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Subsequent Hilchkanum Deeds:
March 15, 1904
Warranty Deed to Chris Nelson

by John Rasmussen

Please read a disclaimer for the statements I make on this website accusing judges, politicians and activists of criminal actions.



Background: The East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    In the late 1990s the leadership of King County, Washington, participated in the East Lake Sammamish (ELS) federal tax fraud scheme. As part of the railbanking "purchase" of the ELS right-of-way from Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF), King County agreed to accept a donation of the land under the right-of-way. This was land BNSF did not own and King County knew the donation was fraudulent. In order to hide this criminal act, King County then falsely claimed ownership of this "donated" land. Landowners along the right-of-way realized this was dishonest and lawsuits followed. Sadly, federal and Washington State judges decided to participate in the tax fraud scheme by illegally awarding the land to King County. The most disappointing and significant event was the participation in the tax fraud scheme by the judges of our Washington State Supreme Court.
    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

The importance of this deed was ignored or misstated by the judges in order to cover-up the tax fraud scheme.

    In order to cover-up the tax fraud scheme and falsely award the BNSF "donated" land to King County, the judges misconstrued the 1887 right-of-way deeds which first established the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way. This March 15, 1904 warranty deed to Chris Nelson was important evidence in the misconstruing of the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the Seattle, Lake Shore, and Eastern Railway (SLS&E). Because this deed conveys the land under the SLS&E right-of-way in 1904, it strongly suggests that Hilchkanum did not earlier convey this same land to the SLS&E with his 1887 right-of-way deed. How could Hilchkanum sell his land to Chris Nelson with this 1904 real estate deed if he previously granted that land to the SLS&E with his 1887 right-of-way deed? This deed would indicate that Hilchkanum did not earlier convey this land, and that the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was an easement. But, the judges in King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002) dishonestly decided that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed conveyed fee simple title of the right-of-way land to the Railway. Their dishonest opinions cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. An honest evaluation of this 1904 deed strongly suggests these judges lied. The Rasmussen judges stole my land and gave it to King County. These opinions also established a precedent and pattern for the theft other ELS landowner’s land. This deed conveyed 96% of the land contested in the King County v. Rasmussen lawsuit and should have been honestly considered in the Rasmussen opinions, but it wasn’t. Further, this 1904 deed to Chris Nelson provided a material fact which should have been honestly considered in Ray v. King County (2004). Again, it wasn’t. These issues will be discussed in more detail below. But first, we will locate the property contested in King County v. Rasmussen and identify the portion of that property that is conveyed in this March 15, 1904 warranty deed to Chris Nelson. This will help to understand that this deed was directly relevant to the King County v. Rasmussen opinions, and indirectly relevant to Ray v. King County.
    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

Orientation of this March 15, 1904 warranty deed to Chris Nelson, its transcription, and a photocopy.

    King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002) decided ownership of the portion of the BNSF right-of-way that crossed the Rasmussen property in King County, Washington. The right-of-way was originally established in 1887 by the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E). The SLS&E right-of-way passed along the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish, and through the homestead of Bill and Mary Hilchkanum. The following map provides an orientation for the Hilchkanum homestead in relation to Lake Sammamish and the present city of Seattle.

     The Hilchkanums made their homestead application in 1876. On May 9, 1887, they granted the right-of-way to the SLS&E Railway. The Hilchkanums received their homestead patent in 1888. The following map shows the Hilchkanum homestead in pink and the location of the Rasmussen property in green.

     The total area of the Rasmussen property, including the right-of-way, is about one acre. The area of railroad right-of-way is about one third of an acre. The following map shows the position of the BNSF right-of-way on the Rasmussen property.

     As stated at the top of this page, the King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002) decisions construed ownership of the portion of the BNSF right-of-way that crossed the Rasmussen property in King County, Washington. King County claimed that the Hilchkanums granted fee simple title to the Railway in 1887. But, the County knew the donation was fraudulent. It is obvious to me that the King County Prosecutor conspired with BNSF and the Land Conservancy of Seattle and King County (TLC) to work a federal tax fraud scheme in the railbanking of the right-of-way.
    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

     There were three subsequent Hilchkanum deeds that transferred the portion of the railroad right-of-way which was construed in King County v. Rasmussen to other members of the community. This subsequent Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson on March 15, 1904, conveyed 96% of the contested property. 1% of the Rasmussen right-of-way land was on government lot three and conveyed to John Herder on June 30, 1905. 3% of the Rasmussen right-of-way land was on government lot five and conveyed to Edward Sanders on September 3, 1904.

     As shown above, the deed to Chris Nelson conveyed 96% of the right-of-way land contested in the King County v. Rasmussen lawsuit. Below, find the transcribed deed and a photocopy of the original.

Transcribed Hilchkanum deed to Chris Nelson on March 15, 1904:

     The following is a transcribed copy of the March 15, 1904 deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson. The deed was drawn on a preprinted deed form. In the transcription, below, the handwritten portions are in bold font.



    Bill Hilchkanum Et Ux                                                            No. 291395
              To                                                                      Warranty Deed
    Chris Nelson

    This Indenture, made the 15th day of March in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Four

         Between Bill Hilchkanum and Louise Hilchkanum his wife, of Monohon, County of King, State of Washington, the parties of the first part, and Chris Nelson of Monohon, County of King, State of Washington partyof the second part:

         Witnessed. That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of Two Hundred and Twenty-five ($225.00) DOLLARS lawful money of the United States, to them in hand paid by the said party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents Grant, Bargain, Sell, Convey and Confirm unto the said party of the second part, and to his heirs and assigns, the following described tract, lot or parcel of land situate, lying and being in the County of King, State of Washington, and particularly bounded and described as follows, to wit:

         Lot two (2) Section Six (6) Township Twenty-four (24) North, Range six (6) east of the Willamette Meridian, in the County of King, State of Washington, Containing Twenty One Acres More or less.

         Together with the appurtenances, to have and to hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and his heirs and assigns forever.

         And the said parties of the first part their heirs, executors and administrators, do by those presents covenant, grant and agree to and with the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, that they, the said parties of the first part their heirs, executors and administrators, all and singular, the premises hereinabove conveyed, described and granted, or mentioned, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, and against all and every person or persons whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same, or any part thereof shall and will WARRANT and FOREVER DEFEND.

         In Witness Whereof, the parties of the first part have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written.

    Note from John Rasmussen:
    The remainder of the deed contains Bill and Louise Hilchkanum's marks (signatures), the witness signatures, and the notary section.

      View a photocopy of the March 15, 1904 deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson.



Subsequent real estate deeds are examined to determine the intentions of the parties to a right-of-way deed.

     In Washington State common law, previous opinions supply precedent which establish the rules to construe railroad right-of-way deeds. These previous opinions span more than one hundred years and are consistent in the establishment of these rules. This railroad right-of-way precedent shows that one factor to consider in construing the deed is the "subsequent conduct of the parties". This subsequent real estate deed from the Hilchkanums to Chris Nelson conveys 96% of the land considered in King County v. Rasmussen and should have been honestly analyzed by the judges in order to understand the Hilchkanum’s intentions in their 1887 right-of-way deed to the Seattle, Lake Shore, and Eastern Railway (SLS&E). The judges in King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County either ignored or misrepresented the significance of this deed in their opinions.
    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

It is very significant that the right-of-way land was not excepted in this March 15, 1904 real estate deed from the Hilchkanums to Chris Nelson.

     So, what is the significance of this deed? The significance is not what is found in the deed, but rather what is not found in this deed. What’s missing in this March 15, 1904 warranty deed from the Hilchkanums to Chris Nelson is an exception of the land under the ELS right-of-way. In King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County the judges claimed, or implied, that Hilchkanum always excepted the land under the right-of-way in his subsequent real estate deeds. Based on this lie, the judges "concluded" that Hilchkanum must have intended to earlier grant fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way with his 1887 right-of-way deed to the Seattle, Lake Shore, and Eastern Railway (SLS&E). If one believes the judge’s lie (that Hilchkanum conveyed his land to the SLS&E in 1887) there would need to be an exception of the right-of-way land in all of his subsequent real estate deeds. Otherwise, Hilchkanum would be conveying his land a second time with those subsequent real estate deeds. But the judges were wrong with their claim that Hilchkanum always excepted this land, and it was obvious that they were wrong. Some of the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds excepted the right-of-way and some did not. This March 15, 1904 Deed to Chris Nelson conveyed 96% of the land contested in King County v. Rasmussen and did not except the right-of-way. Additionally, none of these subsequent deeds excepted the right-of-way land. They just excepted the right-of-way. There is a difference in Washington State Common law between excepting a right-of-way and excepting right-of-way land. This will be explained further below. This inconsistency in excepting the right-of-way was no problem for the dishonest judges in King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County. They ignored this inconsistency in their analysis. Or, they declared that the subsequent deeds which did not except the right-of-way were "not significantly probative of whether or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate". Or, they declared the deeds "not probative of the grantors' intent in the 1887 deed". These subsequent deeds which did not except the right-of-way are significantly probative of the parties intentions in the 1887 right-of-way deed. This inconsistency with the exception language is examined next.
    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

There were two deeds to Chris Nelson in 1904. One excepted the right-of-way. One did not.

     It’s significant that the Hilchkanums conveyed two parcels to Chris Nelson in 1904 because one deed excepted the SLS&E right-of-way and one did not. One deed was conveyed on February 27th. The other was conveyed on March 15th, and is the subject of this document. If one deed to Chris Nelson excepted the right-of-way, shouldn’t the second one except the right-of-way too? There is a legal explanation for this inconsistency. But first, here are links to the February 27th and March 15th warranty deeds from Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson. Note that the February 27th deed excepts "three (3) acres heretofore conveyed to the Seattle & International Railway for right of way purposes". It’s important to observe that it excepts acres of right-of-way, not acres of land.

    View the February 27, 1904 Warranty Deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson.

    View the March 15, 1904 Warranty Deed from Bill Hilchkanum to Chris Nelson.

Excepting a right-of-way in a deed does not automatically except the underlying land.

     Above, I stated that there is a difference in Washington State Common law between excepting a right-of-way and excepting right-of-way land. When a right-of-way is excepted in a subsequent real estate deed, the judge determines its meaning by going to the original right-of-way deed to determine how the term "right-of-way" is understood from the words of that original deed and from the actions of the parties to that original deed. Then, that meaning of the term "right-of-way" is what is excepted in the subsequent real estate deed. If the original right-of way deed conveys an easement, the exception of that right-of-way in a subsequent deed merely recognizes the easement. In that case, it does not except or withhold the right-of-way land in that subsequent real estate deed. That precedent is best explained in Zobrist v. Culp (1977). I’ve written a study that explains this issue and is linked here.

    Understand the meaning of the exception of a right-of-way in a deed.

     In Washington State/Territory common law, the term "right-of-way" can be understood with two different meanings in a railroad deed. How it is understood depends on where and how it is used. If the term "right-of-way" is used in the granting clause or the habendum to designate what is granted, or to limit the grant, then the term is understood as an easement. If the term "right-of-way" is used in the legal description of the property part of the deed, it is understood to be describing the land, and not an easement, a right, to use the property. This precedent was spelled out in Brown v. State of Washington (1996).

    "The words "right of way" can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Morsbach, 152 Wash. at 568; Harris, 120 Wn.2d at 737. Unlike Swan, Veach, and Roeder, where "right of way" was used in the granting or habendum clauses to qualify or limit the interest granted, "right of way" in the deeds at issue here appears in either the legal description of the property conveyed or in the portion of the deeds describing Milwaukee's obligations with respect to the property."
       [Brown v. State of Washington (1996)]

In Rasmussen and Ray the judges cherry-picked the subsequent real estate deeds, considering only the deeds that excepted the right-of-way. Then, they dishonestly concluded that the right-of-way land was withheld. This is completely dishonest!

     In King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County, the judges cherry-picked the Hilchkanum subsequent real estate deeds. They considered only the ones which excepted the right-of-way. They ignored or dismissed the deeds which did not except the right-of-way, dishonestly claiming that they were "not significantly probative of whether or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate" or that they were "not probative of the grantors' intent in the 1887 deed". Then, the Rasmussen and Ray judges falsely defined the term "right-of-way" in these cherry-picked deeds to mean "right-of-way land". Instead of going to the original 1887 right-of-way deed to the SLS&E to determine whether the right-of-way was conveyed as an easement or as fee simple title of the land, these judges falsely assumed that the later exception of the right-of-way could only be understood to except the land. Based on that falsehood, they then concluded that Hilchkanum conveyed his land to the SLS&E with his 1887 right-of-way deed. Essentially, they worked the logic backward. The easement-or-fee meaning of "right-of-way" is established in the original right-of-way deed, not the subsequent deeds. This can best be understood by observing the dishonest analysis of this issue in the Rasmussen and Ray opinions. Below, are links to citations from the three opinions with my comments added.
    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Understand that Judge Cox "cherry-picked" and misrepresented Hilchkanum’s subsequent real estate deeds in Ray v. King County (2004).

    Understand that Judge Cox dishonestly declared a Hilchkanum subsequent deed "not probative of the grantors' intent in the 1887 deed" in Ray v. King County (2004).

    Understand that Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher "cherry-picked" and misrepresented Hilchkanum’s subsequent real estate deeds in King County v. Rasmussen (2002).

    Understand that Federal Judge Barbara Rothstein "cherry-picked" and misrepresented Hilchkanum’s subsequent real estate deeds in King County v. Rasmussen (2001).

Summary:

     This March 15, 1904 warranty deed from the Hilchkanums to Chris Nelson should have provided strong evidence that the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E was intended to convey an easement, but this evidence was ignored in the Rasmussen and Ray opinions. Because it conveyed 96% of the contested land in King County v. Rasmussen, it should have been the most important subsequent real estate deed considered in the determination of the subsequent conduct of the parties to the original 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The importance of this deed was briefed to Judge Rothstein in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), but she simply ignored our brief and failed to analyze this deed. In King County v. Rasmussen (2002), Judge Fletcher dishonestly declared this deed "not significantly probative of whether or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate". That was a lie by that very dishonest Ninth Circuit judge. This Chris Nelson deed was not in the chain of title in Ray v. King County (2004) and not mentioned in that opinion. However, Judge Cox considered a similar 1890 deed from Hilchkanum to Julia Curley which did not except the right-of-way. Cox dismissed that deed with the statement that it was "not probative of the grantors' intent in the 1887 deed". Judge Cox simply plagiarized Fletcher’s words in order to dishonestly dismiss the issue.
    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

     The judges in Rasmussen and Ray refused to honestly consider the legal effect of this deed in their opinions. Instead, they considered only deeds which excepted the right-of-way and then falsely claimed that the exception of a "right of way" means the same as the exception of the "right of way land". That is not correct, as explained above. These dishonest opinions cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protect the participants. The judges became participants themselves, with their dishonest opinions.
    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

     Sadly, the judges of our Washington State Supreme Court became participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme with their refusal to accept Ray v. King County for appeal and correct its many factual and legal errors. The profound dishonesty of all these opinions strongly suggests that they are intentional criminal acts from the bench by our judges.
    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

Understand that the judges of our Washington State Supreme Court intentionally participated in the
ELS federal tax fraud scheme.