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King County v. Rasmussen May 25, 2001

United States District Court
Western District of Washington at Seattle

Dated May 25, 2001, Entered May 29, 2001

KING COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN RASMUSSEN and NANCY RASMUSSEN, husband and wife, and their marital community, Defendants.

No. C00-1637R



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    This "legal opinion" is a CRIMINAL ACT from the bench.

            This is not a legal opinion, but rather it is an intentional criminal act from the bench by Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein. It's subsequent cover-up by fellow federal and Washington State judges calls into question the legitimacy of our legal system. While an occasional mistake is inevitable in legal opinions, this "legal opinion" has critical mistakes in essentially every paragraph. The reason for her "mistakes" is found in the effect of her mistakes. Rothstein's "mistakes" cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants from criminal prosecution. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            There are two basic elements in the resolution of this lawsuit: the facts and the law. As I show in the annotated versions of this opinion, Rothstein manipulates both the facts and the law. Disputed material facts are required to be resolved by juries in legitimate courts of law. Here, Rothstein dishonestly strikes facts we present and then manufactures irrational, unsupported, and undocumented material facts to support her dishonest conclusions. She prohibits the resolution of questions of fact by a jury. She does this by illegally allowing summary judgment. Further, Rothstein cherry-picks other material facts, ignoring more relevant material facts which contradict her opinion.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            With respect to manipulating the law, Rothstein intentionally ignores the precedential Washington State common law opinion which applies most directly to this lawsuit, King County v. Squire (1990). In Squire, the court construed a deed from the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) which had an identical granting clause to the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E, which is construed here. The Squire court found the granting clause of the Squire right-of-way deed "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". Rothstein found the identical granting clause in the Hilchkanum deed to convey fee simple title. The Squire court based its conclusion of one-hundred years of consistently applied common law. Rothstein bases her opinion on Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument concocted by King County Prosecutor, Norm Maleng, and his staff to cover-up King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Federal Judge Barbara Rothstein becomes an active participant in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme with this "legal opinion".
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            It's important to understand at the top of this document that Judge Rothstein's most outrageous lie in this opinion was never briefed by King County. Rothstein manufactures the material fact that Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, actually wrote his deed to the SLS&E. She does this without any substantiation. She does this after striking my lawyer's and my statements which contradict this concocted material fact. This lie was critical for Rothstein and the other Hilchkanum judges because it "established" the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed as a unique deed, separate and different from the other identical SLS&E deeds which had all been determined to convey easements. The Hilchkanum judge's "finding" that the Hilchkanum deed conveyed fee simple title was necessary to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. If the King County Prosecutor had briefed this ridiculous lie, we would have been afforded the opportunity to more properly counter that unsupportable claim. Further, we would have had the opportunity to describe and cite the documents which show that claim to be an absolute lie. Considering the dishonesty in almost every paragraph of this "legal opinion", I believe that Rothstein conspired with King County, or other active participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, to present this unsupportable material fact as part of her opinion in order to deny any briefing or exhibits which would counter this lie. Knowing that we are not automatically allowed to submit additional exhibits on appeal, this dishonest tactic was important for Rothstein in this first of the Hilchkanum opinions. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    There are three versions of this opinion on this website.

      First, the published version:

        View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      Second, a version containing only brief comments. The second version is built to maintain the continuity of Judge Rothstein's opinion, but at the same time, make the reader aware of the violation of constitutional rights, the massive dishonesty, and the intentional misapplication of the law by Rothstein.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)

      Third, the version which you are viewing here contains detailed analysis of this opinion. This version provides links to supporting argument, historical documents, and precedential opinions. But, this version breaks up the continuity of Judge Rothstein's opinion because of the lengthy explanations of her dishonest tactics and misapplication of the law.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            My suggestion is to read the Second version (with brief comments) and, when interested in viewing expanded justification and documentation, use the hyperlink at the bottom of each note to open this detailed version's of the corresponding note, in a separate window.

    Color Scheme:

            Rothstein's opinion is presented here in bold blue font color. I've broken her opinion into small sections for the purpose of analysis. Each portion of Rothstein's opinion is preceded with the notice: "The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein."

            I have added my comments and analysis in black font color, indented, and bracketed by horizontal reference lines, as shown here. My comments are preceded with the words "Note from John Rasmussen:".

    Reference:

      View briefs, declarations, and exhibits presented to Federal District Judge Rothstein in this lawsuit.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments. (More readable!).



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE, GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS MATTER comes before the court on plaintiff King County's (the "County") motion for summary judgment, motion to dismiss, and motions to strike. Having reviewed the papers filed in support of and in opposition to these motions, the court rules as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

The dispute centers on ownership of a 100' - wide strip of land that runs along the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish in King County, Washington. Homesteaders Bill Hilchkanum and Mary Hilchkanum claimed the strip and the surrounding land in 1876. They received their final ownership certificate in 1884 and their fee patent in 1888. On May 9, 1887, by deed, the Hilchkanums conveyed an interest in the strip to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company (the "Railway"). The text of the deed states:

      In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit

      Lots one (1) two (2) and three (3) in section six (6) township 24 North of Range six (6) East.

      Such right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across our said lands by the Engineer of said railway Company which location is described as follows to wit (legal description)

      And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road.

      To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * The real "BACKGROUND" to this lawsuit:

      * The elements of this deed which are material to the issue of easement-or-fee have previously been determined to convey an easement. So, why is King County bringing this question of ownership back to court?

      * The Hilchkanum deed:

        * There is more to this deed than Judge Rothstein shows above.

        * Rothstein denied my right to establish the author of the Hilchkanum deed:

        * Rothstein ignores David Denny's participation in the deed:

        * Rothstein changes the words in the granting language of the deed:

        * Rothstein refused to identify the obvious purpose of the deed:

    The real "BACKGROUND" to this lawsuit:

           There is an event which dominates and controls this opinion but is never mentioned by Judge Rothstein. That event is the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the East Lake Sammamish BNSF right-of-way. I described the tax fraud scheme to Judge Rothstein in my declaration. Rothstein struck that portion of my declaration, citing no legal authority to do so. I provide a copy of my declaration here. The tax fraud scheme description begins at the bottom of page seven.

        View my declaration to Judge Rothstein. Description of the tax fraud scheme starts at bottom of page seven.

           In my declaration, my description of the federal tax fraud scheme is highlighted in yellow. The highlighted portions of my declaration are the portions which Judge Rothstein struck. The King County Prosecutor was an active participant in the federal tax fraud scheme. Judge Rothstein struck my declaration and evidence of this crime on a motion by the Prosecutor. It's a windfall when a criminal can get a judge to strike evidence of his crime, as the King County Prosecutor does here. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           My declaration describing the tax fraud scheme referenced a number of exhibits to the court. Judge Rothstein struck all of this evidence of the tax fraud scheme and failed in her duty to turn this uncontested evidence over to federal prosecutors. By those dishonest actions, Judge Rothstein became an active participant in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme. The proof of her participation is understood by her elimination of the description and evidence of the crime in my declaration and exhibits, her failure to turn the evidence over to federal prosecutors, her denial of my constitutional rights in her court, her illegal application of summary judgment, her intentional misapplication of the law, and her willingness to cherry-pick and manufacture facts. This is the never-mentioned background to this lawsuit.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    The elements of this deed which are material to the issue of easement-or-fee have previously been determined to convey an easement. So, why is King County bringing this question of ownership back to court?

           This isn't the first time the King County Prosecutor has been to court with the issue of whether a SLS&E deed conveyed an easement or fee simple title in a SLS&E right-of-way deed. The Prosecutor has been there with that issue before. All of the SLS&E deeds that King County has previously contested in court have been determined to grant easements. This becomes even more important because this Hilchkanum right-of-way deed has identical language to deeds that have previously been determined to convey easements. So, why would the King County Prosecutor be back in court claiming the same deed language now conveys fee simple title? The answer is that King County participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by accepting a phony tax donation of about $40 million in land from BNSF and therefore must claim that language which previously was determined to convey an easement now should be construed to convey fee simple title. That's an intentional criminal act by King County!
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           About fourteen SLS&E deeds had previously been determined to convey easements in King County lawsuits. The Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E was construed to convey an easement in King County v. Squire (1990). About twelve SLS&E deeds were determined to convey easements in Lawson v. State (1986). While "about twelve" SLS&E deeds were involved in that lawsuit, only two deeds were presented as exhibits to the Washington State Supreme Court. Those two deeds were the Bargquist right-of-way deed to the SLS&E and the Puget Mill Co. right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. Another SLS&E deed, the Burke right-of-way deed to the SLS&E was construed in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910). Since the King County Prosecutor, Norm Maleng, was directly involved in Squire and Lawson, I'll compare those deeds to the Hilchkanum deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           While every word, phrase, sentence, and the deed as a whole, are considered in determining the issue of easement-or-fee, usually this issue is determined by the words of the granting clause and habendum. These deeds are no exception. So, here are the granting clause and habendum from the Hilchkanum, Squire and Bargquist deeds.

      The Granting Clause:

           In King County v. Squire (1990), the court determined that the words of the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...".

        Squire Granting Clause:

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:"
           [Transcription and photocopy of the Squire right-of-way deed]

           In Lawson v. State (1986), this Bargquist granting clause was presented as an exhibit to the Washington State Supreme Court. The King County Prosecutor admitted this deed granted an easement, but claimed that the easement for a railroad right-of-way could be shifted to use as a recreational trail. The Washington State Supreme Court found in favor of the Bargquist's successor in interest, and against the King County Prosecutor.

        Bargquist Granting Clause:

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to me from the location construction and operation of the Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, I do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through my lands in said county, described as follows, to wit:"
           [Transcription and photocopy of the Bargquist right-of-way deed]

           Here is the Hilchkanum granting clause, which is published above in this opinion. The Hilchkanum, Squire, and Bargquist granting clauses are identical. The Hichkanum granting clause is found to grant fee simple title in this opinion in direct violation of the precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990) which found the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". This finding is also contrary to the King County Prosecutor's admission that this identical granting clause conveyed an easement in Lawson v. State (1986).

        Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit"
            [Transcription and photocopy of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed]

           Why did the King County prosecutor bringing the Hilchkanum granting clause back to court when the Squire court already found the identical Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement..."? Why did the King County prosecutor bringing the identical granting clause back to court when he agreed that it conveyed an easement in Lawson v. State (1986)? The granting clause hasn't changed. What has changed is that the King County Prosecutor accepted a phony tax donation of about $40 million from BNSF and needed to claim that this granting clause conveys fee simple title in order to cover-up his crime. The more disgusting aspect is that Federal District Judge Rothstein refuses in this "legal opinion" to acknowledge the common law precedent established in King County v. Squire (1990) which found the identical Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". As a judge, Rothstein is required to apply this common law precedent. She refused.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      The Habendum:

           The Hilchkanum, Bargquist, and Squire habendum clauses start out with identical words. The Hilchkanum habendum stops with the words used in the SLS&E "ELS form deed". The Bargquist habendum adds the requirement for the Railway to provide up to three crossings. The Squire habendum continues with words added by Governor Squire. His additional words reiterate the requirement for the right-of-way to revert on abandonment, and require the railway to be completed by January 1, 1888. Here are the Squire, Bargquist and Hilchkanum habendum clauses with the Railway "ELS form deed" words in blue font with the additions to the Bargquist and Squire deeds in Red Font:

        Squire Habendum:

        "To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888."
           [Transcription and photocopy of the Squire right-of-way deed]

        Bargquist Habendum:

        "To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever. Said Railway company agrees to furnish said grantor good and sufficient crossings on said above described premises, not to exceed three in number."
           [Transcription and photocopy of the Bargquist right-of-way deed]

        Hilchkanum Habendum:

        "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever."
            [Transcription and photocopy of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed]

           At the top of this section I asked: Why is King County bringing this question of ownership back to court? As I've shown with the elements of the Squire and Bargquist deed, the issue of easement-or-fee was decided by the court to be an easement in King County v. Squire (1990) when the court found the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". The Squire and Hilchkanum granting clauses are identical. In its opinion, the Squire court found that the words added by Governor to his habendum "...reiterat[ed] the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way...an easement..". In Lawson v. State (1986) the King County Prosecutor agreed the SLS&E deeds in that lawsuit granted easements. The Bargquist deed from that lawsuit is materially identical to the Hilchkanum deed with respect to easement-or-fee. The only difference in those two deeds is the requirement that the Railway provide up to three crossings for the Bargquists. This language has no effect on the question of easement-or-fee. King County obviously agrees with this fact because it agreed the Bargquist deed granted an easement.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           King County claimed ownership of the land under the Hilchkanum right-of-way because that false claim covered-up King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. King County accepted a donation of the land under the Hilchkanum right-of-way from BNSF as part of that tax fraud scheme. I "blew the whistle" on this crime with my letter to the King County leadership on February 7, 2000. Now, more than twelve years later, the crime I described in that letter has never been prosecuted. This "legal opinion" is a big factor in the cover-up of the crime.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           It is important to understand that my lawyer rubbed Judge Rothstein's nose in the truth. He briefed the legal precedent established in Squire which I discuss above. Rothstein refused to acknowledge that precedent, as did every one of the Hilchkanum judges. All of the Hilchkanum opinions were illegally decided using summary judgment. This took the right of due process away from the Rays and me. No legitimate jury would agree with the dishonest conclusions of fact made by the Hilchkanum judges. Read my lawyer's brief to Judge Rothstein in order to understand that the precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990) was clearly explained to her. Go to page fourteen of that brief to find this argument by my lawyer. Note that portions of that brief are highlighted in yellow. These are the portions which Judge Rothstein struck. Her dishonest striking of our briefing is explained later in this document.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion. Go to page 14 to read my lawyer's brief of the precedent established in Squire.

    The Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed:

           In her "Background" paragraph above, Judge Rothstein begins her dishonest process of covering up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by leaving out important portions of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Her dishonesty then continues in almost every paragraph of this opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      There is more to this deed than Judge Rothstein shows above.

           Rothstein omitted the signature portion of the deed. Bill Hilchkanum and his wife, Mary, signed this right-of-way deed with an "X". They were illiterate in the English language, and unable to even sign their own names. It was important for Rothstein to omit this fact, because further on in this opinion she irrationally decides that Hilchkanum was the author of his right-of-way deed. Since many other right-of-way deeds for this railway use identical wording, Rothstein therefore established Hilchkanum as author of the "ELS form deed" Ridiculous! Hilchkanum didn't write his right-of-way deed. The truth is that the Hilchkanum deed is an unaltered copy of the "ELS form deed" which was written by the lawyers for the Railway. Further, Rothstein decided that Hilchkanum was a legal expert who indicated his intention to grant fee simple title of his right-of-way land by his subtle choice of the words in the deed. Illiterate Native Americans didn't write the deeds for the railroads in Washington Territory in the late 1880s, but that's what Rothstein decided. She decided that without any fact, document, or precedent to support her conclusion. She just made up that "fact". In coming to her bizarre conclusion that Hilchkanum wrote his right-of-way deed, Rothstein ignored the history of the settlement of the American West, the laws that were established to protect Natives in the late 1800's and early 1900's, and specific documents we provided as exhibits that showed Hilchkanum to not be the author of his deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read an overview of Hilchkanum's participation and intentions with his right-of-way deed.

        View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

        Understand that the Hilchkanum is based on the SLS&E "ELS form deed" which was provided by the Railway.

      Rothstein denied my right to establish the author of the Hilchkanum deed:

           Of course, Rothstein had no legal right to conclude Hilchkanum authored his deed because the authorship of the deed, and Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed, is not a question of law. Authorship is a question of fact. The authorship of the deed, Hilchkanum's ability to participate, and his intentions with his deed, are material facts. Under the rules of summary judgment, if there is disagreement with the material facts, the judge is required by law to have a jury resolve the disagreement. Rothstein illegally allowed summary judgment in this decision, assigning herself to be the jury. In our brief and declaration to Rothstein, we stated that the Hilchkanums were at a great disadvantage in their dealings with the Railway, and that the Railway lawyers were responsible for the words in the deed. Rothstein struck our statements of the Hilchkanum's inability to participate in their deed, and struck our statements of the Railway lawyer's authorship of the deed. As stated in the preceding paragraph, she then found that the Hilchkanums were experts in legal matters and that they wrote the words of their right-of-way deed. When a judge makes up the facts in a case, as Rothstein does here, there is no legitimate decision, only the illegitimate power of a federal judge to commit crimes from the bench with no consequences. Welcome to the courts of the Ninth Circuit of the United States of America.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Rothstein ignores David Denny's participation in the deed:

           Further, Rothstein omits the portion of the deed that shows that D.T. Denny was a witness. This is significant because David Denny was Hilchkanum's "white man" advocate in those days. But, at the same time, David Denny was one of the thirteen owners of the Railway. This was a significant conflict of interest that Rothstein and the other Ninth Circuit judges hid with their decisions. Since Judge Rothstein concocted the fact that illiterate Bill Hilchkanum wrote his own deed to the Railway, she then should have assumed that Denny was the white man who actually drafted the deed for Hilchkanum. Since Denny was one of the Railway owners, she would have then been required to assume the deed was prepared by the Railway, not Hilchkanum. Under the rules of summary judgment, this fact must be construed in my favor, as the non-moving party. But, doing that would not support Rothstein's predetermined outcome of the lawsuit. So, this fact is ignored and hidden in Rothstein's decision. Rothstein lied about the authorship of the deed, then refused to consider the logical implications of her concocted fact. That's why we have juries to resolve the facts. Of course, Rothstein could not allow the facts to be decided by a jury because a legitimate jury would not possibly come to the dishonest conclusions of fact that Rothstein made in this opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View an 1884 document showing Hilchkanum's reliance on Denny.

        View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      Rothstein changes the words in the granting language of the deed:

           Later in this decision, Judge Rothstein states that the Hilchkanums conveyed a "'strip' of land" to the Railway. This would be a good chance to look at the Hilchkanum granting clause and see what was actually conveyed.

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit..." (Granting Clause of Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed)

           One can see that the Hilchkanums conveyed a "right of way". So, why would Rothstein state that a "strip of land" was conveyed? The answer to that question is held in over one hundred years of consistently applied common law. In Washington State/Territory the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad had always been held to be the grant of an easement. Federal Judge Rothstein didn't want the grant to be an easement, so she intentionally misstated the words of this 1887 deed when she analyzed its language.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           This substitution, and blending, of these contradictory terms is an essential element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Maleng's "legal theory" is a strategy devised by the King County Prosecutor's office after the Prosecutor and leadership of King County committed to participate in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. The "legal theory" was first made public by King County Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney in 1997. The elements of this theory were briefed to Judge Rothstein by King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson in this lawsuit. Judge Rothstein's adoption of this dishonest legal argument signals her cooperation with the King County Prosecutor in his attempt to hide his crime. Rothstein's adoption of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is a criminal act from the bench.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

        View fourteen citations explaining the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys only an easement.

        View forty-four citations explaining how the term "right-of-way" is construed in a railroad deed.

        Open the portion of this decision where Rothstein states a "'strip' of land" is conveyed.

        Read a discussion of how the words "right-of-way" are interpreted in a deed.

      Rothstein refused to identify the obvious purpose of the deed:

           Judge Rothstein not only determined that a "'strip' of land" was conveyed, but she stated that there was no railroad right-of-way purpose in the deed. This is what is called the "big lie", a technique used by confident liars. Judge Rothstein denies the obvious when she writes that she can find no purpose in the Hilchkanum deed to grant a right-of-way to a railroad. Rothstein prints the words of the Hilchkanum deed, which plainly grant a right-of-way to a railroad, then denies that there was a purpose in the deed to grant a right-of-way to a railroad. Ridiculous! Rothstein goes for the big lie. It's a privilege of federal judges to lie without suffering any consequences.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           A railroad right-of-way purpose can be found throughout the deed. The deed is captioned "Right of Way Deed". The words in the granting clause state that the Hilchkanums did "donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through" their land for the "advantages to accrue" "from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway". This language shows that the primary purpose of the grant is to convey a right-of-way to the Railway. There is a secondary grant that allows the railway to go beyond the limits of the right-of-way to cut trees which could endanger the railway's operation within its right-of-way. This secondary grant is for the railroad right-of-way purposes, too. The portion of the deed which describes the "right of way" contains this statement: "Such right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across our said lands by the Engineer of said railway Company..." . This statement is another indication that the grantor intended the deed to be conveyed for right-of-way purposes. One needs to read the deed as a whole, paying particular attention to the granting clause and habendum, in order to understand its purpose. The purpose to grant a "right of way" is directly stated in the granting clause and confirmed throughout the deed. So, why would Rothstein state that she could find no railroad right-of-way purpose in the Hilchkanum deed? Again, the answer to that question is held in over one hundred years of consistently applied common law. In Washington State/Territory if a deed is granted for railroad right-of-way purposes, it had always been held to be the grant of an easement. Federal Judge Rothstein didn't want the grant to be an easement, so she simply stated that there was no railroad right-of-way purpose in the Hilchkanum grant. This blatant lie by Rothstein is understood by simply reading the deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to determine whether a railroad right-of-way purpose is evident.

        View the portion of this opinion where Rothstein claims there is no railroad right-of-way purpose in the Hilchkanum deed.

        Read a discussion of how the words "right-of-way" are interpreted in a deed.

           The fact that Judge Rothstein could find no railroad right-of-way purpose becomes even more ridiculous when one reads the next paragraph in her opinion, directly below. There she cites a subsequent Hilchkanum deed:

        "Bill Hilchkanum then conveyed the property to a third party 'less three (3) acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle International Railway for right of way purposes.'" (Find this Rothstein statement, directly below.)

           In that subsequent real estate deed, Hilchkanum referred to the right-of-way deed which is being construed in this decision, and states that he understood his right-of-way deed was granted for "right of way purposes". Rothstein didn't find evidence that Hilchkanum intended his grant to be for right-of-way purposes because she didn't want to find that evidence. In the paragraph, below, Rothstein publishes a citation which directly contradicts her own conclusion that there was no railroad right-of-way purpose intended by Hilchkanum. This dishonesty by Judge Rothstein covers up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Conclusion:

           In her statement describing the background for this lawsuit, Judge Rothstein fails to mention the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, which is the basis for all the dishonesty in this opinion. Further, she leaves out important parts of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E because those facts contradict her dishonest, predetermined, conclusions. Of course, key to her dishonest presentation of facts is Rothstein's decision to deny my constitutional right to resolve the disputed material facts before a jury.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

Mary Hilchkanum later conveyed her portion of the homestead property to her husband by quitclaim deed. The conveyance is "less (3) three acres right of way to Rail Road." Bill Hilchkanum then conveyed the property to a third party "less three (3) acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle International Railway for right of way purposes." Later conveyances of the property included language "excepting" the Railway right of way from the legal descriptions. John Rasmussen and Nancy Rasmussen (the "Rasmussens") currently own the Hilchkanum property. The right of way strip bisects their land.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    This is a very dishonest and misleading statement by Rothstein. There are three elements to her dishonesty:

      * The subsequent deeds most relevant to this lawsuit did not except the right-of-way or the land under the right-of-way.

      * Rothstein intentionally misrepresents the law used to construe the exception of a right-of-way in a subsequent real estate deed.

      * Rothstein misrepresents King County deputy prosecutor Scott Johnson's Exhibit 5 in her above statement. She gets the name and acreage wrong in her statement.

    The subsequent deeds most relevant to this lawsuit did not except the right-of-way or the land under the right-of-way.

           Here, Judge Rothstein dishonestly hides the fact that the property, which is the subject of this lawsuit, did not have this exception language when it was transferred to other parties in the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds. What complete dishonesty by this judge to state just the opposite, in the paragraph above!
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the portion of this opinion that contains Rothstein's dishonest analysis of exception language.

           The Hilchkanum homestead contained about eighty-five acres and included about three-fourths of a mile of Lake Sammamish waterfront. My property, a small portion of the original homestead, contained about one acre and 120 feet of Lake Sammamish waterfront. When the Hilchkanums later sold off their eighty-five acres of homestead land, some of those subsequent deeds excepted the right of way, some did not. There were three subsequent Hilchkanum deeds which conveyed the land under the SLS&E right-of-way on my property to outside parties. These deeds conveyed the land that is the subject of this lawsuit. The deeds were: Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904, Hilchkanum warranty deed to Edward Sanders, September 3, 1904, and Hilchkanum warranty deed to John Herder, June 30, 1905. Read these deeds to understand that none of them except the right-of-way. So, why didn't Rothstein use these third party deeds that are associated with the land in the lawsuit? These are the deeds that are most relevant to this lawsuit and were presented to her as exhibits.

           Rothstein didn't use these deeds because they fail to support her misapplication of the use of exception language in a deed. Instead, Rothstein "cherry-picked" the extrinsic evidence to find subsequent Hilchkanum deeds which excepted the right-of-way. To do this, she used subsequent Hilchkanum deeds that were not in the chain of title of the land contested in this lawsuit. The result is that Rothstein manufactured false intentions for the Hilchkanums, in their railroad right-of-way deed, by misapplied the legal meaning of exception language that was found in only some of the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds. Of course, she had no right to do that.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Determining the intentions of the parties is the primary consideration in construing a deed. The intention of the Hilchkanums in their deeds is a material fact, not a legal conclusion. Summary judgment is allowed only when there is agreement with the material facts. We adamantly disagreed with King County's and the court's conclusion about Hilchkanum's intentions with these subsequent deeds, and Hilchkanum's ability to participate in the construction of their deeds. In intentional violation of the rules of summary judgment, Rothstein declared there was no disagreement with these material facts, and then allowed herself to decide this case based on material facts that she dishonestly manufactured. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           What did these words in a deed mean to the parties in those early days? Why is Hilchkanum inconsistent with this exception language in his subsequent deeds, including it in some, and not in others? Did Hilchkanum have adequate legal experience, or advice, to protect his interests in the execution of these deeds, considering the fact that he was an illiterate American Indian? The answer to these questions strongly color the material fact that is Hilchkanum's intentions with these deeds. Judge Rothstein, and the other Ninth Circuit judges, denied my constitutional right to have these questions answered by a jury. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein intentionally misrepresents the law used to construe the exception of a right-of-way in a subsequent real estate deed.

           Later in this opinion, Rothstein decides that the exception of a right-of way in a deed withholds the land under the right-of-way. Her conclusion misrepresents common law. The exception of a right-of-way in a deed withholds whatever property right is represented by that right-of-way. Here is a citation that supports the understanding of this common law precedent: (with my emphasis)

        "In 6 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property SS 3090, at 773 (repl. ed. 1962), it is stated:

          An exception is the withholding from the operation of the deed of something existent which otherwise the deed would pass to the grantee.

        Accord, Duns v. Ephrata, 14 Wn.2d 426, 430, 128 P.2d 510, 134 P.2d 722 (1942). The conveyance of a fee simple interest with a clause excepting an easement previously deeded to a third party, therefore, conveys to the grantee all the grantor's rights and interests in the land, yet compels the grantee to refrain from acting in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the third party in the land as described in the exception."
        [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

           So, when a right-of-way is excepted in a real estate deed, the legal question becomes: What interest was granted to the railroad in the original right-of-way deed? If the railroad right-of-way deed granted an easement, the subsequent real estate deed excepts only an easement. Excepting an easement in a deed does not except the land under the easement, it merely makes the grantee aware of the easement. There is no requirement that an easement be noted as an exception in a real estate deed, because the easement goes with the title of the land whether it is specifically noted in the deed, or not. Therefore, the fact that Hilchkanum excepted the right-of-way in only some of his subsequent real estate deeds supports the legal analysis that Hilchkanum considered his railroad right-of-way deed to grant only an easement. If Hilchkanum had granted fee simple title to the SLS&E Railway in his right-of-way deed, he would have been required to except the land under the right-of-way in every subsequent real estate deed. Otherwise, Hilchkanum would be conveying the land under the right-of-way a second time, land that he had previously conveyed to the Railway. That would be fraud. Judge Rothstein refused to consider this logical consequence in her dishonest analysis. Instead, she implied that Hilchkanum always excepted his right-of-way in subsequent deeds. This is a lie by Judge Rothstein. Further, Rothstein states that the exception of the right-of-way in the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds explains that Hilchkanum intended to grant of fee simple title of his right-of-way land to the SLS&E Railway. That conclusion is not supported by common law as explained in the citation above.
           My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open this opinion at the position which Rothstein makes her dishonest analysis of Hilchkanum's exception language in his subsequent real estate deeds.

    Rothstein misrepresents King County deputy prosecutor Scott Johnson's Exhibit 5 in her above statement. She gets the name and acreage wrong in her statement.

           In her statement above, Judge Rothstein refers to King County's Exhibit 5 presented by Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson. Exhibit 5 consists of two Hilchkanum subsequent deeds. First, I'll hyperlink these two deeds for the purpose of this discussion.

        King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson Exhibit 5-2 (Quit Claim deed Annie Hilchkanum to Bill Hilchkanum, August 25, 1899)

        King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson Exhibit 5-1 (Warranty Deed Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson, February 27, 1904)

           In this opinion, Judge Rothstein holds my lawyer and me accountable for any minor error in our presentation. This can be seen in her striking a great portion of our briefs and exhibits for technical (petty) reasons. Yet, in her statement above, Rothstein gets the name of Bill Hilchkanum's wife wrong and misstates the acreage that is plainly displayed in the deed she cites. Rothstein claims that "Mary Hilchkanum later conveyed her portion of the homestead..." If one reads the August 25, 1899 deed from Annie to Bill Hilchkanum, above, one will realize that "Mary Hilchkanum" was not the person who executed that quit claim deed. Further, Rothstein misstates the acreage involved in that deed. While I believe that these mistakes are minor, I point them out because Judge Rothstein harshly enforces the rules in the admissibility of our briefs and exhibits. This will be seen below. If Rothstein insists that every "t" be crossed and every "i" be dotted in our briefs, then she should demand the same exactness from herself and King County. She doesn't. The basic concept in a lawsuit is to establish the facts (the truth) and then apply the law. Rothstein manipulates the facts and the law in this opinion based, in part, on her nitpicking our arguments and exhibits. I simply point out here that she applies her harsh standards only to us. When seen in the context of her dishonesty in almost every paragraph of this opinion, one can understand that her harsh standards are not to fairly apply the law, but rather to manipulate and predetermine the outcome of this decision. If perfection in the courtroom is Rothstein's goal, she should start with herself. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Understand the meaning of the exception of a right-of-way in a deed.

      Understand the rules of summary judgment.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The Railway, and its successor Burlington Northern, built a track on the strip of land and used the track regularly for rail service until approximately 1996. In 1997, Burlington Northern sold its railway corridor, including the Hilchkanum strip, to The Land Conservancy of Seattle and King County ("TLC"). TLC petitioned the United States Surface Transportation Board ("STB") to abandon use of the corridor for rail service under the National Trail System Act, 16 U.S.C. paragraph 1247(d) ("Rails-to-Trails Act"). The STB approved interim trail use of the corridor by King County and issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use. The County then purchased the corridor from TLC and obtained title to the right of way carved from the Hilchkanum property.

The Rasmussens have vigorously opposed the County's efforts to railbank the strip and have asserted a fee simple interest in the right of way. As a result, the County brought this action to quiet title and to obtain a declaration of its rights to use the strip. The County received a preliminary injunction in state court against the Rasmussens to prevent interference with County work on the site. The Rasmussens then removed the action to federal court. The Rasmussens have counterclaimed with allegations that the County violated their First Amendment, Second Amendment, Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights, along with violations of 16 U.S.C. paragraph 1247(d), 42 U.S.C. paragraph 1983, 28 U.S.C. paragraph 1358, and Article 1, Section 16 of the Washington state Constitution. The County brought these motions to dispose of the entire case.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike Briefing and Evidence

1. Overlength Briefs.

Civil Rule 7(c) of the Western District of Washington limits parties to 24 page memoranda unless they obtain prior permission from the court. The Rasmussens submitted a 34-page response to the County's motion for summary judgment and a 32-page response to the County's motion to dismiss. Moreover, a declaration from John Rasmussen accompanies the responses and includes legal argument. The Rasmussens did not request advance permission from the court to file overlength briefs.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    This is a lie by Judge Rothstein:

           Shortly before our brief was due to the court, my lawyer called Judge Rothstein's clerk, Christian Halliburton, to request overlength briefs. After a short conversation, the two agreed that it would be acceptable to request overlength briefs in the first paragraph of each submitted brief. I was in my lawyer's office at the time of the conversation, but not on the phone. I heard only my lawyer's half of the conversation. I recall my lawyer hanging up and immediately explaining the agreed upon process to me.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Judge Rothstein's clerk should not have agreed to this procedure, on her behalf, if this were not a method acceptable to the judge. If Christian Halliburton acted on Rothstein's behalf, without her consent, Rothstein should not have punished us for her clerk's mistake. Considering the complete dishonesty throughout this opinion, it seems obvious that Rothstein reneged on her clerk's commitment in order to make my lawyer appear a fool, and to throw out as much of our briefs and exhibits as possible, leaving us no remedy.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read the letter from my lawyer to Judge Rothstein describing this situation and apologizing for his part in the "misunderstanding".

    There is no "Civil Rule 7(c) of the Western District of Washington".

           There is no page limit stated in "Civil Rule 7(c) of the Western District of Washington". That limit is found in Civil Rule 7(e). So, is it petty for me to point this out? Judge Rothstein picked apart our argument and exhibits using the strictest standard. She doesn't apply the same standard for herself. It is obvious to me that Rothstein gets petty with us in order to destroy the presentation of our side of the issues. This striking of briefing and exhibits must be viewed in the context of Rothstein's illegal use of summary judgment and misapplication of the law in almost every paragraph of this opinion. Read Civil Rule 7(c) in the local rules linked below. You will find that 7(c) is "Reserved" and doesn't exist.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal District Court of Western Washington.

        Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The Rasmussen's submissions violate the plain language of Civil Rule 7 (c). The court will strike all briefing of both responses beyond page 24, and the arguments contained in those excess pages will not be considered. In addition, the court will strike all portions of the John Rasmussen declaration and attached exhibits that include legal argument. Specifically, the following portions of John Rasmussen's declaration will not be considered:

(a) Exhibits 1, 9, and 10 to the Rasmussen declaration, which are legal briefs on various issues;
(b) Page 2, line 17 - page 4, line 7 of the declaration, which contain legal argument;
(c) Page 7, line 26 - page 10, line 3 of the declaration, which contain legal argument, and Exhibits 4-7 introduced on those pages;
(d) Page 12, lines 11-15 of the declaration, which contain legal argument; and
(e) Page 18, line 4 - page 20, line 19 of the declaration, which contain legal argument, and Exhibits 11-14 introduced on those pages.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

      Read my declaration to Judge Rothstein, with the portions she struck highlighted in yellow.

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * This striking of briefing and exhibits must be seen as an element of Rothstein's criminal behavior in this opinion.

      * The striking of our argument and exhibits is one of several steps Rothstein took to deny my right to present argument and facts in "her" court.

      * View the Exhibits and Declaration Struck by Judge Rothstein:

    This striking of briefing and exhibits must be seen as an element of Rothstein's criminal behavior in this opinion.

          This striking of declaration and exhibits must be seen in the context of Rothstein's decision to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and to protect the other active participants in the crime from prosecution. Rothstein cites no rule or precedent for striking these significant portions of my declaration and my exhibits. I've searched the FRCP and local rules (including Civil Rule 7) and can find no rule that excludes my right to express my understanding of the law with respect the violation of my rights and theft of my land by King County. Here are the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal District Court of Western Washington. I invite the reader to review the rules, hyperlinked here.

        Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal District Court of Western Washington.

        Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)

          It is a violation of my constitutional right of due process to deny my right to make "legal argument". While declarations are for the purpose of a party supplying facts relevant to a lawsuit, I can find no prohibition for legal argument in a declaration. My right to express "legal argument" is even more important in this lawsuit because King County brought this lawsuit against me after I "blew the whistle" on the ELS federal tax fraud scheme in February 2000. Later, after months of stonewalling by King County, I summarized King County's criminal actions and expressed my willingness to defend by rights and property with a gun. King County filed this lawsuit in Superior Court and provided purjurious declarations and lies, such as the Shelley Marelli declaration in August 2000. These criminal actions by King County against me establish my right to explain my understanding of the law and provide the evidence of the tax fraud which I discovered. With that knowledge, Rothstein strikes my discussion and evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and fails in her duty to turn that incriminating evidence over to federal prosecutors. Rothstein strikes my discussion of the importance of King County v. Squire (1990) and then dishonestly misrepresents that opinion in this "legal decision". My understanding of property law was material to my expressing my willingness to defend that right with a gun. Rothstein strikes my description of the County's pattern to deny my civil rights. Then, later in this opinion Rothstein dismisses my claim of a civil rights violation because she refused to acknowledge and consider the portion of my declaration which she struck here.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Summary judgment requires agreement with the material facts. It was critical for Rothstein to eliminate material facts that we presented so that she could substitute her own unsubstantiated facts. After striking our argument and exhibits, Rothstein then claims we provide no argument to counter her dishonest contriving of facts. Rothstein's illegal application of summary judgment is discussed in greater detail later in this annotated opinion. In this section, Rothstein strikes my description and evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. I provide links to these portions of this annotated opinion here: My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open this opinion at the position which Rothstein "justifies" summary judgment, and I explain her dishonesty.

        Open this note at the position which identifies the evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    The striking of our argument and exhibits is one of several steps Rothstein took to deny my right to present argument and facts in "her" court.

      Here are steps she took to limit our argument.

        First, Rothstein reneged on her clerks agreement for extend briefs and struck all briefing beyond the 24 page limit, as I explained in the note above. This striking of our briefing, after her clerk agreed to an informal procedure on her behalf, is a denial of my right of due process.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Second, Rothstein refused our many requests for oral arguments. Oral arguments may be the option of the judge, but it is not the judge's prerogative to deny the constitutional right of due process by denying oral argument. When her denial of oral arguments is seen in the context of her dishonesty throughout this opinion, the denial of oral arguments must be seen as a denial of constitutional rights. Directly below is the docketing statement provided by Rothstein's clerk, Christian Halliburton. The docketing statement is used for appeal, and lists the procedural events for the decision being appealed. This document shows at least fourteen times that we requested oral arguments with Judge Rothstein. It is important to understand that Rothstein denied request for oral arguments many times.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          View the docketing statement from the Western District Court for appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

        Third, in her ruling, above, Rothstein strikes twelve of my fourteen exhibits, and about seven pages of my twenty page declaration. Approximately three hundred pages of my exhibits were reduced to eight pages by her various rulings to strike. The validity of the information in any of those struck pages was never questioned. That information is correct. I question Rothstein's right to strike this material in my discussion below. This striking of exhibits and briefs fits into her pattern of violating my constitutional rights by limiting my argument.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Forth, Rothstein illegally decided this lawsuit by using summary judgment. Summary judgment gives complete control of the decision to the judge. It appears that abuse of summary judgment is rampant in our courts. By illegally allowing summary judgment, Rothstein denied my constitutional right to correct the disputed material facts and challenge the flawed legal argument she used to decide this case. This issue is briefly discussed in the paragraph above.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Exhibits and Declaration Struck by Judge Rothstein:

    Rothstein struck my studies on the law.

           Regarding "(a) Exhibits 1, 9, and 10" above: I had never been involved in a lawsuit before this one. To understand my rights, I dug into the law that applies to this case. My lawyer told me to prepare a declaration but didn't tell me it was limited to 24 pages. (After rereading local rule 7, I'm not sure there is any page limit on declarations and other materials supporting a lawyer's brief.) Because my declaration was about one hundred pages, I split out my detailed discussion on the issues and provided them to the court as exhibits 1, 9, and 10. My declaration was reduced to twenty pages by splitting out that information.

           As stated above, Judge Rothstein cited no authority to strike my "legal argument". It seems to me that denying a party's right to make an argument to the court would be a violation of the right of due process, found in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. But, even if Rothstein legally struck my exhibits which make legal argument, she was still responsible for the law that she struck in those exhibits. My Exhibit 1 correctly explains the application of Washington State common law in construing railroad right-of way deeds. This study contradicts Rothstein's dishonest manipulation of this law in this opinion. Did she strike my study of this topic to comply with legal technicalities, or did she do it to hide her participation in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme? Since she refused oral arguments and illegally allowed herself summary judgment, I can only assume she did this to hide her crime. Judge Rothstein's illegal grant of summary judgment cut off any chance for me to reestablish the facts she struck, and denied my right to place the participants in the fraud under oath to question them about their participation in the crime.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View struck Exhibit 1, Rasmussen Study of Easement-Fee Issues.

        View struck Exhibit 9, Rasmussen Study of Spur Issue.

        View struck Exhibit 10, Rasmussen Study of Takings Issues.

        Read my declaration to Judge Rothstein, with the portions she struck highlighted in yellow.

    Rothstein struck my discussion of King County v. Squire (1990), and then misrepresented that opinion in her discussion.

           Regarding "(b)Page 2, line 17 - page 4, line 7" above: How convenient for Judge Rothstein find a reason to strike my statement of how a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire deeds destroys King County's claim of ownership. The 1887 Squire deed to the SLS&E Railway was construed in King County v. Squire (1990) and found to be an easement. The granting clauses in the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds are identical. The Squire court found that the words of the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". Rothstein refused to acknowledge this legal precedent and irrationally found the identical granting clause of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed granted fee simple title of the underlying land. Ninth Circuit Appeals Judge Betty B. Fletcher was so afraid of comparing of these two deeds that she refers to the Squire decision as "a Washington Court of Appeals case", refusing to state the decision by its name. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Go to Pages 2 thru 4 of my declaration to view the portions Rothstein struck here. (Portions struck by Rothstein are highlighted in yellow)

        View a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire deeds in order to understand Judge Rothstein's dishonesty with respect to this issue.

    Rothstein struck my description and evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

           Regarding " (c) Page 7, line 26 - page 10, line 3 and "Exhibits 4-7" above: This struck portion of my declaration and exhibits describes the federal tax fraud scheme used to establish the East Lake Sammamish Trail. Rothstein strikes my description of the crime, strikes all the evidence, and then fails in her duty to turn this uncontested information over to federal prosecutors. When these actions are combined with her illegal use of summary judgment, her dishonest analysis, and her misapplication of the law, this striking of evidence appears to be a tactic by Judge Rothstein to cover-up of the federal tax fraud scheme.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Did Judge Rothstein have the right to strike this declaration and exhibits?

           I "blew the whistle" on the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme in a February 7, 2000 letter to the King County leadership. By late summer of that year, it was obvious to me that every member of the county leadership had either participated in the tax fraud scheme or didn't care if the county acted illegally. I made the decision to stand up to the corruption in the county and declared that intention in an August 9, 2000 letter to David Irons, my King County Councilman. My description of the crime the county was committing, the evidence that I had discovered, and my understanding of the law are material facts, of which I had personal knowledge, that should have been allowed in my declaration. Judge Rothstein mischaracterized this information as "legal argument". I don't believe that is correct. I believe that Rothstein struck this information in order to cover up the tax fraud scheme, not to strike what she characterized as "legal argument".
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Was Judge Rothstein correct in striking my "legal argument"?

           I've read through the FRCP and the local rules of civil procedure for the Federal District Court of Western Washington. It is apparent to me that declarations or affidavits are for the purpose of providing facts, of which a party has personal knowledge, to use in support of a brief. But as I read the rules, I cannot find a prohibition against legal argument in a declaration. Judge Rothstein cites no rule to justify her striking my "legal argument". I believe there is no rule that allows a judge to go through a declaration and clean out anything she/he feels is "legal argument". So, I question Rothstein's motives, and right, to strike my description of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and the evidence which led to my commitment to defend my property with a gun against the corruption of the county. The civil rules are available in the links directly below.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Go to Pages 7-10 of my declaration to view my description of federal tax fraud which Rothstein struck here. (Portions struck by Rothstein are highlighted in yellow)

        View my Exhibit 4, struck by Judge Rothstein. (BNSF instructed the disgraced accounting firm Arthur Andersen to appraise the land under the right-of-way as if BNSF owned it all. See page 8.) Note: 3.8 mb file size.

        View my Exhibit 5, struck by Judge Rothstein. (Draft sale agreement between BNSF and TLC showing TLC was aware of the dishonest appraisal. This draft agreement appears to have been altered in order to hide TLC's knowledge of the fraud.)

        View my Exhibit 6, struck by Judge Rothstein. (Final sale agreement between BNSF and TLC, with evidence that TLC hid its participation in the tax fraud scheme.)

        View my Exhibit 7, struck by Judge Rothstein. (Final sale agreement between TLC and King County, showing that King County agreed to accept the phony donation of land which the County knew BNSF did not own. See page 4.)

        Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the ELS right-of-way.

        View the evidence of the tax fraud scheme with a discussion of its importance.

        Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal District Court of Western Washington.

        Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)

    Rothstein struck my description of King County's violation of my civil rights.

           Regarding "(d) Page 12, lines 11-15" above: Here, Rothstein strikes my description of the County's violation of my civil rights. Then, later in this opinion, Rothstein dismisses our civil rights claim because we did not describe a violation or make a claim. How profoundly dishonest. For many months, I express my frustration that King County would continue to send its employees across my property for trail purposes when the county had purchased an easement for railroad purpose only. I had explained, many times, that the county had a right to enter my property for railroad purposes, but not for recreational trail purposes until they compensated me for the taking of a trail easement. The County responded by ignoring my right to an explanation and my right to not have illegal trespassers on my property. Instead, the County directed its employees to continually trespass. Apparently, Judge Rothstein struck this because she believes an American citizen has no right to understand and express his understanding of his constitutional and civil rights. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Go to Page 12 of my declaration to view the portions Rothstein struck here. (Portions struck by Rothstein are highlighted in yellow)

    Rothstein struck my suggestion that the federal government had no right to railbank the ELS right-of-way.

           Regarding "(e) Page 18, line 4 - page 20, line 19" and "Exhibits 11-14" above: Here, Judge Rothstein strikes my claim that the abandoned East Lake Sammamish right-of-way was a spur line under the authority of the State of Washington law, and not under federal authority. Also, Rothstein strikes my claim that the taking of a trail easement was by King County, rather than by the federal Rails-to-Trails Act. Rather than address these issues, Rothstein simply strikes my argument. By her actions, Rothstein declares that I have no right to express my understanding of my rights in "her federal court". I believe she did this to hide the federal tax fraud scheme which casts a dark shadow over the actions of the county and this judge in this lawsuit.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Go to Pages 18-20 of my declaration to view the portions Rothstein struck here. (Portions struck by Rothstein are highlighted in yellow)

        View struck Exhibit 11, TLC petition for abandonment exemption.

        View struck Exhibit 12, STB decision in favor of TLC abandonment exemption.

        View struck Exhibit 13, the 1999 GAO report on Rails-to-Trails, made to U.S. Senator Sam Brownback.

        View struck Exhibit 14, the 1998 STB Offer of Financial Assistance by RIRPA.

    Reference:

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

2. Inadmissible Evidence

"It is well settled that only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Beyene v. Colman Sec. Serv., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988). Evidence that lacks foundation is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (witness must posses personal knowledge). In paragraph 1 of the response to the motion for summary judgment, the Rasmussens speculate on the intent of Bill Hilchkanum based on his Native American ethnicity. The Rasmussens provide no evidence to support the allegations. Therefore, all but the last two sentences of the paragraph will be stricken.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

          Here, Judge Rothstein strikes our briefing of critical material facts. Later in this opinion, she replaces these struck statements of fact with her ridiculous, unsupported facts. She then uses her concocted "material facts" to justify her predetermined outcome to this lawsuit. Further, this corrupt judge does this in the most disgusting and cowardly way. She implies that our statement of fact is based on racial bias rather than documents submitted to the court. Judges shouldn't be taking "cheap shots" at innocent parties with their opinions. Of the hundreds of pages of briefing and exhibits that Rothstein struck, the sentences she struck in the above paragraph are the most important in hiding the dishonesty of her conclusions. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * What "Inadmissible Evidence" did Rothstein strike?

      * Rothstein strikes our correct statement of Hilchkanum's ethnic background and then ignores the well documented disadvantages American Indians had at that time in our history.

      * Rothstein strikes our correct statement of Hilchkanum's illiteracy and later "finds" that Hilchkanum actually wrote his deed.

      * Rothstein strikes our correct statement that the Railway lawyers wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

      * Rothstein takes a "cheap shot" at us by playing the "race card". In truth, it is Judge Rothstein who commits the act of racial bias.

      * Specific Hilchkanum documents provided to Judge Rothstein, the history of the times, and laws passed to protect Native Americans, combine to explain Hilchkanum's intentions and participation in his right-of-way deed. Judge Rothstein managed to ignore all of these factors.

    What "Inadmissible Evidence" did Rothstein strike?

          In order to understand Judge Rothstein's reason for striking this significant portion of my lawyer's brief, we need to first look at the sentences she struck. Here are those sentences.

            "Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian. At the very best he was functionally illiterate, and "made his mark" when he signed legal documents. Thus, all drafting of any ambiguous documents was completed by the railroad’s representative. In this case Bill Hilchkanum and his wife signed a document that did not comport with the necessary elements for conveyance of a fee simple interest, because of the qualifying and limiting language of the document."

        [Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion and view this statement on page 2. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.]

          This statement by my lawyer contains three significant material facts. First, his statement identifies Hilchkanum as an "Indian", a Native American. Second, his statement identifies the fact that Hilchkanum was illiterate. Third, his statement identifies the Railway lawyers as author of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. These three material facts were struck by Rothstein. It was critical for Rothstein to strike our statement of these material facts because they completely contradict the undocumented, ridiculous material facts on which she bases this opinion. When there is disagreement with the material facts the disputed facts are required to be resolved by a jury. No legitimate jury would agree to the ridiculous facts that Rothstein substituted for the material facts my lawyer described here. So, Rothstein manufactured a reason to strike this portion of my lawyers brief, then declared we agreed with her substituted material facts, and last, granted herself complete control of his decision through the illegal application of summary judgment. Next, I'll discuss the legitimacy of these three material facts.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein strikes our statement of Hilchkanum's ethnic background and then ignores the well documented disadvantages American Indians had at that time in our history.

          My lawyer's first sentence identified Bill Hilchkanum as an "Indian". While my lawyer did not link that statement to any of the exhibits we provided which established that fact, it did give notice to Judge Rothstein that Hilchkanum was a Native American. "Indian" is the term that was consistently used to describe Hilchkanum in the historical documents we provided as exhibits. Here is just one of many exhibits that we provided to Rothstein which justify my lawyer's statement.

        Read Hilchkanum's 1876 homestead application affidavit in which he states "I am an indian formerly of the Duwamish Tribe".

          We identified Hilchkanum as an "Indian" in my lawyer's brief. Does the fact that Rothstein struck our correct statement of fact somehow make Hilchkanum a white settler? This notification of Hilchkanum's ethnic background gives notice to Rothstein that she must look at that issue whether she strikes my lawyer's sentence or not. She has no legal right to strike this fact, and then assume Hilchkanum was a white settler or a member of some other ethnic group, with no document of fact to justify her assumption. But, that is what she did in this opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Rothstein struck our statement of Hilchkanum's ethnicity, implying that our statement exhibits a racial bias. She then ignored the historical fact that Native Americans were at great disadvantage in Washington Territory in the late 1880's. Natives had been forced onto reservations by Governor Stevens in the middle of that century. When they realized that their lives were forever changed by the white man's settlement, they rebelled. The Indian wars which followed in the 1850's and early 1860's ended with ugly and humiliating defeat for the Natives. This is basic American history which is taught to children in school. It is not our responsibility to brief basic American history to judges who limit our legal argument to a precious twenty-four pages.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Rothstein strikes our correct statement of Hilchkanum's ethnicity by claiming that "the Rasmussens speculate on the intent of Bill Hilchkanum based on his Native American ethnicity." It is a well understood historical fact that Native Americans were at great disadvantage in legal proceedings in the 1880's in Washington Territory. Our statement is not speculation. It is an historical fact. There were laws which recognized and protected Native American Indians from being taken advantage of by white settlers. Here is just one example to support this statement. (with my emphasis)

        R.C.W. 64.20.020, Enacted Laws 1890, p. 500, §2.

          "Manner of conveyance. All deeds, conveyances, encumbrances or transfers of any nature and kind executed by any Indian, or in any manner disposing of any land, or interest therein, shall be by deed executed in the same manner as prescribed for the execution of deeds conveying real estate, or any interest therein, except that the same shall in all cases be acknowledged before a judge of a court of record. In taking said acknowledgment, the said judge shall explain to the grantor the contents of said deed or instrument, and the effect of the signing or execution thereof, and so certify the same in the acknowledgment, and before the same shall be admitted to record shall duly examine and approve the said deed or other instrument."

          Rothstein struck our statement of Hilchkanum's ethnicity and ignored his ethnic background later in this opinion when she attributed to Hilchkanum the legal expertise of a lawyer. She made Hilchkanum a lawyer without any supporting documentation that would explain why a Native American Indian would have this unusual ability in 1887. Our statement was the truth and was supported by documents we submitted to the court. The fact that Hilchkanum was an Indian is a material fact. If Rothstein had doubt of this fact she was required to allow us to resolve and prove the fact to a jury. At the very least, Rothstein should have resolved this question with oral arguments. It is obvious from the complete dishonesty of this opinion, in almost every paragraph, that Rothstein struck our statement of Hilchkanum's ethnicity in order to hide the historical disadvantage American Indians suffered in that period. She then manufactured legal abilities for Hilchkanum which have no justification whatsoever.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein strikes our statement of Hilchkanum's illiteracy and later "finds" that Hilchkanum actually wrote his deed.

          Rothstein struck our statement of Hilchkanum's illiteracy, based on her opinion that there was no foundation for my lawyer's statement. The dishonesty of her striking this statement is seen by reading the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Portions of this deed are published by Rothstein above. This deed is the principal subject of this lawsuit. One needs to simply read the deed to see that Hilchkanum signed with an "X". This establishes a foundation to question his literacy. Read the following full transcription of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, with a photocopy of the original, to verify Hilchkanum and his wife signed with an "X".
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E in order to confirm that it was signed with an "X".

          By refusing to admit that the Hilchkanums signed the deed with an "X", is Rothstein claiming that she didn't read the deed which she construed in this opinion? Or, is she claiming that people who sign deeds with an "X" are assumed iterate by law? It appears that Rothstein was simply looking for a reason to strike our correct statement of Hilchkanum's illiteracy, because later in this opinion she establishes Hilchkanum as author of all the words in his right-of-way deed. She could not make Hilchkanum the author and at the same time admit that he could not read or write the English language, so she dishonestly struck my lawyer's statement. Conflict resolved!
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Hilchkanum's illiteracy is a material fact. We correctly state that he was illiterate. It is obscene for Rothstein to decide the opposite and deny our constitutional right to resolve this disagreement before a jury. At the very least she could have allowed oral argument to resolve this fact. The truth is that she didn't want to establish the truth. She wanted to illegally establish Hilchkanum as author of his right-of-way deed, so she dishonestly struck our briefing which contradicted her contrived fact, she denied oral arguments, and she decided the lawsuit by illegally allowing summary judgment.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          There were a number of documents submitted to Rothstein which established Hilchkanum's illiteracy. She refused to acknowledge them, too. Here is but one.

        View an Exhibit presented to Judge Rothstein which specifically identifies Hilchkanum's illiteracy.

    Rothstein strikes our statement that the Railway lawyers wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

          Judge Rothstein struck my lawyer's statement that the Railway lawyers wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. His statement was tied to the fact that Hilchkanum was illiterate and, as an Indian, in no position to write or participate in the deed. If we had been allowed our constitutional right to establish Hilchkanum's illiteracy and disadvantage as a Native American in the late 1800's, this statement should have been allowed, too. But, we were not allowed to resolve these disputed material facts. It is apparent to me that Judge Rothstein does not believe in the constitutional right of due process. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          There is a precedential Washington State opinion which establishes the SLS&E Railway lawyers as authors of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. That decision is King County v. Squire (1990). In Squire, the court construed the right-of-way deed from Watson Squire and his wife to the SLS&E. The court published the relevant portions of the Squire deed and indicated which words were changed or added by Watson Squire. While the Squire court did not specifically identify the Railway lawyers as author of the remaining words, there were only two parties to the Squire right-of-way deed, the Squires and the Railway. So, by default it must be assumed that the words not attributed to Squire were provided by the Railway lawyers. In fact, most SLS&E right-of-way deeds from that time and location used the "ELS form deed", a form deed composed by the Railway lawyers. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E is an unaltered copy of the "ELS form deed". When the changes made by Governor Squire are removed from the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, the remaining words are an unaltered copy of the "ELS form deed". The court found that the language in the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". That granting clause is identical to the granting clause in the Hilchkanum deed, and was written by the Railway lawyers. Later in this opinion, when Rothstein addresses the relevance of King County v. Squire, she intentionally misrepresents the Squire court's findings because the conclusions in Squire are so contrary to Rothstein's analysis of the identical granting clause.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a study which compares the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

        Understand the SLS&E "ELS form deed" used to obtain the right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish.

          Judge Rothstein refused to honestly compare the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the Squire right-of-way deed. She refused to explain how her determination that Hilchkanum wrote all the words in his deed is consistent with the default finding by the Squire court that the identical SLS&E deed language was written by the Railway. The Squire findings are legal precedent. They are the law. The authorship of the Hilchkanum deed is a material fact. Rothstein decided that Hilchkanum wrote his deed without any fact, or document, or basis in law to support her conclusion. She struck our statement that the deed was written by the Railway lawyers. She denied our constitutional right to establish this material fact before a jury. She denied oral arguments at least fourteen times.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein takes a "cheap shot" at us by playing the "race card". In truth, it is Judge Rothstein who commits the act of racial bias.

          Judge Rothstein struck our statement of Hilchkanum's ethnicity and illiteracy by falsely implying that we are racists. The truth is that my lawyer's statements were accurate. Further, Rothstein then assigned the skills of a lawyer to Hilchkanum and credited him with the words in his right-of-way deed. She doesn't explain where Bill Hilchkanum got his education and expert understanding of the law, in light of the fact that he was born in a native environment before the white settlement of Western Washington. Her manipulation of the facts to elevate an illiterate Native American to the status of a lawyer is the act of racism, not our correct statement of fact. Her manipulation of the facts denies the hardship that Natives suffered in white society at the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Her manipulation of American history denies the dignity of the Natives in dealing with the loss of their traditional way of life, the loss of their lands, their mismanagement by the federal government, and the discrimination they suffered in white society. Instead, based on her statements in this opinion, Rothstein apparently believes that Native Americans in the late 1800's were all skilled lawyers. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Specific Hilchkanum documents provided to Judge Rothstein, the history of the times, and laws passed to protect Native Americans, combine to explain Hilchkanum's intentions and participation in his right-of-way deed.

          Rothstein claims that we provided no foundation for our statements of Hilchkanum's ethnicity and ability to participate in his deed. This is not true. We provided a number of documents to Judge Rothstein which supported our statement. It is true that we did not draw Rothstein's attention to those documents at the place that my lawyer made the statement. But, it is also true that King County did not brief that Hilchkanum was the author of his deed and an expert in legal proceedings. If the county had briefed those ridiculous lies, we would have responded with a more detailed and documented argument. We didn't make that more detailed argument because Judge Rothstein manufactured the fact that Hilchkanum had the skills of a lawyer and that he wrote the words in his right-of-way deed. This ridiculous conclusion didn't appear until the opinion was published. How do we respond to a legal argument that was never made by King County? This can be understood by reading King County's motion for summary judgment, hyperlinked below. One will realize that the county's argument relied on misrepresenting Washington State common law, not on the authorship of the Hilchkanum deed. The second hyperlink below is a "companion document" which aids the reader in understanding the dishonesty of King County's argument.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        King County Brief "Brief in Support of King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (February 15, 2001)

        Companion Document "Brief in Support of King County's Motion for Summary Judgment" (Comments and Analysis by John Rasmussen - This is not a court record.)

          In order to understand Hilchkanum's disadvantage in his right-of-way deed, I've prepared a study of the history of the settlement of Washington Territory, the federal and Territorial laws which were established to protect Indians, and specific Hilchkanum documents which were presented to Judge Rothstein. These factors combine to explain Hilchkanum's intentions and ability to participate in his right-of-way deed. As a judge, with the responsibility to establish the truth in the process resolving a lawsuit, Rothstein failed in her duty to understand this information, all of which was available to her. Further, Rothstein denied my constitutional right to present this information to a jury in the determination of Hilchkanum's intentions and ability to participate in his right-of-way deed. Please use the following hyperlink to view this study.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read a study about Hilchkanum's participation and intentions in his right-of-way deed.

    Reference:

      View the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E in order to confirm that it was signed with an "X"

      Read a study about Hilchkanum's participation and intentions with his deed.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The Rasmussens also submit a document purportedly created by an unnamed government employee. John Rasmussen attempts to admit this document through his declaration, but he does not have personal knowledge of its authenticity. Fed. R. Evid. 901. As a result, exhibit 3 to the Rasmussen declaration; page 5, lines 4-11 of the Rasmussen declaration; and paragraph 8 of the response to the motion for summary judgment lack foundation and will be stricken.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Here, King County moves to strike its own document:

           Exhibit 3 Shows it was the opinion of the King County Office of Open Space that the right-of-way was probably an easement.

        "Vesting: ***The particular deed under which this property was acquired was entitled "right of way deed" which would probably be deemed to be an easement interest only. ***"

           This is King County's own document and was obtained from the County. Here Rothstein grants the King County prosecutor's motion to strike a copy of a document that was under his control. The documents authenticity was not the problem. The problem was that the document provided proof that the prosecutor was dishonest in his testimony and declarations. Striking this exhibit hides the county's participation in the federal tax fraud scheme used to railbank the right-of-way. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Was it legal for Rothstein to strike this exhibit?

        Go to Page 5 of my declaration to view the portions Rothstein struck here. (Portions struck by Rothstein are highlighted in yellow)

        Go to Page 6 of our Brief Opposing SJM to view "paragraph 8" which Rothstein struck here. (Portions struck by Rothstein are highlighted in yellow)

        View my Exhibit 3, struck by Judge Rothstein. (Report by a King County title officer stating his opinion that the right-of-way was probably an easement. See: item 9 on page 2, item 9 on page 4, item 9 on page 6, and item 9 on page 8.)

        Read the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 901, and decide if this exhibit was illegally struck.

    Reference:

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The County seeks to strike as irrelevant other evidence and arguments about "spur lines" and about the County's behavior in this dispute. Although the evidence's value may be minimal, the court will not strike the evidence in its entirety. The court will accord the evidence the appropriate weight.

3. Unauthorized Memoranda

Finally, Civil Rule 7(b) provides for an opening brief, a response, and a reply. Nothing in the rule or in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 authorizes a surreply. The Rasmussens have filed a surreply to the motion to dismiss and have submitted a supplemental declaration from John Rasmussen. The Rasmussens did not request prior permission from the court. Because the court rules do not authorize these submissions, they will be stricken and will not be considered. Cf., e.g., Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996) (new evidence not considered in reply). The County's motions to strike are GRANTED in part.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Amazingly, Rothstein is correct here:

           I'm forced to agree with her for one of the few times in this decision. We did not request a surreply, so she had every right to ignore it. But, contrast this with her clerk's informal agreement to allow extended briefs, as described above, and then her decision to renege on the commitment made by her clerk, Christian Halliburton.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read the letter from my lawyer to Judge Rothstein describing this situation.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

The County has moved for summary judgment on both its causes of action. First, the County seeks to quiet title to the disputed strip of land. Second, the County seeks a declaration that it has the right to use the land without interference.

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). There are no material factual disputes in this matter. Although the Rasmussens have raised factual issues regarding the County's behavior and the STB's proceedings, those have little bearing on how the court should interpret the Hilchkanum deed.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    This statement by Judge Rothstein takes us to the heart of the issue of Criminal actions by Ninth Circuit Judges:

           Illegal use of summary judgment is a maneuver which Ninth Circuit judges use to force their predetermined outcomes on the cases before them. Summary judgment is legally allowed under limited circumstances. The critical issue is that the facts which control the case are in agreement. These are called material facts. If the material facts are in agreement, a judge can apply the law to the material facts to resolve the case, saving the cost and time of a jury trail. The federal judges of the Ninth Circuit have figured out that they simply need to declare that there is agreement with the material facts in order for the judge to take complete control of the case. I believe that this opinion is typical of the criminal acts that go on in the Ninth Circuit. There was absolutely no agreement with the material facts in this lawsuit, but Rothstein lied and declared that there was agreement with the facts, granting herself complete control of the decision. Her illegal application of summary judgment was upheld by the three judge appeals panel, and the full Ninth Circuit court in its denial of en banc review. We will always have criminal acts by individual judges. These criminal acts are supposed to be corrected on appeal. That process has been replaced by the intentional disregard of constitutional rights at every level in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit is no longer a legitimate judicial body. This lawsuit, and its denials of appeal, are proof of that.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Disputed Material Facts Identified in this Note:  (Each Fact is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * It is a material fact who wrote the Hilchkanum deed.

      * The intention of the parties in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact.

      * The intention of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds is a disputed material fact.

      * The ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their railroad right-of-way deed is a material fact.

      * It is a material fact to determine what was conveyed in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

      * The statement of facts made in King County v. Squire is a material fact.

      * It is a material fact to determine if King County's actions against me constituted a "policy, practice or custom" to violate my civil rights.

      * It is a material fact that King County participated in a federal tax fraud scheme.

    Here are a significant number of material facts that were not in agreement:

      It is a material fact who wrote the Hilchkanum deed because the words in a deed are construed against its author, or the party whose attorney prepared the deed. We stated that the lawyers for the Railway wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, which was then merely signed by the Hilchkanums. Instead, Rothstein "found" that Hilchkanum wrote the deed, and then she construed the words in the deed against only Hilchkanum. With no agreement on this material fact, Judge Rothstein intentionally violated the rules of summary judgment and denied my constitutional right to establish this material fact before a jury. As I explained above, Rothstein dishonestly struck our statements of fact that the Railway lawyers wrote the deed. The first indication that this was an issue of fact appeared in Rothstein's opinion. King County never briefed that Hilchkanum wrote his right-of-way deed. The concept that illiterate Native American Bill Hilchkanum wrote his deed to the SLS&E Railway in 1887 was conjured by Rothstein and presented in her opinion, too late for our formal legal rebuttal. Considering the fact that this opinion is dishonest in almost every paragraph, I believe that Rothstein conspired with King County of one of the other active participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme in order to come up with this dishonest strategy.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a citation from the Brown dissenting opinion which explains that railroads author form deeds which they then present to the settlers.

        Understand that the Hilchkanum deed is an unaltered copy of the SLS&E "ELS form deed" which was authored by the Railway lawyers.

      The intention of the parties in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a material fact. With absolutely no agreement on this material fact, Rothstein stated there was no disagreement, and decreed that the Hilchkanums intended to grant an unrestricted fee simple title. Judges routinely determine the intentions of the parties by interpreting the legal meaning of the words in the deed, the intrinsic evidence. But in this opinion, Rothstein exceeds that authority to determine intentions and takes us on a trip of fantasy. In examining the legal meaning of the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, she correctly compares the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with the right-of-way deed construed in Veach v. Culp (1979). She correctly finds that the Hilchkanum right-of way deed compares to the deed in Veach, which was found to be an easement. But then she departs on her fantasy trip. Rothstein conjures the Hilchkanum's intentions in their right-of-way deed by misrepresenting their actions in their subsequent real estate deeds. Extrinsic evidence is allowed in the construing of a deed, but not in the way Rothstein misuses it in this opinion. Rothstein cherry-picked the extrinsic evidence, selecting only Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds which excepted the right-of-way, and then misapplied the law to find that Hilchkanum expressed his intentions in the right-of-way deed by his exception of that right-of-way deed in his subsequent real estate transactions. She refused to admit that the most relevant subsequent Hilchkanum deeds did not contain this exception language. She refused to justify this gigantic inconsistency in Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds. Her bizarre legal analysis, using cherry-picked facts, goes far beyond the narrow authority of judges to determine the material fact which is the intentions of a party in a deed. Rothstein intentionally violated the rules of summary judgment and denied my constitutional right to establish the material fact of the Hilchkanum's intentions in their right-of-way deed. Read the following citation to understand that the intentions of a party in a deed is a material fact. (My emphasis in the citation below.)
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "A conveyance of a right-of-way to a railroad may be in fee simple or may be an easement only. Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 568, 278 P. 686 (1929). The interpretation of such a deed to determine its effect is a mixed question of fact and law. It is a factual question to determine the intent of the parties. Then we must apply the rules of law to determine the legal consequences of that intent."
        Veach v. Culp (1979)

      The intention of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds is a disputed material fact. As I explain above, when Rothstein illegally determined the Hilchkanum's intentions in their subsequent real estate deeds, she cherry-picked the deeds, ignoring the most relevant. Rothstein then misstated the words in her cherry-picked deeds and misapplied the common law precedent which should have been applied. It is difficult to imagine how Judge Rothstein could be any more dishonest in her illegal determination of the Hilchkanum's intentions. Since the intentions of a party in a deed is a material fact, the intentions of the Hilchkanums in both their right-of-way deed and subsequent real estate deeds is a material fact which was illegally manipulated by Rothstein. We have juries to keep this from happening. Rothstein denied my right to a Jury.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the note in this document where Rothstein's dishonest manipulation of extrinsic evidence is discussed.

      The ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their railroad right-of-way deed is a material fact. We provided documents that showed the Hilchkanums were Native Americans who gave up their tribal affiliation to qualify for a homestead in the late 1880's. We expressed the fact that American Indians were at the mercy of the white settlers in those days. Rothstein ignored the history of the settlement of the American west, and the history of the settlement in Washington Territory. She ignored the laws that protected Natives in those days. Rothstein ignored the documents, that we provided as exhibits, which showed the Hilchkanums were dependent on white friends in legal matters. She ignored the fact that the Hilchkanums signed their deed with an "X". Instead she decided that the Hilchkanums were essentially skilled lawyers, capable of dealing with complex legal issues. She claims that they used subtle wording in their deed in order to express their intention to grant fee simple title of their right-of-way land. With these contradictions glaring in her face, Rothstein denied our right to a jury trial and our right to make oral arguments. With no agreement on this material fact, Judge Rothstein intentionally violated the rules of summary judgment and denied my constitutional right to establish this material fact before a jury.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Understand that the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their right-of-way deed is a material fact.

      It is a material fact to determine what was conveyed in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Judge Rothstein states in this opinion that a "strip of land" was conveyed by the Hilchkanums to the SLS&E. This obvious lie was proposed by the King County Prosecutor in his briefs. We pointed out that one needs to simply read the Hilchkanum deed to see that a "right of way" was conveyed. This is a critical fact because, in construing a railroad deed, "right of way" and "strip of land" are contradictory terms. Identifying which of these contradictory terms is used in the granting clause or habendum is critical to the determination of the interest granted. It's beyond bizarre for Rothstein to state that a "strip of land" is conveyed to the SLS&E when the words of the deed explicitly state that a "right of way" is conveyed. Nothing in the law allows a judge to change the words in a deed, substituting contradictory terms. What is written in a deed is a material fact. Obviously, we need a jury to decide what is plainly written in the deed when the judge proves to be incapable (or unwilling) of correctly reading and stating the words of the deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read the granting clause of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to understand that a "right of way" is conveyed.

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a "right of way" one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit..." (Granting Clause of Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed)

        View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      The statement of facts made in King County v. Squire is a material fact. The facts established in King County v. Squire absolutely destroy Rothstein's analysis in this opinion, so Rothstein misrepresented the facts and conclusions in that decision. The Squire and Hilchkanum granting clauses are identical and therefore should be assumed to be authored by the same party. In the Squire opinion, the words altered or added by Governor Squire were presented in bold font. By default, the remaining words must be attributed to the Railway, as the only other party to the deed. Logically assuming that the Railway was responsible for the Squire granting clause, would persuade a person to assume the Railway wrote the identical Hilchkanum granting clause. Rothstein refused to acknowledge the material facts of authorship established by the Squire court and instead irrationally found that Hilchkanum authored the identical words in his right-of-way deed. Further, Rothstein misrepresented the legal conclusion in Squire which found that the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". This was an outright and intentional misrepresentation of material facts and the law by Judge Rothstein.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Compare the Hilchkanum and Squire ROW deeds to understand the Railway lawyers wrote the Hilchkanum deed.

        Open the discussion in this opinion where Rothstein dishonestly misrepresents the conclusions in King County v. Squire.

      It is a material fact to determine if King County's actions against me constituted a "policy, practice or custom" to violate my civil rights. In order for King County to be found in violation of my civil rights, the law requires that the County must exhibit a "policy, practice or custom" to violate my rights. It is a material fact whether the actions the county took against me fit the description of a "policy, practice or custom" to violate my rights. A jury must decide if the specific facts we described added up to a "policy, practice or custom". If the material fact of a "policy, practice or custom" is establish by a jury, then the law is applied to that material fact to find a violation of my rights. Rothstein refused to let this happen by deciding this disputed material fact for herself.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the portion of this annotated opinion in which Rothstein decides this disputed material fact for herself.

      It is a material fact that King County participated in a federal tax fraud scheme. The establishment of that material fact would have explained the dishonest actions of the County against my neighbors and me. The establishment of that fact would have explained the false identity manufactured by the King County Prosecutor to threaten and discredit me. The establishment of that material fact would have forced the court to see the dishonesty in the prosecutor's briefs as a criminal act. Judge Rothstein dishonestly struck my description of the tax fraud scheme and its evidence. It is obscene that Rothstein refused my right to establish the evidence of this crime, which is a material fact. It is obscene that Rothstein refused my right to describe the crime in my declaration. When Rothstein struck the portion of my declaration which described the crime, she cited no authority for her removal.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the portion of this annotated opinion which describes Rothstein's elimination of all evidence of the tax fraud scheme.

    Summary:

           By illegally allowing summary judgment, my rights as an American citizen were intentionally denied by Judge Rothstein, the Ninth Circuit appeals panel, and the full Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. It is the most basic concept in any legitimate legal system that each side shall have the right to establish the facts and present their side of the issues. This is the "right of due process", formerly guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but not anymore. Here, the Ninth Circuit intentionally denies that right. I believe that this is a daily happening in this court. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

1. Quite Title Action

Ownership of the strip of land turns on the deed executed by the Hilchkanums in 1887. The interest they granted to the Railway passes to the County as the Railway's successor in interest. *

(* The Rasmussens argue that the Railway - and therefore the County - received no interest at all, because the Hilchkanums had not received their homestead patent when they executed the deed. To the contrary, federal law specifically authorized unpatented homesteaders to transfer land to railroads for rights of way. See Act of March 3, 1873, c. 266, 17 U.S. Stat. 602; Pierce v. Chicago, M & P.S. Ry. Co., 52 Mont. 110, 156 P. 127, 129-30 (1916). The Rasmussens also state that the County has no claim to the land because the STB improperly authorized railbanking. As explained later, the argument challenges the STB's order, and this Court has no jurisdiction over such challenges. See 28 U.S.C. paragraphs 2321(a), 2342(5). )



    Note from John Rasmussen:

           Judge Rothstein dishonestly implies that Congress intended for homesteaders to convey fee simple title of their land in its act authorizing unpatented homesteaders to convey rights-of-way to railroads. In this note, we will look at what Congress intended in its 1873 act.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that subject.)

      * Rothstein fails to examine what the term "right-of-way" meant to Congress in its legislation after 1850.

      * Rothstein fails to recognize laws protecting Natives in the 1800's.

      * Rothstein misrepresents our argument.

    Rothstein fails to examine what the term "right-of-way" meant to Congress in its legislation after 1850.

        Judge Rothstein states above:

        "...federal law specifically authorized unpatented homesteaders to transfer land to railroads for rights of way. See Act of March 3, 1873..."

           Judge Rothstein is correct that the Act of March 3, 1873 allowed homesteaders to grant rights-of-way to railroads before they received their patent. But, that does not settle the issue in this lawsuit. The issue in this lawsuit is whether that grant of a right-of-way was the grant of an easement or the grant of fee simple title to the Railway. What did Congress intended by the grant of a right-of-way in its Act of March 3, 1873? The United States Supreme Court studied that issue in Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S. (1942), looking at the intentions of the Congress in its legislation related to rights-of-way after 1850. In Great Northern the Court was considering the effect of the General Right of Way Statute, Act of March 3, 1875, but the Court also provided a history and study of congressional intentions for that period which would explain the intent of Congress in its Act of March 3, 1873. Here is an edited portion of Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S. (1942) which explains that Congress intended the words "right of way" to mean an easement in its 1873 Act. The citation is followed by a hyperlink to that complete Supreme Court opinion: (my emphasis in the citation below)

        "Beginning in 1850 Congress embarked on a policy of subsidizing railroad construction by lavish grants from the public domain. This policy incurred great public disfavor which was crystallized in the following resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on March 11, 1872:

          'Resolved, that in the judgment of this House the policy of granting subsidies in public lands to railroads and [315 U.S. 262, 274] other corporations ought to be discontinued, and that every consideration of public policy and equal justice to the whole people requires that the public lands should be held for the purpose of securing homesteads to actual settlers, and for educational purposes, as may be provided by law.' Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1585 (1872).

        After 1871 outright grants of public lands to private railroad companies seem to have been discontinued. But, to encourage development of the Western vastnesses, Congress had to grant rights to lay track across the public domain, rights which could not be secured against the sovereign by eminent domain proceedings or adverse user. For a time special acts were passed granting to designated railroads simply 'the right of way' through the public lands of the United States. That those acts were not intended to convey land is inferable from remarks in Congress by those sponsoring the measures. For example, in reporting a bill granting a right of way to the Dakota Grand Trunk Railway (17 Stat. 202), the committee chairman said: 'This is merely a grant of the right of way'. Likewise, in reporting a right of way bill for the New Mexico and Gulf Railway Company (17 Stat. 343), Mr. Townsend of Pennsylvania, the same Congressman who sponsored the Act of 1875, observed: 'It is nothing but a grant of the right of way.' [315 U.S. 262, 275] The burden of this special legislation moved Congress to adopt the general right of way statute now before this Court. Since it was a product of the sharp change in Congressional policy with respect to railroad grants after 1871, it is improbable that Congress intended by it to grant more than a right of passage..."

        "...The first such interpretation, the general right of way circular of January 13, 1888, was that the Act granted an easement, not a fee. 13 The same position was taken in the regulations of March 21, 1892, 14 L.D. 338, and those of November 4, 1898..."

        "...Also on June 26, 1906, an act was passed confirming the rights of way which certain railroads had acquired under [315 U.S. 262, 277] the 1875 Act in the Territories of Oklahoma and Arizona. The House committee report on this bill said: 'The right as originally conferred and as proposed to be protected by this bill simply grants an easement or use for railroad purposes. Under the present law whenever the railroad passes through a tract of public land the entire tract is patented to the settler or entryman, subject only to this easement'..."
        [Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S., 315 U.S. 262 (1942)]

           This U.S. Supreme Court decision differentiated between the earlier land grant law, which granted land to the railroads, and the later right-of-way laws that granted only easements. The Court found that the term "right-of-way" was understood to mean an easement.

           Great Northern dealt with The Act of March 3, 1875. But, as one can see from the discussion, the Supreme Court looked at the intent of Congress, in its use of the term "right-of-way", from 1850 onward. After 1871, Congress recognized and responded to the public disfavor with the grant of land to the railroads. The resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on March 11, 1872 and subsequent legislation reveals the intent of congress with its use of the words "right-of-way" in The Act of March 3, 1873. The U.S. Supreme Court found the intent of Congress in "17 Stat. 202" and "17 Stat. 343", above, was to use the term "right-of-way" as an easement. Both of those Statutes were passed in 1872, prior to The Act of March 3, 1873.

           Rothstein states above that the Hilchkanums were allowed to convey a right-of-way to a railroad as un-patented homesteaders under authority of the Act of March 3, 1873. But, Rothstein does not examine what property interest Congress intended to be granted by that Act. The analysis by the U.S. Supreme Court in Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S. (1942) indicates that Congress intended the grant of a right-of-way, under authority of the Act of March 3, 1873, to be the grant of an easement.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein fails to recognize laws protecting Natives in the 1800's.

           There is another Federal act that would contribute to this understanding. The Act of March 3, 1875 extended homesteading rights to American Indians, but they were not allowed to sell their homesteaded land until five years after receiving patent. This was done to protect them from white folks who would take their land through legal trickery. Here is a portion of the federal law, The Act of March 3, 1875, that relates to this issue: (my emphasis)

        Chapter 131   Mar. 3, 1875. | 18 Stat., 402

        SEC. 15

          "That any Indian born in the United States, who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and who has abandoned, or may hereafter abandon, his tribal relations, shall, on making satisfactory proof of such abandonment, under rules to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, be entitled to the benefits of the act entitled "An act to secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain," approved May twentieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and the acts amendatory thereof, except that the provisions of the eighth section of the said act shall not be held to apply to entries made under this act:"

          "Provided, however, That the title to lands acquired by any Indian by virtue hereof shall not be subject to alienation or incumbrance, either by voluntary conveyance or the judgment, decree, or order of any court, and shall be and remain inalienable for a period of five years from the date of the patent issued therefor:"

           If the Hilchkanums granted their right-of-way under the Act of March 3, 1873, and Congress intended that a right-of-way granted under that act to be an easement, then why didn't Rothstein find that the Hilchkanums granted an easement to the SLS&E? Answer: Judge Rothstein doesn't feel bound by acts of Congress, or the opinions of the United States Supreme Court. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein misrepresents our argument.

        Judge Rothstein states above:

        " The Rasmussens also state that the County has no claim to the land because the STB improperly authorized railbanking. As explained later, the argument challenges the STB's order, and this Court has no jurisdiction over such challenges. "

           We argued that the abandoned section of the railroad was a spur line, which would not be under control of the Surface Transportation Board. This goes directly to the issue of state's rights versus federal rights. Our argument was that the STB does not have jurisdiction over intrastate spur lines, and therefore had no authority to railbank the line. Rothstein mischaracterized our argument and claims we are challenging the "STB order". The STB cannot issue orders over railroad segments that are not under federal control. Rothstein misrepresents this issue, here, and ducks her responsibility to address our argument.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Go to Page 4 of our Brief Opposing SJM to view this argument. (The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.)

    Reference:

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

If the Hilchkanums granted a fee interest to the Railway, then the County possesses fee title to the strip. If the Hilchkanums granted only an easement to the Railway, then the County possesses an easement and the Rasmussens own the underlying land.

The intent of the parties is "of paramount importance" when interpreting deeds. Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2nd 430, 924 P.2d 908, 911 (1996). The deed must "clearly indicate" an intent to make the conveyance conditional. King County v. Hanson Inv. Co., 34 Wn2d 112, 208 P.2d 113, 117 (1949); see also Brown, 924 P.2d at 912. *



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Rothstein draws a dishonest conclusion from her citation:

           Rothstein states above:

        " The deed must "clearly indicate" an intent to make the conveyance conditional."

           As I've previously stated, Rothstein has the very dishonest habit of citing a few words from precedential opinions, and then describing a different meaning than is found when the citation is read in context. Although King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. (1949) does represent Washington State common law precedent applicable to the construing of railroad deeds, Rothstein should have been more honest and given the complete quote from Hanson Inv. Here it is: (my emphasis) My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "It is the almost universal rule that, in order to make an estate conditional, the words used in the deed must clearly indicate such an intent, either by express terms or by necessary implication from the language used."
        [King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. (1949)]

           The critical words here are: "by necessary implication from the language used." It would appear that Rothstein intentionally omitted these words. Over one hundred years of consistently applied legal precedent has established that it is a "necessary implication" that the grant of a "right-of way" to a railroad is considered to be an easement under Washington common law. To be more specific, it has always been held that an easement is conveyed when the term "right-of way" is used in the granting clause or habendum of a railroad deed to specify what is granted. Read the citations hyperlinked below to understand this precedent. This opinion by Rothstein overturns that common law precedent. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          This misrepresentation of Hanson is a constant theme found in Norm Maleng's "legal theory", and is evident in King County's briefs and the dishonest opinions which hide the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Norm Maleng's "legal theory" subverts common law by blurring the understanding of the term "right-of-way" in a deed. Maleng contends that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys the land underlying the right-of way. Maleng then contends that the grant of a right-of-way can be found to be an easement only if there is a statement to "'clearly indicate' an intent to make the conveyance conditional". This is an essential element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". This dishonest legal argument is adopted and falsely justified by Rothstein with her above citation from Hanson.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

      View fourteen citations explaining the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement.

      View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

      Look at an in-depth analysis of the "necessary implication" of the meaning of the grant of a railroad right-of-way in common law.

      Read my Exhibit 1, a study on this subject, submitted with my declaration, and struck by Judge Rothstein.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

(* Washington courts presume that a deed in statutory form grants a fee simple. Brown. 924 P.2d at 912. The Hilchkanums deed is not in statutory form, so the presumption does not apply, although clear evidence of conditions still is required.)

Intent analysis requires case-by-case examination of the overall effect of the (1) language of the deed, (2) subsequent behavior of the parties regarding the land, and (3) circumstances at the time of execution. See Brown. 924 P.2d at 912; Scott v. Wallitner, 49, Wn.2d 161, 299 P.2d 204, 204-205 (1956). The three factors interconnect in the Hilchkanum case to depict intent to convey a fee interest.

a. Language of the Deed

"The intent of the parties is to be derived from the entire instrument ...." Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc., 120 Wn.2d 727, 844 P.2d 1006, 1012 (1993); see also Brown, 924 P.2d at 913. *

(* Washington courts have found the following overlapping factors helpful in analyzing deed language; (1) whether the deed conveys a strip of land and does not include language regarding the purpose or limiting the conveyance, (2) whether the deed conveys a strip of land and limits use to a specific purpose, (3) whether the deed conveys a right of way over a strip of land rather than a strip of land, (4) whether the deed grants only a right to construct a railway, (5) whether the rights revert to the grantor if the railway ceases operations, (6) whether the stated consideration is nominal or substantial, (7) whether the deed contains a habendum clause limiting use, and other considerations based on language in the deed. See Brown, 912 P.2d at 912.)



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Rothstein radically changes Washington State common law with her dishonest analysis of the language of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

           It is critical to understand, at this beginning of Rothstein's analysis of the language of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, that every time the term "right-of way" has been used in the granting clause or habendum of a railroad deed to specify what is granted, the deed has been found to be an easement in Washington State/Territory courts. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E conveys a "right-of way" in its granting clause, and therefore is an easement based on this precedent. But, Judge Rothstein overturns this long held and consistently applied precedent with this opinion. She ignores the many Washington opinions which hold the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement and instead adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument concocted by the crooked lawyers in the King County Prosecutor's office after they participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read a description and analysis of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

           How and where the term "right-of-way" is used in a railroad deed is critical in understanding whether an easement or fee simple title is conveyed. This understanding has been developed over the years in the common law opinions which establish the precedent used to construe railroad deeds. The opinion which most directly contradicts Rothstein's dishonest analysis of the language in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is King County v. Squire (1990). In Squire, the court construed a SLS&E right-of-way deed which used granting words that are identical to the granting words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The Squire court found that those identical granting words "strongly" indicated that an easement was conveyed by Squire. This precedential opinion is completely contrary to Rothstein's analysis of the same words. So, Rothstein and the other Hilchkanum judges ignored and hid the Squire court's finding that the Squire granting clause conveys an easement.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Understand that a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E destroys Judge Rothstein's analysis.

        View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

        View fourteen citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The Hilchkanum deed's overall language does not restrict the conveyance by designating a specific purpose, by limiting use of the land, or by adding a reversion clause. The omissions result in an unconditional grant and distinguish the deed from those in which courts have found easements. See Roeder Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wn.2d 567, 716 P.2d 855, 859 (1986) ("for all railroad and other right-of-way purposes"); Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wn.2d 533, 225 P.2d 199 (1950) ("for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way"); Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wn. App. 491, 857 P.2d 283, 286-287 (1993) ("to its successors and assigns forever for railway purposes"); King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wn. App. 888, 801 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1991) ("so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company... and this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888"). In contrast to those cases, the open-ended language of the Hilchkanum deed shows intent to convey a fee.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that topic.)

      * The above analysis by Rothstein is a wholesale adoption of "Norm Maleng's 'legal theory'".

        * Is a "specific purpose" expressed in the Hilchkanum Deed?

        * Is there language "limiting use of the land" in the Hilchkanum Deed?

      * Rothstein misapplies the rule used by the Brown court, which construed railroad deeds that were written using a different form.

      * Rothstein misrepresents the meaning of her citations in her above discussion.

      * Other specific and non-specific evidence of a purpose in the Hilchkanum deed:

    The above analysis by Rothstein is a wholesale adoption of "Norm Maleng's 'legal theory'".

           Norm Maleng's "legal theory" is the dishonest legal argument contrived by the King County Prosecutor to hide his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. The adoption of this blatantly dishonest and unsupported legal argument by Federal Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein is proof of her participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. The more disgusting aspect of her crime is the support of her criminal action by her fellow federal judges when this decision was appealed. The appeal court judge's willingness to support criminal acts by their lower court pals, signals that there is no legitimate judicial system in King County, Washington.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Rothstein states above:

        "The Hilchkanum deed's overall language does not restrict the conveyance by designating a specific purpose, by limiting use of the land, or by adding a reversion clause. The omissions result in an unconditional grant and distinguish the deed from those in which courts have found easements."

           In this statement, Judge Rothstein states that the Hilchkanum deed is an "unconditional grant" which does not "restrict the conveyance by designating a specific purpose". As I read the deed, it grants a "right of way" to the Railway, which has always been construed to grant an easement in Washington State common law. Not anymore. Rothstein states that the deed is an "unconditional grant". What "the hell" does that mean? Is an "unconditional grant" the conveyance of everything the Hilchkanum's own? Rothstein's conclusion would indicate that. Does it grant all the wealth and savings of the Hilchkanum's? An "unconditional grant" would include that. Does it commit the Hilchkanum's children into slavery for the use of the SLS&E? Apparently so, because it's an "unconditional grant", according to Rothstein. What exactly does an "unconditional grant" include? According to Rothstein, it's whatever she decides an "unconditional grant" includes. In this decision, Rothstein decides an "unconditional grant" includes the land under the Hilchkanum right-of-way. Rothstein is Maleng's dream come true, a judge who buys his ridiculous Norm Maleng's "legal theory". My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Open a complete transcription of the 1887 Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed to the SLS&E, in a separate window, as a reference source for the following paragraphs.

          Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory" which is the basis of this statement by Rothstein.

    Is a "specific purpose" expressed in the Hilchkanum Deed?

           The Hilchkanum deed grants a right-of-way to the SLS&E Railway in its granting clause, but Judge Rothstein could find no specific purpose to grant a railroad right-of-way in the words of the deed. It's outrageous for Rothstein to deny what is plainly stated in the deed, and come to that conclusion. How can Rothstein state there is no specific purpose in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed when the deed grants only a right-of-way to the Railway? How could the deed be any more specific with its purpose? (There is a secondary grant that is not a factor here, and is discussed later in this annotated opinion.) My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Is there language "limiting use of the land" in the Hilchkanum Deed?

           The Hilchkanum deed grants only a right-of-way to a railroad in its granting clause, but Judge Rothstein could find no language limiting the use of the land. Again, it's outrageous for Rothstein to deny what is plainly stated in the deed. If the deed grants only a railroad "right of way", the use of the land is limited only to railroad right-of-way use, by definition. If the deed is intended to grant land, instead of only a "right", it must clearly state that intention in the deed. It does not! In Washington common law it has always been held that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad restricts and limits the grant to an easement. This common law precedent is spelled out in the railroad right-of-way decisions that span more than one hundred years. With little effort I can find fourteen citations which define this precedent and reconfirm it, again and again. It is important for the reader to understand Rothstein is complete dishonesty here. Please take the time to open the hyperlinks directly below. The first provides citations which hold the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement. The second provides forty-four citations which explain the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in a railroad deed. Each of these citations are displayed as hyperlinks. Clicking on a citation will take you to its place in the complete opinion from which it is taken. Read the citations and read the whole opinion to understand this precedent. Judge Rothstein is counting on nobody doing this. Rather, she is counting on folks accepting her dishonest analysis without researching the common law precedent which she misrepresents.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View fourteen citations holding the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement.

        View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

           From the above hyperlinks, I provide two citations which use the term "limit" or "limitation" in the analysis of railroad rights-of-way deeds: (my emphasis)

               "'The grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely and the fee of the soil remains in the grantor. Although the language used in the granting part of the deed and in the habendum is appropriate, and that commonly used to convey the fee, yet the clause descriptive of the use to be made of the land may so limit or qualify the grant as to change it from a fee to an easement.' Cyc. 1162; Robinson v. Missisquoi R. Co., 59 Vt. 426, 10 Atl. 522."
          Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)

          "In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed."
          King County v. Squire (1990)

           Both of these citations are taken from decisions which found SLS&E deeds to be easements. About fourteen SLS&E right-of-way deeds have been before the courts prior to this Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. All of the deeds previously construed were determined to be easements, either by the court's decision or by King County admitting that they were easements during the legal process. Most, if not all, of these SLS&E deeds used the same granting language as the Hilchkanum deed. It is this granting language which is responsible for the deeds being found to be easements. Judge Rothstein ignored this legal precedent in this opinion because she had predetermined to find the Hilchkanum deed granted fee simple title. She needed to do this in order to cover up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Understand that, prior to the ELS tax fraud scheme, all SLS&E deeds contested in King County courts were determined to be easements.

           Of the two citations above, the one from Squire is most damaging to Rothstein's "analysis" because the Squire deed was granted to the SLS&E using granting words which are identical to the granting words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The Squire court found that these granting words limited the conveyance to use as a right-of-way, and this limitation was confirmed and reiterated by the words of the habendum. The Squire deed was found to be an easement, as shown by the above citation. The discussion and conclusions in King County v. Squire absolutely destroys Rothstein's analysis in this opinion, so she hides the conclusions of the Squire court.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to understand why the Squire opinion destroys the analysis by Judge Rothstein in this opinion.

    Rothstein misapplies the rule used by the Brown court, which construed railroad deeds that were written using a different form.

           In adopting Norm Maleng's "legal theory" to construe the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, Rothstein is misapplying the rule that was used in Brown v. State of Washington to construe deeds which are written in statutory warranty form and conveyed land, not a "right of way". The Statutory Warranty Deed Form was established by the Washington Territorial legislature in 1886, and was designated as a "form deed" to be used to convey fee simple title of land. Therefore, the use of the statutory warranty form implies a fee simple conveyance. But, if a deed to a railroad, in statutory warranty form, has a statement expressing a limitation to right-of-way use or a statement of right-of-way purpose, the deed is construed to grant only an easement. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was not written in the same form as the deeds construed in Brown. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed does not convey land and is not in statutory warranty form. So, applying the analysis used in Brown to construe the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is completely dishonest. There is no need to have a statement expressing a specific purpose or limitation in order for the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to be construed an easement, because that rule applies only to deeds which convey land.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           As I stated above, in Brown v. State of Washington (1996) the Washington State Supreme Court was construing deeds that were written in the statutory warranty form and conveyed land. The Court looked for language which limited the deeds to use for a right-of-way, and did not find this language in any of the deeds. This citation from Brown explains to this issue: (with my emphasis)

        "Weighing the factors outlined in Swan, we conclude construing the deeds to convey fees simple more accurately reflects the intent of the parties, given the form of the deeds and the fact they convey 'fee simple title' to definite strips of land given without any limitation or qualification. While the manifest purpose of the deeds is to convey land for railroad lines, railroads have never been prohibited from holding rights of way in fee simple. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 575. In the absence of language in the deeds expressly and clearly limiting the estate conveyed, the deeds fall squarely within the rule that where there is no language in a deed relating to the purpose of the grant or limiting the estate conveyed, and it conveys a definite strip of land, it will be construed to convey fee simple title. See Swan, 37 Wn.2d at 536."
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

           This rule in Brown is not new. For more than one hundred years it has been a precedent that a deed conveys an easement if it conveys land to a railroad company and contains a condition that it is to be used for railroad right-of-way purposes. Conversely, a deed which conveys land to a railroad in statutory warranty deed form, without the conditions, conveys fee simple title to the land.

           The rule in Brown, described above, would not apply to the Hilchkanum deed because the Hilchkanum deed does not convey land. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed conveys only a "right of way" to the SLS&E. There is no need to include a separate statement declaring the purpose of the Hilchkanum deed is to grant a railroad right-of-way because a right-of-way is exactly what is granted in the Hilchkanum granting clause. It would be redundant to include a statement that the purpose is to grant a right-of-way to the Railway.

           Judge Rothstein pulls the same stunt that the Prosecutor uses to misrepresent Brown with Norm Maleng's "legal theory". They both ignore the discussion in Brown which acknowledges that the grant a right-of-way, expressed in the granting clause or habendum, qualifies or limits the deed to be an easement. Again, I must emphasize that the Brown court was considering only deeds which granted land. Here is the citation from Brown which Rothstein and Maleng avoid and ignore in their dishonest analysis. (with my emphasis)
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property. The Eidal deed, for example, states:

          Said Railway Company . . . will permit a telephone wire and an electric light wire to cross its said right-of-way. . . . Before grading is begun Right of way fences shall be built. . . . Said Railway Company is to furnish such facilities for conducting water for irrigation and other purposes under its track and across its Right-of-Way as are reasonable and practicable. . . .

        Clerk's Papers (Brown) at 27. Used in this manner, "right of way" merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines; it does not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses. To point out that the Eidal deed and others describe the property as right of way simply begs the question of what interest Milwaukee acquired, because a railroad can own rights of way in fee simple if that is what the deed conveys."
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

           This misrepresentation of Brown was developed by the Prosecutor in order to cover-up King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. This dishonest tactic is found in the Prosecutor's briefs in all of the Hilchkanum lawsuits. As I've stated above, I've done a study on this tactic and given it a name: Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Rothstein's adoption of this obviously dishonest tactic is proof of her participation in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme and her decision to aid Maleng in the cover-up of his crime.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

    Rothstein misrepresents the meaning of her citations in her above discussion.

           Judge Rothstein has the dishonest habit of providing short citations and then misrepresenting their meaning. She does that with the four citations she provides in her paragraph above. I'll copy her paragraph here and then discuss the dishonesty of each of her citations.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The Hilchkanum deed's overall language does not restrict the conveyance by designating a specific purpose, by limiting use of the land, or by adding a reversion clause. The omissions result in an unconditional grant and distinguish the deed from those in which courts have found easements. See Roeder Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wn.2d 567, 716 P.2d 855, 859 (1986) ("for all railroad and other right-of-way purposes"); Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wn.2d 533, 225 P.2d 199 (1950) ("for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way"); Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wn. App. 491, 857 P.2d 283, 286-287 (1993) ("to its successors and assigns forever for railway purposes"); King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wn. App. 888, 801 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1991) ("so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company... and this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888"). In contrast to those cases, the open-ended language of the Hilchkanum deed shows intent to convey a fee."
            [Judge Rothstein's above paragraph in this opinion]

           Rothstein's citations take the reader to the words of the deeds in the cited opinions, but she does not cite the analysis of those words made in those opinions. Instead, Rothstein does her own analysis which is not consistent with the analysis in those opinions. She is making up precedent, here, to support her predetermined outcome to my lawsuit. Directly below, I provide hyperlinks that will take the reader to the cited position in each of these opinions. Read the words of the deed and then read the analysis of those words in the context of their full opinion to understand Rothstein's trick of using short citations and then misrepresenting their meaning.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Roeder v. BNSF (1986) - The Roeder court construes a railroad deed in statutory warranty form. A statement of purpose is required to restrict the grant to an easement, as discussed above. The Hilchkanum deed is not in statutory warranty form, so is not presumed to convey fee simple title of the land under its right-of-way. Instead, the Hilchkanum deed specifies that a "right of way" is conveyed in its granting clause. It's completely dishonest for Rothstein to imply that the Hilchkanum deed needs a separate limiting statement, when the words in the granting clause limit the grant to a "right of way".
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Swan v. O'Leary (1950) - Swan construes a quit-claim deed that grants a strip of land. A statement of purpose is required to restrict the grant to an easement. The Hilchkanum deed does not need a statement of purpose because in directly conveys a "right of way", not "a strip of land" as in Swan.

        Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993) - Northlake supplies the Thomas Burke deed to the SLS&E, but does not construe its meaning. The Burke deed is construed in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910). This is a very important deed because Thomas Burke was co-founder of the Railway and its lead attorney. The Burke deed was found to be an easement because of elements that are identical in the Hilchkanum deed. This is analyzed two paragraphs below.

        King County v. Squire (1990) - Of all the decisions she cites above, the Squire decision is the most devastating to Rothstein's argument. So, Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein dishonestly hides the Squire court's overall analysis. Instead, Rothstein recognizes only the language added by Governor Squire in his habendum. This is a gross misrepresentation of the Squire court's analysis of the Squire right-of-way deed. The Squire court concentrated on the grant of the right-of-way in the Squire granting clause, holding the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement..." This language is identical to the language in the Hilchkanum granting clause! The Squire court then found that the language Governor Squire added to his habendum "...reiterat[es] the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way...an easement..". An honest comparison of the Squire and Hilchkanum right-of-way deeds, in the context of the Squire decision, absolutely destroys Rothstein's analysis of King County v. Squire (1990). So, Rothstein ignores the Squire court's analysis and pretends that the determining factor in Squire was only the language in the habendum. That's an intentional lie by Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          View a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

        The above hyperlink compares all the elements of the Hilchkanum and Squire deeds to the SLS&E. Because the Squire court concentrated on the granting clause, holding it strongly indicated an easement was conveyed, and because the granting language in the Hilchkanum granting clause is identical, I provide the two granting clauses here. The words in red in the Squire granting clause are changes made to the Railway's form deed by Governor Squire. There were no changes made by Hilchkanum to his right-of-way form deed.

          The Squire Granting Clause:

          "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:"
          [King County v. Squire (1990)].

          The Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

          "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit"
          [The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

           Judge Rothstein cites four decisions above, and misinterprets the meaning of each. With little effort, I was able to find forty-four citations which explain the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. The forty-four citations come from railroad right-of-way decisions covering more than one hundred years of Washington common law, and are consistent in their interpretation of the meaning of the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad. These citations destroy Rothstein's analysis above. These citations are the law. By ignoring these citations, Judge Rothstein shows that she does not believe in the law. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

           From the above forty-four citations, here are several which explain that a "specific purpose" is found in the Thomas Burke grant of a right-of-way to the SLS&E Railway, and not for the reason Judge Rothstein states/implies in her analysis above:

               Judge Thomas Burke was cofounder and lead attorney for the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E). Also, as a settler owning property on the proposed railway route, Burke granted a right-of-way deed to his own railroad. The SLS&E right-of-way deeds were based on a "form deed" written by Burke and his co-council George Haller. So, the granting language in the Burke right-of-way deed is very similar to the granting language in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The Burke deed was construed in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910) and found to be an easement. Notice that, in the following citation, the words "right of way" and "easement" are understood to have the same meaning. (citation with my emphasis)

            "...when the instrument is construed as a whole and in the light of the purpose for which the grant was made, it is a grant of a right of way or easement and nothing more.

                   'The grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely and the fee of the soil remains in the grantor. Although the language used in the granting part of the deed and in the habendum is appropriate, and that commonly used to convey the fee, yet the clause descriptive of the use to be made of the land may so limit or qualify the grant as to change it from a fee to an easement.' Cyc. 1162; Robinson v. Missisquoi R. Co., 59 Vt. 426, 10 Atl. 522."
            Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)

               The Burke deed was not shown in Pacific Iron Works. but it was printed in Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993). I print the Burke granting clause and habendum from the Northlake opinion, here, and follow each with the relevant portions of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed:

            Burke Granting Clause:

            "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby remise, release and forever quitclaim unto said Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through the lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit: . . "
            [Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993)]

            Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

            "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit..."
            [Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed]

            Burke Habendum:

            "To have and to hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever for railway purposes; but if it should cease to be used for a railway the said premises shall revert to said grantors, their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns."
            [Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993)]

            Hilchkanum Habendum:

            "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever."
            [Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed]

               Comparing the Burke and Hilchkanum granting clauses, one can see that each deed grants a "right of way" to the SLS&E using the same "consideration". The habendum wording is exactly the same, except for the reversion clause added by Burke. So, is the "specific purpose", which limited the Burke deed to an easement, expressed in the grant of a "right of way" to the SLS&E, or is the "specific purpose" expressed in the words added by Burke in habendum? The Burke deed was construed in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910) and found to grant an easement because a "purpose" to grant a right-of-way was found by the court. As shown above, the Hilchkanum and Burke grants are the same in that respect. Judge Rothstein failed to consider this precedent in her discussion of a "specific purpose" in a deed. (my emphasis)

            The Court's analysis of the Burke Right-of-Way Deed in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber

            "...The right of way deed remised, released, and forever quitclaimed to the company, a right of way 100 feet in width 'to have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever, *for railway purposes, but if it should cease to be used for a railway, the said premises shall revert to said grantors, their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns*.' If this were a grant in fee simple, it would, perhaps, have the effect claimed for it by the respondent, but, in our opinion, it was not.

                 While some of the language contained in the deed might imply such a grant, when the instrument is construed as a whole and in the light of the purpose for which the grant was made, it is a grant of a right of way or easement and nothing more.

                   'The grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely and the fee of the soil remains in the grantor. Although the language used in the granting part of the deed and in the habendum is appropriate, and that commonly used to convey the fee, yet the clause descriptive of the use to be made of the land may so limit or qualify the grant as to change it from a fee to an easement.' Cyc. 1162; Robinson v. Missisquoi R. Co., 59 Vt. 426, 10 Atl. 522."
            Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)

               The following citation from Morsbach identified the grant of a "right of way" in the Burke deed as the language which limited it to a specific purpose. (my emphasis)

            The Court's analysis of the Burke Right-of-Way Deed in Morsbach v. Thurston Co.

                "Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 60 Wash. 502, 111 Pac. 578, cited and relied upon by respondents, involved a right of way deed wherein the grantors conveyed a strip of land one hundred feet in width for railway purposes, and contained a reversion clause that, if it should cease to be used for a railway, the premises should revert to the grantors, their heirs, administrators, executors or assigns. It is true that the habendum clause in that deed was to the effect that the grantee should have and hold the premises and appurtenances to it, its successors and assigns forever; and the court adverted thereto, saying that, although such words were in the deed, it did not have the effect of creating a grant in fee simple, because plainly the instrument, construed as a whole and in the light of the purpose for which it was made, was a grant of a right of way or easement and nothing else."
            Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)

            Further on, in Morsbach the court makes this observation:

            "...where a railroad has taken a conveyance expressly granting a right of way, it will be held to have taken an easement merely..."
            Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)

               Since the Washington State Supreme Court found a specific "purpose" in Burke deed with its express grant of a right-of-way to the Railway, the same specific purpose should be found in the Hilchkanum deed because the Hilchkanum deed expressly grants a right-of-way to the SLS&E, too. Judge Rothstein could not find that purpose because she was committed to not find a specific purpose in the Hilchkanum deed.
              My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Other specific and non-specific evidence of a purpose in the Hilchkanum deed:

           Continuing to look for a specific purpose in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, the deed was granted "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway", but Judge Rothstein could find no specific railroad purpose in those words of the deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           In the section of the deed which describes the property, a "right of way strip" was defined in relation to the "center line of the railway track as located across our said lands by the Engineer of said railway Company", but Judge Rothstein could find no railroad right-of-way purpose in those words of the deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           A secondary grant is included in the deed: "...the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road." Rothstein could find no intention that this secondary grant was for railroad purposes, either.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Judge Rothstein could find no specific purpose in the intrinsic evidence (the words of the Hilchkanum deed), in spite of that evidence being expressed throughout the deed. Instead, in order to come to her predetermined outcome, Judge Rothstein gave excessive weight to the extrinsic evidence (circumstances at the time of the deed and subsequent conduct of the parties). But, Rothstein took it even further than that. She "cherry-picked" the extrinsic evidence concentrating on certain documents and ignoring others so that she could find no intention by Hilchkanum to convey his land for railroad or right-of-way purpose. But, then she provides a quote by Hilchkanum that states exactly what she claims she could not find: Evidence that Hilchkanum considered this grant to the SLS&E to be for railroad right-of-way purposes. In the second paragraph of this decision, Rothstein quotes these words from a portion of a subsequent Hilchkanum deed:
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "Bill Hilchkanum then conveyed the property to a third party 'less three (3) acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle International Railway for right of way purposes.'"(Quoted from "I. BACKGROUND" above, with my emphasis)

           Here, in plain words in this opinion, Rothstein provides the language she claims she cannon find. She cites Hilchkanum's own words expressing that he understood his right-of-way was conveyed to the railway for "right of way purposes". If Judge Rothstein actually wanted to find language which expressed Hilchkanum's intentions to convey the use of his land for railroad right-of-way purposes, she should have read her own citation in her own opinion (this opinion). Of course Rothstein went to great lengths to not find that language so that she could "find" that Hilchkanum intended to convey his land to the Railway with no restriction or specific purpose. We have juries to protect us from this sort of judicial corruption. None of the Hilchkanum judges allowed a jury to the decide issues which are required to be resolved by a jury. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Summary:

           Judge Rothstein states that "The Hilchkanum deed's overall language does not restrict the conveyance by designating a specific purpose, by limiting use of the land, or by adding a reversion clause. The omissions result in an unconditional grant and distinguish the deed from those in which courts have found easements." This is an absolute lie which echoes the dishonest analysis found in Norm Maleng's "legal theory". To come to that dishonest conclusion, Rothstein needed to ignore over one hundred years of Washington State common law precedent that holds the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad establishes a specific purpose that limits and restricts the deed to an easement.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           The most damaging precedential opinion is King County v. Squire. Rothstein intentionally ignores the portions of the Squire court's opinion which contradict her conclusions. The Squire granting clause is identical to the Hilchkanum granting clause and was found by the Squire court to "...strongly suggest[] conveyance of an easement...". It's criminal for Rothstein to refuse to acknowledge that precedent.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           By dishonestly stating that there was no railroad right-of-way purpose in the Hilchkanum grant, and no language limiting the grant to an easement, Judge Rothstein hid the criminal activity of BNSF, King County and The Land Conservancy of Seattle and King County (TLC). King County accepted a donation of right-of-way land from BNSF that the County knew BNSF didn't own. This decision illegally awards that land to King County and steals it from its rightful owners. Judge Rothstein became an active participant in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme with this decision, and protected the other participants in the crime from prosecution.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View a description of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

      View a more in-depth analysis of the meaning of the grant of a railroad right-of-way in Washington State common law, including citations supporting the analysis.

      Read my Exhibit 1, a study on this subject, submitted with my declaration, and struck by Judge Rothstein.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The absence of limitations in the Hilchkanum right of way conveyance is even more striking when contrasted with a different conditional grant in the same deed. The deed grants the Railway the right to "go upon the land adjacent to said line ... and cut down" dangerous trees. This language specifies a purpose and thus differs significantly from the conveyance at issue. Thus it is clear that the parties knew how to limit a grant, and that they chose not to limit the right of way.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Rothstein lies when she states that Hilchkanum knew how to limit a grant:

           In Common law, the words of a deed are construed most strongly against its author. In this opinion, Rothstein construes every word of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against Hilchkanum without justifying her dishonest tactic. Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American who lived in a time that "Indians" were at great disadvantage in white society. Yet, in her above statement, Judge Rothstein dishonestly proclaims that Hilchkanum "...knew how to limit a grant...". This unfounded statement of material fact was contradicted by my lawyer in his brief to Judge Rothstein. My lawyer made the following statement in his "Brief Opposing King County Motion for Summary Judgment":
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             "Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian. At the very best he was functionally illiterate, and "made his mark" when he signed legal documents. Thus, all drafting of any ambiguous documents was completed by the railroad’s representative. In this case Bill Hilchkanum and his wife signed a document that did not comport with the necessary elements for conveyance of a fee simple interest, because of the qualifying and limiting language of the document."
          [Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion and view this statement on page 2. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.]

           Judge Rothstein struck my lawyer's statement with this comment:

            "In paragraph 1 of the response to the motion for summary judgment, the Rasmussens speculate on the intent of Bill Hilchkanum based on his Native American ethnicity. The Rasmussens provide no evidence to support the allegations. Therefore, all but the last two sentences of the paragraph will be stricken."
          [Open this document at the position that Judge Rothstein made this statement.]

           Judge Rothstein's above statement was a self-serving lie. My lawyer was not ..."speculat[ing] on the intent of Bill Hilchkanum based on his Native American ethnicity." Instead, he made two distinctly separate observations, both of which were correct. First, my lawyer stated that Bill Hilchkanum was an "Indian". This fact is obvious from the documents we provided Judge Rothstein. For my lawyer and me, who have a basic understanding of American history, this fact is relevant because Native Americans in Washington Territory were at a disadvantage in legal transactions in the mid to late 1800's. It's not our job to teach basic American history to arrogant judges who have a criminal intent with their opinions. Second, my lawyer separately stated that the Hilchkanums were illiterate. This fact was obvious to Judge Rothstein if she actually read the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed which she construed. The Hilchkanums both signed the deed with an "X". This is a sign of illiteracy by any common sense standard. Additionally, we provided a number of documents which described Hilchkanum's illiteracy and disadvantage in legal transactions.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View a photocopy of the Hilchkanum deed to confirm it was signed with an "X".

           Considering the fact that the Hilchkanums were Native Americans and were illiterate, my lawyer rightly concluded that the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed should be construed against the Railway. Judge Rothstein's striking of my lawyers statements and conclusion does not make the Hilchkanums white lawyers and does not make them literate. Rothstein claims my lawyer did not justify his statement with ..."evidence to support [his] allegations", but my lawyer was not making an argument in opposition to King County's brief, he was just stating obvious facts as justification for his conclusion that the deed should be construed against the Railway. If Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein had any interest in the truth, she would have allowed our many requests for oral arguments or sought written justification from my lawyer. The docketing statement prepared by Rothstein's clerk for our appeal, and linked below, shows at least fourteen times that we requested oral arguments. It's obvious from reading this opinion that Rothstein was eliminating contested material facts from consideration so that she could substitute the lies she had concocted in order to justify her dishonest opinion. By striking my lawyer's statements about Hilchkanum's status as an illiterate Native American, Rothstein eliminated a contested material fact which would require a jury trial to resolve. Rothstein was setting up the conditions necessary for her illegal use of summary judgment in resolving the lawsuit.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View Hilchkanum's Homestead affidavit stating that he is an "Indian".

        View a photocopy of the Hilchkanum deed to confirm it was signed with an "X".

        View the docketing statement to understand we repeatedly requested oral arguments.

           When one reads Rothstein's above claim about Hilchkanum's use of limiting language, it becomes apparent that Judge Rothstein struck my lawyers statements about Hilchkanum's disadvantage in legal proceedings in order to dishonestly establish that Hilchkanum "...knew how to limit a grant...". She dishonestly struck our legitimate argument and then established Hilchkanum as the author of his deed, and an expert in property law, by construing complex language in his right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Rothstein misrepresents the Hilchkanum's intentions in this secondary grant:

           To believe Rothstein's interpretation of the meaning of this secondary grant, the reader must accept the foundation of lies and dishonesty that gets Rothstein to this point in her decision. If a person believes her irrational assertion that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants fee simple title, without limitations, then one can believe this "secondary lie", also. This decision, and the above interpretation, is a "house of cards" built of a foundation of outright lies and misapplication of the law. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           The Hilchkanum deed contains a secondary grant allowing for the removal of trees that could fall across the track and inhibit the operation of the Railway. The secondary grant is in these words:

        "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road."
        [Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed]

    Rothstein manufactures a new precedent:

           These secondary grants are common in railroad deeds and deal with issues specific to the individual right-of-way deed. Secondary grants are necessary for the construction or operation of the railroad. The Hilchkanum secondary grant resolved a minor problem with the operation of the railroad. That problem was that the right-of-way was only 100 feet wide, 50 feet on each side of the centerline, but there were tall trees outside of the easement that could fall on the tracks and affect the operation of the railroad. So, this secondary grant allowed the Railway the right to cut down those trees. These secondary grants have nothing to do with the intentions of the parties to convey an easement or fee simple interest in the land underlying the right-of-way. There is no precedent in Washington common law for these secondary grants to be considered in the analysis of easement or fee. This analysis by Judge Rothstein is just more of her irrational, undocumented, non-precedential, dishonest reasoning.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Here are two other examples of secondary grants to railroads. One secondary grant is from a deed which was found to be an easement because a "right-of-way" was granted in its premises. The other secondary grant is from a deed which was found to be a fee simple grant because a "strip of land" was granted to the railroad. Neither of these opinions found any significance in the secondary grant in analyzing the fee-easement issue. Please follow the hyperlinks to the actual opinions to understand that these secondary grants have no effect to signal whether their deed granted an easement or a fee interest. This illogical construing of a secondary grant by Federal District Judge Rothstein is a new precedent established by this dishonest judge. This new precedent makes no sense when seen in the context of one hundred years of common law precedent construing railroad right-of-way deeds .
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        The Edward Kratz right-of-way deed to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company in 1872:
            After granting a right-of-way to the Railroad, the Kratz deed included a secondary grant that allowed the Railroad to deal with the interference of a nearby river on its rail operation. The secondary grant allowed for:

          "...the construction of certain canals, whereby the channel of Skookumchuck is changed and prevented from infringing upon said railroad including the land necessary for said roads and canals..."
          [Morsbach v. Thurston County (1929)]

            The Kratz deed was construed in Morsbach v. Thurston County (1929), which is hyperlinked above. The Kratz deed was found to grant the Northern Pacific Railroad an easement because a "right-of-way" was conveyed in the deed's premises. Further, there is no mention in Morsbach of the significance of the secondary grant with respect to the determination of easement or fee.

        The Brown right-of-way deed to the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company:
            After granting a strip of land to the Railroad, the Brown deed included a secondary grant that allowed the Railroad to resolve problems with the railroad's construction. The secondary grant allowed for:

          "Also conveying the following extra widths for excavations, embankments, depositing waste earth, and borrowing pits, as follows: Two strip[s] of land each fifty (50) feet in width and bordering one on either side of the strip of land first above described..."
          [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

            The Brown deed was construed in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), which is hyperlinked above. The Brown deed was found to grant the Milwaukee Railroad fee simple title because a "strip of land" was conveyed in the granting clause of its premises. There is no mention in Brown of the significance of the secondary grant with respect to the determination of easement or fee.

    Summary:

           Judge Rothstein lies when she states that "...the parties knew how to limit a grant...". There were only two parties to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed; the Hilchkanums and the SLS&E Railway. So, Rothstein is stating that the Hilchkanums "...knew how to limit a grant...". That is an intentional lie from a judge who ignored our briefing, the documents we submitted to her, the history of Native Americans in the west, the laws which recognized the disadvantage Indians had in legal proceedings at that time, and my right to resolve this question of material fact before a jury. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Rothstein finds great unjustified meaning in the Hilchkanum secondary grant. She supplies no citation to justify her ruling that the words in the secondary grant indicated the intentions of the Hilchkanums to grant fee simple title in the main granting clause of their deed. Judge Rothstein simply makes up a new precedent. Rothstein uses her twisted logic to "prove" Hilchkanum's intention to grant fee simple title to the SLS&E. But, the intentions of a party in a deed is a material fact. If there were some legal precedent to establish Rothstein's meaning of the Hilchkanum secondary grant, she might be justified in her interpretation. There is no legal precedent. It was my right, under the Constitution, to present facts to a jury that would resolve the intentions of the Hilchkanum's with their secondary grant. Rothstein denied my constitutional rights in order to force her unsubstantiated set of facts and her predetermined opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The Rasmussens ignore the "entire instrument's" unconditional language and instead urge the court to focus on isolated words. For example, they note that the Hilchkanum deed recognizes the Railway will build tracks on the land. However, an acknowledgement of the probable use cannot limit the conveyance unless accompanied by a specific restriction on use - something the Hilchkanum deed lacks. See Scott, 299 P.2d at 205 (fee simple when deed acknowledged that land would be used for railway but did not include any specific limitations); see also Brown, 924 P.2d at 913. Similarly, the Rasmussens claim the deed limits the conveyance by using the term "right of way" in the text and caption, but courts have rejected this narrow view as well. See, e.g., Brown, 208 P.2d at 912, 915 (railroad can obtain a "right of way" as either a fee or an easement); Harris 844 P.2d at 1011-13 (1993) (court found fee simple despite right of way language); Roeder Co. v. K&E Moving & Storage Co., Inc., 102 Wn. App. 49, 4 P.2d 839, 842-43 (2000). *



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Rothstein belittles us by misrepresenting our argument.

           Considering her complete dishonesty in every part of this decision, one would expect Rothstein to misrepresent our argument in order to dismiss our correct explanation of legal precedent. We were very specific as to how the words "right-of-way" are understood in a railroad deed. In common law, where and how the words "right-of-way" are used in a railroad deed are critical to understanding their meaning.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           When a "right-of-way" is conveyed to a railroad in the words of the granting clause, the Washington courts have always held that an easement is granted. This decision by Rothstein is the first exception to this rule in over one hundred years. Following this dishonest opinion, King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and the "sister case", Ray v. King County (2004) relied excessively on this opinion for their conclusions.

        View fourteen citations holding the grant of a right-of-way conveys an easement. This long held precedent is dishonestly destroyed by Rothstein in this opinion.

        Understand the meaning of the term "right-of-way" in a railroad deed.

           The words "right-of-way" can have a different meaning in a railroad deed, depending on where and how the words are used. When the words "right-of-way" are used to merely describe the strip of land that is conveyed, and not in the words of conveyance, there is not an automatic presumption that an easement has been granted. There is a critical difference between using "right-of-way" in the granting clause or habendum, and using "right-of-way" in the legal description portion of the deed. This understanding has been precedent for over one hundred years. Since Judge Rothstein relies on Brown for much of the authority in this opinion, I'll provide a citation from Brown which explains this issue, and which Rothstein dishonestly ignores. (citation with my emphasis)
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property. The Eidal deed, for example, states:

          Said Railway Company . . . will permit a telephone wire and an electric light wire to cross its said right-of-way. . . . Before grading is begun Right of way fences shall be built. . . . Said Railway Company is to furnish such facilities for conducting water for irrigation and other purposes under its track and across its Right-of-Way as are reasonable and practicable. . . .

        Clerk's Papers (Brown) at 27. Used in this manner, "right of way" merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines; it does not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses. To point out that the Eidal deed and others describe the property as right of way simply begs the question of what interest Milwaukee acquired, because a railroad can own rights of way in fee simple if that is what the deed conveys."
        [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

           Above, Rothstein implies that we generalized the use of the term "right-of-way" rather than follow the very specific precedential requirements that are used to construe the use of those words in a railroad deed. But, it is she who ignores the common law legal precedent which holds the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement. This is the "Railroad Right-of-Way Granting Rule". Instead, Rothstein claims that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, which grants a right-of-way to a railroad, needs a separate "specific restriction on use" in order to be found an easement. This is not common law. Rather, this is a statement of Norm Maleng's "legal theory", and signals Rothstein's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Read my lawyer's brief on this issue, starting on page 13. The portions of this brief highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.

      Read my declaration to Judge Rothstein, starting near the bottom of page 2. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.

      View fourteen citations explaining the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement.

      View forty-four citations explaining how the term "right-of-way" is construed in a railroad deed.

      Look at an in-depth analysis of the meaning of the grant of a railroad right-of-way, in common law.

      Read my Exhibit 1, a study on this subject, submitted with my declaration, and struck by Rothstein.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

(* One Washington case did find that a deed containing the term "right of way" without additional limiting language granted an easement rather than a fee. Veach v. Culp, 92 Wn.2d 570, 599 P.2d 526 (1979). Veach, however did not analyze the circumstances surrounding the transfer or the subsequent behavior of the parties. Evidence on both factors exists here and provides context that was lacking in Veach.)



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that topic.)

      * Rothstein ignores King County v. Squire (1990) because it destroys her dishonest argument.

      * Effectively, the Squire court construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

      * Other SLS&E right-of-way deeds contained the identical granting clause.

      * Rothstein denies my right to resolve disputed material facts, again.

      * Rothstein ignores the right-of-way deed and instead uses "cherry-picked" extrinsic evidence to determine the Hilchkanum's intentions.

    Rothstein ignores King County v. Squire (1990) because it destroys her dishonest argument.

           Rothstein concentrates on only Veach, and ignores the Washington State precedential opinion which destroys her argument, King County v. Squire (1990).

           My lawyer and I briefed the fact that King County v. Squire (1990) clarifies the significant issues in this lawsuit. My statement was struck by Rothstein because she decided that I am not allowed to make legal argument in "her" court. (She provided no legal citation to justify that action.) Additionally, my lawyer's briefing on the subject was simply ignored. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           The Squire and Hilchkanum deeds to the SLS&E were executed just five weeks apart. Their granting clauses are identical. The granting clause of the Squire deed to the SLS&E was found to convey an easement. In this opinion, Rothstein "finds" the identical granting clause in the Hilchkanum to the SLS&E conveys fee simple title. The Squire court identified who authored of the words in the Squire deed. Some of the words were provided from the Railway's "ELS form deed", and some of the words were changed or added by Governor Watson Squire. To distinguish who authored the words of the Squire deed, the Squire court published the words authored by Governor Squire in bold font. The words of the Squire granting clause are taken from the "ELS form deed". Governor Squire made no significant change to his granting clause.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           It's obvious that Rothstein ignored King County v. Squire because it destroys her opinion that Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, wrote the words in his deed to the SLS&E. The Squire court concluded that the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". Rothstein found the identical words in the Hilchkanum granting clause to convey fee simple title. Rothstein refused to acknowledge the legal precedent established by the Squire court. She hid the King County v. Squire conclusions and refused to address the comparison in my declaration and my lawyer's brief.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of both the "form deed", the Hilchkanum deed, and significant portions of the Squire deed.

        Read the comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds that Rothstein refused to make.

    Effectively, the Squire court construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

           As I explained in the paragraph above, the Squire court identified which words were written by the SLS&E Railway lawyers and which words were added or changed by Governor Squire. In construing the words in the deed, the Squire court first concentrated on the granting clause, holding it strongly indicated an easement was conveyed. The words in the Squire granting clause were written by the Railway lawyers and are identical to the words in the Hilchkanum granting clause. I provide the two granting clauses here. The words in red in the Squire granting clause are changes made by Governor Squire, as described in the Squire opinion. There were no changes made by Hilchkanum to his right-of-way deed. By illegally allowing summary judgment, Rothstein denied our right to establish these facts before a jury.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        The Squire Granting Clause:

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:"
        [King County v. Squire (1990)].

        The Hilchkanum Granting Clause:

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit"
        [The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E]

        Read the comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds that Rothstein refused to make.

           Since the granting words in the two deeds are identical, one would assume that Judge Rothstein would be eager to explain why she "found" a grant of fee simple in the Hilchkanum granting clause while the Squire court found the grant of an easement in Squire's identical granting clause. Rothstein refused to explain this inconsistency. Instead, she misrepresented the findings in King County v. Squire by ignoring the analysis of the granting clause and admitting only to the limiting language found in the habendum. On appeal, Judge Fletcher was so afraid of King County v. Squire, that she refused to name the decision when she referred to our briefing on that opinion. Instead, she referred to our briefing on the facts determined by the Squire court as "...the facts of a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way.". Fletcher hid and misrepresented the analysis in King County v. Squire in much the same way that Rothstein did in this opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Open the annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) at the position Judge Fletcher refuses to name King County v. Squire.

    Other SLS&E right-of-way deeds contained the identical granting clause.

           While I understood that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was based on the unaltered SLS&E "form deed", I didn't have the proof that I needed for this webpage. So, I asked my son to go down to the King County Records Office and obtain copies of SLS&E right-of-way deeds which were recorded near the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed in May 1887. Since the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is recorded in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42, Page 250, my son copied all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds he could find in the first 500 pages of Volume 42. There were nineteen SLS&E right-of-way deeds in those 500 pages which were executed between February 4, 1887 and May 27, 1887. So, the below discussion is based on twenty-six recorded SLS&E right-of-way deeds which consist of the nineteen deeds my son found in the Book of Deeds, the Burke deed, the Squire deed which is displayed in King County v. Squire (1990), the SLS&E deeds provided to the court in Lawson v. State (1986), and the ELS deeds presented to the Federal Court of Claims in Beres v. United States (2010). While this is not an examination of all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds, I believe the reader will understand from observing these deeds that this is an adequate number to establish the SLS&E "form deed" which was used at the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

        View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway lawyers as author of the "form deed", the Hilchkanum deed, and significant portions of the Squire deed.

           The SLS&E "form deed" granting clause is determined from the common language found in a number of SLS&E deeds which were executed near the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Here are the Hilchkanum granting clause, the Squire granting clause, and the SLS&E "form deed" granting clause followed by links to a number of other SLS&E deeds containing the identical granting words.

        May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - Granting Clause:

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit."
        [View a photocopy and the full transcription of the May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.]

        March 29, 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - Granting Clause:

        In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:
        [View a photocopy and the full transcription of the March 29, 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.]

        SLS&E "Form Deed" Granting Clause:

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to ("me" or "us") from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory ("I" or "we") do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way ("one hundred (100)" or "fifty (50)") feet in width through ("my", "our" or "said") lands in said County described as follows to wit."
        [View the SLS&E "form deed" which was composed by the SLS&E Railway lawyers]


        View the Lee granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Lurber granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the McGraw granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Stone granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Yonderpump granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Tahalthkut granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Lewellyn granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Burnett granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Pearson granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Davis granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Anderson granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Sbedzuse granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Ashworth granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Bargquist granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Peterson granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Perry granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Palmberg granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

          In this opinion, Judge Rothstein dishonestly construes the words of the Hilchkanum deed against only Hilchkanum, as author of his deed. She was unwilling to explain the common factors in the Squire and Hilchkanum right-of-way deeds in her opinion, so she ignored a comparison of the two deeds. As shown above, it isn't just the Hilchkanum and Squire deed which have identical granting language. This granting language is common to many SLS&E right-of-way deeds and is obviously authored by the Railway lawyers. The authorship of a deed is a material fact. Authorship is important because the words of a deed are construed against the party who prepared, or wrote, the deed. Disagreement with material facts are resolved before a jury. It is not the privilege of a judge to resolve that issue. Rothstein knew that she was illegally manufacturing material facts, and denying my right to establish the truth before a jury, when she "found" Hilchkanum to be author of his right-of-way deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          In my declaration to Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein (The yellow highlighted portions were struck by Rothstein.), I wrote:

          "The Squire deed was granted to SLS&E a few months before the Hilchkanum deed. The established factors used to construe these deeds compare well because these two deeds use almost identical language. 1 The Squire deed was found to be an easement. 2".

          Judge Rothstein struck these words in my declaration, citing no authority to do so. Footnote 1 in my above statement took Rothstein to a study I and provided as Exhibit 1 with my declaration. In that study, I made this statement: My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          King County ignores Squire because it destroys its claim to ownership of my property. Here are the similarities between Hilchkanum and Squire:

            Both deeds granted a right of way to SLS&E for railroad purposes using the same wording. This very strongly suggests an easement.

            Both deeds granted strips of land and limit its use to a specific purpose, using the same words.

            Both deeds granted only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land, using exactly the same words.

            Both deeds were granted with nominal consideration. Neither Hilchkanum nor Squire was paid any monetary compensation for their easements. They both granted a right of way for the "benefits and advantages to accrue", rather than a cash amount. Again, exactly the same words were used.

            Both deeds were established with the same circumstances surrounding the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties because they were established just five weeks apart, on the same railroad line.

              One minor difference between the deeds is that Squire had a clause providing that if the railroad ceased to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor. Hilchkanum did not have such a clause. In Squire that statement is in the habendum. Since the granting clause of the deed already specified a right of way for railroad purposes, the habendum in this case only serves the purpose of explaining or qualifying that grant. That clause simply reinforces the reversionary language already in the granting clause, and is not necessary to prove the deed an easement. This fact is supported in Squire :

                "The Squire deed granted a 'right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands'. This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, 'or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company,' which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the 'so long as' language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the 'so long as' language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and 'to its successors and assigns forever'. The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement.

                In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed."
                    King County v. Squire Investment Co., 59 Wn. App. 888, 894, 801 P.2d 1022 (1990).

            Read the above quote in the context of my Exhibit 1.

          Of course, Judge Rothstein struck all of my above briefing. God forbid that we be allowed to legitimately present our argument. In fact, she struck all of my Exhibit 1. Rothstein needed to strike that information because it correctly analyzed Washington State common law and precedent, and she needed to destroy some of that legal precedent in order to come to her preordained opinion. Rothstein had predetermined to find that Hilchkanum granted fee simple title of the land with his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. This protected the participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme from federal prosecution. Rothstein couldn't allow briefing to be presented that destroyed her opinion, so she struck major parts of our argument. Judge Rothstein struck twelve of my fourteen exhibits. She reduced my exhibits from several hundred pages to eight pages. More important, she denied my constitutional right to establish the facts before a jury. If she had allowed a jury trial all the exhibits and briefing that she struck would have been reintroduced. Rothstein could not let the truth be told in her court. She could not allow us to have a jury trial because no legitimate jury would agree with her that Hilchkanum wrote his deed and granted fee simple title to the Railway. Rothstein committed this crime with the confidence that, on appeal, the judges of the Ninth Circuit would support her dishonesty and protect her. Rothstein was correct.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein denies my right to resolve disputed material facts, again.

      Rothstein states above:

        "Veach, however did not analyze the circumstances surrounding the transfer or the subsequent behavior of the parties. Evidence on both factors exists here and provides context that was lacking in Veach."

           The effect of "evidence" on "factors" is resolved before a jury when there is disagreement. We completely disagreed with the effect of the "circumstances" Rothstein refers to above. Yet, Rothstein declared we agreed with her and allowed herself to decide these issues. This is a complete violation of the rules of summary judgment. Rothstein knew this, and every appeals judge, who studied this lawsuit, knew this. But, it was necessary for Rothstein to deny my constitutional right to a jury because a legitimate jury would never have come to the conclusions which Rothstein irrationally contrived in this opinion. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein ignores the right-of-way deed and instead uses "cherry-picked" extrinsic evidence to determine the Hilchkanum's intentions.

           For those without a law dictionary, when construing a deed, the words of the deed are considered intrinsic evidence. The "circumstances surrounding" and "subsequent behavior" are extrinsic evidence. Here, Rothstein "throws out the baby with the bath." She reluctantly admits that the words of the Hilchkanum deed (intrinsic evidence) are comparable to the Veach deed, which was found to be an easement, but then throws out the comparison because of the "powerful extrinsic evidence" she pretends to find. To find her "powerful extrinsic evidence", she sorts through the Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds and finds one that she can misconstrue to falsely indicate the Hilchkanum's intentions. Further, she hides the subsequent deeds which, when analyzed, would force her to come to a different conclusion. Her tactic to "cherry-pick" the extrinsic evidence is discussed below. Use the following link to open that section.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View the section of this opinion where Rothstein "cherry picks" the extrinsic evidence.

    Reference:

      Look at an in-depth analysis of the meaning of the grant of a railroad right-of-way, in common law.

      Understand Washington common law related to the exception of a railroad right-of-way in a subsequent deed.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

Furthermore, because the Hilchkanums were homesteaders without a final patent, federal law limited them to certain types of conveyances, such as grants to schools, cemeteries, and rights of way to railways. See 17 U.S. Stat. 602. The Act provides more context for the choice of the term "right of way" in the deed, indicating that the Hilchkanums chose the phrase out of necessity rather than a desire to create an easement.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that topic.)

      * Rothstein dishonestly and irrationally names the Hilchkanums as author of their right-of-way deed.

      * Rothstein ignores the court's conclusions in King County v. Squire relating to authorship of the SLS&E form deed.

      * It is obscene that Rothstein cites 17 U.S. Stat. 602 in support of her finding the Hilchkanums granted fee title, but refuses to admit that the United States Supreme Court found the intent of Congress under that act was the grant of an easement.

    Rothstein dishonestly and irrationally names the Hilchkanums as author of their right-of-way deed.

           Above, Judge Rothstein dishonestly establishes the Hilchkanums as authors of their right-of-way deed, ignoring the fact that the lawyers for the Railway wrote the deed. Rothstein states "the Hilchkanums chose the phrase out of necessity". With this statement and her previous statement that "...it is clear that the parties knew how to limit a grant, and that they chose not to limit the right of way", she is establishing that the Hilchkanums actually wrote their deed and therefore are responsible for the meaning of the words of the deed. This is completely ridiculous. The Hilchkanums were illiterate Native Americans, born in a tribal environment, and then displaced in the 1850s from their tribal lands onto treaty reservations. After the Hilchkanums gave up their tribal affiliation in order to apply for a homestead and live off reservation, they had this railway right-of-way deed placed in front of them to sign. Native Americans were at the mercy of white settlers in those days, so they signed the right-of way deed. They didn't write the deed, they didn't alter the deed, and they certainly aren't responsible for the legal meaning of the words in the deed. Indians died when they resisted the will of the white settlers in those days, yet this judge has decided that the Hilchkanums wrote the deed and chose the words in their deed with the ability and learning of skilled lawyers. Ridiculous! My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Understand the Hilchkanums participation and intentions with their right-of-way deed.

           In the paragraph, above, Rothstein decides that the Hilchkanums intended to convey fee simple title, but were forced to use the contradictory words "right-of-way" "out of necessity". According to Rothstein, this legal tactic by the Hilchkanums was based on their critical understanding of Act of 3 March 1873, and the amendment in the Act of 3 March 1875, relating to "Indian" homesteading. The Hilchkanums could not read or write the English language, but Rothstein finds that they based their words in the right-of-way deed on their expert understanding of these federal acts. She does this without any fact or document to support her conclusion. She does this in the face of the many documents that we provided that would force her to come to the opposite conclusion. Rothstein should resign as a judge, and write fairy tales. She has had a lot of practice writing fiction with this decision.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           I paid over $10,000 to a respected title researcher to examine, and analyze, the chain of deeds that established my property right in the land contested in this lawsuit. This title researcher, Steve Graddon, of Graddon Consulting and Research, Inc, explained to me that there were a number of Native American deeds involved in the establishment of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway. None of the American Indians altered the deeds presented to them by the Railway. Yet, Judge Rothstein decided that the Hilchkanums chose the words in their deed, and then she construed the words against only the Hilchkanums.

           It is a material fact who wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, what the intentions of the parties were with the deed, and what ability the Hilchkanums had to participate. Summary judgment is allowed only when the material facts are in agreement. It is simply criminal that Rothstein would not allow us to establish the fact that Hilchkanum did not write his deed to the SLS&E. It is criminal that Rothstein would not allow us to establish that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was the unaltered form deed written my the Railway lawyers. It is criminal that Rothstein denied our right to present an honest analysis of the Hilchkanum's participation in their right-of-way deed. Rothstein intentionally violated the rules of summary judgment by sorting through the disputed facts to find those that supported her predetermined outcome to the case, then dishonestly declared that we were in agreement with those facts.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Earlier in this opinion, Judge Rothstein struck much of our argument and exhibits. I repeat here a struck portion of my lawyer's briefing.

            "Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian. At the very best he was functionally illiterate, and "made his mark" when he signed legal documents. Thus, all drafting of any ambiguous documents was completed by the railroad’s representative. In this case Bill Hilchkanum and his wife signed a document that did not comport with the necessary elements for conveyance of a fee simple interest, because of the qualifying and limiting language of the document."

        Open the location in this annotated opinion where Rothstein strikes this briefing.

           The importance of her striking my lawyer's statements becomes apparent at this place in her opinion. Here, Rothstein establishes Hilchkanum as author of the words in his right-of-way deed and describes him as an expert in deed construction. Her irrational set of facts are contrary to the statements in my lawyer's brief. So, Rothstein struck my lawyer's briefing and a similar statement that I made in my declaration, and then decided the lawsuit by use of summary judgment. Summary judgment requires that there be no disagreement with the material facts. By striking my lawyer's briefing and my declaration on this subject, Rothstein removed evidence that we disagreed with her contrived material facts. It is particularly offensive to me that she justified the striking of my lawyer's briefing by falsely accusing us of racial prejudice. Rothstein played the "race card" in order to eliminate our argument. This was an evil act by a very dishonest federal judge. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein ignores the court's conclusions in King County v. Squire relating to authorship of the SLS&E form deed.

           In the section directly above, I explain that Rothstein has dishonestly established Hilchkanum as author of the words in his right-of-way deed, and construed the meaning of those words against only Hilchkanum. Rothstein does this without directly addressing the issue of authorship. Instead, she makes conclusions as if Hilchkanum's authorship is a given fact. Authorship is a critical material fact that Rothstein knew we disputed, so she only indirectly addressed authorship by construing the deed as if Hilchkanum' authorship had been established. The authorship of the deed is a material fact which would be established by a jury in a legitimate court of law. Rothstein did not allow that constitutional right in "her" court. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Authorship is a critical material fact because, in common law, the words of a deed are construed against its author. Here is a citation to support that statement.

        "Initially, it should be noted that contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it. Underwood v. Sterner, supra; Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn.2d 162, 332 P.2d 454 (1958); Restatement, Contracts SS 236 (d) (1932)."
        [Stickney v. Underwood (1966). The citation is on page 3 in yellow highlight.]

           Judge Rothstein dishonestly assumes Hilchkanum is author of his deed and construes the words against only Hilchkanum. She uses that assumption without any fact or document for justification. She does this and in spite of our statement that the Railway lawyers wrote the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, and the many documents we provided which describe Hilchkanum's inability to participate in the construction of his deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Rothstein's "web of lies" becomes even more complex with a statement she makes in her subsection "c. Circumstances Surrounding Execution" below. In that subsection of her argument, she makes this statement.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The Squire and Northlake deeds are modeled off the same form deed as the Hilchkanums'."
        [Open subsection "c. Circumstances Surrounding Execution" to observe this statement by Judge Rothstein.]

           If Hilchkanum wrote the words in his right-of-way deed, as Rothstein states or implies above, and the Hilchkanum deed is built off the same "form deed" as the Burke and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E, then Rothstein is finding that Hilchkanum authored the words in those deeds, too. Of course this is not the case. The truth is that the SLS&E Railway lawyers prepared a form deed which was taken to the settlers to sign. The truth is that Hilchkanum signed the form deed without making any changes. But, Judge Rothstein wasn't interested in the truth in this opinion. Rothstein was interested in protecting the participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by determining that Hilchkanum conveyed fee simple title to the SLS&E in his right-of-way deed. This would make BNSF, successor to the SLS&E interest, the owner of the land under the ELS right-of-way and would make BNSF's tax donation of that land to King County a legitimate transaction. So, we get this "web of lies" by Judge Rothstein about Hilchkanum's authorship of his right-of-way deed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

           The SLS&E form deed and its authorship was established in King County v. Squire (1990). In Squire, the court published the significant portions of Watson Squire's right-of-way deed. The Squire court then identified which words were altered or added by Governor Squire. By default, the remaining words were provided from the SLS&E form deed which was prepared by the Railway lawyers. By comparing these words from the SLS&E form deed to the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, one can see that Hilchkanum did not make changes to the SLS&E form deed. This establishes the Railway lawyers as author of the Hilchkanum deed, and requires that the analysis of the granting language by the Squire court be considered in the construing of the identical granting words in the Hilchkanum deed.

           As I stated above, we were prepared to show that Hilchkanum and the other Native American homesteaders did not modify the Railway-prepared right-of-way "form deed" in any way. Rothstein intentionally denied our right to establish that material fact. Instead, in the portion of the Rothstein opinion above, Rothstein finds illiterate Hilchkanum to be an expert in the law and the author of the words of the deed. Rothstein knew that we did not agree with that material fact, yet she illegally allowed summary judgment and issued this horribly flawed and dishonest decision which protected the participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Judge Rothstein, and on appeal Judge Fletcher, refused to apply the legal analysis which had been correctly applied in King County v. Squire (1990). I wrote that Squire destroys King County's claim of ownership. Of course, Judge Rothstein struck my statement, and then ignored a comparison of the Squire and Hilchkanum right-of-way deeds. Judge Fletcher was so afraid of drawing attention to King County v. Squire (1990) that she refused to refer to Squire by name and instead referred to "...a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way." What dishonesty! My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read a study which compares the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

    It is obscene that Rothstein cites 17 U.S. Stat. 602 in support of her finding the Hilchkanums granted fee title, but refuses to admit that the United States Supreme Court found the intent of Congress under that act was the grant of an easement.

           17 U.S. Stat. 602 is the encoding of the Act of March 3, 1873. The Act allowed for a homesteader to grant a right-of-way to a railroad across his homestead prior to the grant of his patent. This overcame a requirement of the Homestead Act which forbid any alienation of the homestead prior to patent.

        17 U.S. Stat. 602 (my emphasis)

        "March 3, 1873. CHAP. CCLXVI. - An Act to authorize Pre-emptions or Settlers upon Homesteads on the public Land to alienate Portions of their Pre-emptions or Homesteads for certain public Purposes.

               Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any person who has already settled or hereafter my settle on the public lands of the United States, either by pre-emption, or by virtue of the homestead law or any amendments thereto, shall have the right to transfer by warranty, against his or her own acts, any portion of his or her said pre-emption or homestead for church, cemetery, or school purposes, or for the right of way of railroads across such pre-emption or homestead, and the transfer for such public purposes shall in no way vitiate the right to complete and perfect the title to their pre-emptions or homesteads. Approved, March 3, 1873."
          [17 U.S. Stat. 602]

           Rothstein shows that homesteaders were allowed, by law, to grant rights-of-way to railroads prior to patent, but she fails to admit that the United States Supreme Court had found that Congress intended these grants to be easements. Instead, Rothstein interpreters 17 U.S. Stat. 602 to allow homesteaders to grant fee simple title of their land to railroads for the use of rights-of-way. Apparently, Judge Rothstein does not feel bound by the opinions of the United States Supreme Court. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           The United States Supreme Court dealt with the meaning of the term "right-of-way" in Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S., 315 U.S. 262 (1942). This Supreme Court decision looked at the history of laws governing the establishment of railroads in the 1800's. It found that the meaning of "right-of-way", as used in the Right-of-Way Act of March 3, 1875, was an easement, and not a grant of fee simple title. While Great Northern dealt with The Act of March 3, 1875, the discussion of Congressional intent in the use of the term "right-of-way" after 1871, would apply equally to the Act of March 3, 1873 (17 U.S. Stat. 602).

      Here is a portion of Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S. (1942): (my emphasis)

        "The Act of March 3, 1875, from which petitioner's rights stem, clearly grants only an easement, and not a fee. Section 1 indicates that the right is one of passage since it grants 'the', not a, 'right of way through the public lands of the United States'. Section 2 adds to the conclusion that the right granted is one of use and occupancy only, rather than the land itself, for it declares that any railroad whose right of way passes through a canyon, pass or defile 'shall not prevent any other railroad company from the use and occupancy of said canyon, pass, or defile, for the purposes of its road, in common with the road first located'.1

        Section 4 is especially persuasive. It requires the location of each right of way to be noted on the plats in the local land office, and 'thereafter all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way'.2 This reserved right to dispose of the lands subject to the right of way is wholly inconsistent with the grant of a fee. As the court below pointed out, 'Apter words to indicate the intent to convey an easement would be difficult to find' (119 F.2d 825). That this was the precise intent of Section 4 is clear from its legislative history. 3 While Section 4 pro- [315 U.S. 262, 272]   vides a method for securing the benefits of the Act in advance of construction,4 no adequate reason is advanced for believing that it does not illumine the nature of the right granted. The Act is to be interpreted as a harmonious whole.

        The Act is to be liberally construed to carry out its purposes. United States v. Denver, etc., Railway Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 , 14 S.Ct. 11, 15; Nadeau v. Union Pacific R. Co., 253 U.S. 442 , 40 S.Ct. 570; Great Northern R. Co. v. Steinke, 261 U.S. 119 , 43 S. Ct. 316. But the Act is also subject to the general rule of construction that any ambiguity in a grant is to be resolved favorably to a sovereign grantor-' nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit language'-Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20 , 21 S., 39 S.Ct. 397, 398, and cases cited. Cf. Great Northern R. Co. v. Steinke, supra. Plainly there is nothing in the Act which may be characterized as a 'clear and explicit' conveyance of the underlying oil and minerals. The Act was designed to permit the construction of railroads through the public lands and thus enhance their value and hasten their settlement. The achievement of that purpose does not compel a construction of the right of way grant as conveying a fee title to the land and the underlying minerals; a railroad may be operated though its right of way be but an easement. 5   [315 U.S. 262, 273]   But we are not limited to the lifeless words of the statute and formalistic canons of construction in our search for the intent of Congress. The Act was the product of a period, and, 'courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed'. United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 91 U.S. 72 , 79. And see Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 , 5 S.Ct. 606, 609; Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490, 494 , 13 S. Ct. 634, 635; United States v. Denver, etc., Railway Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 , 14 S.Ct. 11, 15.

        Beginning in 1850 Congress embarked on a policy of subsidizing railroad construction by lavish grants from the public domain. 6 This policy incurred great public disfavor7 which was crystallized in the following resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on March 11, 1872:

          'Resolved, that in the judgment of this House the policy of granting subsidies in public lands to railroads and [315 U.S. 262, 274]   other corporations ought to be discontinued, and that every consideration of public policy and equal justice to the whole people requires that the public lands should be held for the purpose of securing homesteads to actual settlers, and for educational purposes, as may be provided by law.' Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1585 (1872).

        After 1871 outright grants of public lands to private railroad companies seem to have been discontinued. 8 But, to encourage development of the Western vastnesses, Congress had to grant rights to lay track across the public domain, rights which could not be secured against the sovereign by eminent domain proceedings or adverse user. For a time special acts were passed granting to designated railroads simply 'the right of way' through the public lands of the United States. 9 That those acts were not intended to convey and land is inferable from remarks in Congress by those sponsoring the measures. For example, in reporting a bill granting a right of way to the Dakota Grand Trunk Railway (17 Stat. 202), the committee chairman said: 'This is merely a grant of the right of way'.10 Likewise, in reporting a right of way bill for the New Mexico and Gulf Railway Company (17 Stat. 343), Mr. Townsend of Pennsylvania, the same Congressman who sponsored the Act of 1875, observed: 'It is nothing but a grant of the right of way.' 11   [315 U.S. 262, 275]   The burden of this special legislation moved Congress to adopt the general right of way statute now before this Court. Since it was a product of the sharp change in Congressional policy with respect to railroad grants after 1871, it is improbable that Congress intended by it to grant more than a right of passage, let alone mineral riches. The presence in the Act of Section 4, which, as has been pointed out above, is so inconsistent with the grant of a fee, strongly indicates that Congress was carrying into effect its changed policy regarding railroad grants. 12  

        Also pertinent to the construction of the Act is the contemporaneous administrative interpretation placed on it by those charged with its execution. Cf. United States v. Johnston, 124 U.S. 236, 253 , 8 S.Ct. 446, 454; United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760 , 763; Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 , 53 S. Ct. 350, 358. The first such interpretation, the general right of way circular of January 13, 1888, was that the Act granted an easement, not a fee. 13 The same position was taken in the regulations of March 21, 1892, 14 L.D. 338, and those of November 4, 1898, 27 L.D. 663. While the first of these circulars followed the Act by 13 years, the weight to be accorded them is not dependent on strict contemporaneity. Cf. Swendig v. Washington Water Power Co., 265 U.S. 322 , 44 S.Ct. 496. This early administrative gloss received indirect Congressional approval when Congress repeated the language of the Act in granting canal and reservoir companies rights of way by the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, 26 Stat. [315 U.S. 262, 276]   1101, 43 U.S.C.A. 946, and when Congress made the Act of 1875 partially applicable to the Colville Indian Reservation by Act of March 6, 1896, c. 42, 29 Stat. 44. Cf. National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 , 40 S.Ct. 237, 239.

        The circular of February 11, 1904, 32 L.D. 481, described the right as a 'base or qualified fee'. This shift in interpretation was probably due to the description in Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267 , 23 S.Ct. 671, 672, of a right of way conveyed in a land-grant act (13 Stat. 365) as a 'limited fee, made on an implied condition of reverter'.14 But the earlier view was reasserted in the departmental regulations of May 21, 1909, 37 L.D. 787.15 After 1915 administrative construction bowed to the case of Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44 , 36 S.Ct. 5, which applied the language of the Townsend case to a right of way acquired under the Act of 1875. We do not regard this subsequent interpretation as binding on the Department of the Interior since it was impelled by what we regard as inaccurate statements in the Stringham case. Cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 , 60 S.Ct. 444, 452, 125 A.L.R. 1368

        Congress itself in later legislation has interpreted the Act of 1875 as conveying but an easement. The Act of June 26, 1906, c. 3550, 34 Stat. 482, 43 U.S.C.A. 940 declaring a forfeiture of unused rights of way, provides in part that: 'the United States hereby resumes the full title to the lands covered thereby (by the right of way) freed and discharged from such easement'. This language is repeated in the forfeiture act of February 25, 1909, c. 191, 35 Stat. 647, 43 U.S.C.A. 940. Also on June 26, 1906, an act16 was passed confirming the rights of way which certain railroads had acquired under [315 U.S. 262, 277]   the 1875 Act in the Territories of Oklahoma and Arizona. The House committee report on this bill said: 'The right as originally conferred and as proposed to be protected by this bill simply grants an easement or use for railroad purposes. Under the present law whenever the railroad passes through a tract of public land the entire tract is patented to the settler or entryman, subject only to this easement'.17 It is settled that 'subsequent legislation may be considered to assist in the interpretation of prior legislation upon the same subject.' Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 309 , 31 S.Ct. 578, 583, 584. See also Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682 , 11 S.Ct. 222; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556. These statutes were approximately contemporaneous with petitioner's acquisition of the rights of way of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway.

        That petitioner has only an easement in its rights of way acquired under the Act of 1875 is therefore clear from the language of the Act, its legislative history, its early administrative interpretation and the construction placed upon it by Congress in subsequent enactments."
        [Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S., 315 U.S. 262 (1942)]

           Great Northern dealt with The Act of March 3, 1875. In her above paragraph, Judge Rothstein is characterizing the intent of the U.S. Congress in the Act of March 3, 1873 (17 U.S, Stat. 602). So, one could argue that this analysis of the Act of March 3, 1875 by the United States Supreme Court would not apply to Rothstein's analysis of the Act of March 3, 1873 (17 U.S, Stat. 602). But, as one can see from the discussion in Great Northern above, the Supreme Court looked at the intent of Congress, in its use of the term "right-of-way", from 1850 onward. The Supreme Court differentiated between the earlier land grant law, which granted land to the railroads, and the later right-of-way laws. The U.S. Supreme Court found the intent of Congress in "17 Stat. 202" and "17 Stat. 343" was to use the term "right-of-way" as an easement. Both of those Statutes were passed in 1872, prior to The Act of March 3, 1873 (17 U.S, Stat. 602). So, this analysis of the intent of Congress by the U.S. Supreme Court would apply to the Act of March 3, 1873 (17 U.S, Stat. 602). Rothstein's dishonest assumption that the Act of March 3, 1873 (17 U.S, Stat. 602) allowed settlers to convey fee simple title of the land under their rights-of-way is contradicted by the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of the intent of Congress in Great Northern.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Judge Rothstein had no right to interpret the grant of a right-of-way under 17 U S Statute 602 as the grant of fee simple title, when the United Supreme Court had found the intent of Congress, with those words, was to grant an easement. Rothstein has the very dishonest habit, throughout this opinion, of citing a legal source and then assigning a different meaning than is understood when the citation is studied in its context.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Understand that the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their deed is a material fact which is required to be determined by a jury, if disputed.

      View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

      Understand the meaning of the words that grant a right-of-way to a railroad.

      Read my Exhibit 1, a study on this subject, submitted with my declaration, and struck by Rothstein.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

Moreover, other aspects of the language favor a fee simple. The deed grants a "strip" of land described in metes and bounds rather than merely a right "over" the land (as it does with the tree-cutting grant). The deed uses the word "convey" when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers (notably, "convey" is absent in the tree-cutting grant). See Hanson, 208 P.2d at 119. Finding that the overall language contains no restriction, the court concludes that the Hilchkanums intended to convey a fee interest to the Railway.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein lies in her statement above:

      * It is a lie that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "'strip' of land".

      * It is a lie that describing a property interest in metes and bounds implies a fee simple conveyance.

      * It is a lie that the word "convey" implies a fee simple conveyance.

      These lies are discussed separately, below.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    * It is a lie that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "'strip' of land".

           The Hilchkanums didn't grant a "'strip' of land" as Rothstein writes above. Judge Rothstein's dishonest claim that the Hilchkanum deed grants a "'strip' of land" ties her to Norm Maleng's "legal theory". The substitution of the term "right-of-way" with the term "strip of land" is an essential element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory".
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Here, again, is the Hilchkanum granting clause. One needs to simply read it to understand that a "right of way" is granted, not a "'strip' of land".

        "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit..."
        [Granting Clause of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.]

           At the beginning of this opinion, Rothstein prints significant portions of the Hilchkanum deed. The deed grants a "right of way". From that point on, Judge Rothstein refers to the land disputed in this lawsuit as a "right of way strip" or a "strip of land" or simply a "strip". It is acceptable, but sloppy, to describe the land that is the subject of this lawsuit in those terms, but it in not acceptable to state that the deed grants a "'strip' of land". What is granted must be stated in the legal terms used in the deed, not substituted, generalized, confusing, and contradictory language. Judge Rothstein knows this. How and where the words "right of way" are used in a railroad right-of-way deed is critical to the understanding of what is granted. In the paragraph above, Rothstein intentionally misstates what was granted in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. A "'strip' of land" was not granted in the Hilchkanum deed. A "right of way" was granted. If one reviews her opinion to this point, this is the first time she has made this very dishonest statement. The discussion and citations below will explain how the words "right of way" are construed in railroad deeds.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           The grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been held to be an easement in Washington State/Territory, until this very dishonest opinion by Judge Rothstein. To avoid her responsibility to observe this precedent, Rothstein simply states that the deed grants a "'strip' of land". There is no such grant in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed! Rothstein ignores the many times this issue has been analyzed in Washington railroad right-of-way deeds, but we will not ignore the issue. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           What is granted in a deed is a material fact that is critical in construing the deed. In our briefs, we pointed out clearly that the grant was of a "right of way". The only justification for Rothstein changing what is granted in a deed would be for her to cite some law of legal precedent allowing the substitution of contradictory terms in a deed. Of course there is no such law or precedent. What is granted in the deed is a disputed material fact that should have been presented to a jury. Rothstein refused to comply with this rule of summary judgment because no legitimate jury would determine that a "strip of land" was conveyed in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. A person simply needs to read the deed to understand this intentional lie by Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Below, are forty-four abbreviated citations which explain the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. The opinions, from which the citations are derived, span over one hundred years and are consistent in their interpretation that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is the grant of an easement. Each abbreviated citation is a hyperlink which will take the reader to its location in its respective opinion. Read these opinions in their entirety to understand how the words "right-of-way" are construed in railroad deeds. (Citations with my emphasis)

      Citations Explaining the Meaning of the Words "Right-of-way" in Railroad Deeds:

      (Citations are in reverse chronological order, with my emphasis on the terms "right-of-way" and "easement".)

        2000: Roeder v. K&E Storage (2000)
          "Because the words "right of way" appeared only in each deed's legal description or in the description of the railroad's obligations, instead of in the granting or habendum clauses, the court concluded that '[u]sed in this manner, 'right of way' merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines; it does not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses.'"

        1996: Brown v. State of Washington (1996)
          "We have given special significance to the words "right of way" in railroad deeds."

          "...we held the deed granted an easement based on the specifically declared purpose that the grant was a right of way for railroad purposes..."

          "...the term "right of way" as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant generally creates only an easement."

          "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway." ... "Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations..." "Used in this manner, "right of way" merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines; it does not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses."

          Dissenting Opinion: "...where the granting clause...declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement only..."

          Dissenting Opinion: "...an easement is not created unless the magic words "right of way" are contained in the 'granting clause.'"

          Dissenting Opinion: "...Morsbach does not narrowly define "granting clause" nor does it require the right of way purpose be expressed in any particular words."

          Dissenting Opinion: "Where the purpose is right of way...it was the intent of the parties to grant...an easement."

          Dissenting Opinion: "...majority...giving "special significance to the words 'right of way' in railroad deeds,"...finding the absence...overpowering in significance."

          Dissenting Opinion: "A grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely..."

        1993: Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)
          "...when the granting clause...declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only..."

        1990: King County v. Squire (1990)
          "...rights of way granted to a railroad are frequently held to create easements."

          "[W]hen the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose...to be a right of way...the deed passes an easement only..."

          "...construing the deed as a whole, held...instrument conveyed a right of way easement..."

          "...The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way...This suggests an easement was conveyed."

          "...right-of-way...language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement..."

          "...language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed."

        1986: Lawson v. State (1986)
          "...where a deed is construed to convey a right of way for railroad purposes only, upon abandonment...the land...reverts...free of the easement...."

        1986: Roeder v. BNSF (1986)
          "Since the granting clause...declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement..."

          "...land being conveyed as "a right-of-way"...has been found to create an easement..."

        1979: Veach v. Culp (1979)
          "The parties...describe what was being conveyed: a right-of-way...Language like this has been found to create an easement..."

          "...language of the deed...describing the conveyance of a right-of-way...we conclude the deed conveyed an easement..."

        1977: Zobrist v. Culp (1977)
          "...when the granting clause...declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only..."

        1956: Scott v. Wallitner (1956)
          "...in none of these transactions was there a grant of a right of way for the purpose of building a railroad..."

        1950: Swan v. O'Leary (1950)
          "...when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only..."

        1929: Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)
          "...we held that the reservation was of a right of way creating nothing more than an easement..."

          "...an instrument reserving and excepting a strip of land...conveyed...for a right of way...only an easement was granted..."

          "...construed as a whole...in the light of the purpose...it was made, was a grant of a right of way or easement..."

          "...grant of the right of way...was intended to convey simply the right of way and easement..."

          "...a conveyance...granting a right of way...will be held to have taken an easement merely..."

          "...granting clause...conveys only a right of way, which is a mere easement..."

          "...Where the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose...to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement only, and not a fee..."

          "...Where the granting clause declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement..."

          "...the granting clause"..."described as follows, to wit: The right of way for a railroad"..."conveyed an easement only, and not a fee."

          "...grant involved was of a right of way...across a tract of land"..."held...that...an easement...was granted."

          "In the Uhl case...what meaning...given 'right of way' used in the granting clause of the deed...its effect...to vest...an easement..."

          "...grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely..."

        1910: Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)
          "The grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement..."

        1905: Abercrombie v. Simmons et al (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1905)
          "...in regard to the right of way...the grant...vests...an easement..."

          "...a deed releasing and quitclaiming to a railroad company a right of way...did not acquire the fee of the land."

          "...the words "right of way" in a grant to a railroad company means an easement..."

        1894: Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co.(1894)
          "The conveyance is one of a mere right of way habendum to the grantee...and show the grant of an easement only..."

        1893: Biles v. Tacoma, Olympia & Gray's Harbor R.R. Co.(1893)
          The term "right-of-way" means "easement".

           The term "right-of-way" can have two different meanings when used in a railroad right-of-way deed. To understand which meaning is intended, a person must examine how and where the words "right-of-way" are used. The decisions, above, establish the rules that are used to understand which meaning is intended. One rule stands out and controls this opinion. The grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad has always been held to grant an easement in Washington State/Territory. That is, it has been a consistently held precedent until this very dishonest decision and its ugly offspring, King County v. Rasmussen (2002)] and Ray v. King County (2004).
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           There is a reason that Judge Rothstein changed the words in the Hilchkanum grant. She had predetermined that the deed would grant a fee simple interest. She could not come to that conclusion if she admitted that the deed granted a "right of way" and referenced the precedent established in the forty-four citations shown above.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           In the mid 1990's, a federal tax fraud scheme was concocted by the leadership of King County, BNSF, and a couple of "public interest" lawyers, which netted King County a free bike path along East Lake Sammamish, and netted BNSF a $40 million illegal tax write-off. A number of powerful people in King County participated in the crime, including judges. I describe the crime as "Theft-by-Community". There was a problem that needed fixing in order for the tax fraud scheme to succeed. The land under the right-of-way was mostly easements and therefore not owned by BNSF. In order to hide the tax fraud scheme, it was necessary to establish that BNSF actually owned the land under its ELS right-of-way. BNSF couldn't take a tax write-off for donating land it didn't own. Since the King County Prosecutor, Norm Maleng, was a prominent participant in the tax fraud, he needed to devise an argument to keep himself out of federal prison. The result was Norm Maleng's "legal theory". This "legal theory" was first presented by Senior Deputy Prosecutor Bill Blakney in a 1997 memorandum. Later, Norm Maleng's "legal theory" was promoted in King County's briefs to various courts, including the briefs to this court. But, to get the "legal theory" to work, it required a judge to cooperate and "find" that BNSF owned fee simple title to the land under the right-of-way. That would require the judge to misconstrue original right-of-way deeds by ignoring one hundred years of consistently held legal precedent. It would require the judge to steal the land from its rightful owners and award ownership to BNSF. It would require a judge to deny the constitutional rights of the people she was defrauding. Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein is that crooked judge. This is the very dishonest decision that hides the tax fraud scheme and protects the participants. This is the first of several opinions which adopt Norm Maleng's "legal theory". If you didn't understand how things are done in the Federal Ninth Circuit, you will after you study this opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    * It is a lie that describing a property interest in metes and bounds implies a fee simple conveyance.

           The fact that the Hilchkanum right-of-way was described in metes and bounds does not indicate that it was a fee simple grant of a "'strip' of land". While Rothstein does not explicitly make that claim, she implies it with her statement "The deed grants a "strip" of land described in metes and bounds rather than merely a right "over" the land..." There is no presumption that a description in metes and bounds implies a fee simple grant. If that were the case, it would be impossible to accurately describe the borders of an easement in a deed. This issue is also well established common law in Washington State. Here is a citation that supports that precedent:
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "The fact that the exact boundaries of the right-of-way were set out does not outweigh the express intent of the grantor to convey only a right to use the land, not the land itself."
        [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)]

    * It is a lie that the word "convey" implies a fee simple conveyance.

           Rothstein's statement that the "...deed uses the word "convey" when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers..." is, again, completely dishonest. The word "convey" is also commonly used to grant easements. Since the issue here is whether the grant is fee or easement, to imply that the word "convey" in the Hilchkanum deed indicates that the grant is fee simple, is completely dishonest. Rothstein provides no citation to support her analysis. Instead, she cites Hanson, which is not a decision dealing with railroad rights-of-way. More importantly, the statement in Hanson does not support Rothstein's analysis that the word "convey" in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed indicates the deed grants fee simple title. Click on this hyperlinked citation from Hanson to take you to the citation in the context of the whole decision. Read King County v. Hanson (1949) to confirm that Rothstein is completely wrong in her analysis. Then, read four citations from railroad decisions to understand that the word "convey" is commonly used in the granting of railroad easements. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "It is also the settled rule in this state, as elsewhere, that a deed which by its terms conveys the land to a grantee operates as a grant of the fee, although it may also contain a recital designating, or even restricting, the use to which the land may be put."
        [King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. (1849)]

           Rothstein cites King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. and then misinterprets it meaning with respect to this opinion. Hanson Inv. Co. does not find that the word "convey" is associated with fee simple grants. It's completely dishonest by Rothstein to make that statement. Judge Rothstein uses this same tactic throughout this opinion. She cites other opinions and then misrepresents the meaning of the citations. Further, she ignores Washington State railroad right-of-way decisions which use the word "convey" and were found to be easements. Here are four examples: (my emphasis)
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The granting clause gives to the grantee, his heirs or assigns, "the right and privilege of surveying and laying out, by his or their agents and engineers, through, over, across and along the land hereinbefore described the route and site of said railroad," and grants, bargains, sells and conveys unto the said party of the second part and to his heirs and assigns, a right of way for said railroad..."
        [Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. CO (1894)]

        Reichenbach was found to grant an easement.

        "...by these presents give, grant, bargain, sell and convey unto said Northern Pacific Company, or its assigns the following described premises, viz: the right-of-way for the construction of said company's railroad..."
        [Morsbach v. Thurston Co. (1929)]

        Morsbach was found to grant an easement.

        "...by these presents do sell, convey, remise, release and forever quit-claim unto said part*y* of the second part, and to *his* heirs and assigns, the following described premises, situate, lying and being in the County of Thurston, State of Washington, *for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way..."
        [Swan v. O'Leary (1950)]

        Swan was found to grant an easement.

        "... we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way..."
        [ King County v. Squire (1990)]

        Squire was found to grant an easement.

    Summary:

      Her short paragraph above contains a concentrated set of lies by Judge Rothstein.

        Rothstein lied when she stated a "'strip' of land" was conveyed in the Hilchkanum deed. This lie helped her avoid a one hundred year old precedent which holds the grant of a "right of way" to a railroad is always an easement.

        Rothstein lied when she implied the fact the Hilchkanum right-of-way was described in metes and bounds presumes the grant was fee simple. This is an old argument that has always failed.

        Rothstein lied when she implied that the word "convey" in the Hilchkanum granting words indicates Hilchkanum intended to grant fee simple title. Her citation does not support that ridiculous analysis.

      I'm sick of Rothstein's lies and dishonesty in this opinion.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

b. Later Behavior of the Parties

The Hilchkanums' descriptions of the rest of their land in later transfers buttress the intent gleaned from the plain language. After the grant to the Railway, Mary Hilchkanum conveyed her portion of the homestead to her husband. He then conveyed the homestead to a third party. Each deed states that it is "less" the land of the right of way. When parties execute later deeds, they also carve out exceptions for the right of way - as the Hilchkanums did. This is a strong indication that the parties viewed the grant to the Railway to be a fee simple. See Harris, 844 P.2d at 1013 (any other interpretation would render exception "superfluous"); Scott, 299 P.2d at 205.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    In this portion of her opinion, Judge Rothstein misrepresents the extrinsic evidence and then misapplies the legal meaning of that evidence. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Rothstein dishonestly states above:

        "Each deed states that it is "less" the land of the right of way. When parties execute later deeds, they also carve out exceptions for the right of way - as the Hilchkanums did."

      Rothstein's dishonesty involves these elements. (Each element is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that topic.)

        * Rothstein "cherry-picks" the extrinsic evidence.

        * Rothstein dishonestly substitutes the word "land" for the term "right-of-way".

        * Rothstein misrepresents exception law.

        * Rothstein goofs, and gets sloppy.

    Rothstein "cherry-picks" the extrinsic evidence.

           None of the land contested in this lawsuit contained this exception language when it was transferred to outside parties. Rothstein implies here that Hilchkanum always excepted the right-of-way land in his subsequent deeds. This is a self-serving lie. Three deeds conveyed the right-of-way land which was contested in the King County v. Rasmussen lawsuit to third parties. None of these deeds excepted the right-of-way land. The Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904 conveyed 96% of the contested land and did not except the right-of-way. The Hilchkanum warranty deed to Edward Sanders, September 3, 1904 conveyed 3% of the contested land and did not except the right-of-way. The Hilchkanum warranty deed to John Herder, June 30, 1905 conveyed 1% of the contested land and did not except the right-of-way.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Rothstein ignored the most relevant deeds and instead "cherry-picked" deeds which were not in the chain of title to the land involved in this lawsuit. She ignored the most relevant deeds because they do not support her misrepresentation of exception law. Instead, she "cherry-picked" the extrinsic evidence, and then states/implies that the words of those "cherry-picked" deeds were representative of all the Hilchkanum subsequent deeds. This is a lie.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Rothstein refers to King County Prosecutor Scott Johnson's Exhibit 5 in her statement above. The deeds which Johnson provides deal mostly with Hilchkanum's land on Government Lot 1. None of my land, the land contested in this lawsuit, was on Government Lot 1. To understand Rothstein's dishonesty, I'll first hyperlink these two deeds for the reader. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson Exhibit 5-2 (Quit Claim deed Annie Hilchkanum to Bill Hilchkanum, August 25, 1899)

        King County Deputy Prosecutor Scott Johnson Exhibit 5-1 (Warranty Deed Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson, February 27, 1904)

           As I stated above, these two deeds deal mostly with Government Lot 1, and none of the land involved in this lawsuit is on Government Lot 1. Further, we provided research and exhibits which established the chain of title from Hilchkanum's homestead to the present. Rothstein ignored our exhibits and instead concentrated on land that was not in the chain of title of this lawsuit. The deed which should have been most significant for Judge Rothstein to consider was the Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904, which conveyed Government Lot 2 and comprised 96% of the contested land. So, why did Rothstein analyze a deed to Chris Nelson for Government Lot 1, and ignore the deed to Chris Nelson for Government Lot 2? It would appear she did this because that Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904, for Government Lot 2, did not except the right-of-way. Instead, she considered the less relevant Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, February 27, 1904 for Government Lot 1, which did except the right-of-way. She then dishonestly states/implies in her paragraph above that all the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds excepted the right-of-way land.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein dishonestly substitutes the word "land" for the term "right-of-way":

           Next, Rothstein writes in her paragraph directly above, "Each deed states that it is 'less' the land of the right of way." This is a complete lie, again. She added the word "land" to her earlier citation. This isn't the only instance in this dishonest opinion where Rothstein changes the words in a deed she cites. She changed the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way granting clause when she analyzed it. Near the beginning of this opinion, Rothstein makes this statement: (Note: Rothstein incorrectly names Mary Hilchkanum where she should have named Annie Hilchkanum.)
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "Mary Hilchkanum later conveyed her portion of the homestead property to her husband by quitclaim deed. The conveyance is "less (3) three acres right of way to Rail Road." Bill Hilchkanum then conveyed the property to a third party "less three (3) acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle International Railway for right of way purposes." Later conveyances of the property included language "excepting" the Railway right of way from the legal descriptions."

          View the quit-claim deed from Annie Hilchkanum to Bill Hilchkanum on August 25, 1899.

           This earlier paragraph shows that Rothstein's own words describe the exceptions as "right of way". Hilchkanum did not except "land" in his subsequent deeds. How did the exception change from "right of way" at the beginning of this opinion, to "land" in this portion of Rothstein's opinion? There is a major difference between excepting "land" and excepting a railroad "right-of-way". When a railroad has been granted a "right-of-way", it has always been found to be an easement (until this opinion). If that right-of-way is later excepted in a subsequent deed, the exception merely recognizes the easement and does not except the land. This is common law in Washington State. This issue is discussed, in detail, in the following hyperlink.

        Read an explanation of the exception of a railroad right-of-way in a deed, under Washington State common law.

    Rothstein misrepresents exception law:

           Last, Rothstein's statement: "any other interpretation would render exception 'superfluous'" is completely dishonest. Here, she is stating that her interpretation of the meaning of the exception language in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds can have only the one meaning she has dishonestly assigned. To do this, she cites a short portion of Harris v. Ski Park Farms, and then assigns the citation a completely different meaning than is understood when it is read in the context of Harris. She uses her dishonest interpretation of that older decision as a false precedent in this decision. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Read the Harris v. Ski Park Farms decision and compare the circumstances in that deed to the circumstances in the Hilchkanum subsequent deeds. In Harris, you will find that the grantor excepted a right-of-way which had been abandoned, but the abandonment was unknown to the grantor. So, what was granted in the deed? In construing a deed, the court is required to enforce the intentions of the parties at the time they executed the deed. In this case the grantor was claiming different intentions in his lawsuit than were evident from the words in his deed. Was the grantor lying in his lawsuit? Was there some other interpretation of the deed words in Harris which would explain the inconsistency? The court struggled to understand the intentions of the grantor in this unusual circumstance. The hypertext link, below, gives greater context to the situation in Harris. Click on the hyperlink to be taken to the citation in the context of the complete Harris v. Ski Park Farms decision. Read the whole decision, Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993), to understand how Rothstein takes words out of context and assigns them different a meaning in her opinion. Rothstein cannot fairly apply the unusual circumstances in Harris v. Ski Park Farms to the circumstances of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, but she did. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The court stated that its conclusion as to Winkelman's intent was necessary because to hold otherwise would make the exception language "superfluous". However, that language would be superfluous only if Winkelman intended to except an easement knowing that an easement no longer existed. Since Winkelman did not know of the abandonment (and the resulting fee interest), it cannot be said with certainty that it intended to reserve the fee interest in the right of way." Harris v. Ski Park Farms,120 Wn.2d 727,844 P.2d 1006(1993)
        [Harris v. Ski Park Farms (1993)]

           To understand the correct interpretation of the use of exception language in a deed, I present a citation from Zobrist v. Culp (1977). One needs to read the Zobrist opinion and compare it to the Harris opinion in order to understand the complete dishonesty by Rothstein in explaining the exception of the railroad right-of-way in Hilchkanum's subsequent deeds. This takes a little time and energy. Rothstein counts on the fact that folks will simply believe her, and not make that comparison. One needs to read the whole decision to confirm this. I provide this quote from Zobrist for those unwilling to make that effort. Click on the hyperlink to be taken to the citation in the context of its complete decision.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "The conveyance of a fee simple interest with a clause excepting an easement previously deeded to a third party, therefore, conveys to the grantee all the grantor's rights and interests in the land, yet compels the grantee to refrain from acting in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the third party in the land as described in the exception."
        [Zobrist v. Culp (1977)].

           Zobrist is stating that the exception of an easement in a deed simply recognizes the existence of the easement, and nothing else. So, when a right-of-way is excepted in a deed, this question needs to be answered first: Is the right-of-way grant an easement or fee? If the right-of-way is an easement, then the precedent in the above citation from Zobrist would apply.

           Rothstein works the logic backwards in this opinion. She misstates the words of her "cherry-picked" Hilchkanum subsequent deeds, claiming that Hilchkanum excepted the land under his right-of-way in those subsequent deeds. The truth is that Hilchkanum excepted the right-of-way, not land, in only some of his subsequent deeds. Then Rothstein claims that the exception language in his subsequent deeds proves his intentions in his right-of-way deed. This is reverse logic. Rothstein needed to determine what Hilchkanum granted in this right-of-way deed in order to understand what he excepted in his subsequent deeds.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           It is not required to except an easement in a deed because the restrictions in the easement carries on to the grantee whether it is stated in the deed, or not. It is more common for folks to find easements in their title report. So, it would be optional to include the exception of an easement in the deed. Therefore, the fact that Hilchkanum excepted the railroad right-of-way in only some of his subsequent deeds should have forced Rothstein to admit that Hilchkanum (and the white men who helped him prepare his subsequent deeds) understood his right-of-way grant was easement. If Hilchkanum believed that the railroad owned the land under the right-of-way, as Rothstein contends, he would have been required to except the land under the right-of-way in every subsequent deed. Otherwise, he would be selling the land under his right-of-way a second time with his subsequent deeds which did not contain an exception. Judge Rothstein hides this critical conflict in her logic by hiding the fact that only some of the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds excepted the right-of-way. Instead, she states/implies that all the Hilchkanum subsequent deeds contained exception language. Further, Rothstein throws in her ridiculous "any other interpretation would render exception 'superfluous'" statement to mislead the reader. As I stated above, the most relevant subsequent deed for this lawsuit, the Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904, did not contain an exception. Honestly construing the language in this deed would force Rothstein to admit the likelihood that Hilchkanum considered his right-of-way grant to be an easement. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           I ask this question. How is that I can find several relevant "except language" decisions in a legal database and Federal Judge Rothstein, with her top-law-graduate clerks, cannot find the same relevant decisions? The logical answer is that Rothstein intentionally misrepresents the law here. She does this to protect the participants in the federal tax fraud scheme from taking a "vacation" in federal prison. She does this to force her predetermined outcome to this case. By doing this, Rothstein destroys my rights as a citizen of the United States. In Rothstein's court, the "truth" and the "law" is whatever she says it is. It depends on Rothstein's whim. Apparently, this is business-as-usual in Ninth Circuit courts because her blatant dishonesty was upheld on appeal by the three judge appeals panel and the full Ninth Circuit, en banc. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein goofs, and gets sloppy.

           Further, in her above statement, Rothstein gets the name of Bill Hilchkanum's wife wrong, and misstates the acreage that is plainly displayed in the deed she cites. Rothstein claims that "Mary Hilchkanum later conveyed her portion of the homestead..." If one reads the quit-claim deed from Annie Hilchkanum to Bill Hilchkanum on August 25, 1899, one will realize that "Mary Hilchkanum" was not the person who executed that quit claim deed. Further, Rothstein misstates the acreage involved in that deed. While I believe that these mistakes are minor, I point them out because Judge Rothstein harshly enforces the rules in the admissibility of our briefs and exhibits. This can be seen in her decision to strike large portions of our briefs and exhibits. If Rothstein insists that every "t" be crossed and every "i" be dotted in our briefs and exhibits, then she should demand the same perfection from herself and King County. She doesn't. The basic concept in resolving a lawsuit is to establish the facts (the truth) and then apply the law. Rothstein manipulates the facts and the law in this opinion, based in part on her nitpicking our arguments and exhibits. I simply point out here that she applies her harsh standards only to us. When seen in the context of her dishonesty in almost every paragraph of this opinion, on can understand that her harsh standards are not to fairly apply the law, but rather to manipulate and predetermine the outcome of this decision. If perfection is Rothstein's goal, she should start with herself.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Read a study analyzing the exception of railroad rights-of-way in a deed.

      Read the Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson, March 15, 1904. This deed conveyed 96% of the land contested in this lawsuit and did not contain exception language.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

c. Circumstances Surrounding Execution

Finally, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed confirm an intent to convey a fee interest. Deeds from other landowners during the same time period contain different language than the Hilchkanum deed. The Squire and Northlake deeds are modeled off the same form deed as the Hilchkanums'. Northlake, 857 P.2d at 286-87; Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023. However, both Squire and Northlake contain additional language that specifically restricts the grant to railroad purposes and reverts the interest to the grantor if the railroad ceases to operate. Northlake, 857 P.2d at 286-87; Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023. Nowhere in the Hilchkanums' deed are there any such limitations. See generally Danya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 Ecology L.Q. 351, 378 (2000) (explaining that railroads used form fee simple deeds and then added language to reflect limitations requested by landowners, which resulted in railroads possessing a variety of fee and easement interests along the same tracks).



    Note from John Rasmussen:
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Rothstein is dishonest in her paragraph above:

      Topics Discussed in this Note:  (Each topic is presented as a hyperlink. Use this menu to jump to that topic.)

        * Rothstein contradicts herself by earlier assigning authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to Hilchkanum, and now admitting the Hilchkanum deed is based on a "form deed".

        * If Rothstein claims that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is based on a "form deed". So, why doesn't Rothstein provide that "form deed" in this "opinion"?

        * Rothstein intentionally misrepresents the decisions construing the Squire and Burke deeds.

        * Having established the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is based on a "form deed", Rothstein then dishonestly states that all railroad "form deeds" were designed to convey fee simple title, and that it was up to the landowner to add or change the deed language if he wanted the deed to convey an easement.

        * Rothstein's "wacko 'form deed' theory" is not supported by Washington State common law.

      Each of these issues is discussed below.

    Rothstein contradicts herself by earlier assigning authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to Hilchkanum, and now admitting the Hilchkanum deed is based on a "form deed".

      Judge Rothstein states above:

        "The Squire and Northlake deeds are modeled off the same form deed as the Hilchkanums'."

           "Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practise to deceive!" (Sir Walter Scott)   Rothstein now finds herself caught in the web of lies that she has built throughout this decision. After dishonestly construing all the words in the deed against Hilchkanum and establishing him the author of his deed, she now admits that the Hilchkanum deed is built on the same "form deed" as the Squire and Burke (Northlake decision) deeds. If Hilchkanum wrote all the words in his deed, and his deed is built on the same "form deed" as the Squire and Burke deeds, then we are forced to conclude that Hilchkanum wrote the "form deed" that was used to establish all three of these deeds. Since these three deeds are built on the same "form deed" that was used to establish the other deeds to the railway, we must then conclude that Hilchkanum wrote the basic "form deed" used for the entire length of the SLS&E railway. Rothstein refuses to explain how this could be possible. Judge Thomas Burke was the lead attorney and co-founder of the Railway, yet Rothstein finds that Burke's deed was essentially written by Hilchkanum, an illiterate American Indian. Judge Burke became Chief Justice of the Washington Territory Supreme Court a year after the Hilchkanum deed was written. He was considered an expert in property law. Watson Squire also was a lawyer. Further, Squire was the governor of Washington Territory. How is it that Judge Rothstein can find that an American Indian, who could not read or write the English language, wrote the deeds for these two powerful lawyers? Her made-up material fact that Hilchkanum wrote his deed, and hence the other SLS&E deeds, is ridiculous.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a study of the SLS&E "ELS form deed" which identifies the Railway lawyers as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

    Rothstein claims that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is based on a "form deed". So, why doesn't Rothstein provide that "form deed" in this "opinion"?

           Any legitimate judge who identifies a "form deed" would logically provide that "form deed". In Brown v. State of Washington (1996), the Washington State Supreme Court identified a "form deed" used by the Milwaukee Railroad to obtain deeds in Washington State. Use the following link to observe that the Supreme Court supplied that "form deed" in Brown.

        View the "form deed" described in Brown v. State of Washington (1996).

           A number of ELS residents have gone to the United States Federal Court of Claims claiming the SLS&E right-of-way deeds associated with their properties are easements. Federal Judge Marian Horn recognized that the deeds before her were based on a "form deed" and published that "form deed" in her opinion. Use the following link to open her opinion Beres v. United States (2010) and go to page 2 to view the "form deeds" she identified.

        Open Beres v. United States (2010) and go to page 2 to view the "form deed"

           So, Judge Rothstein claims that the Hilchkanum deed is based on a "form deed" but doesn't identify that "form deed". Why? The answer is that the Hilchkanum deed is based on an unaltered version of the "ELS form deed". Railroad "form deeds" are prepared by the railroad, so the words of a railroad "form deed" would be construed against the railroad as author. (This is discussed in the next section, below.) But, in an above paragraph Rothstein stated the following: My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        "Furthermore, because the Hilchkanums were homesteaders without a final patent, federal law limited them to certain types of conveyances, such as grants to schools, cemeteries, and rights of way to railways. See 17 U.S. Stat. 602. The Act provides more context for the choice of the term "right of way" in the deed, indicating that the Hilchkanums chose the phrase out of necessity rather than a desire to create an easement."
            [Open this Rothstein citation in a new window.]

           In that citation, Rothstein states as a fact that Hilchkanum chose the term "right of way" in his granting clause in order to comply with 17 U.S. Stat. 602. That unfounded and ridiculous lie established Hilchkanum as author of the words in his granting clause. But here, Rothstein is claiming that the Hilchkanum deed is based on a "form deed". The obvious truth is that the Hilchkanum deed is based on an unaltered version of the "ELS form deed". Had Rothstein recognized that truth, or allowed that truth to be established in "her federal court", she would have been forced to conclude that the Railway lawyers chose the term "right of way" in the Hilchkanum granting clause, not Hilchkanum. Further, if the truth had been allowed in "her federal court", Rothstein would have acknowledged that the identical SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause had been construed to be an easement in King County v. Squire (1990). But, since Rothstein had determined to find the Hilchkanum deed granted fee simple title in order to protect the active participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, she doesn't publish the "form deed" she refers to here. As I wrote above, "Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practise to deceive!" (Sir Walter Scott). If you give a liar like Federal Judge Rothstein enough space, she will start to contradict herself, as she does here.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      The Railway lawyers wrote the Hilchkanum deed:

           If the Hilchkanum deed was based on a "form deed", as Rothstein states, then we had the right to establish the material fact of who wrote that "form deed". The answer was that Judge Thomas Burke and attorney George Haller, co-council for the railway, were responsible. If we had been allowed our right to establish that fact, Rothstein would have been required to construe the words of the "form deed" against the Railway. Her decision in King County v. Rasmussen would have had a different outcome, if she had honestly done that.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           In 1887, Thomas Burke and George Haller had their representatives take the "form deed" to the landowners along the proposed route of the SLS&E Railway and obtain right-of-way deeds. If the "form deed", prepared by Burke and Haller, was altered by these landowners, then only those altered words should have been be held against the landowner in construing the deed. The words that these landowners used to alter the "form deed" expressed their intentions in the deed. The words in the basic "form deed" represent the intentions of the owners of the Railway and should be construed against the Railway lawyers and Railway owners. As stated above, Thomas Burke and George Haller wrote the "form deed". The words that Burke and Haller wrote indicate the Railway's intentions in the deeds, and should be construed against the Railway.

           Rothstein denied our right to have our deed researcher prove that none of the deeds signed by Native Americans had the language altered from that basic "form deed". This was true of the Hilchkanums, who were Natives. Rothstein didn't allow us to establish that fact because it would have forced her to construe the words in the Hilchkanum deed against the Railway, and come to a different opinion concerning the fee-easement issue. Rothstein had predetermined to find the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to be a fee simple transfer of ownership, and the fact that the SLS&E lawyers wrote the deed interfered with her dishonest logic. So, Rothstein assigned the Hilchkanums as author and construed every word in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against them. It is a sacred constitutional right for the parties to a lawsuit to have the opportunity to establish the facts in a lawsuit. Rothstein didn't believe I should have that constitutional right.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           In my research to expose the criminal nature of this and the other Hilchkanum opinions, I've obtained twenty-eight right-of-way deeds associated with the SLS&E on East Lake Sammamish, Washington. Of those twenty-eight deeds, twenty-six are SLS&E right-of-way deeds which were filed in King County. Of those twenty-six filed SLS&E deeds, five of the deeds were signed with an "X" by the grantors. The signing of a deed with an "X" is an indication that the grantor was illiterate. Below, are the five deeds I've researched which are signed with an "X". Please read them to understand they are identical in the elements which explain the easement-of-fee issue. Further, understand they are unaltered versions of the SLS&E "ELS form deed". In real courts of law, a jury would have looked at these facts. But, Rothstein doesn't believe in the right to a jury, as she demonstrates in this "legal opinion".
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View the Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it's based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Yonderpump Right-of-Way Deed to confirm it's based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Tahalthkut Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Sbedzuse Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

        View the Davis Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

      The authorship of the SLS&E "form deed" was established in King County v. Squire (1990):

           The Squire court identified which words were written by the Railway lawyers and which words were added by Watson Squire. I stated in my declaration that an examination of the Squire decision destroys King County's claim of ownership. Of course, Judge Rothstein struck my statement and struck a study that supported that statement. My study was presented as exhibit 1 with my declaration. Then, Judge Rothstein misrepresented the Squire decision in this opinion by refusing to admit that the granting words are identical in the Squire and Hilchkanum deeds, and that the Squire court found that those words granted an easement. When this dishonest opinion was appealed, Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher was so afraid of the comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire deeds that she referred to the King County v. Squire (1990) decision as "a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way." Fletcher lacked the honesty to even name the Squire decision, which would invite a comparison.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a study comparing the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

        Read my Exhibit 1, a study on this subject, submitted with my declaration, and struck by Rothstein.

    Rothstein intentionally misrepresents the decisions construing the Squire and Burke deeds:

           Judge Rothstein makes this statement above:

        "...both Squire and Northlake contain additional language that specifically restricts the grant to railroad purposes and reverts the interest to the grantor if the railroad ceases to operate. Northlake, 857 P.2d at 286-87; Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023. Nowhere in the Hilchkanums' deed are there any such limitations."

           Judge Rothstein is completely dishonest when she states that the reversion words in the Squire and Burke deeds are the only reason those deeds were found to be easements. By reversion words, Rothstein is referring to the words in the habendum of each deed that stipulate that the use of the land reverts to the grantor on abandonment. Here are the habendum words from these two deeds: (My emphasis on the reversion language.)
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Squire Habendum:

        "To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888...."

        Burke Habendum:

        "To have and to hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever for railway purposes; but if it should cease to be used for a railway the said premises shall revert to said grantors, their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns."

           Rothstein states that the reversion language is the only language in the Squire and Burke deeds which cause them to be easements. This is just another lie by Judge Rothstein. This is an important lie because the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed does not have a similar reversion statement in its habendum. This is Rothstein's method of ignoring a comparison of these three deeds. So, lets look at the opinions which construed the Squire and Burke right-of-way deeds and see if the court came to the same conclusion as Rothstein. Again, Rothstein's conclusion was that, in Squire and Pacific Iron Works, the reversion language was the only reason that the courts found the Squire and Burke deeds to be easements.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           In Squire the court found that the words in the granting clause strongly suggested and easement. Those granting words are identical to the granting words in the Hilchkanum deed. Read this citation from Squire to verify this fact. (my emphasis.) Click on the hyperlink to go to the citation's location in the complete Squire decision.

        "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, "or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company," which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the "so long as" language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the "so long as" language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and "to its successors and assigns forever". The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement."
            [King County v. Squire (1990)]

        Read an in-depth comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

           The Burke right-of-way deed was construed in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910), but the habendum was not published in that decision. The Burke habendum was published in Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993). In Pacific Iron Works the court found that the grant of a right-of-way in the granting clause caused the deed to grant an easement. The granting clause the Hilchkanum deed conveys a right-of-way, too. Read this citation from Pacific Iron Works to verify that the grant of a right-of-way was the reason the deed was found to be an easement. (with my emphasis.) Click on the hyperlink to go to the citation's location in the complete Pacific Iron Works decision.

        "...when the instrument is construed as a whole and in the light of the purpose for which the grant was made, it is a grant of a right of way or easement and nothing more.

               "The grant of a right of way to a railroad company is the grant of an easement merely and the fee of the soil remains in the grantor. Although the language used in the granting part of the deed and in the habendum is appropriate, and that commonly used to convey the fee, yet the clause descriptive of the use to be made of the land may so limit or qualify the grant as to change it from a fee to an easement." Cyc. 1162; Robinson v. Missisquoi R. Co., 59 Vt. 426, 10 Atl. 522.
        [Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910)]

           Rothstein states that the reversion language is the only reason the Squire and Burke right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E were found to be easements. But, when one goes to the opinions which construed these two deeds, one finds that Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein has lied again. In the two citations above, one can see that the grant of a right-of-way in the granting clause was the reason these two deeds were found to be easements. The same grant of a right-of-way to the same railroad is found in the Hilchkanum deed, yet Rothstein dishonestly finds the Hilchkanum deed grants fee simple title.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Having established the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is based on a "form deed", Rothstein then dishonestly states that all railroad "form deeds" were designed to convey fee simple title, and that it was up to the landowner to add or change the deed language if he wanted the deed to convey an easement.

           In her paragraph above, Rothstein makes this statement:

        "See generally Danya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 Ecology L.Q. 351, 378 (2000) (explaining that railroads used form fee simple deeds and then added language to reflect limitations requested by landowners, which resulted in railroads possessing a variety of fee and easement interests along the same tracks)"

           It is completely dishonest for Rothstein to explain that all the railroad deeds in the 1800s and 1900s, which were based on "form deeds", were written to grant fee simple interest. Let's call this her "wacko 'form deed' theory". In this all encompassing statement, Rothstein lumps together the early deeds, that resulted from Congressional land grants, with the later deeds, which were written after Congress stopped land grants. Rothstein's all encompassing statement lumps together the national railroads, which were chartered to cross the continent, with the small intrastate railroads like the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E,) which were founded and chartered by local folks who obtained rights-of-way from their friends and neighbors. Rothstein lumps together all railroad deeds, over all time, under all circumstances. It is obscene that Rothstein would make such an all encompassing, unfounded, and completely ridiculous statement. In my discussion above, I provided citations from the opinions which construed the Squire and Burke right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E. Those opinions establish the SLS&E "form deed" and construe the words in that "form deed" to convey easements. The SLS&E "form deed" is the issue that Rothstein needs to address in her analysis of the Hilchkanum deed. Instead, we get her "wacko 'form deed' theory". Of the two opinions, the analysis in Squire absolutely destroys Rothstein's argument that the Hilchkanum deed was based on a "form deed" and therefore was intended to grant fee simple interest to the Railway. The Squire court identified which words were from the SLS&E "form deed" and which words were added by Governor Squire. The Squire court found that the words in the SLS&E "form deed" granted an easement. This conclusion by the Squire court is completely opposite to Rothstein's "wacko 'form deed' theory" that all railroad "form deeds" granted fee simple title.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Understand how a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds, combined with the analysis in King County v. Squire (1990), destroys Rothstein's argument.

           When I first read this dishonest opinion, I was surprised to see the reference to "Pipes, Wires and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries". I wondered where Rothstein got this reference. King County made no mentioned of that book in its briefs. So, I tried to find a copy to read. First, I checked the King County Library system. The book was not available from the King County Library. Then, I did a search on the internet. There was only one place I could find to obtain "Pipes, Wires and Bicycles" on the internet. It was available from the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy. How did a book written by rails-to-trails activists, and not readily available, become the basis of a "wacko 'form deed' theory" theory by a federal judge? Two lawyers associated with the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy were active participants in the federal tax fraud scheme, which is the unstated factor responsible for the dishonesty of this opinion. Rothstein struck large amounts of our argument and exhibits under questionable authority, and refused to grant oral arguments. But, it appears she may have granted private oral argument to representatives of the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy. Considering her dishonesty in every paragraph of this opinion, this seems a likely event. Additionally, I question the objective analysis in this book written by Wright and Hester. This irrational theory that all railroad "form deeds" were written to convey fee simple interest is a theory that makes no sense in an historical sense, but nicely serves the needs and agendas of rails-to-trails activists.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read a discussion about criminal activity at the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy.

    Rothstein's "wacko 'form deed' theory" is not supported by Washington State common law.

           There is no merit in Judge Rothstein's "wacko 'form deed' theory" that all railroad "form deeds" were written to convey fee simple title and that it was up to the landowner grantors to add language to change the deeds to be easements. We have over one hundred years of consistently held common law precedent in Washington State to use to construe railroad right-of-way deeds. No previous opinion supports Rothstein's "wacko 'form deed' theory". Below, I provide fourteen precedential citations which show that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is the grant of an easement. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "right of way" to the SLS&E Railroad, yet Rothstein finds the Hilchkanum deed grants fee simple title. An honest look at the analysis in King County v. Squire (1990) destroys Rothstein's "wacko 'form deed' theory", but Rothstein mischaracterizes Squire in order to hide her dishonesty. Further, I provide forty-four citations in a second hyperlink that explain how the words "right of way" are understood in railroad deeds. None of these citations support Rothstein's "wacko 'form deed' theory".
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

        View fourteen citations explaining the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad conveys an easement.

        View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

        Understand how a comparison of the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds, combined with the analysis in King County v. Squire (1990), destroys Rothstein's "wacko 'form deed' theory".

    Summary:

          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this summary are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Judge Rothstein is completely dishonest in her above paragraph. She states that "form deeds", like the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, were written to grant fee simple title and that it was up to the grantor to add language to change the conveyance to an easement. This is a ridiculous lie and not supported by Washington State common law.

           For proof of her "wacko 'form deed' theory", Rothstein claims that the Squire and Burke right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E were construed to be easements only because of reversion language added to their habendum clauses. I provided citations from the decisions construing the Squire and Burke deeds which prove Rothstein to be a liar. These deeds were found to be easements because of the grant of a right-of-way in their granting clauses. The grant of a right-of-way in the Squire and Burke deeds was part of the SLS&E "deed form" and not words added by grantors, as Rothstein dishonestly claims. The Hilchkanum deed has the same granting language. A study of this "form deed" is provided by a link in the reference section below.

           It is ridiculous and suspicious for Rothstein to cite "Pipes, Wires and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries" as a legal authority because it suggests she conspired with activists from the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy in the authorship of this opinion.

      My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this summary are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      View a study of the SLS&E "form deed" which identifies the Railway as author of both the "form deed" and the Hilchkanum deed.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The language of the deed, the behavior of the parties, and the circumstances converge to show the Hilchkanums' intent to convey a fee simple. Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Rasmussens, only isolated words support their argument, and the evidence does not "clearly indicate" an intent to condition the conveyance. The County, as the Railway's successor, possesses a fee simple in the strip of land. *

(*The Rasmussens submitted evidence that the deed incorrectly describes the boundaries of the right of way. This does not alter the County's rights, because the location of the actual tracks controls. See DD&L, Inc. v. Burgess, 51 Wn. App. 329, 753 P.2d 561, 564 (1988). )



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Rothstein summarizes her dishonesty here:
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           This is a summary of Judge Rothstein's dishonest analysis, misstatements, and violation of my rights. I'll briefly comment on each.

      "language of the deed"

           Rothstein actually changed the "language of the deed" when she construed the words. The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed granted a "right of way" to the Railway. Rothstein changed the words of the deed to grant a "'strip' of land". Based on this dishonest substitution of words, Rothstein found that the deed granted fee simple title to land.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      "behavior of the parties, and the circumstances"

           Rothstein manufactured abilities and "behavior" for Hilchkanum that are not evident from the history of the times or the documents supplied to her as exhibits. She manufactured "circumstances" that did not exist by cherry-picking the extrinsic evidence. Both of these issues are discussed in more detail in the next portion of this comment.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      "the light most favorable to the Rasmussens"

           The rules of summary judgment required Rothstein to view the material facts in "the light most favorable" to me, the non-moving party. She writes that she does this, but actually she did exactly the opposite. Here are a couple of examples:

        * The Hilchkanums were Native Americans and at great disadvantage in legal dealings. They were illiterate, and as "Indians" were on the bottom rung of society in the late 1800's when they signed the right-of-way deed that was placed in front of them by representatives of the Railway. We briefed the Hilchkanum's disadvantage and provided exhibits that supported our contentions. Further there were federal and state laws that recognized this problem. Judge Rothstein not only failed to view this information in "the light most favorable to the Rasmussens", but found that the Hilchkanums had the legal understanding and skill of lawyers. She came to this bizarre conclusion without any substantiation whatsoever.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          Understand Hilchkanum's disadvantage in legal dealings.

        * For another example, Rothstein sorted through the Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds to find evidence of their intent in their railroad right-of-way deed. In order to "find" the Hilchkanum's intentions, she ignored the subsequent deeds which would be construed in a "light most favorable to the Rasmussens", and instead used a subsequent Hilchkanum deed which was not associated with the land contested in the lawsuit. She then misstated the legal understanding of the words in that cherry-picked deed.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          View a critical subsequent Hilchkanum deed which Rothstein refused to consider.

        * For a third example, Rothstein failed to display the complete Hilchkanum right-of-way deed at the beginning of this opinion. One part she left out was the portion which showed DT Denny to be a witness to the deed. We provided documents that showed that David (DT) Denny was the white man that Hilchkanum depended upon for legal help in those days. But, David Denny was also one of the owners of the Railway. If Hilchkanum wrote his right-of-way deed, as Rothstein so dishonestly determines in this opinion, then Rothstein was required to acknowledge that one of the owners of the Railway was the person who helped Hilchkanum write the deed. If Rothstein had any intention to view the facts in a "light most favorable" to me, as she states above, then she would have admitted DT Denny's authorship of the Hilchkanum deed. This would have established the Railway as author of the deed and forced Rothstein to construe the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed in a different "light".My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

          View the full Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E and a photocopy of the original.

      Judge Rothstein didn't view the material facts in "the light most favorable to the Rasmussens". She did quite the opposite. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The County's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and title is quieted in the County's favor.

2. Declaratory Relief

Because the County posses a fee simple in the strip of land, it has the right to access the property without interference from the Rasmussens. The County motion for summary judgment on its second clause of action is GRANTED.

C. Motion to Dismiss

The County has moved to dismiss all the Rasmussens' counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1), 12 (b) (6). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if, based on the complaint and attachments, the party can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to relief. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997). Counterclaims (a), (d), (f), and (g) rely on finding that the Rasmussens own the strip of land. Because the court has quieted title in the County, the Rasmussens have no rights to the strip of land and none of the counterclaims state a claim for which relief can be granted.

The Rasmussens attempt to overcome this conclusion by arguing that the County's title is invalid, because the STB order that authorized railbanking was allegedly invalid. By challenging the STB proceedings, the Rasmussens are asking the court to reverse an STB order. See Dave v. Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, 79 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1996) (court looks at whether practical effect of cause of action requires review of order); Grantwood Village v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 95 F.3d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 1996) (challenge to property transfer required review of order). The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over any proceeding "to enjoin or suspend, in whole or in part, a rule, regulation, or order of the Surface Transportation Board ... ." 28 U.S.C. paragraph 2321 (a); see also Dave, 79 F.3d at 942; Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 879 F.2d 316, 320 (8th cir. 1989); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 43 F.Supp.2d 708, 711 (E.D. Tex. 1999). Thus, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Rasmussens' argument, and the Rasmussens fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The County's motion to dismiss counterclaims for violations of 16 U.S.C. paragraph 1358, and the Washington State Constitution, Article 1, Section 16 will be GRANTED.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Rothstein misrepresents our argument:

           We argued that the abandoned section of the railroad was a spur line which would not be under control of the Surface Transportation Board. Our argument was that that the STB did not have jurisdiction, and therefore its decision and orders were void. The STB cannot issue orders over railroad segments that are not under federal control. Rothstein misrepresents this issue, here. We were not asking the court to reverse a STB order. We were asking the court to recognize that the STB had no jurisdiction, and to therefore find the STB order authorizing railbanking was invalid. The STB cannot establish jurisdiction by simply issuing an order, it has to have the authority to issue that order. Subject matter jurisdiction is a matter for this court and is not limited by the short period for appeal which was established by the STB. It's one of the dirty little secrets of the Rails-to-Trails Act that the owners of the land under railroad easements are given no legitimate notice of the railbanking transaction. When they do learn of the "smoke filled room" transaction that bargained away their land, the short period of appeal, set by the STB, has often passed.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           It is important to understand that the Rails-to-Trails Act an immoral, but legal, act of Congress. Do not confuse this immoral Act with the outright crimes involving federal tax fraud, and their cover-up, which I discuss in detail on this website. The first is disgusting, the second is criminal.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

           Judge Rothstein misrepresents our argument here by stating that our complaint should have been taken to the STB. Of course, Rothstein knew that the period for appeal to the STB had long passed. How convenient. Rothstein ducked her responsibility to look at the issue of whether the East Lake Sammamish BNSF spur line was under the authority of the STB (federal government), or whether it was under the authority of Washington State law. This is a "states rights" issue which Rothstein did not have the character or honesty to address.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Read my lawyers brief on this topic starting at page 11.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

Counterclaims (b) and (c), for violation of the first Amendment and Second Amendment, do not explicitly rely on the Rasmussens' ownership of the land.*

(* The Rasmussens failed to include an allegation that the County violated 42 U.S.C. paragraph 1983 in either counterclaim (b) or (c). Instead, they stated the allegation as a separate counterclaim. The Rasmussens have acknowledged in their briefing that the Section 1983 allegation was intended to be incorporated into the other causes of action rather than stand alone. Therefore, the court will incorporate 42 U.S.C. paragraph 1983 into counterclaims (b) and (c) and counterclaim (e), which contained the misplaced Section 1983 allegation, will be DISMISSED.)

However, both causes of action still fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. A cause of action against a county for constitutional violations requires both allegations of unconstitutional behavior and allegations that the conduct resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 570 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1986). The Rasmussens' counterclaims do not allege any specific behavior by the County that violated their rights. Moreover, the Rasmussens do not allege any policies, customs, or practices that violated their rights. In their briefing, but not in the counterclaims, the Rasmussens quote numerous county ordinances. They do not allege that any of these ordinances violated their rights, nor do they explain any actions County employees took to enforce the ordinances that somehow violated the Rasmussens' rights. The Rasmussens have failed to plead any facts to support the basic elements of their causes of action and have therefore failed to state a claim. The County's motion to dismiss counterclaims (b) and (c) for violations of the First Amendment and Second Amendment will be GRANTED. *



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    Rothstein refused to let me establish King County's violation of my civil rights:

           In the section "II. ANALYSIS, A. Motion to Strike Briefing and Evidence" at the beginning of this opinion, Rothstein strikes large portions of my declaration and exhibits. One of the portions of my declaration that she struck is "Page 12, lines 11-15 of the declaration, which contain legal argument". If one goes to that page of my declaration and reads what she struck, along with the related statements, I believe one will find the "missing" allegation and justification of a civil rights violation. It appears to me that, in her discussion above, Rothstein struck the very information that she cannot "find" in order to justify my civil rights claim. In this case, justice is truly "blind", unable and unwilling to see what was placed before her. Further, as I stated in my note responding to her striking of so much of my declaration and exhibits, Rothstein cites no rule for striking that information. Without a rule or law to justify her striking of that portion of my declaration, Rothstein violates my constitutional right of due process. Go to my declaration, page 12, lines 11-15, view what Rothstein struck, and decide if she illegally struck my civil rights claim.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Go to Page 12 of my declaration to view the portions Rothstein struck here. (Portions struck by Rothstein are highlighted in yellow)

           Further, Rothstein states above:

      "... the Rasmussens do not allege any policies, customs, or practices that violated their rights."

           My declaration describes criminal activity by King County and fifteen months of stonewalling by the county when I demanded an explanation for their illegal activities. This constitutes an official policy to violate my rights, but Rothstein simply denies that fact. When there is a disagreement about facts, I have a constitutional right to establish those facts before a jury. Rothstein denies my right to a jury to resolve the facts, and instead manufactures the fact that I did not allege a violation of my rights or provide facts that show a policy or practice to violate my rights by the County.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Read my declaration to Judge Rothstein and decide if my claim of violation of my first Amendment and Second Amendment rights was adequately documented. (Portions struck by Rothstein highlighted in yellow)

           Here are a series of letters to King County, all of which required an answer. None were answered in any significant way. Read these letters and decide for yourself if the County has established a pattern to deny my civil rights.

        April 9, 1999 email to Ron Sims demanding that the county recognize my property rights. No Response.

        April 14, 1999 email to Governor Gary Locke, requesting assistance defending my rights. No Significant Response.

        April 21, 1999 email to the King County prosecutor demanding that the county recognize my property rights. Vague Response.

        April 26, 1999 email from the King County prosecutor. Vague, non-specific response.

        April 29, 1999 email to the King County prosecutor. I demand he stay off my property until I was compensated for the taking. No Response.

        June 21, 1999 email to Ron Sims and County Council. I demanded they justify their trespass on my property. No Response.

        July 4, 1999 email to Ron Sims, County Council and Sheriff. I asked they respect my property rights on the Forth of July. No Response.

        July 15, 1999 email to Ron Sims, County Council and Sheriff. I demanded they justify their trespass on my property. No Response.

        August 2, 1999 email to the King County prosecutor demanding he explain his "clear view" of the legal situation on ELST. No Response.

        August 11, 1999 email to the King County Sheriff and leadership explaining that I believe the Sheriff is ignoring a crime. No Intelligible Response.

        August 18, 1999 email to Maggi Fimia, King County Council, asking her to obey the law. No Response.

        November 29, 1999 email to King County dcfm with cc. to King County leadership. No Response.

        December 19, 1999 email to the prosecutor asking him to confirm his claim to ownership of all the land under the ELS right-of-way. No Response.

        December 31, 1999 email to the prosecutor asking him, a second time, to answer my question. No Response.

        January 10, 2000 email to Norm Maleng, the Prosecutor, asking him to confirm his claim to ownership of my right-of-way land. No Response.

        January 11, 2000 email to the prosecutor asking him to meet with me to discuss our differences. No Response.

        January 18, 2000 email to my weak King County Representative, David Irons, No Honest Response.

        January 23, 2000 email to the King County Sheriff, challenging the Sheriff to uphold the law. No Response.

        February 7, 2000 email to Ron Sims and County Council describing the federal tax fraud scheme used to establish the trail. No Response.

        August 9, 2000 email to David Irons, describing the law, and expressing my willingness to defend my rights and my property with a gun.No Response to the letter, but this lawsuit resulted.

           It is a determination of fact to decide whether King County has established a pattern to discriminate against my rights. Disputed facts are resolved before a jury, not resolved by a judge. Judge Rothstein denied my constitutional right to establish the facts in every area of this case. This gave Rothstein complete control, and resulted in this predetermined decision. Our Constitution does not allow that, but our dishonest appeals court judges do.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Reference:

      Read my declaration to decide if my claim of violation of my first Amendment and Second Amendment rights were adequately documented. (Portions struck by Rothstein highlighted in yellow)

      Lie, Stonewall, and Slander: How King County deals with its Citizens when they allege criminal activity by the County.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View the full transcribed Hilchkanum right-of-way deed with a photocopy of the original.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments and documentation. (Recommended)



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

(*The Rasmussens request discovery, mediation, a stay of proceedings, and oral argument. None of these are necessary in light of the court's rulings, and the requests will be DENIED.)

III. CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS plaintiff's motions to strike in part. The court GRANTS plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court quiets title in the County's favor and declares that the County has the right to quiet enjoyment of its property without interference by the defendants. The court GRANTS plaintiff's motion to dismiss all counterclaims.

DATED at Seattle, Washington this 25th day of May, 2001.

Signed by
Barbara Jacobs Rothstein
United States District Judge



    My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Conclusion by John Rasmussen:

         Where do I go to get back my rights as an American citizen? I graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and served as a Naval officer for more than ten years. In that period, I put my "life on the line" to defend that very constitutional rights which were denied me by Judge Rothstein in this lawsuit.

         While I describe dishonesty in almost every paragraph of this opinion, there are three principal dishonest maneuvers which Rothstein used to "justify" her predetermined outcome to this lawsuit.

    Rothstein's Dishonest Maneuvers:

      1. Illegally use summary judgment:

           Abuse of summary judgment appears to be the method dishonest judges use to control the outcome of lawsuits. There must be agreement with the material facts in order for a judge to allow summary judgment. In this annotated opinion I describe a number of material facts which were not in agreement, yet Rothstein allowed summary judgment by declaring we agreed with the "facts" she used. There are two basic elements to a legal decision, the facts and the law. When a judge makes up the facts, as Rothstein does in this opinion, the judge illegally controls the outcome of the lawsuit. This illegal use of summary judgment is a violation of the Fifth Amendment right of due process. But of course, Judge Rothstein demonstrates in this opinion that she does not believe in the United States Constitution.

        Open the portion of this opinion in which Rothstein allows summary judgment, and I provide detailed comments to describe her dishonesty.

      2. Ignore the common law understanding of the deed:

           Rothstein ignored the common law understanding of the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The deed granted a right-of-way to the Railway. This language has always been held to be an easement in Washington common law. The most important precedential opinion, King County v. Squire (1990), was ignored and misrepresented by Rothstein. Instead she adopted Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument concocted by King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng to hide his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. This "legal theory" was based on a misrepresentation of Brown v. State of Washington (1996). A careful reading of Brown exposes this dishonesty.

        Open the portion of this opinion in which Rothstein discusses the "Language of the Deed", and I provide detailed comments to describe her dishonesty.

      3. Manipulate the extrinsic evidence:

           Rothstein ignored the long held precedent that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement, and instead "found" Hilchkanum's intentions in his right-of-way deed by analyzing "cherry-picked" Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds. She ignored the more relevant Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds which contradicted her "findings". Further, Rothstein misapplied the law in her analysis of her "cherry-picked" deeds. It just doesn't get more dishonest that this.

        Open the portion of this opinion in which Rothstein analyzes Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds, and I provide detailed comments to describe her dishonesty.

    The Purpose of this Opinion is to Cover-up the Federal Tax Fraud Scheme:

         After experiencing the dishonesty of King County Superior Court, we moved the lawsuit to federal court in search of justice. It appears that Norm Maleng and his co-conspirators had ample influence in federal court, too. Rothstein's legal conclusions are consistently dishonest throughout this opinion. The purpose of her dishonesty can be seen by understanding the effect of her dishonesty. The effect of her dishonest maneuvers and violation of constitutional rights is to illegally award my land to King County. Rothstein's award my land to King County covers up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protects Norm Maleng and the other active participants from prosecution.

    There is Treason in the Ninth Circuit Courts:

         There is nothing in the Constitution or the law which allows Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein the right to make up material facts and illegally control this decision using summary judgment. Nothing in the Constitution or the law allows Rothstein the right to her dishonest legal analysis in almost every paragraph of this opinion. This opinion has little to do with the Constitution or the law. Rather, this opinion is based on the abuse of power. That's anarchy, not law. Judge Rothstein committed a crime from the bench with the confidence that she would not be held accountable. She was right. A study of the appeals decisions which followed, and the sister lawsuit in State court (Ray v. King County), show the willingness of judges to support criminal activity in betrayal of their oaths. These judges have intentionally withheld the Constitution and the law in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. These treasonous actions are destroying the judicial branch of our government, and will eventually destroy our Nation from within. The Ninth Circuit is no longer a legitimate court of law.

    The Following Federal and State Actions Support this Treasonous Opinion:

      King County v. Rasmussen (2002)

      Ray v. King County (2004)

      Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting)

      Understand How My Complaint of Judicial Misconduct was Dismissed

      Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, February 10, 2004

      Schroeder denial of Complaint of Judicial Misconduct

    My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.