Charles T. Wright, Respondent,
Ole Olsen et al., Appellants,
The State of Washington, Respondent. /1
Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Mason
county, No. 5656, Poyhonen, J., entered August 14, 1952,
upon findings in favor of the plaintiff and intervener, in an
action to quiet title, tried to the court. Affirmed.
Merrill Wallace, for appellants.
B. Franklin Heuston, The Attorney General, and William
C. Hallin, Assistant, for respondents.
OLSON, J.-This is an action to quiet title to a street
vacated in 1941. The trial court decreed that plaintiff and
intervener state of Washington each own one half of its
area, and that defendants have no interest in it. Defendants
do not challenge the court's findings of fact in this appeal,
but do assert that its legal conclusions are erroneous.
Decision of the controversy turns upon the nature of the
estate of the state of Washington in a tract of land conveyed
to it before the street was vacated. This tract, now a state
highway, adjoins the vacated street on the east and lies
between it and the property owned by defendants. If the state
owns this tract in fee simple, there can be no claim by
defendants to a portion of the vacated street, because they
cannot be the owners of any property on the "side" of such
street, and cannot meet the requirement of the statute
designating the persons in whom title to a vacated street outside
an incorporated city or town shall vest. RCW 58.12.110
[cf. Rem. Rev. Stat., SS 9303].
 A sovereign state is under no disability regarding its
right or capacity to own property.
 The state acquired title to this tract by a
bargain-and-sale deed, drawn in statutory form and in plain and
unambiguous terms, without reservations, restrictions, or
limitations upon the grantee's title. Such a deed conveys an
estate in fee simple to the grantee. RCW 64.04.040 [cf. Rem.
Rev. Stat., SS 10553].
 This deed does not express the purpose of the conveyance
to the state, but, in any event, its estate in a tract
conveyed to it in fee simple is not limited by the fact that it
has used the property for highway purposes. At the time of
its acquisition in 1926, the state was authorized to acquire
lands for highway purposes by gift, purchase, or
condemnation. Rem. Rev. Stat., 6766. It can only be divested of its
estate in such lands by its own deed of conveyance, both
under the law as it was in 1926 (Rem. Rev. Stat., SSSS 6829-1,
6829-2) and under the statutes now in effect (RCW 47.12.060,
47.12.070 [cf. Rem. Supp. 1945, SS 6400-28]).
This indicates a legislative intent not only that the state
acquire an estate in fee in such lands but that the
abandonment of their use for such purposes does not accomplish
a reversion, through operation of law. Cf. King County v.
Hanson Inv. Co., 34 Wn.2d 112, 118, 208 P.2d 113
 It follows that defendants have no possibility of
reverter in the tract owned by the state. They have no
interest of any nature in any land which is contiguous to the
vacated street, and are foreclosed from any claim to it.
There is no cross-appeal, and no issue is presented by
plaintiff or the state regarding the adjudication of their
respective titles to the area in dispute. Defendants cannot
question that decision because they have no interest in the
property which is its subject matter, and have established no
other ground upon which they can be heard.
The judgment is affirmed.
GRADY, C. J., MALLERY, HILL, and WEAVER, JJ., concur.
1. Reported in 257 P.2d 782.