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King County v. Rasmussen May 25, 2001

United States District Court
Western District of Washington at Seattle

Dated May 25, 2001, Entered May 29, 2001

KING COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington, Plaintiff
v.
JOHN RASMUSSEN and NANCY RASMUSSEN, husband and wife, and their marital community, Defendants.

No. C00-1637R



    Note from John Rasmussen:

    This "legal opinion" is a CRIMINAL ACT from the bench.

            This is not a legal opinion, but rather it is an intentional criminal act from the bench by Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein. It's subsequent cover-up by fellow federal and Washington State judges calls into question the legitimacy of our legal system. While an occasional mistake is inevitable in legal opinions, this "legal opinion" has critical mistakes in essentially every paragraph. The reason for her "mistakes" is found in the effect of her mistakes. Rothstein's "mistakes" cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the active participants from criminal prosecution.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            There are two basic elements in the resolution of this lawsuit: the facts and the law. As I show in the annotated versions of this opinion, Rothstein manipulates both the facts and the law. Disputed material facts are required to be resolved by juries in legitimate courts of law. Here, Rothstein dishonestly strikes facts we present and then manufactures irrational, unsupported, and undocumented material facts to support her dishonest conclusions. She prohibits the resolution of questions of fact by a jury. She does this by illegally allowing summary judgment. Further, Rothstein cherry-picks other material facts, ignoring more relevant material facts which contradict her opinion.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            With respect to manipulating the law, Rothstein intentionally ignores the precedential Washington State common law opinion which applies most directly to this lawsuit, King County v. Squire (1990). In Squire, the court construed a deed from the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) which had an identical granting clause to the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E, which is construed here. The Squire court found the granting clause of the Squire right-of-way deed "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". Rothstein found the identical granting clause in the Hilchkanum deed to convey fee simple title. The Squire court based its conclusion of one-hundred years of consistently applied common law. Rothstein bases her opinion on Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument concocted by King County Prosecutor, Norm Maleng, and his staff to cover-up King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Federal Judge Barbara Rothstein becomes an active participant in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme with this "legal opinion".
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

            It's important to understand at the top of this document that Judge Rothstein's most outrageous lie in this opinion was never briefed by King County. Rothstein manufactures the material fact that Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, actually wrote his deed to the SLS&E. She does this without any substantiation. She does this after striking my lawyer's and my statements which contradict this concocted material fact. This lie was critical for Rothstein and the other Hilchkanum judges because it "established" the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed as a unique deed, separate and different from the other identical SLS&E deeds which had all been determined to convey easements. The Hilchkanum judge's "finding" that the Hilchkanum deed conveyed fee simple title was necessary to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. If the King County Prosecutor had briefed this ridiculous lie, we would have been afforded the opportunity to more properly counter that unsupportable claim. Further, we would have had the opportunity to describe and cite the documents which show that claim to be an absolute lie. Considering the dishonesty in almost every paragraph of this "legal opinion", I believe that Rothstein conspired with King County, or other active participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, to present this unsupportable material fact as part of her opinion in order to deny any briefing or exhibits which would counter this lie. Knowing that we are not automatically allowed to submit additional exhibits on appeal, this dishonest tactic was important for Rothstein in this first of the Hilchkanum opinions.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    There are three versions of this opinion on this website.

      First, the published version:

        View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      Second, the version which you are viewing here contains only brief comments. This version is built to maintain the continuity of Judge Rothstein's opinion, but make the reader aware of the violation of constitutional rights, the massive dishonesty, and the intentional misapplication of the law by Rothstein. My suggestion is to read this version and, when interested in viewing expanded justification and documentation, use the hyperlink at the bottom of each note to open the detailed version of that note in a separate window.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Third, a version containing detailed analysis of this criminal act from the bench It provides links to supporting argument, historical documents, and precedential opinions. The third version breaks up the continuity of Judge Rothstein's opinion, but supplies the justification for my description of this opinion as crime and racketeering.
            My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with detailed comments and documentation.

    Color Scheme:

            Rothstein's opinion is presented here in bold blue font color. I've broken her opinion into small sections for the purpose of analysis. Each portion of Rothstein's opinion is preceded with the notice: "The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein."

            I have added my comments and analysis in black font color, indented, and bracketed by horizontal reference lines, as shown here. My comments are preceded with the words "Note from John Rasmussen:".

    Reference:

      View briefs, declarations, and exhibits presented to Federal District Judge Rothstein in this lawsuit.

      Read a description of the federal tax fraud scheme that Judge Rothstein covered-up with this decision.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in PDF format, without my additional comments.

      View King County v. Rasmussen (2001), with brief comments. (More readable!).



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE, GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS MATTER comes before the court on plaintiff King County's (the "County") motion for summary judgment, motion to dismiss, and motions to strike. Having reviewed the papers filed in support of and in opposition to these motions, the court rules as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

The dispute centers on ownership of a 100' - wide strip of land that runs along the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish in King County, Washington. Homesteaders Bill Hilchkanum and Mary Hilchkanum claimed the strip and the surrounding land in 1876. They received their final ownership certificate in 1884 and their fee patent in 1888. On May 9, 1887, by deed, the Hilchkanums conveyed an interest in the strip to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company (the "Railway"). The text of the deed states:

      In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in width through our land in said County described as follows to wit

      Lots one (1) two (2) and three (3) in section six (6) township 24 North of Range six (6) East.

      Such right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across our said lands by the Engineer of said railway Company which location is described as follows to wit (legal description)

      And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road.

      To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        The real "background" for this lawsuit is that the King County Prosecutor participated in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by accepting a BNSF donation of the land under the Hilchkanum right-of-way with the knowledge that BNSF did not own that land. This opinion hides that federal tax fraud scheme and protects the Prosecutor of King County and the other participants in the crime from being held responsible.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        With respect to the portions of the deed which Rothstein publishes above, the reader should consider the whole Hilchkanum right-of-way deed because Judge Rothstein leaves out several important parts. Use the following link to view the fully transcribed deed and a photocopy of the filed original.

      1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

        It appears that Judge Rothstein omits important parts of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed because they contradict her dishonest analysis. She omits the portion of the deed which shows the Hilchkanums signed with an "X". The Hilchkanums were illiterate Native Americans, yet Rothstein irrationally decides that they wrote the deed. Rothstein also leaves out the portion that shows David Denny as a witness. David Denny was the white man who aided the Hilchkanums with legal matters in those days, but he was also one of the owners of the Railway. This is a significant conflict of interest which Rothstein failed to address. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Pay close attention to the words in the Hilchkanum granting clause, which grant a "right-of-way" to the Railway. Rothstein changes the words "right-of-way" to "'strip' of land" in this opinion and then construes her substituted words rather than the actual words of the deed. This substitution, and blending, of these contradictory terms is an essential element of Norm Maleng's "legal theory". My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Also as you read the deed, understand that Judge Rothstein could find no purpose to grant a right-of-way to a railroad in the words of this deed. Simply read the deed to understand that this ridiculous conclusion by Rothstein is an intentional lie. That lie is part of her cover-up of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

Mary Hilchkanum later conveyed her portion of the homestead property to her husband by quitclaim deed. The conveyance is "less (3) three acres right of way to Rail Road." Bill Hilchkanum then conveyed the property to a third party "less three (3) acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle International Railway for right of way purposes." Later conveyances of the property included language "excepting" the Railway right of way from the legal descriptions. John Rasmussen and Nancy Rasmussen (the "Rasmussens") currently own the Hilchkanum property. The right of way strip bisects their land.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        None of the property involved in this lawsuit had this exception language when it was transferred to third parties in the subsequent Hilchkanum deeds. Instead of analyzing the sale of land that was the subject of this lawsuit, Judge Rothstein selected a subsequent Hilchkanum real estate deed which was not in the chain of title of the land contested here. Rothstein "cherry-picked" the extrinsic evidence and then misrepresented the meaning of exception language in that deed in order to manufacture false intentions for the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed. This misrepresentation of exception language is discussed, in detail, later in this opinion.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The Railway, and its successor Burlington Northern, built a track on the strip of land and used the track regularly for rail service until approximately 1996. In 1997, Burlington Northern sold its railway corridor, including the Hilchkanum strip, to The Land Conservancy of Seattle and King County ("TLC"). TLC petitioned the United States Surface Transportation Board ("STB") to abandon use of the corridor for rail service under the National Trail System Act, 16 U.S.C. paragraph 1247(d) ("Rails-to-Trails Act"). The STB approved interim trail use of the corridor by King County and issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use. The County then purchased the corridor from TLC and obtained title to the right of way carved from the Hilchkanum property.

The Rasmussens have vigorously opposed the County's efforts to railbank the strip and have asserted a fee simple interest in the right of way. As a result, the County brought this action to quiet title and to obtain a declaration of its rights to use the strip. The County received a preliminary injunction in state court against the Rasmussens to prevent interference with County work on the site. The Rasmussens then removed the action to federal court. The Rasmussens have counterclaimed with allegations that the County violated their First Amendment, Second Amendment, Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights, along with violations of 16 U.S.C. paragraph 1247(d), 42 U.S.C. paragraph 1983, 28 U.S.C. paragraph 1358, and Article 1, Section 16 of the Washington state Constitution. The County brought these motions to dispose of the entire case.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike Briefing and Evidence

1. Overlength Briefs.

Civil Rule 7(c) of the Western District of Washington limits parties to 24 page memoranda unless they obtain prior permission from the court. The Rasmussens submitted a 34-page response to the County's motion for summary judgment and a 32-page response to the County's motion to dismiss. Moreover, a declaration from John Rasmussen accompanies the responses and includes legal argument. The Rasmussens did not request advance permission from the court to file overlength briefs.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        This is a lie by Judge Rothstein. Shortly before our brief was due, Judge Rothstein's clerk agreed with my lawyer that we could request overlength briefs in the first paragraph of each submitted brief.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The Rasmussen's submissions violate the plain language of Civil Rule 7 (c). The court will strike all briefing of both responses beyond page 24, and the arguments contained in those excess pages will not be considered. In addition, the court will strike all portions of the John Rasmussen declaration and attached exhibits that include legal argument. Specifically, the following portions of John Rasmussen's declaration will not be considered:

(a) Exhibits 1, 9, and 10 to the Rasmussen declaration, which are legal briefs on various issues;
(b) Page 2, line 17 - page 4, line 7 of the declaration, which contain legal argument;
(c) Page 7, line 26 - page 10, line 3 of the declaration, which contain legal argument, and Exhibits 4-7 introduced on those pages;
(d) Page 12, lines 11-15 of the declaration, which contain legal argument; and
(e) Page 18, line 4 - page 20, line 19 of the declaration, which contain legal argument, and Exhibits 11-14 introduced on those pages.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        This striking of declaration and exhibits must be seen in the context of Rothstein's decision to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and to protect the other active participants in the crime from prosecution. Rothstein cites no rule or precedent for striking these significant portions of my declaration and my exhibits. I've searched the FRCP and local rules (including Civil Rule 7) and can find no rule that supports her removal of that information. It is a violation of my constitutional right of due process to deny my right to make "legal argument". While declarations are for the purpose of a party supplying facts relevant to a lawsuit, I can find no prohibition for legal argument in a declaration. My right to express "legal argument" is even more important in this lawsuit because King County brought this lawsuit against me after I "blew the whistle" on the ELS federal tax fraud scheme in February 2000. Later, after months of stonewalling by King County, I summarized King County's criminal actions and expressed my willingness to defend by rights and property with a gun. King County filed this lawsuit in Superior Court and provided purjurious declarations and lies, such as the Shelley Marelli declaration in August 2000. These criminal actions by King County against me establish my right to explain my understanding of the law and provide the evidence of the tax fraud which I discovered. With that knowledge, Rothstein strikes my discussion and evidence of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and fails in her duty to turn that incriminating evidence over to federal prosecutors. Rothstein strikes my discussion of the importance of King County v. Squire (1990) and then dishonestly misrepresents that opinion in her discussion. My understanding of property law was material to my expressing my willingness to defend that right with a gun. Rothstein strikes my description of the County's pattern to deny my civil rights. Then, later in this opinion Rothstein dismisses my claim of a civil rights violation because she refused to acknowledge and consider the portion of my declaration which she struck here. How "convenient" to strike the evidence I provide and then claim I provided no evidence.
          My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

2. Inadmissible Evidence

"It is well settled that only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Beyene v. Colman Sec. Serv., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988). Evidence that lacks foundation is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (witness must posses personal knowledge). In paragraph 1 of the response to the motion for summary judgment, the Rasmussens speculate on the intent of Bill Hilchkanum based on his Native American ethnicity. The Rasmussens provide no evidence to support the allegations. Therefore, all but the last two sentences of the paragraph will be stricken.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Of the hundreds of pages of briefing and exhibits that Rothstein struck, the sentences she struck in the above paragraph are the most important in hiding the dishonesty of her conclusions. This statement by my lawyer contains three significant material facts. First, his statement identifies Hilchkanum as an "Indian", a Native American. Second, his statement identifies the fact that Hilchkanum was illiterate. Third, his statement identifies the Railway lawyers as author of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. These three material facts were struck by Rothstein. It was critical for Rothstein to strike our statement of these material facts because they completely contradict the undocumented, ridiculous material facts on which she bases this opinion.     My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Rothstein claims above that "The Rasmussens provide no evidence to support the allegations." This is a lie. We provided many documents to Judge Rothstein which justified my lawyer's statement. While it is true that we didn't draw Rothstein's attention to those documents at the point in my lawyer's brief in which he made those statements, it is also true that King County made no argument that Hilchkanum was a lawyer who wrote his own deed to the SLS&E. That wacky conclusion is made by Judge Rothstein in this opinion, and is supported by no document, no historical fact, and no legal finding. Rothstein just made up the fact that Hilchkanum wrote his deed. How could we anticipate such a ridiculous statement from the judge? How could we make a formal argument in rebuttal when King County made no such argument in its brief?
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Further, it is disgusting that Rothstein implies our statements about Hilchkanum are based on racial bias. If Rothstein wanted to accuse us of racial bias, she should have had enough character to confront us with that accusation and to allow us to explain our statement in writing or at oral arguments. Character and honesty are hard to find in this judge. Rothstein's statement implying we are racially biased is a cowardly "cheap shot", obviously intended to slander and diminish my lawyer and me. More important it supplied a phony reason for Rothstein to strike the truth so that she could substitute her lies.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The Rasmussens also submit a document purportedly created by an unnamed government employee. John Rasmussen attempts to admit this document through his declaration, but he does not have personal knowledge of its authenticity. Fed. R. Evid. 901. As a result, exhibit 3 to the Rasmussen declaration; page 5, lines 4-11 of the Rasmussen declaration; and paragraph 8 of the response to the motion for summary judgment lack foundation and will be stricken.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Here, King County moves to strike its own document. It appears that the document's authenticity was not the problem. Rather, the problem was that the document provided proof that the prosecutor was dishonest in his testimony and declarations. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The County seeks to strike as irrelevant other evidence and arguments about "spur lines" and about the County's behavior in this dispute. Although the evidence's value may be minimal, the court will not strike the evidence in its entirety. The court will accord the evidence the appropriate weight.

3. Unauthorized Memoranda

Finally, Civil Rule 7(b) provides for an opening brief, a response, and a reply. Nothing in the rule or in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 authorizes a surreply. The Rasmussens have filed a surreply to the motion to dismiss and have submitted a supplemental declaration from John Rasmussen. The Rasmussens did not request prior permission from the court. Because the court rules do not authorize these submissions, they will be stricken and will not be considered. Cf., e.g., Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996) (new evidence not considered in reply). The County's motions to strike are GRANTED in part.



    Note from John Rasmussen:


        We did not request a surreply, so the judge is correct for one of the few times in this opinion.
           My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

The County has moved for summary judgment on both its causes of action. First, the County seeks to quiet title to the disputed strip of land. Second, the County seeks a declaration that it has the right to use the land without interference.

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). There are no material factual disputes in this matter. Although the Rasmussens have raised factual issues regarding the County's behavior and the STB's proceedings, those have little bearing on how the court should interpret the Hilchkanum deed.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Illegal use of summary judgment is a maneuver that Ninth Circuit judges use to force their predetermined outcomes to the cases before them. Summary judgment requires that there be agreement with the material facts. In this opinion there is disagreement with a significant number of material facts:

      The authorship of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a disputed material fact.

      The intention of the parties in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is a disputed material fact.

      The intention of the Hilchkanums in their subsequent real estate deeds is a disputed material fact.

      The ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their railroad right-of-way deed is a disputed material fact.

      It is a disputed material fact to determine what was conveyed in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

      The statement of facts made in King County v. Squire is a disputed material fact.

      It is a disputed material fact to determine if King County's actions against me constituted a "policy, practice or custom" to violate my civil rights.

      It is a disputed material fact that King County participated in a federal tax fraud scheme.

        Rothstein took complete control of this lawsuit by illegally allowing summary judgment. She lied when she claimed "There are no material factual disputes in this matter.". No lawyer with Rothstein's experience could honestly come to that conclusion after reading the Hilchkanum deed, briefs, and exhibits that were submitted to her. No legitimate jury would agree with the facts that Rothstein then dishonestly manufactured in her illegal resolution of this lawsuit.
         (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

1. Quite Title Action

Ownership of the strip of land turns on the deed executed by the Hilchkanums in 1887. The interest they granted to the Railway passes to the County as the Railway's successor in interest. *

(* The Rasmussens argue that the Railway - and therefore the County - received no interest at all, because the Hilchkanums had not received their homestead patent when they executed the deed. To the contrary, federal law specifically authorized unpatented homesteaders to transfer land to railroads for rights of way. See Act of March 3, 1873, c. 266, 17 U.S. Stat. 602; Pierce v. Chicago, M & P.S. Ry. Co., 52 Mont. 110, 156 P. 127, 129-30 (1916). The Rasmussens also state that the County has no claim to the land because the STB improperly authorized railbanking. As explained later, the argument challenges the STB's order, and this Court has no jurisdiction over such challenges. See 28 U.S.C. paragraphs 2321(a), 2342(5). )



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Rothstein fails to examine what the term "right-of-way" meant to Congress in its legislation after 1850. Congress intended the term "right-of-way" to mean an "easement" in its Act of March 3, 1873.

        Further, Rothstein misrepresents, dismisses, and refuses to consider our argument that the STB had no authority to railbank the ELS right-of-way because in was a spur line under only the authority of Washington State law. She had jurisdiction to determine whether the STB issued orders for a railway spur that was not under federal control. Our argument was not to challenge a ruling of the STB, but rather our argument was to challenge the right of the STB to have any authority in a state's rights issue. Rothstein refused in her duty to deal with this question, thereby granting powers to the STB which it does not legally possess. My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

If the Hilchkanums granted a fee interest to the Railway, then the County possesses fee title to the strip. If the Hilchkanums granted only an easement to the Railway, then the County possesses an easement and the Rasmussens own the underlying land.

The intent of the parties is "of paramount importance" when interpreting deeds. Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2nd 430, 924 P.2d 908, 911 (1996). The deed must "clearly indicate" an intent to make the conveyance conditional. King County v. Hanson Inv. Co., 34 Wn2d 112, 208 P.2d 113, 117 (1949); see also Brown, 924 P.2d at 912. *



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Rothstein has the very dishonest habit of citing a few words from precedential cases, and then describing a different meaning than is held in that precedent. Here, she misrepresents King County v. Hanson Inv. Co. (1949). This misrepresentation of Hanson is a constant theme found in Norm Maleng's "legal theory", and is evident in King County's briefs and the dishonest opinions which hide the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

(* Washington courts presume that a deed in statutory form grants a fee simple. Brown. 924 P.2d at 912. The Hilchkanums deed is not in statutory form, so the presumption does not apply, although clear evidence of conditions still is required.)

Intent analysis requires case-by-case examination of the overall effect of the (1) language of the deed, (2) subsequent behavior of the parties regarding the land, and (3) circumstances at the time of execution. See Brown. 924 P.2d at 912; Scott v. Wallitner, 49, Wn.2d 161, 299 P.2d 204, 204-205 (1956). The three factors interconnect in the Hilchkanum case to depict intent to convey a fee interest.

a. Language of the Deed

"The intent of the parties is to be derived from the entire instrument ...." Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc., 120 Wn.2d 727, 844 P.2d 1006, 1012 (1993); see also Brown, 924 P.2d at 913. *

(* Washington courts have found the following overlapping factors helpful in analyzing deed language; (1) whether the deed conveys a strip of land and does not include language regarding the purpose or limiting the conveyance, (2) whether the deed conveys a strip of land and limits use to a specific purpose, (3) whether the deed conveys a right of way over a strip of land rather than a strip of land, (4) whether the deed grants only a right to construct a railway, (5) whether the rights revert to the grantor if the railway ceases operations, (6) whether the stated consideration is nominal or substantial, (7) whether the deed contains a habendum clause limiting use, and other considerations based on language in the deed. See Brown, 912 P.2d at 912.)



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Here Rothstein begins her dishonest analysis of the language of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. It must be understood at the beginning of this "analysis" that she ignores the many precedential opinions which hold the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad is an easement. I place the term "right-of-way" in quotes because where and how those words are used in a railroad deed are critical to understanding their meaning. The King County Prosecutor, Judge Rothstein, and the other Hilchkanum judges play sick word games with the understanding of that term. The legal meaning of the term "right-of-way" has changed over time. Rather than use the term "right-of-way" in the legal context it was understood by the parties to the Hilchkanum deed in 1887, Rothstein adopts Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument concocted by the King County Prosecutor to confuse the legal meaning of "right-of-way" by using a modern definition and applying it to a deed written at a time that modern definition did not apply.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The Hilchkanum deed's overall language does not restrict the conveyance by designating a specific purpose, by limiting use of the land, or by adding a reversion clause. The omissions result in an unconditional grant and distinguish the deed from those in which courts have found easements. See Roeder Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wn.2d 567, 716 P.2d 855, 859 (1986) ("for all railroad and other right-of-way purposes"); Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wn.2d 533, 225 P.2d 199 (1950) ("for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way"); Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wn. App. 491, 857 P.2d 283, 286-287 (1993) ("to its successors and assigns forever for railway purposes"); King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wn. App. 888, 801 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1991) ("so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company... and this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888"). In contrast to those cases, the open-ended language of the Hilchkanum deed shows intent to convey a fee.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Rothstein states that the Hilchkanum deed is an "unconditional grant" which does not "restrict the conveyance by designating a specific purpose". This is a statement of Norm Maleng's "legal theory" which holds that the grant of a right-of way is the "unconditional grant" of fee simple title of the land underlying the right-of-way, unless additional language limits and "restrict(s) the conveyance by designating a specific purpose". After King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng agreed to participate in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by accepting a phony tax donation of the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way from BNSF, Maleng and his morally challenged staff manufactured a phony legal argument to hide their participation in the crime. Here, Rothstein adopts Maleng's dishonest argument.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        When the term "right-of-way" is used to specify what is conveyed to a railroad in the granting clause or the habendum of a railroad deed, the deed has always been construed to be an easement under Washington State/Territory common law. For over one-hundred years, this has been a consistently held common law legal precedent, until this criminal opinion by Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein. Please use the following link to view a more complete explanation of the criminal act Rothstein is committing here.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The absence of limitations in the Hilchkanum right of way conveyance is even more striking when contrasted with a different conditional grant in the same deed. The deed grants the Railway the right to "go upon the land adjacent to said line ... and cut down" dangerous trees. This language specifies a purpose and thus differs significantly from the conveyance at issue. Thus it is clear that the parties knew how to limit a grant, and that they chose not to limit the right of way.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Rothstein lies when she states that the Hilchkanums "knew how to limit a grant". The Hilchkanums were illiterate Native Americans who took no part in writing the limiting language in their right-of-way deed. Further, the King County Prosecutor never suggested that the Hilchkanums "knew how to limit a grant" in his briefs. Rothstein's statement that the Hilchkanums "knew how to limit a grant" suggests that the Hilchkanums authored the words of their right-of-way deed. The Hilchkanums were illiterate Native Americans in a time of our history that "Indians" were on the bottom rung of our society. There is no evidence that the Hilchkanums "knew how to limit a grant" or that they wrote their deed. Later in this opinion Rothstein claims the Hilchkanums chose the words "right of way" in their granting clause in order to conform with federal law. This isn't legal analysis by Federal Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, its a fairy tale which dishonestly identifies the Hilchkanums as active participants in their right-of-way deed and covers-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        There is no legal precedent for Rothstein to find that the Hilchkanum secondary grant reveals the intentions of the Hilchkanums to grant fee simple title in the granting clause of their right-of-way deed. The intentions of a party in a deed is a material fact. Rothstein denies my right to resolve this disputed material fact before a jury. Instead, she illegally and dishonestly resolves the Hilchkanum's intentions with their secondary grant all by herself. It is also worth noting that this secondary grant argument was not proposed by the King County Prosecutor in his briefs. This unsupported, illogical argument just magically appeared in Rothstein's opinion. It's impossible for my lawyer to counter a dishonest legal argument, such as this one, when it isn't revealed until the opinion is published.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The Rasmussens ignore the "entire instrument's" unconditional language and instead urge the court to focus on isolated words. For example, they note that the Hilchkanum deed recognizes the Railway will build tracks on the land. However, an acknowledgement of the probable use cannot limit the conveyance unless accompanied by a specific restriction on use - something the Hilchkanum deed lacks. See Scott, 299 P.2d at 205 (fee simple when deed acknowledged that land would be used for railway but did not include any specific limitations); see also Brown, 924 P.2d at 913. Similarly, the Rasmussens claim the deed limits the conveyance by using the term "right of way" in the text and caption, but courts have rejected this narrow view as well. See, e.g., Brown, 208 P.2d at 912, 915 (railroad can obtain a "right of way" as either a fee or an easement); Harris 844 P.2d at 1011-13 (1993) (court found fee simple despite right of way language); Roeder Co. v. K&E Moving & Storage Co., Inc., 102 Wn. App. 49, 4 P.2d 839, 842-43 (2000). *



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        We were very specific in our briefing of the meaning of the term "right-of-way" in railroad deeds. Rothstein belittles us by misrepresenting our argument, then refuses to acknowledge one hundred years of consistently held legal precedent which holds that the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement. Instead, she claims that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed needs a separate "specific restriction on use" in order to be found an easement. This does not represent common law, but rather is a statement of Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument concocted by the King County Prosecutor to hide his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

(* One Washington case did find that a deed containing the term "right of way" without additional limiting language granted an easement rather than a fee. Veach v. Culp, 92 Wn.2d 570, 599 P.2d 526 (1979). Veach, however did not analyze the circumstances surrounding the transfer or the subsequent behavior of the parties. Evidence on both factors exists here and provides context that was lacking in Veach.)



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Rothstein ignores the analysis in King County v. Squire (1990), which destroys her argument. The Squire and Hilchkanum granting clauses are identical. The granting clause of the Squire deed to the SLS&E was found to convey an easement. In this opinion, Rothstein "finds" the identical granting clause in the Hilchkanum to the SLS&E conveys fee simple title. King County v. Squire is legal precedent which Rothstein refuses to acknowledge in this "legal opinion". Instead of addressing the Washington State precedential opinion which is most critical to this discussion, Rothstein considers only the deed and analysis in Veach v. Culp, which she then distinguishes from the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed construed here. The distinguishing factor is her "cherry-picked" extrinsic evidence which Rothstein uses to assign false intentions for the Hilchkanums in their right-of-way deed. The intention of the Hilchkanums in their deeds is a disputed material fact that would be resolved by a jury in legitimate courts of law. No legitimate jury would agree with Rothstein's dishonest manipulation of the facts and the law.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

Furthermore, because the Hilchkanums were homesteaders without a final patent, federal law limited them to certain types of conveyances, such as grants to schools, cemeteries, and rights of way to railways. See 17 U.S. Stat. 602. The Act provides more context for the choice of the term "right of way" in the deed, indicating that the Hilchkanums chose the phrase out of necessity rather than a desire to create an easement.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Rothstein dishonestly and irrationally names the Hilchkanums as author of their right-of-way deed by claiming that they chose the phrase ..."right of way" in the deed....out of necessity rather than a desire to create an easement.. In doing so, she ignores the discussion in King County v. Squire (1990) which (by default) identifies the Railway lawyers as author of the SLS&E "ELS form deed". The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is an unaltered copy of that SLS&E "ELS form deed".
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        Also, Rothstein cites 17 U.S. Stat. 602, but refuses to admit the United States Supreme Court found the intent of Congress, under that Act, was for the grant to be an easement.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

Moreover, other aspects of the language favor a fee simple. The deed grants a "strip" of land described in metes and bounds rather than merely a right "over" the land (as it does with the tree-cutting grant). The deed uses the word "convey" when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers (notably, "convey" is absent in the tree-cutting grant). See Hanson, 208 P.2d at 119. Finding that the overall language contains no restriction, the court concludes that the Hilchkanums intended to convey a fee interest to the Railway.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

      It is a lie that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed grants a "'strip' of land".

      It is a lie that describing a property interest in metes and bounds implies a fee simple conveyance.

      It is a lie that the word "convey" implies a fee simple conveyance.

      (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

b. Later Behavior of the Parties

The Hilchkanums' descriptions of the rest of their land in later transfers buttress the intent gleaned from the plain language. After the grant to the Railway, Mary Hilchkanum conveyed her portion of the homestead to her husband. He then conveyed the homestead to a third party. Each deed states that it is "less" the land of the right of way. When parties execute later deeds, they also carve out exceptions for the right of way - as the Hilchkanums did. This is a strong indication that the parties viewed the grant to the Railway to be a fee simple. See Harris, 844 P.2d at 1013 (any other interpretation would render exception "superfluous"); Scott, 299 P.2d at 205.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Here, Rothstein "cherry-picks" the extrinsic evidence. None of the land contested in this lawsuit contained this exception language when it was transferred to outside parties. Yet, in her discussion above, Rothstein implies that Hilchkanum always excepted the right-of-way land in his subsequent deeds. This is completely dishonest.

        The Hilchkanum warranty deed to Chris Nelson on March 15, 1904 conveyed 96% of the land contested in this lawsuit. This deed did not except the right-of-way (or the land under the right-of-way). The lack of an exception in this Nelson deed suggests that the Hilchkanums understood that they conveyed an easement to the SLS&E with their 1887 right-of-way deed. Rothstein dishonestly struck our briefing on this more relevant deed and hid its legal implication in this opinion. Her willingness to misrepresent the facts is criminal.

        Further, Rothstein misstates the words in her cherry-picked subsequent real estate deeds, stating that they excepted "land". Her statement that "Each deed states that it is "less" the land of the right of way. is a lie. The Hilchkanums only excepted "right-of-way" in the limited number of deeds which even contained an exception. The exception of a right-of-way has a very different legal meaning than the exception of land. Then, after ignoring more relevant deeds, Rothstein misconstrues the meaning of the exception of a right-of-way when she analyzes her cherry-picked extrinsic evidence. Please read the expanded explanation of this note to understand Rothstein's profound dishonesty.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this note are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

c. Circumstances Surrounding Execution

Finally, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed confirm an intent to convey a fee interest. Deeds from other landowners during the same time period contain different language than the Hilchkanum deed. The Squire and Northlake deeds are modeled off the same form deed as the Hilchkanums'. Northlake, 857 P.2d at 286-87; Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023. However, both Squire and Northlake contain additional language that specifically restricts the grant to railroad purposes and reverts the interest to the grantor if the railroad ceases to operate. Northlake, 857 P.2d at 286-87; Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023. Nowhere in the Hilchkanums' deed are there any such limitations. See generally Danya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 Ecology L.Q. 351, 378 (2000) (explaining that railroads used form fee simple deeds and then added language to reflect limitations requested by landowners, which resulted in railroads possessing a variety of fee and easement interests along the same tracks).



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Rothstein now finds herself caught in the web of lies that she has built throughout this decision. After dishonestly construing all the words in the deed against Hilchkanum and naming him the author of the words in his deed, she now admits that the Hilchkanum deed is built on the same "form deed" as the Squire and Burke deeds. The truth is that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is an unaltered copy of the SLS&E "ELS form deed". If Rothstein were honest, she would explain how illiterate Bill Hilchkanum wrote the same "form deed" used by Territorial Governor Watson Squire and Territorial Chief Justice Judge Thomas Burke. The Hilchkanums couldn't even sign their own names, yet in her earlier discussion Rothstein irrationally established the fact that Hilchkanums authored the words of their deed when she stated "the Hilchkanums chose the phrase ["right of way"] out of necessity rather than a desire to create an easement". Is she now suggesting that Hilchkanum also authored the Squire and Burke deeds? Further, Rothstein claims that the Squire and Burke right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E were construed to be easements only because of reversion language added to their habendum clauses. This claim is not supported by the opinions which construed these two deeds, King County v. Squire (1990) and Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910). These deeds were found to be easements because of the grant of a "right-of-way" in their granting clauses. Rothstein intentionally misrepresents the facts and legal precedent here.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

        When a judge states that a deed is based on a "form deed", it is common for that judge to display that "form deed" for comparison. The Milwaukee "form deed" was published in Brown v. State of Washington (1996). When Federal Judge Horn reviewed the SLS&E deeds before her, she identified the "form deed" which was used for the right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish. (Go to page 2 of View Beres v. United States (2010) to view Judge Horn's "ELS form deed") Rothstein states that the Hilchkanum deed is built on the same "form deed" as the Squire and Burke deeds, but doesn't supply that "form deed". Why? The answer is that railroad "form deeds" are construed against the railroad. Admitting that the Hilchkanum deed was authored by the Railway lawyers contradicts Rothstein's earlier conclusion that the Hilchkanums wrote their right-of-way deed. This question of authorship is resolved by a jury in real courts of law. Not here.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The language of the deed, the behavior of the parties, and the circumstances converge to show the Hilchkanums' intent to convey a fee simple. Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Rasmussens, only isolated words support their argument, and the evidence does not "clearly indicate" an intent to condition the conveyance. The County, as the Railway's successor, possesses a fee simple in the strip of land. *

(*The Rasmussens submitted evidence that the deed incorrectly describes the boundaries of the right of way. This does not alter the County's rights, because the location of the actual tracks controls. See DD&L, Inc. v. Burgess, 51 Wn. App. 329, 753 P.2d 561, 564 (1988). )



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        The rules of summary judgment required Rothstein to view the material facts in "the light most favorable" to me, the non-moving party. She writes that she does this, but actually she did exactly the opposite.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

The County's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and title is quieted in the County's favor.

2. Declaratory Relief

Because the County posses a fee simple in the strip of land, it has the right to access the property without interference from the Rasmussens. The County motion for summary judgment on its second clause of action is GRANTED.

C. Motion to Dismiss

The County has moved to dismiss all the Rasmussens' counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1), 12 (b) (6). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if, based on the complaint and attachments, the party can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to relief. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997). Counterclaims (a), (d), (f), and (g) rely on finding that the Rasmussens own the strip of land. Because the court has quieted title in the County, the Rasmussens have no rights to the strip of land and none of the counterclaims state a claim for which relief can be granted.

The Rasmussens attempt to overcome this conclusion by arguing that the County's title is invalid, because the STB order that authorized railbanking was allegedly invalid. By challenging the STB proceedings, the Rasmussens are asking the court to reverse an STB order. See Dave v. Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, 79 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1996) (court looks at whether practical effect of cause of action requires review of order); Grantwood Village v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 95 F.3d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 1996) (challenge to property transfer required review of order). The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over any proceeding "to enjoin or suspend, in whole or in part, a rule, regulation, or order of the Surface Transportation Board ... ." 28 U.S.C. paragraph 2321 (a); see also Dave, 79 F.3d at 942; Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 879 F.2d 316, 320 (8th cir. 1989); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 43 F.Supp.2d 708, 711 (E.D. Tex. 1999). Thus, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Rasmussens' argument, and the Rasmussens fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The County's motion to dismiss counterclaims for violations of 16 U.S.C. paragraph 1358, and the Washington State Constitution, Article 1, Section 16 will be GRANTED.



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Rothstein misrepresents our argument. We argued that the abandoned section of the railroad was a spur line which would not be under control of the Surface Transportation Board. We were not asking Rothstein to reverse a STB order. We were asking her to recognize that the STB had no jurisdiction, and to therefore find the STB order authorizing railbanking was invalid. Since the STB had no jurisdiction, we argued that the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way was governed by Washington State law. When BNSF abandoned, the full use of the land was returned to the reversionary land owners. Railbanking is not allowed under Washington State law.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

Counterclaims (b) and (c), for violation of the first Amendment and Second Amendment, do not explicitly rely on the Rasmussens' ownership of the land.*

(* The Rasmussens failed to include an allegation that the County violated 42 U.S.C. paragraph 1983 in either counterclaim (b) or (c). Instead, they stated the allegation as a separate counterclaim. The Rasmussens have acknowledged in their briefing that the Section 1983 allegation was intended to be incorporated into the other causes of action rather than stand alone. Therefore, the court will incorporate 42 U.S.C. paragraph 1983 into counterclaims (b) and (c) and counterclaim (e), which contained the misplaced Section 1983 allegation, will be DISMISSED.)

However, both causes of action still fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. A cause of action against a county for constitutional violations requires both allegations of unconstitutional behavior and allegations that the conduct resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 570 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1986). The Rasmussens' counterclaims do not allege any specific behavior by the County that violated their rights. Moreover, the Rasmussens do not allege any policies, customs, or practices that violated their rights. In their briefing, but not in the counterclaims, the Rasmussens quote numerous county ordinances. They do not allege that any of these ordinances violated their rights, nor do they explain any actions County employees took to enforce the ordinances that somehow violated the Rasmussens' rights. The Rasmussens have failed to plead any facts to support the basic elements of their causes of action and have therefore failed to state a claim. The County's motion to dismiss counterclaims (b) and (c) for violations of the First Amendment and Second Amendment will be GRANTED. *



    Note from John Rasmussen:

        Earlier in this opinion, Rothstein granted the County's motion to strike briefing, declaration, and exhibits. In that section, Rothstein struck my description of the violation of my civil rights. Rothstein provided no explanation of what authority she used to strike that material. In her statement above, Rothstein states we did not describe a violation or provide a justification. We did, but she illegally struck it. I drew Rothstein's attention to fifteen months of stonewalling by King County when I questioned the legality of its actions. The issue of whether this stonewalling constituted a "policy, custom, or practice" that violated my rights should have been determined by a jury. But, Judge Rothstein does not believe in my right to a jury.
        My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

      Open the expanded and documented discussion of this note.



The following is a portion of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) by Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein.

(*The Rasmussens request discovery, mediation, a stay of proceedings, and oral argument. None of these are necessary in light of the court's rulings, and the requests will be DENIED.)

III. CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS plaintiff's motions to strike in part. The court GRANTS plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court quiets title in the County's favor and declares that the County has the right to quiet enjoyment of its property without interference by the defendants. The court GRANTS plaintiff's motion to dismiss all counterclaims.

DATED at Seattle, Washington this 25th day of May, 2001.

Signed by
Barbara Jacobs Rothstein
United States District Judge



    My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.

    Conclusion by John Rasmussen:

         Where do I go to get back my rights as an American citizen? I graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and served as a Naval officer for more than ten years. In that period, I put my "life on the line" to defend that very constitutional rights which were denied me by Judge Rothstein in this lawsuit.

         While I describe dishonesty in almost every paragraph of this opinion, there are three principal dishonest maneuvers which Rothstein used to "justify" her predetermined outcome to this lawsuit.

    Rothstein's Dishonest Maneuvers:

      1. Illegally use summary judgment:

           Abuse of summary judgment appears to be the method dishonest judges use to control the outcome of lawsuits. There must be agreement with the material facts in order for a judge to allow summary judgment. In this annotated opinion I describe a number of material facts which were not in agreement, yet Rothstein allowed summary judgment by declaring we agreed with the "facts" she used. There are two basic elements to a legal decision, the facts and the law. When a judge makes up the facts, as Rothstein does in this opinion, the judge illegally controls the outcome of the lawsuit. This illegal use of summary judgment is a violation of the Fifth Amendment right of due process. But of course, Judge Rothstein demonstrates in this opinion that she does not believe in the United States Constitution.

        Open the portion of this opinion in which Rothstein allows summary judgment, and I provide detailed comments to describe her dishonesty.

      2. Ignore the common law understanding of the deed:

           Rothstein ignored the common law understanding of the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The deed granted a "right of way" to the Railway. This language has always been held to be an easement in Washington common law. The most important precedential opinion, King County v. Squire (1990), was ignored and misrepresented by Rothstein. Instead she adopted Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument concocted by King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng to hide his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. This "legal theory" was based on a misrepresentation of Brown v. State of Washington (1996). A careful reading of Brown exposes this dishonesty.

        Open the portion of this opinion in which Rothstein discusses the "Language of the Deed", and I provide detailed comments to describe her dishonesty.

      3. Manipulate the extrinsic evidence:

           Rothstein ignored the long held precedent that the grant of a right-of-way to a railroad is an easement, and instead "found" Hilchkanum's intentions in his right-of-way deed by analyzing "cherry-picked" Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds. She ignored the more relevant Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds which contradicted her "findings". Further, Rothstein misapplied the law in her analysis of her "cherry-picked" deeds. It just doesn't get more dishonest that this.

        Open the portion of this opinion in which Rothstein analyzes Hilchkanum's subsequent real estate deeds, and I provide detailed comments to describe her dishonesty.

    The Purpose of this Opinion is to Cover-up the Federal Tax Fraud Scheme:

         After experiencing the dishonesty of King County Superior Court, we moved the lawsuit to federal court in search of justice. It appears that Norm Maleng and his co-conspirators had ample influence in federal court, too. Rothstein's legal conclusions are consistently dishonest throughout this opinion. The purpose of her dishonesty can be seen by understanding the effect of her dishonesty. The effect of her dishonest maneuvers and violation of constitutional rights is to illegally award my land to King County. Rothstein's award my land to King County covers up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protects Norm Maleng and the other active participants from prosecution.

    There is Treason in the Ninth Circuit Courts:

         There is nothing in the Constitution or the law which allows Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein the right to make up material facts and illegally control this decision using summary judgment. Nothing in the Constitution or the law allows Rothstein the right to her dishonest legal analysis in almost every paragraph of this opinion. This opinion has little to do with the Constitution or the law. Rather, this opinion is based on the abuse of power. That's anarchy, not law. Judge Rothstein committed a crime from the bench with the confidence that she would not be held accountable. She was right. A study of the appeals decisions which followed, and the sister lawsuit in State court (Ray v. King County), show the willingness of judges to support criminal activity in betrayal of their oaths. These judges have intentionally withheld the Constitution and the law in order to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. These treasonous actions are destroying the judicial branch of our government, and will eventually destroy our Nation from within. The Ninth Circuit is no longer a legitimate court of law.

    The Following Federal and State Actions Support this Very Dishonest Opinion and use the Same Dishonest Tactics:

      King County v. Rasmussen (2002)

      Ray v. King County (2004)

      Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting)

      Understand the "House of Cards", the common dishonest tactics used by the Hilchkanum judges.

      Understand How My Complaint of Judicial Misconduct was Dismissed

      Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, February 10, 2004

      Schroeder denial of Complaint of Judicial Misconduct

    My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions in this "Conclusion" are a First Amendment expression of MY OPINION.