Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Snohomish
county, No. 56476, Stiger, J., entered June 17, 1955,
dismissing an action to quiet title at the close of the
plaintiff's case. Affirmed.
Dailey & Conroy, for appellant.
Clarence J. Coleman, for respondent.
SCHWELLENBACH, J.- Emma Scott commenced action
against Louise Wallitner alleging that she (Emma Scott)
was the owner and entitled to the possession of the N. W.
1/4 of the S. W. 1/4 of section 34, township 32, NR 6, E.W.M.;
that, at the time she acquired the property, there was
excepted from the description thereof a fifty-foot right of
way for a logging railroad, which constituted an easement
only, and that the railroad had long since been abandoned;
and that Louise Wallitner claimed title to the right of way
by virtue of a quitclaim deed executed to her. The plaintiff
claimed title to the right of way on two grounds: first,
that the deed to the right of way created an easement only;
and, second, adverse use of the property for over the
statutory period after the railroad had been abandoned. The
trial court dismissed the action with prejudice at the close
of plaintiff's case, and this appeal follows.
The question of adverse possession was not presented in
the brief or in oral argument, and we are only concerned in
this appeal with whether or not the deed to the right of way
constituted an easement.
 This question ordinarily arises in situations such as
the following: A owns a section of land. B wishes to
construct a railroad over and across the land. A executes a deed
to B for the railroad right of way. It may be the intention
of the parties that B is to receive an easement only-a right
to use the land for the purpose of operating a railroad
thereon. On the other hand, it may be their intention that
B is to receive a fee in the land conveyed-to become its
owner. The intention of the grantor may be determined
from the language contained in the granting clause of the
deed, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and the
subsequent conduct of the parties with relation thereto. See
Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 278 Pac. 686;
Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wn.2d 533, 225 P.2d 199; Annotation,
132 A. L. R. 142. If it is the intention of the parties
that the grantor convey an easement only, upon abandonment
of the railroad, the right of way reverts to the grantor
or his successor in interest.
However, the above rule is only incidentally applicable to
the problem herein involved, as will be seen from an examination
of the record.
April 27, 1909, the Seattle Cedar Lumber Manufacturing
Company conveyed by warranty deed several tracts of land
(including the twenty acres herein involved) to the Ebey
Logging Company. The Ebey Logging Company constructed a
logging railroad over and across these lands, including
the land involved herein.
June 28, 1927, the Ebey Logging Company conveyed by
warranty deed to the Canyon Lumber Company the logging
railroad which it had constructed, and conveyed: "Also a
strip of land fifty feet in width, being twenty-five feet on each
side of the center line of said railroad track as the same is
now located and exists on all of the above described lands in
Township 32 North, Range 6 East, W. M." (The description
includes the north half of the south half of section 34.)
June 15, 1937, the Canyon Lumber Company quitclaimed
to the Soundview Pulp Company "a strip of land fifty feet
in width, being twenty-five feet on each side of the center
line railroad right of way, formerly owned by the Ebey
Logging Company, a Washington corporation, as constructed
and located over and across the following described
subdivision." (The description of the property involved
herein is included.)
November 12, 1946, the Soundview Pulp Company
quitclaimed to respondent: "Logging railroad right-of-way,
formerly owned by Canyon Lumber Company, being 50
feet in width, being 25 feet on either side of the logging
railroad as formerly constructed, . . ." (Then follows
In the meantime, on December 19, 1927, the Ebey Logging
Company quitclaimed to Eyre Shingle Company all of its
other lands situated in Snohomish county, "excepting
therefrom any lands or interest therein heretofore conveyed by
the grantor to parties other than the grantor."
April 20, 1930, the Eyre Shingle Company conveyed by
warranty deed to Fred Patrick, the
"East Half (E 1/2 of the North West Quarter (NW 1/4)
of the South West Quarter (SW 1/4) of Section thirty four
(34) township Thirty-two (32)-Range Six (6) East containing
20 acres more or less.
"Excepting a 50 foot right-of-way being 25 feet on either
side of the center line of the Logging Railroad as now
constructed . . ."
We shall not burden this opinion by quoting any more
deeds. Patrick conveyed to the Arlington State Bank and
the bank to Fred Eirvine, who, in turn, conveyed to
appellant. Each conveyance contained an exception identical in
language to the one contained in the deed to Patrick.
 It will be noticed that in none of these transactions
was there a grant of a right of way for the purpose of
building a railroad thereon. Here the Ebey Logging
Company purchased several tracts of land. As a part of its
operations, it built and operated a logging railroad thereon.
It carved the right of way out of its own lands. When it
completed its operations, it deeded the railroad and the
right of way thereof to the Canyon Lumber Company. It
subsequently deeded all other lands to the Eyre Shingle
Company. In doing so, it was particular to except any lands
theretofore conveyed to anyone else. From that point on,
one set of conveyances conveyed the right of way and the
other set conveyed land except the right of way. There can
be no doubt that the intent of the grantors of the right of
way was to convey the land and not to convey an easement
or right therein.
The judgment is affirmed.
HAMLEY, C. J., DONWORTH, FINLEY, and OTT, JJ., concur.
1. Reported in 299 P.2d 204.