the conveyance of land, may be substantially in the following form: The grantor. . . for and in consideration of . . . in hand paid, convey and warrant to . . . the following described real estate . . .. Every deed in substance in the above form, when otherwise duly executed, shall be deemed and held a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, . . . SEC. 4. Bargain and sale deeds for the conveyance of land may be substantially in the following form: The grantor . . . for (and) in consideration of ... in hand paid, bargain, sell and convey to . . . the following described real estate . Every deed in substance in the above form shall convey to the grantee, his heirs or other legal representatives and estate of inheritance in fee simple, . . . . SEC. 5. Quit-claim deeds may be in substance in the following form: The grantor. . . for the consideration . . . convey and quit-claim to . . . all interest in the following described real estate . . .. Every deed in substance in form prescribed in this section, when otherwise duly executed, shall be deemed and held a good and sufficient conveyance, release and quitclaim to the grantee, his heirs and assigns in fee of all the then existing legal or equitable rights of the grantor, in the premises therein described, but shall not extend to the after acquired title unless words are added expressing such intention. (emphasis added).

    27 (Emphasis added.)

    28 See Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 437. The Hilchkanum deed contains neither the language nor the warranties of the statutory warranty or bargain and sale form of deeds. Arguably, this conveyance is substantially in the form of a quit claim deed, the third form of statutory deed existing at the time of the conveyance. We note that all three forms of statutory deed convey fee title according to the plain words of the governing statute. Nevertheless, the case authority indicates that the form of conveyance is but one of many factors in analyzing instruments like the one before us.

    29 Appellants' Opening Brief at 6.

    30 Appellants' Opening Brief at 6.

    31 (Emphasis added.)

    32 Brown's third factor considers 'whether the deed conveyed a right of way over a tract of land, rather than a strip thereof.' Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 438 (emphasis added).

    33 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 439 (emphasis added).

    34 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 439-40.

    35 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 440 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

    36 59 Wn. App. 888, 890, 801 P.2d 1022 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1021 (1991) (construing a deed conveying 'a right-of- way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands ').

    37 299 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2220, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1106 (2003).

    38 Veach, 92 Wn.2d at 572 (construing a deed quit-claiming 'A right-of-way one hundred feet wide, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the B.B. & Eastern R.R. as now located '); see also Reichenbach, 10 Wash. at 358 (construing deed conveying 'right of way for said railroad, twelve feet in width ').

    39 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 442.

    40 These factors are: '(1) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land, and did not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose to which the land was to be put, or in other ways limiting the estate conveyed; (2) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and limited its use to a specific purpose.' Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 438.

    41 This factor questions 'whether the deed granted only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land.' Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 438.

    42 The fifth factor is 'whether the deed contained a clause providing that if the railroad ceased to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor.' Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 438.

    43 Squire, 59 Wn. App. at 894 (holding that the clause 'so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company' supports the conveyance of an easement).

    44 That language states 'To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto {the Railway} and to its successors and assigns forever.' (emphasis added).

    45 Black's Law Dictionary defines the term habendum clause as the 'clause usually following the granting part of the premises of a deed, which defines the extent of the ownership in the thing granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee.' Further, 'the habendum may lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify, but not totally contradict or be repugnant to, estate granted in the premises.' Black's Law Dictionary 710 (6th ed. 1990).

    46 Squire, 59 Wn. App. at 894.

    47 Appellants' Reply Brief at 18 (arguing that the use of the term 'right' in this provision of the deed conveys an easement).

    48 Bill Hilchkanum was a party to each of the subsequent deeds in the record before us. Mary Hilchkanum, the other grantor under the 1887 deed, was not a party to any.

    49 Clerk's Papers at 66 (emphasis added).

    50 Clerk's Papers at 57 (emphasis added).

    51 Clerk's Papers at 63 (emphasis added).

    52 (Emphasis added.)

    53 Clerk's Papers at 449.

    54See King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F3d at 1087-88.

    55 Minidoka & Southwestern Railroad Company v. United States, 235 U.S. 211, 216, 35 S. Ct. 46, 59 L. Ed. 200 (1914) (quoting Rev. Stat. sec. 2288). Rev. Stat. sec. 2288 states in full: Any person who has already settled or hereafter may settle on the public lands, either by pre-emption, or by virtue of the homestead law or any amendments thereto, shall have the right to transfer, by warranty against his own acts, any portion of his pre-emption or homestead for church, cemetery, or school purposes, or for the right of way of railroads across such pre-emption or homestead, and the transfer for such public purposes shall in no way vitiate the right to complete and perfect the title to their pre-emptions or homesteads.

    56 315 U.S. 262, 62 S. Ct. 529, 86 L. Ed. 836 (1942).

    57 Great Northern, 315 U.S. at 274-75. See also Minidoka, 235 U.S. at 216 ('{The Act of 1875}, however, by its very terms, applies only to 'public lands,' and hence cannot be construed to empower the Secretary to authorize the building of roads across lands which had been segregated from the public domain by the entry and possession of homesteaders or preemptors.').

    58 28 Pub. Lands Dec. 561 (1899).

    59 South Perry, 28 Pub. Lands Dec. at 562.

    60 28 Pub. Lands Dec. 155 (1899).

    61 Lawson, 28 Pub. Lands Dec. at 159-60.

    62 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 439.

    63 Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 444; Conaway v. Time Oil Co., 34 Wn.2d 884, 889, 210 P.2d 1012 (1949) (observing that the term which is applied to a document by the parties thereto does not necessarily determine the nature of the grant).

    64 Appellants' Reply Brief at 7.

    65 We note that the Rays characterize Bill Hilchkanum as 'a Native American who could not read or write.' Appellants' Opening Brief at 16. They also state in their brief that he was 'an illiterate Native American.' Id. at 26. The use of the term 'Native American' in these characterizations adds nothing that is analytically useful. To the extent that the Rays imply something more than his illiteracy by the use of the term, such implication is improper.

    66 Clerk's Papers at 92-94.

    67 'When the court remains in doubt as to the parties' intent or as to the quantum of interests conveyed, a deed will be construed against the grantor.' 17 William B. Search Term Begin Stoebuck, Washington PracticeSearch Term End : Real Estate: Property Law sec. 7.9 at 463 (1995) (citing Wright v. Olsen, 42 Wn.2d 702, 257 P.2d 782 (1953); Cook v. Hensler, 57 Wash. 392, 107 P. 178 (1910)).

    68 State v. Olmedo, 112 Wn. App. 525, 49 P.3d 960 (2002), review denied, 148 Wn.2d 1019 (2003) ('Under ER 704, a witness may testify as to matters of law, but may not give legal conclusions.').

    69 Clerk's Papers at 66 (emphasis added).

    70 'An 'exception' is properly the withdrawing of some part of a parcel of land from the conveyance, such as a deed that conveys Lot 4, block 2, except for the east 20 feet thereof.' 17 William B. Search Term Begin Stoebuck, Washington PracticeSearch Term End : Real Estate: Property Law sec. 7.9 at 463 (1995) (emphasis in original).

    71 The dissent appears to rely on an expert opinion by Stephen J. Graddon to support the view that the Railway drafted the deed and that we should construe ambiguities in that deed against the railroad. Dissent at 3. Graddon opines that the railroad drafted the deed because, among other things, the deed's language tracks language in other railroad deeds, a witness signing the deed was associated with the Railway, and Hilchkanum was illiterate. Clerk's Papers at 233-34. No one disputes that Hilchkanum could not have drafted the deed. But neither Graddon's declaration nor anything else in the record before us contests that B.J. Tallman, the notary who acknowledged the deed, drafted it. Likewise, nothing in the record shows that he did so at the direction of the Railway. Neither the status of a witness to the deed nor the alleged similarity in language with other deeds fills this gap. Thus, Graddon's declaration fails either to create a presumption that the Railway drafted the deed or to create a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment.

    72 114 Wn. App. 523, 58 P.3d 910 (2002), review denied, 149 Wn.2d 1028 (2003).

    73 Hanson, 114 Wn. App. at 532.

    74 Hanson, 114 Wn. App. at 534.

    75 Hanson, 114 Wn. App. at 535.

    76 299 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).

    77 Clerk's Papers at 13.

    78 Clerk's Papers at 222-23.

    79 Clerk's Papers at 222. Foley mistakenly stated in his opinion that the centerline would be located 'in Lake Washington.' Presumably, he meant Lake Sammamish.

    80 DD & L, Inc. v. Burgess, 51 Wn. App. 329, 331 n.3, 753 P.2d 561 (1988).

    81 Matthews v. Parker, 163 Wash. 10, 14, 299 P. 354 (1931).

    82 DD&L, 51 Wn. App. at 331 n.2.

    83 DD&L, 51 Wn. App. at 333.

    84 DD&L, 51 Wn. App. at 336.

    85 '{T}o interpret the words, 'from the center line of the ... Railroad,' as referring to the center of the track, is to strengthen the descriptive part of the deed by fixing an easily recognized monument.... The words 'center line of the railroad' refer to the center of the track, and indicate the track as a monument which aids in determining a certain boundary.' DD&L, 51 Wn. App. at 335 (quoting Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co. v. Tamplin, 156 Ill. 285, 294-95, 40 N.E. 960, 962 (1895)).

    86 Clerk's Papers at 92 (emphasis added).

    87 DD&L, 51 Wn. App. at 335 (citing 6 G. Thompson, Real Property sec. 3044 (1962 repl.); Makepeace v. Bancroft, 12 Mass. 469 (1815); cf. W. Robillard & L. Bouman, A Treatise on the Law of Surveying and Boundaries sec. 26.11 (5th ed. 1987) (a road as constructed becomes the monument and controls)).

    88 221 Kan. 579, 561 P.2d 818 (1977).

    89 See, e.g., Consolidated Amusement Co., Ltd. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc., 6 Haw. App. 312, 719 P.2d 1119 (1986); Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282 (1981); Lindhorst v. Wright, 616 P.2d 450 (1980).