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Opinions Thru Brown

A comparison of Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway deeds
reveals the "ELS Form Deed" used along East Lake Sammamish
and identifies the Railway as author of that "Form Deed"

by John Rasmussen

Please read a disclaimer for the statements I make on this website accusing judges, politicians and activists of criminal actions.



Introduction: The "ELS form deed"

     This webpage recognizes several "form deeds" which were used by the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway lawyers to obtain right-of-way deeds for their railroad in the late 1880's. The SLS&E "form deeds" varied by location and date of execution. This page concentrates on the "ELS form deed" which was used in 1887 to establish the portion of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) which routed from Seattle, around the north end of Lake Washington, and along East Lake Sammamish (ELS) to the present city of Issaquah. From my research, this SLS&E "ELS form deed" was the most common used by the Railway to establish its track. I'll differentiate this "form deed" from the other "form deeds" composed by the Railway lawyers by referring to it as the "ELS form deed", meaning "East Lake Sammamish form deed". Identifying the "ELS form deed" is important in understanding the dishonesty of the Hilchkanum judges who misconstrued the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E in King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County. The effect of their opinions is the reason for their opinions. The effect of their misconstruing of the Hilchkanum deed is the cover-up of the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. Contrary to the contrived conclusions of these Hilchkanum judges, this page will show the Hilchkanum deed was based on an unaltered copy of the "ELS form deed", and that it was authored by the SLS&E lawyers. In violation of the Constitution and the rules of summary judgment, these Hilchkanum judges refused to allow this disputed fact of authorship to be resolved by a jury. No legitimate jury would come to the dishonest conclusions of fact which these Hilchkanum judges illegally established.
    (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)


Menu of the Issues Discussed on this Webpage:

     The issues discussed on this webpage are presented here as a "jump menu". Selecting an issue will take the reader to that portion of the discussion.

    * Typically, railroad lawyers wrote a "form deed" which they used to obtain rights-of-way from landowners.

    * The words of a railroad "form deed" should be construed against the railroad.

    * An examination of SLS&E deeds establishes the "ELS form deed" used for the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

      * The Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) "ELS Form Deed":

        * The SLS&E "ELS Form Deed" Granting Clause is obtained from a study and comparison of SLS&E deeds.

        * The SLS&E "ELS Form Deed" Secondary Grant is obtained from a study and comparison of SLS&E deeds.

        * The SLS&E "ELS Form Deed" Habendum is obtained from a study and comparison of SLS&E deeds.

      * The Hilchkanum deed is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS Form Deed".

    * In King County v. Squire (1990), the court established the Railway lawyers as author of the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

    * Federal and State judges overturned one hundred years of consistently held common law precedent in order to cover-up the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.

        * The King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County judges ignored common law precedent when they construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

        * An honest analysis of King County v. Squire (1990) establishes the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed as an easement.

        * The judges who construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed intentionally misrepresented the findings in King County v. Squire (1990).

      * The King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County decisions were crimes from the bench.

      * King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein:

        * Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein dishonestly eliminated our arguments about Hilchkanum's inability to participate in his right-of-way deed.

        * Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein used undocumented, irrational assumptions about the Hilchkanums in order to construe all the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum.

        * Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein admitted that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was based on a "form deed", but refused to identify and construe that "form deed", and identify its author.

        * Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein intentionally misrepresented the findings in King County v. Squire (1990).

        * Summary of Rothstein's dishonest construing of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

      * King County v. Rasmussen (2002), Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher:

        * Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher and panel dishonestly eliminated our arguments about Hilchkanum's inability to participate in his right-of-way deed.

        * Judge Fletcher was so afraid of the precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990) that she refused to even refer to the decision by its name.

        * Judge Fletcher admitted the Hilchkanum deed was based on a Railway prepared "form deed" and then adopted Rothstein's dishonest analysis.

      * Ray v. King County (2004), Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald Cox:

        * Despite material evidence to the contrary, Washington State appeals judges Ronald Cox and Ann Schindler dishonestly attributed all the words in the Hilchkanum deed to Hilchkanum.

        * Judges Cox and Schindler refused to admit that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was based on a Railway prepared "form deed".

      * The Washington State Supreme Court dishonestly denied appeal of Ray v. King County (2004).

      * U.S. Federal Court of Claims Judge Horn "Overturned" the Prior "Hilchkanum Opinions".

      * Do East Lake Sammamish Residents Now Own the Land under their Rights-of-Way?

    * There were other "form deeds" composed by the SLS&E lawyers.

    * Summary of this webpage:


Typically, railroad lawyers wrote a "form deed" which they used to obtain rights-of-way from landowners.

         Great power was granted to railroads with their state or federal charters. The charters granted railroads the right to survey and build their tracks whether the impacted landowners agreed or not. They granted these privately owned railroad companies the right of eminent domain. In spite of that "right", the railroads didn't just build their tracks without the agreement of the landowners. Typically, the railroad lawyers wrote a "form deed" which their representatives then took to landowners to obtain deeds to locate their track. Sometimes the "form deed" was written to convey an easement. Other times, the "form deed" was written to convey fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way. The Milwaukee "form deed", which was construed in Brown v. State of Washington (1996), is an example of a railroad "form deed" which was constructed to grant fee simple title to the railroad. But, that was not the case with the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E), as is explained on this webpage. From observing a number of SLS&E deeds, it is obvious that the SLS&E lawyers, lead by Judge Thomas Burke, composed several different "form deeds" which were used to locate their track. As stated above, the SLS&E "form deeds" varied by location and date of execution. This page concentrates on the "ELS form deed" used in 1887 to establish the portion of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) which routed from Seattle, around the north end of Lake Washington, and along East Lake Sammamish (ELS) to the present city of Issaquah. In order to differentiate this "form deed" from the others, I'll refer to it as the "ELS form deed" ("East Lake Sammamish form deed"). The "ELS form deed" is the basis of the Hilchkanum deed (which was misconstrued in the Hilchkanum opinions) and the deeds involved in King County v. Squire (1990) and Lawson v. State (1986). Based on common law and the precedent set in Squire, the "ELS form deed" conveys an easement.

Since the words of a deed are construed against its author, the words of a railroad
"form deed" should be construed against the railroad.

         The judges who construed the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004) failed to allow the Rays or Rasmussens (me) their constitutional right to establish the material fact that the Hilchkanum deed was based on an unaltered version of the "ELS form deed" ("East Lake Sammamish form deed"). Authorship of a deed is critical because the words in a deed are strongly construed against its author. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "Initially, it should be noted that contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it. Underwood v. Sterner, supra: Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn.2d 162, 332 P.2d 454 (1958): Restatement, Contracts SS 236 (d) (1932)."
        [Stickney v. Underwood (1966) - Citation is highlighted on page 3.]

         The common law precedent that the words of a deed should be construed against its author is even more significant with respect to railroad right-of-way deeds because railroads had the power to build their tracks whether the landowner agreed or not. This point was made by Washington State Supreme Court Justice Sanders in his Brown dissenting opinion.

      "The railroad was a sophisticated, well financed, and organized party, undoubtedly represented by counsel. Landowners stood at a disadvantage to railroads in the early 1900s. It approached the landowners to purchase their land after it had already laid out or even built its rail line over the land. [ ] The railroad and the landowners knew that the railroad possessed the power of eminent domain and would end up in possession of the right of way, if it were not already. These were not arm's-length transactions between parties of equal bargaining power. For these reasons, the deeds, at least the preprinted portions of them, must be construed against the railroad. '[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it.' Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood, 67 Wn.2d 824, 827, 410 P.2d 7 (1966)"
        [Washington State Supreme Court Judge Richard B. Sanders dissenting in Brown (1996)]

         Since railroad "form deeds" are prepared by the railroad's lawyers, common law requires that the words of a railroad "form deed" be construed most strongly against the railroad.

An examination of SLS&E deeds establishes the "ELS form deed" which was used for the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

         The deeds I present on this website are not "cherry picked". This stands in stark contrast to the tactic King County and the Hilchkanum judges involved in King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County used in order to misconstrue the Hilchkanum's intentions in their deeds. I present here all the deeds in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42, which holds the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Many of the deeds in Volume 42 explain the "ELS form deed" written by the Railway lawyers, but not all of the deeds in that King County record conform to that "form deed". I present all of those deeds for the reader, and for me, to analyze.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         While I understood that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed", I didn't have the proof that I needed for this webpage. So, I asked my son to go to the King County Records Office and obtain copies of SLS&E right-of-way deeds which were recorded near the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed in May 1887. Since the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is recorded in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42, Page 250, my son copied all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds he could find in the first 500 pages of Volume 42. There were twenty SLS&E right-of-way deeds in those 500 pages, which were executed between February 4, 1887 and May 27, 1887. After studying and plotting the location of those twenty deeds, I went to the King County Archives two other times to obtain several more ELS deeds in order to build a better picture of the "ELS form deed" ("East Lake Sammamish form deed"). Therefore, this discussion is based on twenty-eight deeds consisting of the twenty SLS&E deeds my son found in the Volume 42 of the King County Book of Deeds, the Squire deed to the SLS&E which was construed in King County v. Squire (1990), the Burke deed to the SLS&E which was construed in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910) and is displayed in Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993), and the Bargquist (Barquist) and Puget Mill deeds which were provided in the Affidavit of Richard Welsh to King County Superior Court, July 8, 1985 as an exhibit to the Washington State Supreme Court in Lawson v. State (1986). A photocopy of the Bargquist deed from the King County archives is also provided. Also, this discussion includes the SLS&E ELS right-of-way deeds which are discussed in the U.S. Federal Court of Claims opinion Beres v. United States (2010). The unsigned Cooper deed to the SLS&E and the Reeves deed to the Northern Pacific are also shown.

         While this is not an examination of all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds, after viewing these deeds I believe the reader will understand that this is an adequate number to establish several SLS&E "form deeds", principally the "ELS form deed" which was used for the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

      View the twenty-eight deeds used to establish the SLS&E "form deeds"

The Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) "ELS Form Deed":

         As stated above, the SLS&E "form deeds" varied by location and date of execution. This section concentrates on the "ELS form deed" used in 1887 to establish the portion of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) which routed from Seattle, around the north end of Lake Washington, and along East Lake Sammamish (ELS) to the present city of Issaquah. Based on the twenty-eight deeds described above, here are the three material elements of the SLS&E "ELS form deed" which were used at the time and location of the Hilchkanum deed. Each element will be justified in the following sections.

    Note: To aid in differentiating the SLS&E "ELS form deed" elements from the respective elements in the actual deeds, I present the SLS&E "ELS form deed" in dark red font throughout this webpage.

      SLS&E "ELS Form Deed" Granting Clause:

      "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to ("me" or "us") from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory ("I" or "we") do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way ("one hundred (100)" or "fifty (50)") feet in width through ("my", "our" or "said") lands in said County described as follows to wit."

      SLS&E "ELS Form Deed" Secondary Grant:

      "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road"

      SLS&E "ELS Form Deed" Habendum:

      "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever"

The SLS&E "ELS Form Deed" Granting Clause is obtained from a study and comparison of SLS&E deeds.

         The SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause is determined from the common language found in a number of SLS&E deeds which were executed near the time and location of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Here, again, is the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause followed by links to a number of SLS&E deeds containing the identical granting words. Of the twenty-five SLS&E recorded deeds that I've obtained from the King County archives, twenty of them use this identical granting clause. As explained above, these are not "cherry picked" SLS&E deeds. The majority were obtained from a search for all the SLS&E deeds in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42.

      SLS&E "ELS Form Deed" Granting Clause:

      "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to ("me" or "us") from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory ("I" or "we") do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way ("one hundred (100)" or "fifty (50)") feet in width through ("my", "our" or "said") lands in said County described as follows to wit."

      View the Lee granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Lurber granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the McGraw granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Squire granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Stone granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Yonderpump granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Tahalthkut granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Lewellyn granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Burnett granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Pearson granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Davis granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Anderson granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Sbedzuse granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Hilchkanum granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Ashworth granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Bargquist granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Peterson granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Perry granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Palmberg granting clause to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

The SLS&E "ELS form deed" Secondary Grant is obtained by a study and comparison of SLS&E deeds.

         The SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant is determined from the common language found in a number of SLS&E deeds which were executed near the time and location of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Here, again, is the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant followed by links to the identical language in a number of SLS&E deeds. Of the twenty-five SLS&E recorded deeds that I've obtained from the King County archives, seventeen of them use this identical secondary grant. Additionally, the secondary grant from the Squire right-of-way deed is linked below. The Squire deed has the identical secondary grant language with an additional condition added by Governor Squire. As explained above, these are not "cherry picked" SLS&E deeds. The majority were obtained from a search for all the SLS&E deeds in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42.

      SLS&E "ELS form deed" Secondary Grant:

      "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road"

      View the Lee secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Lurber secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the McGraw secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Stone secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Yonderpump secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Tahalthkut secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Lewellyn secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Burnett secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Pearson secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Davis secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Anderson secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Sbedzuse secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Hilchkanum secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Bargquist secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Peterson secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Perry secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant.

      View the Palmberg secondary grant to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Squire secondary grant to understand that it uses the identical SLS&E "ELS form deed" secondary grant,
      and adds a condition that the downed trees belong to the Squires.

The SLS&E "ELS form deed" Habendum is obtained by a study and comparison of SLS&E deeds.

         The SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum is determined from the common language found in a number of SLS&E deeds which were executed near the time and location of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Here, again, is the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum followed by links to deeds containing the identical language. Of the twenty-five SLS&E recorded deeds that I've obtained from the King County archives, eleven of them use this identical habendum. Another five SLS&E deeds use this identical habendum, and then add requirements such as railroad crossings and fences. The last two deeds, from McGraw and Squire, add reverter statements to their habendum. The effect of this reverter language is explained in King County v. Squire (1990) and is discussed in a section below. As explained above, these are not "cherry picked" SLS&E deeds. The majority were obtained from a search for all the SLS&E deeds in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42.

      SLS&E "ELS form deed" Habendum:

      "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever"

      View the Lurber habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum.

      View the Yonderpump habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum.

      View the Tahalthkut habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum.

      View the Lewellyn habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum.

      View the Burnett habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum.

      View the Davis habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum.

      View the Anderson habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum.

      View the Sbedzuse habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum.

      View the Hilchkanum habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum.

      View the Perry habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum.

      View the Palmberg habendum to confirm that it is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

      View the Lee habendum to understand that it uses the identical SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum,
      and adds the requirement for fences, crossings, and cattle guards.

      View the Pearson habendum to understand that it uses the identical SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum,
      and adds the requirement for fences, a cattle crossing, and a wagon crossing.

      View the Bargquist habendum to understand that it uses the identical SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum,
      and adds the requirement for up to three crossings.

      View the Peterson habendum to understand that it uses the identical SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum,
      and adds the requirement for fences, and a crossing.

      View the Stone habendum to understand that it uses the identical SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum,
      and adds the requirement for the Railway to construct a viaduct for cattle to have access to Lake Union

      View the McGraw habendum to understand that it uses the identical SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum,
      and adds a reverter clause requiring the railroad be built by January 1, 1888.

      View the Squire habendum to understand that it uses the identical SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum,
      and adds reverter clauses and reserves the riparian and waterfront rights.

The Hilchkanum deed is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed":

         Federal Ninth Circuit and Washington State judges covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme by construing the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum as its author and grantor. As I show here, the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E is an unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed" which should have been construed against the Railway, as author. The judges were able to pull this off by denying the constitutional right of due process to the Rays and me. Because of the profound dishonesty in essentially every paragraph of their opinions, it must be assumed that these judges intentionally committed criminal acts from the bench with their opinions. Authorship of the Hilchkanum deed is a disputed material fact which the judges refused to have resolved by a jury. The judges illegally decided that Hilchkanum was responsible for the words in his deed, in violation of the rules of summary judgment. I describe this violation of the law by the judges as the foundation of the "house of cards" on which they built their dishonest opinions.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, was in no position to participate in his 1887 SLS&E right-of-way deed. American Indians were on the bottom rung of white society at that time. The Native's defeat in the Indian Wars of the mid to late 1850's established their position in the society of that period. Many Natives were killed when they resisted the ill effects of Territorial Governor Steven's treaties with the tribes. A good example is the execution of Chief Leschi of the Nisqually, who was is hanged on February 19, 1858. His execution was based on trumped-up charges. It's believed that the real reason for his hanging was his opposition to his treaty with Governor Stevens, which he signed under protest, or perhaps never signed at all. Apparently, his hanging was a gala event for the white folks of the time. The judges who found Hilchkanum responsible for the words in his right-of-way deed ignored the history of the period, the laws which recognized the disadvantage Native Americans had in real estate transactions, and the many documents which we provided the judges which explained Hilchkanum's inability to participate in his deed. Of course, this issue of Hilchkanum's participation in his deed was a disputed material fact which the judges resolved in intentional violation of the rules of summary judgment.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View a study of Hilchkanum's participation and intentions with his SLS&E right-of-way deed.

         Here is each transcribed element of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, directly followed by the corresponding element from the SLS&E "ELS form deed". One can see that the words of the Hilchkanum deed are the words of the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed". Please use the hyperlinks below to view a photocopy of the recorded Hilchkanum deed to confirm the words in the deed.

    The Hilchkanum and "ELS form deed" granting clauses are identical.

      May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - Granting Clause:

      "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory we do hereby donate grant
      and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to wit."

        [View a photocopy and the full transcription of the May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.]

      SLS&E "ELS form deed" Granting Clause:

      "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to ____ from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory ____ do hereby donate grant
      and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way ______________ feet in width through ____ lands in said County described as follows to wit."

        [SLS&E "ELS form deed" composed by the SLS&E Railway lawyers]

    The Hilchkanum and "ELS form deed" secondary grants are identical.

      May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - Secondary Grant:

      "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road"

        [View a photocopy and the full transcription of the May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.]

      SLS&E "ELS form deed" Secondary Grant:

      "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road"

        [SLS&E "ELS form deed" composed by the SLS&E Railway lawyers]

    The Hilchkanum and "ELS form deed" habendum clauses are identical.

      May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - Habendum:

      "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever"

        [View a photocopy and the full transcription of the May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.]

      SLS&E "ELS form deed" Habendum:

      "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever"

        [SLS&E "ELS form deed" composed by the SLS&E Railway lawyers]

         Of the twenty-six recorded SLS&E deeds which I analyze on this webpage, there are a number of other SLS&E right-of-way deeds which are based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed". In common law, these unaltered SLS&E "form deeds" must be construed against the Railway because they were wholly written by the Railway lawyers. The SLS&E Railway is the only common party in these deeds. Please observe that the Yonderpump, Tahalthkut, Sbedzuse and Davis right-of-way deeds were signed with an "X", an indication of illiteracy and the inability to fully participate in their deeds. The Hilchkanums signed their deed with "X"s, too.

      View the Yonderpump Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

      View the Tahalthkut Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

      View the Sbedzuse Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

      View the Davis Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

      View the Lurber Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

      View the Lewellyn Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

      View the Burnett Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

      View the Perry Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

      View the Anderson Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that it is based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed".

In King County v. Squire (1990), the court established the Railway lawyers as author of the SLS&E "ELS form deed".

         In Washington State, property law is based on common law. Common law relies heavily on precedent set in previous opinions. There are a number of previous opinions dealing with construing railroad right-of-way deeds. The link below provides the most significant opinions which applied to the construing of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

      View the precedential railroad right-of-way opinions used to construe the Hilchkanum deed to the SLS&E.

         Of the precedential railroad right-of-way opinions linked above, one opinion deals most directly with construing of the Hilchkanum deed. King County v. Squire (1990) construes a SLS&E right-of-way deed which was executed a five weeks before the Hilchkanum deed and contains identical wording found in the Hilchkanum deed. The precedent set in Squire destroys the legitimacy of the King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County opinions. So, all the Rasmussen and Ray judges ignored Squire or mischaracterized the conclusions of the Squire court. With respect to the authorship issue discussed here, the Squire court determined which words of the Squire right-of-way deed were altered or added by Watson Squire. While the Squire judges did not name the Railway as author of the un-altered portion of the deed, the Railway was the only other party to the deed and, by default, must be assumed to be author. I should note that Watson Squire was the last Governor of Washington Territory and one of its first U.S. Senators. Further, Watson Squire was a lawyer. It was important for the Squire court to determine who authored the words of the Squire right-of-way deed because, in common law, the words in a deed are most strongly construed against its author. This was discussed above. Here, again, is a citation which supports that precedent. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "Initially, it should be noted that contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it. Underwood v. Sterner, supra: Wise v. Farden, 53 Wn.2d 162, 332 P.2d 454 (1958): Restatement, Contracts SS 236 (d) (1932)."
        [Stickney v. Underwood (1966) - Citation is highlighted on page 3.]

         With that understanding, the Squire court published the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E in its opinion. The changes made to the Railway's "form deed" by Watson Squire were published in bold font. Here is the portion of King County v. Squire (1990) which provides the material portions of the Squire Right-of-Way Deed. (The bold emphasis in this citation is the court's.)

      "On March 29, 1887, Watson and Ida Squire executed a deed granting a half-mile right of way to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company. The material portion of the deed reads as follows with the handwritten additions by Mr. Squire set forth in boldface type:

        In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit: [legal description]. Such right-of-way strip to be twenty-five (25) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across the said lands by the Engineer of said Railway Company, which location is described as follows, to-wit [description.] . . . .

        To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888...."

          [King County v. Squire (1990)]

         When one removes the words altered or added by Watson Squire, the words remaining are identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" which is discussed and established above. In this case the words which are identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" are the granting clause and the habendum. The granting clause and habendum portions of a deed traditionally describe what is granted. This is the case with the Squire deed and the other deeds which used the Railway prepared SLS&E "ELS form deed".

         The "ELS form deed" secondary grant is also present in the Squire deed, and apparently was omitted by the Squire court because it did not consider it material to its analysis of easement-or-fee.

      View a photocopy and transcription of the Squire right-of-way deed to confirm that the "ELS form deed" secondary grant is included in the recorded deed.

         A study of King County v. Squire (1990) reveals the correct way to construe a SLS&E right-of-way deed. The Squire judges identified the words which were added or altered by Governor Squire. This was important because the words in a deed are construed against its author, as shown in the above citation. The Squire judges were puzzled about the reverter language added by Governor Squire to his habendum. Here, again, is that habendum with the words added by Governor Squire shown in bold font.

      "To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888...."
        [King County v. Squire (1990)]

         The Squire court noted that the reverter words "...or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company..." might suggest that the grant was a "fee simple determinable". Please understand that upon railroad abandonment a "fee simple determinable" would have a very different effect than an unrestricted "fee simple" grant. With this reverter language, upon railroad abandonment a "fee simple determinable" would revert to the Squires or their successor, just as an easement would revert. But, the Squire judges concluded that the language of the Squire right-of-way deed "strongly" suggested an easement because of the words in the granting clause. As I show below, the Squire granting clause is an unaltered copy of the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause. The Squire court went on to construe Governor Squire's added reverter clause as his intention to merely reiterate the grant of an easement which was found in the granting clause. Here is a citation from King County v. Squire which explains this point. (The emphasis is mine.)

      "The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, "or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company," which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the "so long as" language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the "so long as" language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and "to its successors and assigns forever". The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement.

      In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed."

        [King County v. Squire (1990)]

         The Squire court identified which words in the Squire deed were added or altered by Governor Squire. By default, the remaining words in the Squire right-of-way deed were written by the SLS&E lawyers. When one strips away the changes made by Governor Squire, the Squire granting clause, habendum, and secondary grant are identical to the granting clause, habendum, and secondary grant in the SLS&E "ELS form deed" which was discussed and identified above. For emphasis, I provide a direct comparison here. First, the granting clauses:

    The Squire and "form deed" granting clauses are identical.

      The Squire Granting Clause (with the changes made by Squire in bold font):

      "In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway [Company] a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit:"

        [King County v. Squire (1990)]      [Transcription and Photocopy of the Squire deed to the SLS&E]

      The SLS&E "ELS form deed" Granting Clause:

      "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to ____ from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory ____ do hereby donate grant
      and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way ____________ feet in width through ____ lands in said County described as follows to wit."

        [SLS&E "ELS form deed" composed by the SLS&E Railway lawyers]

         Next, we compare the words in the Squire habendum to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" habendum which was established in the above discussion. Here, I remove the words of the Squire habendum which were added by Governor Squire.

    The Squire and "form deed" habendum clauses are identical when Squire's additional words are removed.

      The Squire Habendum (with the additions made by Governor Squire removed):

      "To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever [Governor Squire's additional words are removed here.]"

        [King County v. Squire (1990)]

      The SLS&E "ELS form deed" Habendum:

      "To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever"

        [SLS&E "ELS form deed" composed by the SLS&E Railway lawyers]

         Last, we compare the words in the Squire Secondary Grant to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" Secondary Grant. The Hilchkanum judges found the Secondary Grant in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to be material to their opinion that the Hilchkanum deed granted fee simple title of the underlying land. The Squire court didn't find the identical language in the Squire Secondary Grant to be material to that determination, and didn't provide the Squire Secondary Grant in the Squire opinion. So, the Squire Secondary Grant is not discussed in King County v. Squire (1990) but is found in the Squire deed, as shown in the photocopy of the Squire deed, linked below.

    The Squire and "form deed" secondary grant are identical when Squire's additional words are removed.

      The Squire Secondary Grant (with the additions made by Governor Squire in bold font):

      "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road. Provided that all trees when cut down shall belong to said first party, the donors, W.C. Squire & wife."

        [Transcription and Photocopy of the Squire right-of-way deed - Secondary Grant]

      The SLS&E "ELS form deed" Secondary Grant:

      "And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road"

        [SLS&E "ELS form deed" composed by the SLS&E Railway lawyers]

         It is obvious that the words of the Squire granting clause are identical to the words of the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause. It is obvious that the words of the Squire habendum are identical to those of the SLS&E "ELS form deed" (with additional limiting language inserted by Governor Squire). Further the "ELS form deed" secondary grant, which the Hilchkanum judges found so important in the construing of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, is materially identical to the Squire secondary grant, which the Squire judges failed to find of importance in determining the issue of easement-or-fee. It is obscene that the judges in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004) concluded that Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, was the author of those identical words in his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, and then construed those words against only him. The dishonesty of the Rasmussen and Ray opinions, with respect to this authorship issue, will be discussed next.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      Read a detailed study comparing the Hilchkanum and Squire right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E.

Federal and State judges overturned one hundred years of consistently held common law precedent in order to cover-up the ELS federal tax fraud scheme.

    The King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County judges ignored common law precedent when they construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.

           Honestly construing the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was very simple and straightforward. The Hilchkanum deed granted a "right-of-way" in the granting clause of its premises. For more than one hundred years, that wording has been held to grant an easement in Washington State common law. There is no instance that wording has been held to grant fee simple interest until the Hilchkanum deed was intentionally misconstrued by federal and Washington State judges in their Hilchkanum opinions. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Understand the basic rules to construe a deed.

        View fourteen citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement.

        View a study of the meaning of the term "right-of-way" in a railroad deed.

        View a list of the precedential railroad right-of-way opinions in Washington State

    An honest analysis of King County v. Squire (1990) establishes the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed as an easement.

           With respect to construing the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, the most critical precedent is found in King County v. Squire (1990), which is discussed above. The precedent set in Squire destroys the legitimacy of the King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County opinions. All the Rasmussen and Ray judges ignored Squire or mischaracterized the conclusions of the Squire court. This blatant dishonesty must be seen as intentional. Several important issues were settled in Squire which were effectively reversed in the Rasmussen and Ray opinions without any justification, supporting facts, or basis in the law. First, by default, the Squire court recognized that the basic deed was written by the Railway lawyers and that Governor Squire then made some changes to that basic deed. Second, the Squire court recognized that the Squire granting clause, which was authored by the Railway lawyers, "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...", and that the changes made by Governor Squire to his habendum reiterated that intention to convey an easement. As shown in the discussion above, the Squire granting clause is identical to the Hilchkanum granting clause and many other SLS&E granting clauses, and is a copy of the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause. Because of the importance of this fact, I show again the "ELS form deed" granting clause and links to the identical granting clauses in the Squire, Hilchkanum and other deeds.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        SLS&E "ELS Form Deed" Granting Clause:

        "In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to ("me" or "us") from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory ("I" or "we") do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way ("one hundred (100)" or "fifty (50)") feet in width through ("my", "our" or "said") lands in said County described as follows to wit."

           Here, again, are the SLS&E deeds which contain the identical "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Squire granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Hilchkanum granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Lee granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Lurber granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The McGraw granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Stone granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Yonderpump granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Tahalthkut granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Lewellyn granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Burnett granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Pearson granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Davis granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Anderson granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Sbedzuse granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Ashworth granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Bargquist granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Peterson granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Perry granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

        The Palmberg granting clause is identical to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" granting clause.

          Review the discussion on how the SLS&E "ELS form deed" was established.

           It is obscene that the judges in King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004) concluded that Bill Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, was responsible for the words in his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, and then construed those words against only him. Common law required the King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County judges to adopt the precedent established in King County v. Squire, finding the granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". Because Squire is a Division I opinion, this was binding precedent for Chief Judge Ronald Cox and Judge Ann Schindler of the State of Washington Court of Appeals, Division I. If the Hilchkanum judges found other legitimate factors which would differentiate the Squire deed from the Hilchkanum deed, they were required to analyze those factors using undisputed material facts and the law. If there were questions of material fact, those issues should have been resolved by a jury. Instead, the King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County judges ignored the precedent set in Squire, refused to allow a jury, and made conclusions based on undocumented facts and the misapplication of the law.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    The judges who construed the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed intentionally misrepresented the findings in King County v. Squire (1990).

           Considering the fact that the Rasmussen and Ray judges were carefully briefed on the effect of the Squire opinion, it must be understood that these judges intentionally misapplied common law in order to arrive at their predetermined decisions. This issue is exposed in the annotated versions of their opinions, which are linked here.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) at the location Judge Rothstein refused to acknowledge the precedent set in King County v. Squire.

        Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) at the location Judge Fletcher refused to acknowledge the precedent set in King County v. Squire.

        Open an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004)) at the location Judge Cox refused to acknowledge the precedent set in King County v. Squire.

The King County v. Rasmussen and Ray v. King County decisions were crimes from the bench.

         This website focuses on the three published opinions which covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, King County v. Rasmussen (2001), King County v. Rasmussen (2002), and Ray v. King County (2004). All three opinions construed the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum. All of these Hilchkanum judges refused the Rays and Rasmussens (me) their constitutional right to establish the material fact that the Hilchkanum deed was based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed". All the opinions made no mention of the Railway's authorship and participation in the deeds. A critical reading of these opinions finds violation of the Constitution, misapplication of the law, and manipulation of the facts in essentially every paragraph. I believe these Hilchkanum judges were privately asked to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, and agreed. The purpose of their dishonesty is understood by the effect of their opinions. Their opinions covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme, and were issued for that reason. These opinions were criminal acts from the bench which should be seen as racketeering because of the common dishonest tactics used to justify their irrational conclusions. These three criminal acts from the bench will be discussed next.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      The common dishonest tactics used by the Hilchkanum judges should be seen as racketeering.

King County v. Rasmussen (2001), Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein:

    Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein dishonestly eliminated our arguments about Hilchkanum's inability to participate in his right-of-way deed.

           Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein struck my lawyers briefing which contradicted her illegal and dishonest conclusions of fact about Hilchkanum. My lawyer made the following statement in his "Brief Opposing King County Motion for Summary Judgment":
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             "Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian. At the very best he was functionally illiterate, and "made his mark" when he signed legal documents. Thus, all drafting of any ambiguous documents was completed by the railroad’s representative. In this case Bill Hilchkanum and his wife signed a document that did not comport with the necessary elements for conveyance of a fee simple interest, because of the qualifying and limiting language of the document."
          [Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion and view this statement on page 2. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.]

           Judge Rothstein struck my lawyer's statement with this comment: (with my emphasis)

            "In paragraph 1 of the response to the motion for summary judgment, the Rasmussens speculate on the intent of Bill Hilchkanum based on his Native American ethnicity. The Rasmussens provide no evidence to support the allegations. Therefore, all but the last two sentences of the paragraph will be stricken."
          [View this statement in an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001)]

           Of course this was a self-serving lie by Judge Rothstein. My lawyer was not ..."speculat[ing] on the intent of Bill Hilchkanum based on his Native American ethnicity." Instead, he made two distinctly separate observations, both of which were correct. First, my lawyer stated that Bill Hilchkanum was an "Indian". This fact is obvious from the documents we provided Judge Rothstein. For my lawyer and me, who have a basic understanding of American history, this fact is relevant because Native Americans in Washington Territory were at a disadvantage in white society in the mid to late 1800's. It's not our job to teach basic American history to arrogant judges who have a criminal intent with their opinions. Second, my lawyer separately stated that the Hilchkanums were illiterate. This fact was obvious to Judge Rothstein if she actually read the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed which she "construed". The Hilchkanums both signed the deed with an "X". This is a sign of illiteracy by any common sense standard. Additionally, we provided a number of documents to Rothstein which described Hilchkanum's illiteracy and disadvantage in legal transactions.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Judge Rothstein was presented Hilchkanum's Homestead affidavit which stated that he is an "Indian".

        View a photocopy of the Hilchkanum deed to confirm it was signed with an "X".

        View documents which explain Hilchkanum's participation and intentions with his right-of-way deed.

           Considering the fact that the Hilchkanums were Native Americans and were illiterate, my lawyer rightly concluded that the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed should be construed against the Railway. Judge Rothstein's striking of my lawyers statements and conclusion does not make the Hilchkanums white settlers, nor does it make them literate. Rothstein claims my lawyer did not justify his statement with ..."evidence to support [his] allegations", but my lawyer was not making an argument in opposition to King County's brief, he was just stating obvious facts as justification for his conclusion that the deed should be construed against the Railway lawyers, as authors of the deed. If Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein had any interest in the truth, she would have granted our many requests for oral arguments or sought written justification from my lawyer. It's obvious from Rothstein's opinion that she was eliminating contested material facts from consideration so that she could substitute the lies she had concocted in order to justify her dishonest opinion. By striking my lawyer's statements about Hilchkanum's status as an illiterate Native American and the Railways authorship of the deed, Rothstein eliminated evidence that these were disputed material facts which should have gone to a jury trial for resolution. Rothstein's elimination of my lawyer's statements was setting up the conditions necessary for her illegal use of summary judgment in resolving the lawsuit.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Judge Rothstein also struck my statement which described the Hilchkanum's inability to participate in their right-of-way deed. In my Exhibit 1 to Judge Rothstein, I provided the following statement concerning Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his right-of-way deed:

             "The deed signed by the Hilchkanums was prepared by the educated white men that organized the railroad. The Hilchkanums, on the other hand, were Indians unable to even sign their own names on the deed. They both signed with an "X". In his homestead application Bill Hilchkanum certified that he had given up his tribal affiliation in order to qualify. This would indicate the Hilchkanums were not educated nor likely socialized to all of the white man's customs. With this thought in mind, the Hilchkanums were at a great disadvantage in their transaction with SLS&E. Since the deed was drafted by SLS&E, and the Hilchkanums probably had little or no unbiased legal advice, the deeds must be construed most strongly against SLS&E. This would favor the deed's interpretation as an easement. This is supported in the citation from Brown below:

               The railroad was a sophisticated, well financed, and organized party, undoubtedly represented by counsel. Landowners stood at a disadvantage to railroads in the early 1900s. For these reasons, the deeds, at least the preprinted portions of them, must be construed against the railroad. '[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it.' Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2d 430, 457, 924 P.2d 908 (1996)"
               [Read the portion of my Exhibit 1 which contains this statement.]

           Judge Rothstein struck my Exhibit 1 in its entirety. Even if she were justified in striking that exhibit, she had no right to use undocumented, irrational assumptions about the Hilchkanums in place of the information she struck. (These undocumented, irrational assumptions about the Hilchkanums are described in the next section of this page.) My lawyer asked me to write a declaration, then later advised me that it should be limited to twenty-four pages. My initial declaration was more than one-hundred pages, so I reduced it to less than twenty-four by splitting out portions into studies. Exhibit 1 was my study of the easement-or-fee issue. Since the King County prosecutor had dishonestly claimed that I had illegally threatened King County employees on the portion of the BNSF right-of-way which crossed my land, my understanding of the law and my right to defend myself against the criminal trespass of King County was material to the lawsuit. With her striking of my declaration and studies, Rothstein was manipulating material facts and eliminating portions of my declaration which were material to the defense of my actions.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           The King County prosecutor moved that all of my studies be struck, as excessive legal argument. If it were correct to strike my Exhibit 1, it was still incumbent on the judge to obtain the facts and law relevant to the lawsuit. It is obvious from the massive amounts of information that Judge Rothstein struck, that she was intent on eliminating material facts so that she could substitute her own contrived facts to justify her "legal" conclusions. In her misapplication of the law, Rothstein struck my correct analysis of the easement-or-fee issue and adopted Norm Maleng's "legal theory", the dishonest legal argument concocted by the King County Prosecutor to cover-up King County's participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein used undocumented, irrational assumptions about the Hilchkanums in order to construe all the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum.

           After striking our factual statements of Hilchkanum's inability to participate in his right-of-way deed, Judge Rothstein manufactured undocumented, irrational assumptions about the Hilchkanum's participation in their deed, and construed all the words in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum. We were blindsided by this dishonest tactic by Judge Rothstein. The King County prosecutor had not suggested in his briefs that Hilchkanum authored his deed, so our statements that Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American who was limited or unable to participate in the construction and execution of his deed were not footnoted or directed to the appropriate exhibit. It is the responsibility of the judges to obtain the material facts in a lawsuit. Rothstein eliminated our material facts, supported by historical documents and citations, and then manufactured irrational facts in her opinion, too late for any response from us. I believe that Rothstein planned this dishonest tactic directly with the King County Prosecutor or one of the other participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. It is important to note that many exhibits were presented to Rothstein which justified our analysis that Hilchkanum was limited in his ability to participate in this right-of-way deed. For instance, here are just two documents, presented as exhibits to Judge Rothstein, which justify the statements which Rothstein struck. They relate to legal problems with Hilchkanum's Homestead proof several years earlier. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Declaration of David Denny explaining Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American and depended on Denny for legal assistance.

        Declaration of George Tibbets explaining Hilchkanum was an illiterate Native American and depended on others for legal assistance.

           Use the following link to view a study of the ability of the Hilchkanums to participate in their right-of-way deed, and the laws which protected Native Americans at that time in our history.

        Understand Hilchkanum's participation and intentions with his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

           While Judge Rothstein construed every word in the Hilchkanum deed against Hilchkanum, she never justified that tactic. Instead, Rothstein simply proclaimed that Hilchkanum was capable of participating in his deed with this statement:
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "Thus it is clear that the parties knew how to limit a grant, and that they chose not to limit the right of way."
             [View this citation in an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001)]

           That is an intentional lie by Judge Rothstein. The fact that the deed had limiting language does not prove that Hilchkanum knew how to limit a deed. It does not prove that Hilchkanum had any part in that limiting language or in any other part of his deed. It simply proves that whoever wrote that limiting language likely knew how to limit a deed. It does not identify Hilchkanum as author. This becomes even more dishonest by Judge Rothstein because my lawyer notified Rothstein in his brief that Hilchkanum was illiterate and a Native American. Whether Rothstein was correct in striking my lawyer's statement or not, she was required to consider whether Hilchkanum was capable of participating in his right-of-way deed. Of course this is a disputed material fact that is required to be resolved by a jury in real courts of law. Rothstein didn't allow a jury because no legitimate jury would agree with her undocumented, irrational assumptions of fact. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Rothstein didn't stop there with manufacturing undocumented, irrational facts. After falsely stating that Hilchkanum "...knew how to limit a grant...", she construed all the words in the Hilchkanum deed against only Hilchkanum. Rothstein justified this by manufacturing ridiculous material facts about Hilchkanum. Here is a citation in which Rothstein manufactured facts to justify her construing the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum: (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "Furthermore, because the Hilchkanums were homesteaders without a final patent, federal law limited them to certain types of conveyances, such as grants to schools, cemeteries, and rights of way to railways. See 17 U.S. Stat. 602. The Act provides more context for the choice of the term "right of way" in the deed, indicating that the Hilchkanums chose the phrase out of necessity rather than a desire to create an easement."
             [View this citation in an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001)]

           In the above citation, Judge Rothstein states that Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American in 1887, understood the complexities of 17 U.S. Stat. 602 and wrote his deed using the term "right of way" in the granting clause only to comply with the words in the federal statute. This is ridiculous, and not supported by any document, exhibit, or legal citation. This is the sort of argument that dishonest lawyers make in their briefs with the hope that a judge or a jury will believe their fiction. This is not legal analysis, but rather this is the illegal establishment of a material fact. It is a question of fact that the Hilchkanums chose the term "right of way" as Rothstein claims. Questions of fact are resolved by juries in legitimate courts of law. Judge Rothstein knew she was making up a material fact here, but had no fear of being held responsible for that dishonest act. The Ninth Circuit Courts of the United States of America are completely out of control, with judges, such as Rothstein, freely committing criminal acts from the bench.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Also in the above citation, Rothstein refers to the phrase "right of way" and then states that "...the Hilchkanums chose the phrase...". If the Hilchkanums chose the phrase, then they wrote that phrase in their deed, and are the authors of that phrase. Rothstein didn't have the character or intellectual integrity to state her opinion that the Hilchkanums authored their deed, but she slips unjustified conclusions in her opinion which imply that she has already established authorship of the deed. This becomes even more dishonest because my lawyer specifically refuted that fact in his brief. Whether Rothstein struck my lawyers statement or not, she needed un-refuted facts to justify the statement that "...the Hilchkanums chose the phrase...". Federal District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein is a dishonest human being and disgrace to the federal judiciary!
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein admitted that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was based on a "form deed", but refused to identify and construe that "form deed", and identify its author.

           In the citation below, Judge Rothstein states that railroads authored "form deeds" which were then modified to satisfy the grantors (the landowners). She admits that the SLS&E Railway authored a "form deed" which was used as a basis of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, but then refused to identify the elements of that "form deed". Since, "[C]ontract language . . . is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it." Rothstein should have identified which language in the Hilchkanum deed was taken from the railroad authored "form deed", and then construed that language against the SLS&E. She refused to admit that the Hilchkanum granting clause, secondary grant, and habendum are identical to the respective clauses in the SLS&E "ELS form deed". She was briefed that the Squire right-of-way deed had language which was identical to the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, but she refused to admit that this identical language was from the SLS&E "form deed" and was used as a basis of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. Further, Rothstein failed to admit that the very similar language in the Burke right-of-way deed granting clause was also found to grant an easement. Instead of honestly comparing the Hilchkanum deed to the Squire deed, Rothstein intentionally misrepresented the findings of the Squire court. This is discussed in the paragraph below the following citation. Also Rothstein misrepresented the findings in Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993) and Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910), opinions which construed the Burke deed to the SLS&E. Here is a citation from King County v. Rasmussen (2001) in which Rothstein admits the SLS&E "ELS form deed" and then misrepresents the findings in Squire, Northlake, and Pacific Iron Works. (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "c. Circumstances Surrounding Execution"

        "Finally, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed confirm an intent to convey a fee interest. Deeds from other landowners during the same time period contain different language than the Hilchkanum deed. The Squire and Northlake deeds are modeled off the same form deed as the Hilchkanums'. Northlake, 857 P.2d at 286-87; Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023. However, both Squire and Northlake contain additional language that specifically restricts the grant to railroad purposes and reverts the interest to the grantor if the railroad ceases to operate. Northlake, 857 P.2d at 286-87; Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023. Nowhere in the Hilchkanums' deed are there any such limitations. See generally Danya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 Ecology L.Q. 351, 378 (2000) (explaining that railroads used form fee simple deeds and then added language to reflect limitations requested by landowners, which resulted in railroads possessing a variety of fee and easement interests along the same tracks)."
             [View this citation in an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2001)]

    Above, Judge Barbara Rothstein intentionally misrepresents the findings in King County v. Squire (1990).

           Rothstein lied when she stated that "Nowhere in the Hilchkanums' deed are there any such limitations." In King County v. Squire (1990), the court determined that the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". Since the Hilchkanum and Squire granting clauses use the identical granting language, Rothstein lied when she claimed that there was no limiting language in the Hilchkanum deed. It's impossible for a judge with average intelligence to read King County v. Squire (1990) and come to the conclusion that there is no limiting language in the Hilchkanum deed. Instead of adopting the Squire courts analysis, Rothstein claimed the only limiting language in the Squire right-of-way deed is the additional wording added by Governor Squire to his habendum. This is an absolute lie. The truth is that the Squire court concluded that the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement", and that Governor Squire added "...language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way". By default, the Squire court found that the Squire granting clause was written by the Railway. As shown in my previous discussion above, this granting clause is identical to many of the other SLS&E granting clauses, and is the unmodified granting clause from the SLS&E "ELS form deed". Since the conclusions in King County v. Squire (1990) were briefed to Rothstein, she was required to provide an explanation why the identical granting words in the Hilchkanum deed had a different legal meaning. Here is a link to the above portion of this webpage which discusses the relevance of King County v. Squire to the construing of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Review my previous discussion on the importance of King County v. Squire in construing the Hilchkanum deed.

           With respect to the construing of the SLS&E "ELS form deed", Rothstein based ridiculous conclusions on "Pipes, Wires and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries". According to Rothstein, the authors of that study concluded that all railroad "form deeds" were written to convey fee simple interest. Rothstein cited no specific analysis of the SLS&E "deed form" from "Pipes, Wires and Bicycles". Further, Railroad "form deeds" are construed by applying common law precedent to the words of that specific "form deed", not by applying generalized conclusions from apparently biased "scholarly" studies. There is no common law precedent in Washington State common law which supports Rothstein's ridiculous legal conclusion that all railroad "form deeds" are written to convey fee simple interest.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Summary of Rothstein's dishonest construing Hilchkanum's right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum:

           To summarize Federal District Judge Rothstein's tactic to misrepresent Hilchkanum's participation and authorship of his right-of-way deed, first, she misrepresented the meaning of language in the deed and irrationally assigned Hilchkanum as author of that language. She provided no fact or document to support her pronouncement of Hilchkanum's authorship and provided no legal precedent in support of her wacky analysis. Second, she ignored the many documents we provided as exhibits, which contradict her conclusion that Hilchkanum wrote his deed. Rothstein then claimed that Hilchkanum used the term "right of way" in his granting clause in order to conform to the language in a federal statute. She provided no document which would support her statement of Hilchkanum's ability, as an illiterate Native American, to make that complex legal decision. To clear the way for this dishonest conclusion, Rothstein dishonestly struck our argument that, as an illiterate Native American, Hilchkanum was restricted in his ability to participate in his deed. She then denied our right to reestablish that contested material fact with her illegally use of summary judgment. Last, Rothstein intentionally misrepresented the findings in King County v. Squire (1990). An honest analysis of Squire destroys her statements that Hilchkanum wrote the words of his granting clause. An honest analysis of Squire establishes that the words of the identical Squire and Hilchkanum granting clauses "strongly" indicate the intention to convey an easement. It is essentially impossible that Rothstein could have accidentally got the Squire court's analysis wrong. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Rothstein's opinion is based on the violation of Constitutional rights, unsubstantiated facts which she manufactured, and the intentional misapplication of the law. She violated my Constitutional "right of due process" by her illegal use of summary judgment. Essentially, every paragraph of King County v. Rasmussen (2001) is dishonest in some way. Her decision contains a number of dishonest tactics which she used to build a "house of cards". On appeal, and in Washington State courts, these same tactics were used by the other judges. The reason for Rothstein's misconduct is found in the effect of her decision. The effect of Rothstein's decision was to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protected the active participants from federal prosecution. Rothstein, and the other Hilchkanum judges who copied her tactics, became active participants in the tax fraud scheme with their opinions.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Understand the "House of Cards", the common dishonest tactics used by the Hilchkanum judges.

King County v. Rasmussen (2002), Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher:

    Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher and panel dishonestly eliminated our arguments about Hilchkanum's inability to participate in his right-of-way deed, then construed all the words of the Hilchkanum deed against only Hilchkanum.

           On appeal, Circuit Judge Fletcher supported every dishonest tactic used by Rothstein, and ignored our legitimate briefing. Her opinion, King County v. Rasmussen (2002), is a criminal act from the bench. Like Rothstein, Fletcher's opinion contains dishonesty in essentially every paragraph. We were "blindsided" by Judge Rothstein's establishment of Hilchkanum as author of his deed and the subsequent construing of all the words of that deed against only Hilchkanum. The King County prosecutor made no such claim of Hilchkanum's authorship in his briefs. This ridiculous conclusion by Rothstein just magically showed up in her opinion and was supported by no document, contributing fact, or legal citation. With her opinion, Rothstein effectively produced a briefing for King County which we were not allowed to counter with our briefs. The counter argument came with this appeal to the three judge Ninth Circuit appeals panel headed by Judge Fletcher. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           District Judge Rothstein dishonestly struck my lawyer's statement of Hilchkanum's difficulty in dealing with legal matters, and then treated Hilchkanum as if her were a skilled lawyer. We tried to correct that misconception in our appeal. In his brief to Judge Fletcher, my lawyer asked the judge to reconsider the striking of this statement in his briefing to Rothstein. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             "Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian. At the very best he was functionally illiterate, and "made his mark" when he signed legal documents. Thus, all drafting of any ambiguous documents was completed by the railroad’s representative. In this case Bill Hilchkanum and his wife signed a document that did not comport with the necessary elements for conveyance of a fee simple interest, because of the qualifying and limiting language of the document."
          [Read my lawyer's brief opposing King County's Summary Judgment motion and view this statement on page 2. The portions highlighted in yellow were struck by Rothstein.]

           This was an important statement because it describes Hilchkanum's inability to participate in his deed and states that the words of the deed must be construed against the Railway lawyers. It is a disputed material fact that Hilchkanum was capable of participating in his right-of-way deed. Under the rules of summary judgment, disputed material facts are required to be resolved by a jury. Rothstein denied my right to a jury. On appeal, the issue of whether summary judgment is allowed is considered "de novo". This means "anew", or that all the requirements to apply summary judgment must be reconsidered. This should nave been a powerful tool for us. Rothstein had found Hilchkanum the author of his right-of-way deed in her opinion. We were not notified nor allowed to make oral arguments on this issue in Federal District Court, Rothstein's personal little fiefdom. But, fortunately we had provided exhibits to the District Court which we could now brief to Fletcher in her "de novo" consideration of the use of summary judgment. As one will see in Fletcher's opinion (King County v. Rasmussen (2002)) she pretended that we didn't make any argument on the issue of Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed or whether he wrote his deed. Fletcher was required, under the law, to do this. But, she didn't. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           Here is a statement from my lawyer's brief to Judge Fletcher in which he describes the difficulty Hilchkanum suffered in dealing with legal matters and his inability to participate in his deed. In real courts of law, this would have gone to a jury for resolution. Here, I've hyperlinked as many of the referenced exhibits (ER...) as possible, in order for the reader to understand the facts which Fletcher disregarded in her dishonest opinion and her illegal application of summary judgment. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             "Bill Hilchkanum was the original homesteader of the Rasmussens’ lands in this case. ER 446. On June 15, 1876 David T. Denny and Luke M. Redmond stated under oath that Bill Hilchkanum was an Indian who had abandoned his membership in the Snoqualmie tribe, and “adopted the habits and pursuits of civilized life”. ER, 494 The entire chronology of events explaining the homestead efforts of Bill Hilchkanum are found as exhibits to the expert witness Graddon declaration, at ER 446-522. On March 6, 1884 David T. Denny testified by sworn affidavit that “Bill Hilchkanum is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language***That said Indian Bill Hilchkanum relied on this affiant to take care of his said business…”. ER, 486. On March 24, 1884 Bill Hilchkanum “made his mark” upon an affidavit, which stated he “is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language and hence depends entirely upon the assistance of his white friends to aid him in transacting his business for him. That one D.T. Denny of Seattle W.T. had the care of his homestead papers for him…” ER, 483. David T. Denny was one of the witnesses to the original Hilchkanum deed in this case. ER, 502. On March 25, 1884 George W. Tibbetts swore by affidavit that he was “well acquainted with Bill Hilchkanum…” and that “…Bill Hilchkanum is an Indian and unable to read or write the English language and that he depended upon other parties to manage his business for him so that said Indian did not understand how to proceed in his homestead proof…”. ER, 485. In all documents of record, including the original Hilchkanum deed to SLS&E, Bill Hilchkanum signed his name by “making his mark”, which was an “X”, rather than a written or printed signature. ER, 476-522. The quitclaim deed from Bill Hilchkanum to SLS&E was signed (by his “mark”) and delivered to SLS&E on May 9, 1887. ER, 501-503. Bill Hilchkanum received the United States’ fee patent to his homestead lands on July 24, 1888. ER, 505-507.

             The above uncontroverted material facts describe the grantor whom the district court in this case found as being competent to limit a grant and to distinguish between an easement and a conveyance of fee simple absolute. ER, 592-597. The district court even found that Bill Hilchkanum was aware of 17 U.S. Stat. 602, and chose the phrase “right of way” out of necessity rather than to create an easement, because Bill Hilchkanum knew the then existing federal law allowed the conveyance of a railroad right of way before he had received his fee patent. ER, 595. The Rasmussens contest these factual findings of the district court, with the above evidence that was before the district court."

          [My lawyer's brief to Judge Fletcher and panel, "Defendants-Appellants’ John and Nancy Rasmussens’ Opening Appeal Brief", and view the above statement beginning on page 4, (PDF page 10).]

           Please read the above hyperlinks which show that Senior Federal Circuit Judge Bette Binns Fletcher had knowledge of the Hilchkanum's inability to legally deal with their right-of-way deed. The dishonest judges in the Ninth Circuit believe that we-the-people have no voice in "their" court. Not only did my lawyer identify a number of documents presented to the District Court which showed Hilchkanum at a great disadvantage in legal proceedings, but he specifically pointed out to Judge Fletcher that this was a disputed material fact that would invalidate Rothstein's use of summary judgment. The material fact of Hilchkanum's ability to participate in his deed was required to be resolved by a jury. This is spelled out in the rules of summary judgment and is required under the due process rule of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The problem is that federal judges, such as District Judge Rothstein and Senior Circuit Judge Fletcher, don't believe in the U.S. Constitution or the rules of the court. Here is a condensed quote from my lawyer's brief to Judge Fletcher in which he specifically identifies this disputed material fact and suggests the lawsuit be returned to Federal District Court, which would then require jury resolution. Again, I've hyperlinked as many of the referenced exhibits (ER...) as possible. (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        [Beginning on page 10 (PDF page 16]

        "(8)     Argument:

          (A)      Genuine contested issues of material fact exist that preclude the entry of a summary judgment order and Fed.R.Civ.P.12 order of dismissal in this case.

        [Skipping to the middle of page 11 (PDF page 17]

        In this case, the district court failed to examine the exhibits authenticated by expert witness Graddon, referenced in the Rasmussens’ briefing, (ER, 434-537); otherwise, the trial court would not have made the unfortunate extrapolation from the Rasmussens’ briefing; i.e., that they claimed Bill Hilchkanum was a Native American so therefore he must have been illiterate1. ER, 57. This first-hand evidence of illiteracy (ER, 467-498) is unrefuted, and supports the Rasmussens’ contentions regarding the “circumstances surrounding execution” of the quit-claim deed, and “intent of the parties”, to prove Bill Hilchkanum could not have known (a) what “granting clause limiting language” was, (b) what an easement was, (c) what the legal distinctions were between fee simple absolute title and an easement, and (d) what effect there was to signing a quit-claim deed without an after-acquired title clause when he didn’t have fee simple title at the time of execution and delivery of the quit-claim deed.

        [Skipping to the top of page 13 (PDF page 19]

        In this case Hilchkanum cannot be faulted for “making his mark” on an ambiguous deed to the railroad. Clearly, the railroad representatives prepared this Hilchkanum deed, and it must be construed in a light most favorable to the Hilchkanums. The railroad was granted an easement, if anything at all.

        [Skipping to the top of page 14 (PDF page 20]

        The Rasmussens, as the nonmoving parties, should have had all these facts reasonably considered by the trial court. The trial court’s opinion is silent concerning these contested material facts. All facts and inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 442 (9th CCA, 1995). The summary judgment order, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 dismissal order, should be reversed and remanded."

          [My lawyer's brief to Judge Fletcher and panel, "Defendants-Appellants’ John and Nancy Rasmussens’ Opening Appeal Brief", and view the above statement beginning on page 10, (PDF page 16).]

           In spite of this argument by my lawyer, Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher and panel upheld Rothstein's illegal use of summary judgment and supported every dishonest conclusion in Rothstein's opinion.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Judge Fletcher was so afraid of the precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990) that she refused to even refer to the decision by its name.

           As I explained in a section above, the findings in King County v. Squire (1990) absolutely destroy the legal analysis in the opinions construing the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. The Squire court concluded that the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". This is important because the Hilchkanum and Squire granting clauses are materially identical. By default, the Squire court found that the Squire granting clause was written by the Railway lawyers. Senior Federal Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher could not recognize this precedent because it conflicted with Rothstein's and her opinion that Hilchkanum was responsible for those identical words in his right-of-way deed.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Review my previous discussion on the importance of Squire in construing the Hilchkanum deed.

           Fletcher was so afraid of drawing attention to King County v. Squire that she refused to even name the opinion when she referred to our argument. Here is the citation from Fletcher's opinion in which she refused to name King County v. Squire as an opinion which must be recognized as a critical precedent. (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "For the most part, however, the fact that this material has been struck will not affect our review. The final pages of the summary judgment response brief do not contain separate legal arguments that are waived because they were not raised in the first twenty-four pages of the brief. Instead, they contain comparisons between the facts of this case and the facts of a Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way. We must consider the effect of any case relevant to the arguments raised, regardless of whether the Rasmussens briefed the particular case."
          [Open King County v. Rasmussen (2002) at the position Judge Fletcher makes this statement.]

           In her above statement, Judge Fletcher "promised" to give that mysterious "Washington Court of Appeals case dealing with a railroad right of way" its due consideration. This next citation from Fletcher's opinion is her dishonest assessment of the effect the precedent set in Squire. (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "[2] Here the term "right of way" appears in the granting clause as well as in the legal description.(11) In this sense, the Hilchkanum deed suggests a possible intent to create only an easement in a way the deeds at issue in Brown did not. However, neither the granting nor the habendum clauses contains language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose. In virtually all cases where Washington courts have found only an easement, the granting or the habendum clauses contained such language. See Swan v. O'Leary, 225 P.2d 199, 199 (Wash. 1950) (granting premises "for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way"); Morsbach v. Thurston County, 278 P. 686, 687 (Wash. 1929) (conveying a "right of way for the construction of said company's railroad"); Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 111 P. 578 (Wash. 1910) (holding that deed providing "to have and to hold the said premises . . . for railway purposes, but if it should cease to be used for a railway the said premises shall revert to said grantors" granted easement); Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co., 38 P. 1126 (Wash. 1894) (construing deed which provided "so long as the same shall be used for the operation of a railroad" as an easement); King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 801 P.2d 1022, 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (granting premises to railroad "so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights. . . ."). Without such additional language, the use of the term "right of way" merely "begs the question" since a railroad could own a right of way either as an easement or in fee. Brown, 924 P.2d at 914."
          [Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) at the position Judge Fletcher makes this statement.]

           Here, Fletcher implies that the only wording in the Squire deed, which limits the deed to an easement, is in the habendum. This is an outrageous and intentional lie by this very dishonest senior circuit judge. I've discussed this issue in an above section. The truth is that the Squire court concluded that the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". The Squire court recognized that the language in the habendum, which Fletcher cites above, "...reiterat[es] the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way...an easement..". By default, the Squire court found that the words of the Squire granting clause were written by the Railway lawyers. These granting words are identical to the granting words in the Hilchkanum deed and the "ELS form deed" used by the Railway to obtain many other right-of-way deeds in that period. Fletcher's misrepresentation of King County v. Squire covers-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protects her fellow Federal Judge, Barbara Rothstein, from being prosecuted for covering-up the fraud. We no longer have a legitimate judicial system in the Ninth Circuit.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Open my previous discussion on the importance of King County v. Squire (1990) in construing the Hilchkanum deed.

    Judge Fletcher admitted the Hilchkanum deed was based on a Railway prepared "form deed" and then adopted Rothstein's dishonest analysis.

           Judge Fletcher adopted Federal District Judge Rothstein's ridiculous analysis of the SLS&E "form deed". Like Rothstein, Fletcher admitted that the Hilchkanum, Squire, and Burke deeds were based on the same SLS&E "form deed", but then falsely claimed that the Squire and Burke deeds were found to be easements only because of limiting language added by the grantors. This is a lie and is not supported by the courts analysis of the Squire and Burke deeds. Further, Fletcher adopts Rothstein's analysis of the Hilchkanum "form deed" elements using Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century. Here is Fletcher's dishonest analysis of the SLS&E "form deed".
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        "[6] Finally, the district court properly looked to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Hilchkanum deed and concluded that they confirmed the parties' intent to convey a fee simple estate. Rasmussen, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. Deeds to the Railway from other landowners executed in the same year as the Hilchkanum deed used the same form but contained additional language explicitly restricting the grant to railroad purposes and providing that the interest would revert to the grantor if the railroad ceased to operate. See Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023; Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 857 P.2d 283, 286-87 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). The differences in these deeds reflected the common practice of the railroads of using fee simple form deeds and adding language to include limitations requested by landowners. See Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, 27 Ecology L.Q. 351, 378 (2000). The deed in question here suggests that the Hilchkanums requested no such limitations."
          [Open an annotated version of King County v. Rasmussen (2002) at the position Judge Fletcher makes this statement.]

           In the above citation, Fletcher identified that there is a SLS&E "form deed", but refused to identify which portions of the Hilchkanum deed are based on that "form deed". Further, Fletcher identified the Squire, Burke and Hilchkanum right-of-way deeds as based on this same "form deed". Of these three deeds, the Squire and Hilchkanum right-of-way deeds have the most similarity and the Squire court provided important analysis which Fletcher was required to consider. Instead of adopting the Squire courts analysis, Fletcher claimed the only limiting language in the Squire right-of-way deed is the additional wording added by Governor Squire to his habendum. This is an absolute lie. The Squire court found that the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". The Hilchkanum and Squire granting clauses use identical wording. Further, the Squire court found the changes made by Governor Squire in his habendum "...reiterat[es] the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way...an easement..". It reiterates the "limitation" which was found in the granting clause. Senior Circuit Judge Fletcher lied in her above citation where she claimed the only language in the Squire deed, which limited it to an easement, was the language added by Governor Squire to his habendum. A detailed analysis of the Squire opinion was made earlier on this webpage. Use the following link to review that analysis. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Open my discussion on the importance of King County v. Squire (1990) in construing the Hilchkanum deed.

           With respect to construing of the SLS&E "form deed", Fletcher supported Rothstein's dishonest analysis and found that the SLS&E "form deed" was written to convey fee simple interest. She concluded that Hilchkanum was required to add limiting language if he wanted the deed to be an easement. Just as Rothstein did, Fletcher based this ridiculous conclusion on "Pipes, Wires and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries". Apparently, the authors of that study concluded that railroad "form deeds" were written to convey fee simple interest. But, Fletcher cited no specific analysis of the SLS&E "deed form" in "Pipes, Wires and Bicycles". Railroad "form deeds" are construed by applying common law precedent to the words of that specific "form deed", not by applying generalized conclusions from biased "scholarly" studies. There is no common law precedent in Washington State common law which supports Fletcher's ridiculous legal conclusion that all railroad "form deeds" are written to convey fee simple interest.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Summary of Fletcher's dishonest construing Hilchkanum's right-of-way deed against only Hilchkanum:

           To conclude, after ignoring all of our legitimate briefing, Judge Fletcher simply copied every dishonest tactic used by District Judge Rothstein. I suspect that Fletcher is a personal friend of Rothstein and used her senior circuit status to request my appeal and run damage control for her friend. King County v. Rasmussen (2002) is a criminal act from the bench by an arrogant federal senior circuit judge who believes that she is above the law and Constitution.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           It was critical for Fletcher and Rothstein to establish Hilchkanum as author of his 1887 right-of-way deed. By assigning Hilchkanum as responsible for the words in his deed, these dishonest federal judges were able to distinguish the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed from the fourteen SLS&E right-of-way deeds which previously had been before King County courts and ALL were found to be easements in legal opinions or by the admission of the King County Prosecutor. Of these fourteen deeds, the Squire right-of-way deed, and its construing in King County v. Squire (1990), was the most damaging to Fletcher and Rothstein's dishonest conclusions. Both judges refused to acknowledge the finding in Squire that the granting clause strongly indicated the intention to convey an easement. The Hilchkanum and Squire granting clauses are materially identical. This fact destroys Fletcher and Rothstein's conclusions. The manipulation of the truth and the law by Judges Fletcher and Rothstein was used to award the ownership of the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way to King County. It wasn't necessary for the judges to do this in order for the community to have a bike trail. The Rails-to-Trails Act was enacted to allow a bicycle trail on unused railroad rights-of-way without the requirement to own the underlying land. The only reason for the judges to illegally award the land under the ELS right-of-way to King County was to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. This is understood by the profound dishonesty in the Hilchkanum decisions, and the coordination in crooked tactics by the federal and State judges. The Rasmussen and Ray opinions are built on a "house of cards" containing dishonesty built on top of other dishonesty.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Understand the "House of Cards", the common dishonest tactics used by the Hilchkanum judges.

Ray v. King County (2004), Washington State Appeals Judge Ronald Cox:

    Despite material evidence to the contrary, Washington State appeals judges Ronald Cox and Ann Schindler dishonestly attributed all the words in the Hilchkanum deed to Hilchkanum.

           The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was first construed in my lawsuit in federal district court, King County v. Rasmussen (2001). The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was construed again when my neighbors, Jerry and Kathy Ray, took the ownership issue of their right-of-way land through the Washington State court system. Both of our properties were contained in the original Hilchkanum homestead and subject to the same 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The most significant Ray opinions are Ray v. King County (2004) in the Washington State Court of Appeals and the denial of review by the Washington State Supreme Court. The Washington State Supreme Court denied review three times. In my lawsuit, federal judges Rothstein and Fletcher construed all the words of the Hilchkanum deed against only Hilchkanum, but they never stated any fact or legal precedent to justify their analysis. Their clever tactics are described in the sections above. Like Rothstein and Fletcher, Washington State Appeals Judge Cox made many conclusions of fact in violation of the rules of summary judgment. He illegally settled the contested material fact that the Hilchkanums were capable of understanding and participating in the construction of their right-of-way deed to the SLS&E, and the contested material fact of who authored the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. He settled the issue of authorship by stating or strongly implying that, the notary public, who merely copied the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed into the King County Book of Deeds, actually authored the Hilchkanum deed. Cox dishonestly claimed that there was no evidence to show the SLS&E lawyers authored the Hilchkanum deed. Cox then pronounced that, with authorship ambiguous, the words of the Hilchkanum right-of-way should be construed against the grantor, Hilchkanum. It's obvious from his opinion that these were contested questions of fact which are required to be resolved by a jury in real courts of law. Instead of calling for a jury trial, Cox dishonestly resolved these questions of material fact in violation of rules of summary judgment. His dishonest and illegal opinion covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protected the participants in the crime. Here is just one citation from Cox' opinion which explains some of Cox' dishonest tactics. (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              The Rays also speculate that the Railway prepared the May 1887 deed.64 Thus, they argue that we should construe ambiguities in that deed language against the Railway. We decline to do so because nothing in the record supports this argument.

              First, the face of the deed shows that the Hilchkanums executed the deed by making their marks, not by signing the instrument. Of course, neither party disputes that the Hilchkanums could neither read nor write.65 While we are mindful of the undisputed evidence that the Hilchkanums could neither read nor write, we are unaware of any rule that says that one who cannot do so lacks the capacity to understand the nature and extent of his or her property or the nature of a conveyance of such property. Nothing in the record before us indicates that the Hilchkanums failed to understand what they were doing in this particular transaction, a point counsel for the Rays appeared to concede at oral argument of this case. Second, and more importantly, examination of the deed shows that it is entirely handwritten, apparently by the same person. Both the language of the main part of the deed, as well as the acknowledgment, is in the handwriting of the notary who acknowledged the signatures of the Hilchkanums, B.J. Tallman.66 Nothing in the record before us indicates that he was the agent of the Railway. Absent such proof, we fail to see why we should construe ambiguities in the May 1887 deed against the Railway. Rather, to the extent we were to engage in applying a rule of construction to any perceived ambiguities in the language of the Hilchkanum deed, we would construe the deed against the Hilchkanums, the grantors.67 Third, the Rays also rely on the opinions of expert witnesses to support their position. Because courts decide the legal questions before us, not experts, we decline to give credence to these opinions.68

          [Open an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004) at this position.]

           In the above citation, Judge Cox writes that "courts decide the legal questions before us", but Cox is deciding questions of fact, not questions of law. The ability of the Hilchkanums to understand and participate in their right-of-way deed is a question of material fact. The authorship of the Hilchkanum deed is another question of material fact which, under the rules of summary judgment, was required by law to be resolved by a jury. Cox and Schindler could not allow this question go to a jury because a legitimate jury would decide that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was wholly written by the Railway lawyers and conveyed an easement. A jury would be shown many SLS&E deeds containing identical language and would identify the "ELS form deed", which I described above. With those facts established, a jury would find the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed indicated the intention to convey an easement, based on the precedent set in King County v. Squire (1990) where the court found that the identical SLS&E granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". A legitimate jury would find that the Railway was author of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed and that it is an unaltered version of the Railway's "ELS form deed", granting an easement. Judges Cox and Schindler refused the requirement that a jury decide these issues of fact.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Is a Copy Machine the author of the documents it copies?

           In his statement above, Cox decides (or strongly implies) that the Hilchkanum deed was written by B.J. Tallman. View the following citation to confirm this fact.

              Both the language of the main part of the deed, as well as the acknowledgment, is in the handwriting of the notary who acknowledged the signatures of the Hilchkanums, B.J. Tallman.66 Nothing in the record before us indicates that he was the agent of the Railway. Absent such proof, we fail to see why we should construe ambiguities in the May 1887 deed against the Railway. Rather, to the extent we were to engage in applying a rule of construction to any perceived ambiguities in the language of the Hilchkanum deed, we would construe the deed against the Hilchkanums, the grantors.67
          [Open an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004) at this position.]

           B.J. Tallman was the notary who merely transcribed the Hilchkanum deed into the King County record. It was very wrong for Cox and Schindler to name him as author of the deed. In modern terms, this is equivalent to determining a copy machine is the author of the papers it copies. Ridiculous! It is obscene that Cox and Schindler resolved that question of authorship, because they were resolving that disputed material fact in violation of the rules of summary judgment. This disputed question of fact would go to a jury for resolution in real courts of law. Sadly, there are no longer legitimate courts of law in Washington State. I don't have the briefs and exhibits to the Washington State Court of Appeals in Ray v. King County, but the issue of B.J. Tallman being author of the Hilchkanum deed would have been destroyed before a jury. As shown in the limited number of SLS&E deeds which I've obtained, the identical words found in the Hilchkanum deed are found in the Luber, Lewellyn, Burnett, Perry, and Palmberg right-of-way deeds to the SLS&E. All of these deeds are constructed from an unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed", using different notaries public. The Luber, Lewellyn, and Burnett deeds use Edwin Briscoe as notary. The Perry deed used Jo. J Beard, a Justice of the Peace and notary public. The Palmberg deed used G. Morris Haller as notary. G. Morris Haller was co-council for the SLS&E with Thomas Burk (Burke). On its face, it's ridiculous that Cox and Schindler would find that B.J. Tallman wrote the Hilchkanum deed. This becomes even more ridiculous when one realized the identical words were filed by at least three other notaries public. Confirm this fact in the transcriptions and photocopies of the deeds, below. I include the Hilchkanum deed, below, for the reader to confirm B.J. Tallmas as notary public. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        View the Lurber Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that Edwin Briscoe acted as notary public.

        View the Lewellyn Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that Edwin Briscoe acted as notary public.

        View the Burnett Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that Edwin Briscoe acted as notary public.

        View the Perry Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that Jo. J Beard acted as notary public.

        View the Palmberg Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that G. Morris Haller acted as notary public.

        View the Hilchkanum Right-of-Way Deed to confirm that B.J. Tallman acted as notary public.

           A legitimate jury would never find B.J. Tallman author of the Hilchkanum deed, considering the fact that identical wording is found in other SLS&E deeds which used other notaries public. The only common party to these SLS&E deeds is the SLS&E Railway. Further, following the notary's signature in each filed deed is the statement: "filed for record at the request of Burk and Haller..." Thomas Burk (Burke) and G. Morris Haller were the SLS&E lawyers. This statement identifies the notary as acting as an agent for the Railway. A legitimate jury would be required to find the Railway as author of these deeds. The Ray and Rasmussen opinions were settled by judges in violation of the rules of summary judgment.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

           In his Ray v. King County dissenting opinion, Judge William W. Baker stated that the issue of Hilchkanum's authorship was a disputed material fact. But, Baker failed to insist that issue be resolved by a jury by returning the lawsuit to King County Superior Court. Here is a citation from Baker's dissenting opinion which explains this situation. (with my emphasis) (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             "When the language of the deed is properly construed against the railroad, the granting clause conveys only a right of way.

             Language in the deed must be construed against the railroad.

             It is a well established principle that ambiguity must be construed against the grantor.2 But as we explained in Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc.,3 when the grantee drafts the deed, this rule does not apply.4 Hilchkanum was illiterate and the handwritten deed contained identical language to that found in a contemporaneous pre-printed deed bearing the railroad's name. The Rays also submitted an affidavit from an expert who opined that 'given the use of pre-printed deeds, and given Hilchkanum's illiteracy, there appears no doubt that Hilchkanum did not draft the deed; but rather, it was the product of the railroad company.'

             The majority states that because Hilchkanum must have understood the nature and extent of his conveyance, the fact that the deed was handwritten by someone else is of no consequence. And the majority holds that because there is nothing in the record indicating that the drafter was an agent of the railway, Hilchkanum must have been the drafter. This conclusion wrongly focuses on the identity of the grantor instead of the identity of the drafter of the deed. It is undisputed that the deed's language was taken from the railroad's standard deed. And the affidavit by the Rays' expert creates a material question of fact concerning who actually drafted the document. Taking this affidavit in a light most favorable to the Rays as the nonmoving party, any ambiguities in the deed must be construed against the railroad.5"

          [Open an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting) at this citation.]

           In Judge Baker's above citation he makes this critical statement: "It is undisputed that the deed's language was taken from the railroad's standard deed. And the affidavit by the Rays' expert creates a material question of fact concerning who actually drafted the document." Here, Judge Baker exposes the dishonesty of the majority opinion. Baker identifies a disputed material fact which judges Cox and Schindler resolved in violation of the rules of summary judgment. In the citation at the beginning of this section, Judge Cox dismissed the disputed material fact of authorship by claiming that the "Rays [] speculate" on that fact. Cox further stated that the facts presented by the Ray's expert were actually legal arguments. In order to justify disregarding the Ray's expert, Judge Cox wrote that "courts decide the legal questions before us, not experts", but as Judge Bakes explains in his dissenting citation above, Cox is deciding questions of fact, not questions of law. Cox and Schindler had no right to allow summary judgment with the critical fact of the deed's authorship properly disputed by the Ray's attorney. A legitimate jury would not agree with Cox' and Schindler's opinion that Hilchkanum wrote his right-of-way deed. A legitimate jury was not allowed because it would have established material facts which, when combined with common law precedent, would cause the Hilchkanum deed to be found to be an easement. The finding of an easement would expose the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. The effect, and therefore the purpose, of Cox' and Schindler's persistent dishonesty was to cover-up the tax fraud and protect the powerful people in King County who had committed the crime. There is massive corruption in the federal and State courts in Washington.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Judges Cox and Schindler refused to admit that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was based on a Railway prepared "form deed".

           Judge Cox relied on the dishonest King County v. Rasmussen analysis of Federal District Judge Rothstein and Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Fletcher in many parts of his opinion. But, Cox refused to copy the federal judge's dishonest analysis that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was based on a SLS&E "form deed". It is obvious from Judge Baker's dissenting opinion that this issue was brought before Cox and Schindler. Here are two citations from Baker's dissenting opinion in which he addresses the issue of the SLS&E "ELS form deed" and its authorship by the Railway lawyers. (with my emphasis) (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

             "BAKER, J. (dissenting) - The majority concludes that the 1887 right of way deed between Bill Hilchkanum and Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway conveyed fee title. For a number of reasons I disagree, and conclude that the deed only conveyed an easement.

             First, contrary to the majority's conclusion, the evidence establishes that the handwritten deed was drafted by the railroad, and must therefore be construed against it. As King County concedes, Hilchkanum did not write the deed. Extrinsic evidence also supports concluding that the deed must be construed against the railroad. The language contained in the handwritten deed is identical to language used on pre-printed forms produced by the railroad. Hilchkanum's attorney, who signed as a witness, was an owner of the railroad. The Rays also provided an affidavit from their expert opining that the deed was drafted by the railroad."

          [Open an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting) at this citation.]

      This second citation reiterates the importance of this issue.

             "When the language of the deed is properly construed against the railroad, the granting clause conveys only a right of way.

             Language in the deed must be construed against the railroad.

             It is a well established principle that ambiguity must be construed against the grantor.2 But as we explained in Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc.,3 when the grantee drafts the deed, this rule does not apply.4 Hilchkanum was illiterate and the handwritten deed contained identical language to that found in a contemporaneous pre-printed deed bearing the railroad's name. The Rays also submitted an affidavit from an expert who opined that 'given the use of pre-printed deeds, and given Hilchkanum's illiteracy, there appears no doubt that Hilchkanum did not draft the deed; but rather, it was the product of the railroad company.'

             The majority states that because Hilchkanum must have understood the nature and extent of his conveyance, the fact that the deed was handwritten by someone else is of no consequence. And the majority holds that because there is nothing in the record indicating that the drafter was an agent of the railway, Hilchkanum must have been the drafter. This conclusion wrongly focuses on the identity of the grantor instead of the identity of the drafter of the deed. It is undisputed that the deed's language was taken from the railroad's standard deed. And the affidavit by the Rays' expert creates a material question of fact concerning who actually drafted the document. Taking this affidavit in a light most favorable to the Rays as the nonmoving party, any ambiguities in the deed must be construed against the railroad.5"

          [Open an annotated version of Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting) at this citation.]

           Judge Baker rubbed the majority's noses in the truth, but the truth was not what judges Cox and Schindler were interested in considering. Judges Cox' and Schindler's opinion coordinated with the criminal acts (opinions) from the Ninth Circuit courts, King County v. Rasmussen (2001) and King County v. Rasmussen (2002). Cox' and Schindler's opinion covered up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protected the active participants from being held accountable for their crimes. With their utter disregard for the facts and the law, Judges Cox and Schindler became participants in the tax fraud scheme.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Judges Cox and Schindler intentionally misrepresented the finding in Squire that the granting clause "strongly" indicated the intention to convey an easement.

           I state that judges Cox and Schindler intentionally misrepresented the finding in Squire that the granting clause "strongly" indicated the intention to convey an easement. I use the word intentionally because it is essentially impossible that these judges could accidentally misrepresent what is clearly decided in Squire. Instead, these crooked judges manufacture facts, deny the Ray's right to a jury, and misrepresent the law in just about every paragraph of their opinion. A mistake or two is often made by a judge, and then corrected on appeal. The profound dishonesty of Ray v. King County (2004) cannot be a mistake. It is intentional. The best way to understand this is to read one of the annotated versions of Ray, linked here.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Study Ray v. King County (2004) with brief comments by John Rasmussen.

        Study Ray v. King County (2004), with detailed comments and documentation by John Rasmussen.

           The construing of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed should have been based on common law. Common law is precedential. This means that Judge Cox was required to consider the previous Washington State opinions which construed the easement-or-fee issue in railroad right-of-way deeds. Here is a link which provides the railroad right-of-way opinions which have established the common law rules used to construe the meaning of the term "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

        View the precedential right-of-way opinions which have established the common law rules used to construe the meaning of the term "right-of-way" in railroad deeds in Washington State

           From the opinions, linked above, one opinion stands out as the precedent which most closely applies to construing the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. That opinion is King County v. Squire (1990). In Squire, the court construed the 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The Hilchkanum and Squire deeds had identical wording in their granting clause. The Squire court concluded that the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". Since Squire is a Washington State, Division One opinion, the findings of the Squire court were binding on judges Cox and Schindler. Instead of correctly citing King County v. Squire, Judge Cox intentionally misrepresented the findings of the Squire court. Judge Cox wrote that the Squire court "...not[ed] that the language of the granting clause could be understood to convey either a fee or an easement...". Judge Cox then states that the Squire deed was found to be an easement only because of the "...so long as said land is used as a right-of-way..." statement in the Squire habendum. This is an intentional lie by Judge Cox. It is impossible for a person with average intelligence to read King County v. Squire (1990) and come to those conclusions. Here is the citation from Ray v. King County (2004) which shows Judge Cox' dishonesty. (with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

              "King County v. Squire Investment Co. illustrates the significance of the language in the habendum clause in determining whether a fee or an easement is granted in a deed conveying a right of way to a railroad. In Squire, the granting clause of the deed granted a 'right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands,' while the habendum clause contained a handwritten addition, 'or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company.' While noting that the language of the granting clause could be understood to convey either a fee or an easement, this court concluded that the granting clause and habendum clause, read together, suggested that 'the 'so long as' language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and 'to its successors and assigns forever'.'46 In contrast, the habendum clause of the Hilchkanum deed contains no limiting language. This distinction supports the conclusion that the granting clause conveyed fee title, not, as in Squire, an easement."
             [Ray v. King County (2004)]

           The Squire court understood that the words of a deed are construed most strongly against its author. So, the Squire court determined which words were added or altered by Governor Squire, and then published the material portions of the Squire right-of-way deed with Squire's changes in bold font. Here, again, is the section of King County v. Squire which provides the material portions of the right-of-way deed. It is important to understand that the bold font emphasis is provided by the Squire court.

        "On March 29, 1887, Watson and Ida Squire executed a deed granting a half-mile right of way to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company. The material portion of the deed reads as follows with the handwritten additions by Mr. Squire set forth in boldface type:

          In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway, in the County of King, in Washington Territory, we do hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway a right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands in said County, described as follows, to-wit: [legal description]. Such right-of-way strip to be twenty-five (25) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across the said lands by the Engineer of said Railway Company, which location is described as follows, to-wit [description.] . . . .

          To Have and to Hold the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns forever or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights and water front rights on the shores of Lake Washington. And this grant is upon the condition that said railway shall be completed over said lands on or before January 1st, 1888...."

            [King County v. Squire (1990)]

           The Squire court was puzzled by the reverter statement "...or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company...", which was added by Governor Squire to his habendum. The Squire court stated that this language "...arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable." The Squire court then postulated that, if the granting clause had granted fee simple title of the land under the right-of-way, the "...or so long as..." language would have restricted the Squire deed to a fee simple determinable. The Squire court concluded that, because the granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...", the "...or so long as..." language added by Governor Squire in his habendum "...reiterat[ed] the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way...an easement...". This means that Judge Cox intentionally lied when he stated that the Squire deed is found an easement only when the granting clause and habendum are considered together. The Squire court found that Governor Squire's "...or so long as..." language added in the habendum reiterated the grant of an easement which was found in the granting clause. This means that the granting clause, by itself, indicated the intention to grant an easement. Here is an extended citation from Squire which lays out this issue in greater context and is linked to the whole opinion. (citation with my emphasis)
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        THE SQUIRE DEED

        [1] Although the language of a particular deed defines the interest conveyed, rights of way granted to a railroad are frequently held to create easements. As stated in 2 J. Grimes, Thompson on Real Property SS 381, at 506 (1980 repl.):

          A deed of a right-of-way for a railroad, habendum "so long as the same shall be used for the operation of a railroad," provided it should be built by a certain date, gives an easement merely and not a fee, and the agreement to build the road is a condition subsequent, and not a mere covenant.

        (citing Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry., 10 Wash. 357, 38 P. 1126 (1894)). /1

        Previous Washington cases show a strong tendency to construe such rights of way as easements. In Swan v. O'Leary, /2 the court considered whether the deed which conveyed two rights of way for use by a railroad created a fee or an easement. /3 Relying on Morsbach v. Thurston Cy., /4 the Swan court stated:

          [W]hen the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only, and not a fee with a restricted use, even though the deed is in the usual form to convey a fee title. Swan, at 537.

        In Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 60 Wash. 502, 505, 111 P. 578 (1910), the deed stated that the land was to be used "for railway purposes, but if it should cease to be used for a railway the said premises shall revert to said grantors, their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns.'" (Italics omitted.) The court, construing the deed as a whole, held that the instrument conveyed a right of way easement, despite the deed's language, which would typically be interpreted as creating a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.

        In Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry., 10 Wash. 357, 358, 38 P. 1126 (1894), the deed conveyed a railroad right of way "so long as the same shall be used for the operation of a railroad." It also permitted the grantors to cross over the right of way and prohibited fencing. As in the instant case, the deed conditioned conveyance upon completion of the railroad line by a certain date. The court held that an easement had been granted.

        The Squire deed granted a "right-of-way Fifty (50) feet in width through said lands". This suggests an easement was conveyed. Both King County and Squire note, however, that the habendum clause contains the handwritten language, "or so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company," which arguably suggests conveyance of a fee simple determinable. If the granting clause merely conveyed the land to the railroad without reference to a right of way, the "so long as" language would create such a fee. Since the language in the granting clause strongly suggests conveyance of an easement, however, we find it more plausible that the "so long as" language was inserted by Squire to preclude the claim that he conveyed a fee simple to the railroad, particularly since the habendum clause granted the interest to the railroad and "to its successors and assigns forever". The authorities and cases discussed above clearly support construing the Squire deed as an easement.

        In Veach v. Culp, /5 the court construed a deed which granted a right of way and used the standard habendum clause language, but without the additional language conditioning use of the property on its continued use as a railroad right of way. The successor railroad argued that the absence of such limiting language showed a fee was conveyed. The Veach court disagreed, holding that the language of the deed which described the conveyance of a right of way indicated an easement had been conveyed. The instant case is much more compelling since Squire specifically included language in the habendum clause reiterating the limitation of the conveyance to use as a right of way. We hold that an easement was conveyed.

        [2] King County contends, however, that its use of the right of way as a recreational trail is within the scope of the interest conveyed to the railroad and, hence, it was not abandoned. The County's argument is without merit. Burlington Northern formally abandoned the right of way on July 29, 1985. The easement was extinguished at that moment and its interest reverted to the Squires' heirs. /6 Burlington Northern had no interest to convey to King County for use as a railroad much less as a trail. Even if the right of way had not been formally abandoned, Lawson v. State /7 defeats the County's argument. Responding to a similar argument, the court stated:

          Applying common law principles, we hold that a change in use from "rails to trails" constitutes abandonment of an easement which was granted for railroad purposes only. At common law, therefore, the right of way would automatically revert to the reversionary interest holders. Lawson, at 452.

        King County's reliance upon Martin v. Seattle /8 is misplaced. In Martin, the court held that the deed in question contained a condition subsequent, not a fee on limitation or an easement, and decided that although the condition had been breached, the grantor and successors did not exercise their power of termination within a reasonable time. In contrast, the Squire deed conveyed an easement and, therefore, no action was required by the grantors' successors to terminate the interest.

        In summary, the Squire deed conveyed an easement to the railroad which terminated when its successor, Burlington Northern, abandoned the line with the approval of the ICC. The reversionary interest passed to the successors of the grantors. The trial court's alternative holding that the Squire deed conveyed an easement and, consequently, King County acquired no interest in the right of way is affirmed. These holdings render it unnecessary to address King County's other contentions as to title.
             [King County v. Squire (1990)]

           Judge Cox intentionally misstated the Squire court's legal analysis of the Squire granting clause and habendum. Instead of acknowledging the Squire court's opinion that the addition Squire made to his habendum suggested a fee (fee simple determinable), Judge Cox intentionally lied and claimed that the Squire court determined that the granting clause might suggest the conveyance of a fee. This wasn't a mistake by Judge Cox. Rather, it was an intentional mischaracterization of King County v. Squire in order to ignore the precedent set by the Squire court, holding that the Squire granting clause "...strongly suggests conveyance of an easement...". Because the Hilchkanum and Squire granting clauses are identical, and King County v. Squire is binding precedent on Judges Cox and Schindler, they were required to find the Hilchkanum granting clause also "strongly suggests conveyance of an easement', or they needed to provide an argument as to why they refused to accept this legal precedent. Instead of drawing attention to their refusal to accept binding precedent, Judge Cox intentionally misstated the Squire court's legal analysis of the Squire granting clause and habendum. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

    Judges Cox and Schindler coordinated their dishonesty with Federal Judges Rothstein and Fletcher by adopting "Norm Maleng's 'legal theory'".

           The King County Prosecutor claimed that the common law used to construe railroad deeds was dramatically changed in the opinion Brown v. State of Washington (1996). This was a lie by the King County Prosecutor and, sadly, was supported by dishonest judges Cox, Schindler, Rothstein and Fletcher in their State and federal opinions. The Prosecutor made this dishonest claim in order to cover-up his participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. The King County Prosecutor, or one of the other participants in the tax fraud scheme, was able to get to these judges. I describe the King County Prosecutor's dishonest mischaracterization of Brown v. State of Washington as Norm Maleng's "legal theory". Use the link below to understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory" and identify its adoption by Cox, Schindler, Rothstein and Fletcher.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Understand Norm Maleng's "legal theory" and identify its adoption by State and Federal judges.

    Summary of Cox' dishonest construing of Hilchkanum's right-of-way deed:

           To conclude, Judge Cox copied most of the dishonest tactics used by District Judge Rothstein and Senior Circuit Judge Fletcher in King County v. Rasmussen. It was critical for these judges to establish Hilchkanum as author of his 1887 right-of-way deed. By assigning Hilchkanum as responsible for the words in his deed, these dishonest judges were able to distinguish the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed from the previous fourteen SLS&E right-of-way deeds which had been before King County courts and were found to be easements in legal opinions or by the admission of the King County Prosecutor. The most damaging of those deeds was the Squire right-of-way deed which was construed in King County v. Squire (1990), and discussed above. Since the SLS&E deeds have common wording which was obviously written by the Railway lawyers, Cox, Rothstein, and Fletcher refused to allow this disputed material fact to be resolved by a jury. In Ray v. King County (2004), the majority judges ignored pre-printed SLS&E deed forms which were presented as exhibits. Any legitimate jury would have found these pre-printed deeds where written by the SLS&E Railway. This manipulation of the truth and the law by judges Rothstein, Fletcher, and Cox was used to illegally award the ownership of the land under the East Lake Sammamish right-of-way to King County. It wasn't necessary for the judges to do this in order for the community to have a bike trail. The Rails-to-Trails Act was enacted to allow a bicycle trail on unused railroad rights-of-way without the requirement to own the underlying land. The only reason for the judges to illegally award the land under the ELS right-of-way to King County was to cover-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. This is understood by the profound dishonesty in the Hilchkanum decisions, and the coordination in crooked tactics by the federal and State judges. The Rasmussen and Ray opinions are built on a "house of cards" containing dishonesty built on top of other dishonesty.
          (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

        Understand the "House of Cards", the common dishonest tactics used by the Hilchkanum judges.

The Washington State Supreme Court denied appeal of Ray v. King County (2004):

         The judges of the Washington State Supreme Court (WSSC) became active participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme with their denial of the Ray's appeal. The most cowardly act of an appeals court is the denial of appeal of a worthy lawsuit. The denial of appeal requires no written opinion which can then be used to condemn the actions of that appeals court. The WSSC denied appeal of Ray v. King County at least three times. According to records, the Ray's attorney appealed directly to the WSSC after losing to King County in Superior Court. The Supreme Court declined his request and the lawsuit proceeded through the Court of Appeals, Division One. The Ray's second appeal to the Washington State Supreme Court was from the very dishonest decision by Judges Ronald E. Cox and Ann Schindler at the Washington State Court Of Appeals, Division One. That opinion, Ray v. King County (2004), is discussed above. After the WSSC refused the second appeal, the Rays went to the United States Court of Federal Claims. Federal Judge Marian Horn requested certification of the issues to the Washington State Supreme Court in the claim by the Rays, and was refused again, for the third time, by the WSSC. Here is the statement by the Washington State Supreme Court in it's refusal to the United States Court of Federal Claims. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      "The court is of the view that, in light of existing precedent such as Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2d 430, 924 P.2d 908 (1996) and Ray v. King County, 120 Wn. App. 564, 86 P.3d 183, review denied, 152 Wn.2d 1027 (2004), the questions posed by the federal court are not 'question[s] of state law ... which [have] not been clearly determined.'"
         [Beres v. United States (2010)] (Citation on Pages 10 and 19)

         In the case of the appeal of Ray v. King County (2004), several judges of the Washington State Supreme Court had participated in the Brown v. State of Washington (1996) and their dissenting opinions in that lawsuit are at odds with their acceptance of Ray v. King County (2004). Their previous opinions and Washington common law show their cowardly dishonesty. On March 31, 2009 I wrote a public letter to the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court and accused them of criminal behavior in their denial of the Ray's appeal. Of course, not one of them replied. My argument that the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court committed a crime can best be understood by reading that public letter.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

      View my March 31, 2009 public letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court.

U.S. Federal Court of Claims Judge Horn "Overturned" the Prior "Hilchkanum Opinions".

         Court of Federal Claims Judge Marian Blank Horn politely trashed the Washington State Supreme Court, Washington State Appeals Court, Division One, and the federal Ninth Circuit in her two opinions finding the 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E granted an easement. In Beres v. United States (2010) Judge Horn decided that "about fourteen" parties, making taking claims based on the Hilchkanum deed, could proceed with their claims. Then in Beres v. United States (2011) and Beres v. United States (2012) Judge Horn carefully and honestly applied the facts and the law to the construing of the Hilchkanum deed, finding it an easement.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

Do East Lake Sammamish Residents Now Own the Land under their Rights-of-Way?

         In spite of Judge Horn's finding that those making claims on the Hilchkanum and other ELS SLS&E right-of-way deeds own the land under the right-of-way, I assume that King County will ignore her opinions and continue to claim title to all the land under the ELS right-of-way. While Horn's opinions are the latest, King County will not relinquish its claim. To admit most of the ELS right-of-way deeds granted only easements would be to admit participation in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme. The crooked prosecutors and politicians in King County will not make that admission.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

There were other "form deeds" composed by the SLS&E lawyers.

    A different SLS&E "form deed" was used in the Seattle area.

           Above, I've established the SLS&E "ELS form deed" based on twenty-five SLS&E recorded deeds which I've obtained from the King County archives, plus the Burke right-of-way deed obtained from Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993). Of those twenty-six deeds, eighteen are based on the unaltered or slightly altered "ELS form deed". Seven of the twenty-six deeds are located in the City of Seattle. Several of these seven deeds have common elements which suggest that they were based on another SLS&E "form deed". It's interesting that, while the Lewellyn right-of-way deed to the SLS&E is located in the City of Seattle, it is based on an unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed" which was commonly used from Lake Washington to Issaquah. On this website, I'm principally interested in the Hilchkanum deed and other deeds based on the SLS&E "ELS form deed". Of the seven deeds linked directly below, the Reuton, Sorenson, Bell, and List Right-of-Way Agreements use identical language, and suggest another SLS&&E "form deed", perhaps a SLS&&E "Seattle form deed". Please read these deeds to understand the common language which is used.

        February 4, 1887 Reuton "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

        February 9, 1887 Sorenson "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

        February 28, 1887 Bell "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

        April 11, 1887 Lewellyn right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

        April 12, 1887 List "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

        May 21, 1887 Gilmore right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

        September 6, 1887 Burke right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993)

    By 1891, a pre-printed SLS&E "form deed" was available

           Here, I present a photocopy of an 1891 SLS&E Pre-printed "Form Deed" obtained from the Burke Library at the University of Washington. The original may be verified at the Burke Library, and is cited as "Box 51/21 Thomas Burke Papers, Acc 1483-2" (Accession No. 1483-2, Box 51, Folder No. 21). The original document is one long page and printed on both sides. Linked directly below, this pre-printed SLS&E deed is displayed as four PDF documents consisting of the top and bottom of the front, and the top and bottom of the back. The original is designed to be folded twice onto a smaller, perhaps pocket sized, document.

        View the 1891 unsigned SLS&E pre-printed "Form Deed" for Isaac Cooper.

           This 1891 pre-printed SLS&E "form deed" is neither completed nor signed. It is a partially filled-in SLS&E pre-printed deed from Isaac and Sarah Cooper to the SLS&E, with only the year "1891" shown as a partially filled-in date. The significance of this 1891 SLS&E pre-printed "form deed" is that it shows a different form of deed construction than was used in 1887 to obtain the SLS&E right-of-way deeds from nearby East Lake Sammamish. This deed is in Statutory Warranty Deed Form and is very different in form the "ELS form deed" used to obtain the right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish in 1887.

           The purpose of this pre-printed SLS&E deed's inclusion on this website is to show that the lawyers for the SLS&E understood how to write a deed which conveys fee simple title of the underlying land to the Railway. This deed grants a "strip of real estate" to the Railway using the Statutory Warranty Deed Form and does not include a statement restricting the deed to right-of-way use or stating that the deed is for the purpose of a right-of-way. Common law, based on Washington State railroad opinions, holds this language would convey fee simple title of the land described in the deed. I describe the law used to construe this deed as the "Railroad Land Granting Rule". There is no "Railroad Land Granting Rule" in common law, per se, but if a person uses the following link, he will discover that there are multiple citations from Washington State railroad opinions which support that "rule".

        Understand the "Railroad Land Granting Rule".

           If time allows, I'll try to find if this Cooper deed to the SLS&E was executed and filed with King County. That would historically interesting, but not critical to the discussion on this website. What is critical here is that Thomas Burke and his co-council George Haller understood how to write a deed for their Railway which conveys fee simple title of the land under the track. Based on one hundred years of consistently held legal precedent, this deed stands in stark contrast to the deeds constructed on the "ELS form deed", such as the May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

           I offer this speculation as to why, in 1891, the lawyers for the SLS&E may have used this pre-printed deed which conveys land to the Railway instead of an easement. According to "Orphan Road" (K.E. Armbruster, Washington State University Press), in 1887 (when the deeds based on the "ELS form deed" were obtained) the railroad was just starting construction. The Railway was funded, or in the process of getting funds from the East, but had not yet built its track from Seattle, around the north end of Lake Washington, through the present city of Issaquah, and on to Sallal Prairie (near the present city of North Bend). The track wasn't finished from Seattle to the north end of Lake Washington until the end of 1887. Besides opening that area to transportation and commerce, the spur to Sallal Prairie would serve Daniel Gillman's coal venture near the present City of Issaquah, provide rail service to Arthur Denny's iron ore deposits in Snoqualmie Pass, and eventually connect Seattle to the intercontinental rail system. At that early time, it would have been easier to obtain easements than fee simple deeds to the underlying land because there was no proof that the railroad would actually be built. Further, the thirteen owners of the SLS&E foresaw great profits from the future operation of the Railway and likely didn't care if they owned the underlying land as long as they had easements.

           In 1891, when this pre-printed deed was available, the SLS&E had been in financial trouble for several years and was facing bankruptcy or purchase from another railroad company. The SLS&E would be worth more, in a sale or merger, if it owned the underlying land. Further, at that time the tracks were down and rail service available to the present City of Issaquah, so the Coopers likely saw a true value from the Railways presence and would be more likely to grant the SLS&E fee simple title to the land under the tracks in exchange for the "benefits and advantages" they would realize from the railroad's presence. Here, again, is the unsigned pre-printed Cooper deed to the SLS&E.

        View the 1891 unsigned SLS&E pre-printed "Form Deed" for Isaac Cooper.

Summary:

         This webpage recognizes the SLS&E "ELS form deed" based on twenty-six recorded SLS&E right-of-way deeds. Since railroad "form deeds" are provided by the respective railroad, the words of a railroad "form deed" should be construed against that railroad because "contract language ... is construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, or whose attorney prepared it". The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E was based on an unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed". Therefore, it is a material fact that the SLS&E Railway lawyers authored the Hilchkanum deed and the deed should have been construed against the Railway. If there were disagreement with authorship of the Hilchkanum deed, the material fact of authorship should have been resolved by a jury in accordance with the rules of summary judgment. That didn't happen with the judicial resolution of the effect of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         Washington State property law is principally common law based on the precedent set in earlier legal opinions. In construing the easement-or-fee issue in the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed, one precedential opinion stands out. In King County v. Squire (1990), the court construed the Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. The Squire deed was executed near the time of the Hilchkanum deed and was based on the same SLS&E "ELS form deed". In Squire, the court identified the changes made to the SLS&E "ELS form deed" by Governor Squire and was puzzled by the reverter language he added to his habendum. The Squire court concluded that the Squire granting clause strongly indicated the intention to convey an easement and that the reverter added by Governor Squire reiterated that intention. Since the Hilchkanum and Squire granting clauses are materially identical, the judges construing the Hilchkanum deed were required to find the Hilchkanum granting clause indicated the intention to convey an easement. That didn't happen with the judicial resolution of the effect of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed. (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         The Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E has been construed more than ten different times in federal and Washington State courts. In violation of the rules of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit and Washington State judges resolved the disputed material fact of authorship. These judges irrationally and illegally found Hilchkanum, an illiterate Native American, responsible for the words of his right-of-way deed to the SLS&E. In each case, the federal and State judges ignored or mischaracterized the legal precedent established in King County v. Squire (1990), which held that the granting clause indicated the intention to convey an easement. Each time these judges illegally and irrationally decided the Hilchkanum deed granted fee simple title of the right-of way land to the SLS&E.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         In spite of U.S. Federal Court of Claims Judge Horn finding the Hilchkanum and other ELS right-of-way deeds granted easement, King County will continue to falsely claim title to all the land under the ELS right-of-way.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)

         The illegal and irrational Rasmussen and Ray opinions covered-up the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme and protected the participants in that crime from exposure and prosecution. The only explanation for these dishonest opinions is that they are intentional criminal acts from the bench. The most disgusting judges in this fraud are the judges of the Washington State Supreme Court. The Washington State Supreme Court is the highest court with the responsibility to maintain the integrity of Washington State property right law. The Washington State Supreme Court has denied appeal or reconsideration of Hilchkanum opinions at least three times. Our legal system and our laws belong to We-the-People, not to arrogant judges who believe they have the right to manipulate the Constitution and the laws in order to enforce their personal agendas or to protect their pals from criminal prosecution.
        (My statements describing wrongdoing or criminal actions on this webpage are a First Amendment expression of my opinion.)








Links to related discussion and documentation:

    Understand the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    Identify the active participants in the East Lake Sammamish federal tax fraud scheme.

    View my February 2000 whistle-blower letter to King County leadership.

    Understand how the King County Prosecutor covered-up his participation in the ELS federal tax fraud scheme,

    Understand King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng's "legal theory".

    Understand the SLS&E "ELS form deed" used to obtain the right-of-way deeds along East Lake Sammamish.

    Understand that all prior SLS&E deeds contested in King County courts were determined to be easements.

    Understand the "House of Cards", the common dishonest tactics used by the Hilchkanum judges.

    Understand Hilchkanum's participation and intentions with his right-of-way deed.

    Understand the rules of summary judgment.

    View an index of the Hilchkanum legal proceedings.

    King County v. Rasmussen (2001) is a criminal act from the bench.

    King County v. Rasmussen (2002) is a criminal act from the bench.

    Ray v. King County (2004) is a criminal act from the bench.

    Ray v. King County (2004) (Dissenting) explains the dishonesty of the majority opinion.

    Beres v. United States (2010) allowed ELS parties proceed with taking claims.

    Beres v. United States (2011) found Hilchkanum granted an easement.

    Beres v. United States (2012) found Hilchkanum granted an easement.

    View my March 31, 2009 public letter to the Judges of the Washington State Supreme Court.

    View my 2004 Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, and its denial by Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Schroeder.

    Understand the basic rules to construe a deed.

    View forty-four citations explaining the meaning of the words "right-of-way" in railroad deeds.

    View fourteen citations holding the grant of a "right-of-way" to a railroad conveys an easement.

    View a list of the precedential railroad right-of-way opinions in Washington State

    Understand that judges protect their fellow judges in violation of their oaths.























































Reference:



The Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway (SLS&E) deeds which
were used to determine the SLS&E "Form Deeds":

by John Rasmussen


     This reference section presents the data which was used to identify the SLS&E "form deeds". While I understood that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed was based on the unaltered SLS&E "ELS form deed", I didn't have the proof that I needed for this webpage. So, I asked my son to go down to the King County Records Office and obtain copies of SLS&E right-of-way deeds which were recorded near the time of the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed in May 1887. Since the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is recorded in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42, Page 250, my son copied all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds he could find in the first 500 pages of Volume 42. There were twenty SLS&E right-of-way deeds, in those 500 pages, which were executed between February 4, 1887 and May 27, 1887. After studying and plotting the location of those twenty deed, I went to the King County Archives two other times to obtain several more ELS deeds in order to build a better picture of the "East Lake Sammamish form deed" ("ELS form deed"). Therefore, the following list contains twenty-eight deeds comprised of the twenty deeds my son found in the Volume 42 of the King County Book of Deeds, the Squire deed which was construed in King County v. Squire (1990), the Burke deed which was construed in Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber (1910) and is displayed in Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993), and the Bargquist (Barquist) and Puget Mill deeds which were provided in the Affidavit of Richard Welsh to King County Superior Court, July 8, 1985 as an exhibit to the Washington State Supreme Court in Lawson v. State (1986). A photocopy of the Bargquist deed from the King County archives is provided. Also, it includes the ELS right-of-way deeds which are discussed in the U.S. Federal Court of Claims opinion Beres v. United States (2010).

     Please note that the last two deeds listed directly below are not SLS&E deeds. The Cooper deed is an unsigned, partially filled-in, pre-printed SLS&E "form deed". The Reeves right-of-way deed was granted to the Northern Pacific Railway Company in 1904. The Northern Pacific Railway Company was successor in interest to the SLS&E. The Reeves property was along East Lake Sammamish and is discussed in Beres v. United States (2010).

     While this is not an examination of all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds, after viewing these deeds I believe the reader will understand that this is an adequate number to establish the "ELS form deed" which was used for the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E.

     Following this list of all the deeds I've obtained to use for reference on this website is a second smaller list of the twenty recorded SLS&E deeds my son researched in Volume 42 of the King County Book of Deeds. I provide this list because of the dishonest cherry-picking tactic used by the Hilchkanum judges to determine the Hilchkanum's intentions in their deeds. Since the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is recorded in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42, Page 250, my son copied all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds he could find in the first 500 pages of Volume 42. That unfiltered list of twenty deeds cannot be characterized as cherry-picking.

    Twenty-eight Right-of-Way Deeds Relating to the Hilchkanum Lawsuits.

    February 4, 1887 Reuton "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

    February 9, 1887 Sorenson "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

    February 28, 1887 Bell "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

    March 23, 1887 Lee right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    March 24, 1887 Lurber right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    March 25, 1887 McGraw right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    March 29, 1887 Squire right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    April 5, 1887 Stone right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    April 6, 1887 Yonderpump right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    April 6, 1887 Tahalthkut right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    April 11, 1887 Lewellyn right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    April 12, 1887 List "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

    April 13, 1887 Burnett right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 6, 1887 Pearson right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 6, 1887 Davis right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 6, 1887 Anderson right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 6, 1887 Sbedzuse right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 10, 1887 Ashworth right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 10, 1887 Bargquist right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 16, 1887 Peterson right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 21, 1887 Gilmore right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 25, 1887 Puget Mill Co. right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 27, 1887 Perry right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    June 13, 1887 Palmberg right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    September 6, 1887 Burke right-of-way deed to the SLS&E - Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle (1993)

    1891 unsigned SLS&E pre-printed "Form Deed" for Cooper

    June 3, 1904 Reeves right-of-way deed to the Northern Pacific Railway Company

Twenty SLS&E Right-of-Way Deeds from Volume 42 of the King County Book of Deeds.

     Following is a list of the twenty recorded SLS&E deeds my son researched in Volume 42 of the King County Book of Deeds. I provide this second list because of the dishonest cherry-picking tactic used by the Hilchkanum judges in order to misrepresent the Hilchkanum's intentions in their deeds. Since the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is recorded in the King County Book of Deeds, Volume 42, Page 250, I asked my son to photocopy all the SLS&E right-of-way deeds he could find in the first 500 pages of Volume 42. There were twenty SLS&E right-of-way deeds in those 500 pages, which were executed between February 4, 1887 and May 27, 1887. This unfiltered list of twenty deeds cannot be characterized as cherry-picking and provides justification for my argument that the Hilchkanum right-of-way deed is based on a common unalatered "ELS form deed" which was authored by the SLS&E Railway.

    February 4, 1887 Reuton "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

    February 9, 1887 Sorenson "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

    February 28, 1887 Bell "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

    March 23, 1887 Lee right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    March 24, 1887 Lurber right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    March 25, 1887 McGraw right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    April 5, 1887 Stone right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    April 11, 1887 Lewellyn right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    April 12, 1887 List "Right-of-Way Agreement" to the SLS&E

    April 13, 1887 Burnett right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 6, 1887 Pearson right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 6, 1887 Davis right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 6, 1887 Anderson right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 6, 1887 Sbedzuse right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 9, 1887 Hilchkanum right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 10, 1887 Ashworth right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 16, 1887 Peterson right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 21, 1887 Gilmore right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    May 27, 1887 Perry right-of-way deed to the SLS&E

    June 13, 1887 Palmberg right-of-way deed to the SLS&E























































Last Update: 2012-02-29